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Abstract 
Entrepreneurs have trouble funding their businesses, from traditional finance sources. These 
entrepreneurs bring to the market innovative ideas and technical skills vital for firm success. 
Yet they may lack managerial advice and/or business expertise, which Venture capital (VC) 
firms are able to provide for them, along with funding. Nonetheless, not all VC-backed firms 
succeed. Therefore, an understanding of the determinants of success of these firms is crucial. 
This study contributes to the literature; by combining the characteristics of 
entrepreneurs and VC firms, and their relationship, to assess their impact on VC-backed firms’ 
performance. There is a sufficient amount of literature testing these determinants separately. 
However, studying them together as they co-exist in the market produces more reliable results. 
Additionally, emerging economies are still developing their VC markets, thus research on these 
markets is relatively recent. Hence, this study is timely and crucial, as it generate key insights 
to help leverage successful industries.  This is achieved by combining two survey responses. 
One distributed to 14 VC firms in Egypt, and another to 79 of their portfolio firms. The research 
data is analysed using t-tests, ordinary least square regression and ordered probit regression. 
Supported by the Institutional Theory, the findings of this study emphasise the importance of 
entrepreneur networks in Egypt. As they have a positive and significant impact on performance 
of VC-backed firms. The resource-based capabilities of portfolio firms, matched to their firms’ 
strategies, have a significant impact on the performance of VC-backed firms. Finally, the VC-
E relationship shows that contracts have a significant negative impact on VC- backed firms’ 
performance. However, when legal environment factors are considered, their impact becomes 
insignificant. Instead, the strength of the VC-E relationship has a positive impact on sales 
growth. Hence, trust is more crucial than contracts, in weak legal environments. 
This study provides recommendations to entrepreneurs, VCs and policy makers in Egypt.  
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Chapter One 
Introduction and Overview of the Study 
1.0 Introduction 
 
This chapter presents an overview of the thesis as a whole, through nine sections. These 
sections start with a theoretical background about venture capital (VC), after which they 
provide a summary of the entire research. The research background, problem, 
objectives, questions and hypotheses are presented. These sections also include an 
explanation of the research significance and contribution. Moreover, they highlight the 
type of data collected and method of collection. Finally, the chapter concludes with a 
presentation of the thesis structure. 
1.1 Brief Background 
This thesis examines the impact of the characteristics of entrepreneurs, and the 
characteristics of venture capitalists and the services they provide, as well as the 
relationship between entrepreneurs and their corresponding venture capitalists, on the 
performance on venture capital-backed firms in Egypt.  
VC funding as a concept has existed for centuries, dating back to the age of 
Magellan (Spencer, 2008). However, in a contemporary context, VC is equity capital 
seeking above market returns, that is most commonly invested in early-stage, high risk 
companies that have high growth potential (Florida and Kenney, 1988; Gompers, 1997; 
Boocock and Woods, 1997; Manigart et al., 2002). The argument for supporting the 
VC markets starts with the standard “macro-economic theory: to produce output, capital 
and labour need to be available” (Lerner and Tag, 2013, p.154). A well-developed VC 
market can boost economic growth through allowing innovative entrepreneurial firms 
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to find funding. Megginson (2004, pg.89) defines modern VC as “a professionally 
managed pool of money raised for the sole purpose of making actively-managed direct 
equity investments in rapidly growing private companies, and with a well-defined exit 
strategy”. 
1.2 Research Gap 
This study examines the performance of VC-backed firms in Egypt in relation to the 
characteristics of entrepreneurs and venture capitalists, and the relationship between 
both. The first gap this study fills is by combining the three variables to provide results 
that are more reliable as they all exist together in the VC market. There is a significant 
amount of research in the literature to address determinants of VC-backed firms’ 
success. However, these studies have either focused on the role of the entrepreneur or 
the VC firm solely, or on the relationship between them. Thus, there is a distinct lack 
in addressing all three variables combined. It is important to look at the whole picture, 
not just a segment, to understand the broader context, appreciating interactions amongst 
the variables (Leischow and Milstein, 2006). Additionally, many of the studies 
addressing entrepreneur characteristics have focused on the performance of firms in 
general and not specifically VC-backed firms (Unger et al., 2009; Dimov, 2010).  
The most widely studied VC model is that of the US (Bruton et al., 2009; 
Mourougane, 2016), followed by Europe (Zeng, 2004). In fact, research on venture 
capital in developing countries is relatively recent (Lerner and Schoar, 2002; 
Cummings and Fleming, 2002). This presents an important research gap, particularly 
given the fact that Institutional Theory suggests that a VC industry would emerge and 
operate differently in an emerging economy context (Bruton and Ahlstrom, 2003). 
Institutional Theory explains that the development of institutions and the culture 
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existing in a nation, determine the actions of individuals and firms in those nations 
(Bruton and Ahlstrom, 2006). Institutions are referred to as the rules of game of a 
society (North, 1990). They influence the uncertainty faced by the economic actors in 
a nation (Banalieva, 2014). Institutions are also essential for the effective functioning 
of a market economy, and in turn for the strategies and operations of all kinds of firms 
(Meyer & Peng, 2005; Peng et al., 2008). These institutions or rules define the way the 
motives of economic actors differ from one context to another, in terms of uncertainty, 
agency relationships, business transactions as well as market structures. Any instability 
of regulatory institutions can itself be a source of uncertainty. In many emerging 
markets where rules and regulations are unpredictable and unstable, firms are forced to 
develop organizational structures and capabilities. This allows them to flexibly respond 
to these dynamics. (Meyer and Peng, 2016). This will be explored more in-depth in 
section 2.4  
This study is conducted on Egypt (an emerging economy). As explained by the 
Institutional Theory, some theories applicable to VC in developed economies may not 
fully characterise the social nature of VC in different economies (Bruton et al., 2002; 
Shane and Cable, 2002). Drivers that exist in one context may not be operating in 
another or may not lead to similar results. It is also important to note that, emerging 
economies have recently started establishing their VC industries, which is another 
crucial reason why the developed market framework may not be exactly adequate 
(Locket and Wright 2002; Bruton et al., 2004). Therefore, this research is both timely 
and critically important as it will generate key insights to help leverage a much-needed 
successful VC industry in an emerging economy context, despite its unstable 
institutional regime (Wright and Robbie, 1998). The Egyptian VC market has only 
commenced in 2004. Not all VC-backed firms are successful, yet no studies have been 
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conducted in Egypt to explore the factors that characterise the success of those firms 
and how they differ from a developed market context.  
VC firms do play a role in fostering economic growth of the regions they exist in 
(Saxenian, 1994; Jeng and Wells, 2000). Being that the goal of the Egyptian 
government, is to thrive towards economic development since the 2011 Revolution, this 
research is of upmost importance. 
1.3 Background of Research Questions 
Previous micro-level research on VC has focused on either the entrepreneur as an 
individual, venture capitalists’ characteristics or, in some studies, on the contractual 
relationship between them. Human Capital Theory (HCT) (Becker, 1975) governs the 
relationship between entrepreneurs as well as fund managers and the success of the 
funds. HCT suggests that HC characteristics of both the entrepreneurs and the fund 
managers determine their performance. In the case of entrepreneurs, some HC 
characteristics, mainly industry or entrepreneurial experience, have been found to 
impact their venture performance (Davidsson and Honig, 2003; Rotefoss and 
Kolvereid, 2005). Empirical evidence has also shown that entrepreneurs who have 
succeeded in preceding ventures have a higher chance of succeeding in their 
subsequent venture, whether funded by top tier or lower tier venture capitalists 
(Gompers et al., 2006). Hence, success in entrepreneurship is attributed to the skill of 
the entrepreneur. Additionally, firm strategies as well as resource-based capabilities of 
the entrepreneurial firm, such as capital equipment, employees and patents, are also 
determinants of its performance (Wang and Ang, 2004). Resources are a source of a 
firm’s capabilities and a firm’s competitive advantage depends on those capabilities 
(Grant, 1991).  
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HCT also suggests that VC managers that possess greater or better-quality 
human capital, assessed by superior education and experience (Becker, 1975), achieve 
higher performance when accomplishing the tasks required by them, pre-and post-
investment of the VC fund (Dimov and Shepherd, 2005). However, it is still important 
to note that the impact of the different aspects of HC differs according to each 
performance criterion. Venture capitalists promote positive performance of portfolio 
firms by two functions, selecting and providing value (Kanniainen and Keuschnigg, 
2003; Keuschnigg and Nielsen, 2002; Rosenbusch et al., 2013).  
HCT is also consistent with Upper Echelon Theory (UET) (Hambrick and 
Mason, 1984; Finkelstein and Hambrick, 1996). UET states that characteristics of top 
management teams make a difference in firm performance (Zarutskie, 2007).  
Besides HC, social capital, which is an investment in social relationships with 
expected returns (Lin, 1999), also matters. Social capital exists when individuals or 
organisations engage in communications and networking in order to yield return. Social 
Capital Theory (SCT) (Bordieu, 1983; Coleman, 1988; Putman, 1993) suggests that a 
firm’s external network is a major contributor to its performance (Granovetter, 1985; 
Lee et al., 2001). Erli et al., (2006, p.3) explain that “a firm’s ability to mobilise 
extramural resources, attract customers, and identify entrepreneurial opportunities is 
conditional on external networks.” VC social networks hold opportunities for the 
funded start-ups and for the VC firms themselves, primarily for the superior information 
they access through their network (Lin, 1999).  
VC has been of academic interest since the late 1980s (Porteba, 1987; Freear 
and Wetzel, 1988), particularly as it is often viewed as a crucial factor in nurturing a 
region’s economic growth (Saxenian, 1994; Jeng and Wells, 2000). However, extant 
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research tends to be contextualised by well-developed economies. However, this 
research examines the Egyptian VC market, which is an emerging economy. Hence, 
this leads to the first research question: 
1. What role do characteristics of entrepreneurs and VC firms each play in 
the success of VC-backed firms in Egypt (an emerging economy)? 
 
In addition to the characteristics of venture capitalists and entrepreneurs, the 
relationship between the two can also affect a VC-backed firm’s performance. While 
the innovative ideas and technical skills provided by entrepreneurs are vital for firm 
success, entrepreneurs may lack managerial advice and/or business expertise, which 
can be offered by VC firms. There is a large amount of academic literature (more 
theoretical than empirical) on the principal-agent problem (pioneered by Holmstrom 
(1979)) in financial contracting. The conflicts between agent and principal stem from 
extensive information asymmetries as well as behavioural uncertainties related to the 
interaction with the investee, which form the detailed contracts used to oversee the 
relationship throughout the investment relationship (Amit et al., 1998; Cumming and 
Johan, 2009). The level of effort provided by both parties is unobservable, which causes 
a double moral hazard problem, and hence both parties need proper financial incentives 
to provide effort. This is achieved through different contract covenants that give rights 
to entrepreneurs and venture capitalists (Elitzur and Gavious, 2001; Casamatta, 2003). 
Other than contracts, complementarity effect of effort sharing between venture 
capitalists and entrepreneurs, which is key to the success of the portfolio firm (Vergara 
et al., 2016). The trust between venture capitalists and entrepreneurs as well as the 
strength of the relationship between them is also found in some studies to be a crucial 
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determinant of the success of the VC-backed firm (Li et al., 2018). This leads to the 
second research question: 
2. What impact does the relationship between the entrepreneur and the VC 
have on the success of VC-backed firms in Egypt (an emerging economy)? 
 
Most of the available literature on determinants of portfolio firms’ success is conducted 
on US firms (Rajan, 2010), where empirical research has shown the US VC-backed 
firms outperform non-VC-backed ones (Kortum and Lerner, 2000; Baum and 
Silverman 2004; Chemmanur et al., 2011). These results are not necessarily evident in 
other countries (Hamao et al., 2000; Wang et al., 2003; Rindermann, 2004; Coakley et 
al., 2007). Additionally, European venture capitalists do not influence growth and 
employment of portfolio firms (Bottazzi and Da Rin, 2002). One of the reasons for the 
inconsistency in results outside the US is heterogeneity of venture capitalists there. This 
shows that context is an important factor, as results may differ in different economies; 
hence, this study focuses on the emerging economy of Egypt, analysing the extent to 
which results may vary there.   
“Institutional Theory argues that institutions in general, and culture in 
particular, shape the actions of firms and individuals in a number of subtle but 
substantive ways” (Bruton and Ahlstrom, 2003, p.233). In this context, culture is 
referred to in terms of a population’s perception of entrepreneurship, its tolerance of 
risk taking, formal institutions, networking, etc. In line with the Institutional Theory 
(Bruton and Ahlstorm, 2003), venture capitalists rely on a steady institutional regime 
with a foreseeable rule of law and enforcement regime to ease simplify and safeguard 
their investments (Cardis et al., 2001). VC firms perform better in countries with a 
stronger legal system, since legal remedy is open to investors, if the information they 
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receive is not accurate or other ﬁnancial fraudulences occur (Bruton and Ahlstrom, 
2006). In a VC setting, property rights, shareholder and creditor protection, and contract 
enforcement are signiﬁcantly affected by the structure of the legal system in place 
(Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). Institutional stability is non-existent in most emerging 
economies, which places more weight on other substitutes such as networks (Butler, 
Brown and Chamornmarn, 2003; Peng, 2003; Hoang and Antoncic, 2003). In such 
settings, government interference may have adverse effects and hence protection from 
it may also be necessary (Henisz, 2000). This leads to the third research question: 
3. How does the impact of entrepreneur characteristics, VC firms and the 
relationship between the entrepreneur and VC change with the 
institutional environment in which they exist? 
1.4 Research Problem 
Entrepreneurial firms face limitations in Egypt. Not all VC-backed firms are successful. 
This research focuses on how characteristics of entrepreneurs, VC firms and the 
relationship between both parties within an institutional framework, can enhance 
performance and success possibilities of portfolio firms. 
1.5 Research Aim and Objectives 
The overall aim of this research is to understand the interrelationship between VC, 
entrepreneurs and the performance of VC-backed firms. This aim is justified as 
reaching such understanding could play a significant role in the enhancement of the 
economy as a whole. Previous studies concluded that VC is believed to spur innovation 
and entrepreneurship, as well as employment rates and is therefore an essential aspect 
in promoting a country’s economic growth (Saxenian, 1994; Jeng and Wells, 2000). 
Evidence from firm-level studies commonly suggests that VC-backed firms reach 
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relatively higher employment and sales growth rates than non-VC-backed start-ups 
(Jain and Kini, 1995; Engel and Keilbach, 2007). Given this effect on the economy, it 
is important to understand what drives the performance or success of the VC-backed 
firms and how these outcomes are achievable in different contextual configurations. 
Considering the aim of this research, several research objectives are formulated 
in order to develop a more coherent approach to the research investigation.  
The research objectives for this study are as follows: 
1. To identify how the characteristics of entrepreneurs and venture capitalists in 
Egypt impact the performance of the VC-backed firms. 
2. To examine how the interaction between the entrepreneurs and venture 
capitalists in all different aspects can impact the performance of VC-backed 
firms. 
3. To identify contextual configurations that characterise the success of the VC-
backed firms in Egypt. 
  
1.6 Research Contribution and Significance 
To the best of our knowledge, this research is the first to examine the interrelationship 
between venture capitalists, entrepreneurs and the performance of VC-backed firms in 
Egypt. Previous studies related to entrepreneurs have mainly focused on the impact 
entrepreneurs’ characteristics have on firm performance (Bruderl and Preisendorfer, 
1998; Davidsson and Honig, 2002; Wang and Ang, 2004) but not relating it to VC-
backed firms. Studies that have linked entrepreneur characteristics to VC funding have 
mainly done so by linking them to the VC’s decision to provide funds (Shane and Cable, 
2002; Batjargal and Liu, 2004; Hallen, 2008). Other studies have also focused solely 
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on the impact venture capitalists have on the performance of VC-backed firms 
(Kanniainen and Keuschnigg, 2003; Rosenbusch et al., 2013) or on whether it is the 
screening effect or value-added effect that contributes to better portfolio firm 
performance (Hellmann and Puri, 2002; Rajan, 2010; Croce et al., 2013). Finally, other 
research has been conducted on the relationship between venture capitalists and 
entrepreneurs (Elitzur and Gavious, 2001; Casamatta, 2003; Vergara et al., 2016), or 
on the contractual agreements created between them (Lim and Cu, 2010). Additionally, 
most of the abovementioned studies focus on the value-adding effect of venture 
capitalists and/or the relationship between entrepreneurs and venture capitalists, 
neglecting the importance of the entrepreneur. Moreover, it is important to consider 
centrality of the entrepreneur, while VC input should be examined from a 
complementary perspective (as Vergara et al., (2016)), where the strengths and 
weaknesses of the venture capitalist and entrepreneur should be matched together. 
Therefore, the three categories are all combined in this study to create a full 
understanding of their impact on firm performance.  
To the best of our knowledge, there are no available studies that have combined 
the impact of all three categories together (entrepreneur characteristics, VC manager 
characteristics, and the interrelations between venture capitalists and entrepreneurs). 
This is the first study to examine the interrelationship between these three dimensions 
in the context of an emerging market. Additionally, in this study’s analysis each VC 
firm is matched to the firms in its portfolio.  This allows for the analysis of the effect 
of characteristics of entrepreneurs as well as VCs together to provide a clearer 
understanding of which has a more significant impact on firm performance. 
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Another contribution of this study stems from the context of the study. 
According to Institutional Theory (Bruton and Ahlstrom, 2006), venture capitalists 
develop differently in diverse settings. This research focuses on an emerging economy, 
examining how the performances of portfolio firms growing in such an institutional 
setting would be impacted by entrepreneurs of the firms themselves, venture capitalists 
offering funds and the relationship between both. Special attention is paid to the 
emerging economy of Egypt, as its financial market and entire economy are in the 
developing phase. After the revolution that Egypt encountered in 2011, the economy 
experienced many transitions. Thus, a focus on VC markets to support GDP growth and 
enable funding of more businesses, and the creation of additional job opportunities has 
become crucial to the economy’s development. Entrepreneurship and VC are 
interdependent; moreover, recent statistics in Egypt have been showing a more positive 
societal perception of entrepreneurship as a career choice, and a high social status is 
associated with entrepreneurs. Such amiable views attract more entrepreneurs to 
develop their new ventures [1]. The VC market in Egypt (a country with a population 
of approximately 90 million) is relatively new, starting in 2004, and with only 16 VC 
firms, or VC-activity performing firms, to date. In addition, very few portfolio firms 
have survived. Very few studies have emphasised venture capitalists in Egypt and there 
appears to be no proper disclosure of any VC-related data in the country nor a well-
established database of existing VC funds.   
The significance of this research is in the recommendations it provides for 
entrepreneurs and venture capitalists to enhance the VC market in Egypt. The results of 
this study clarify the areas of strengths and weaknesses possessed by entrepreneurs and 
                                                 
1 GEM (Global Entrepreneurship Monitor): Egypt National Report 2015-2016. 
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venture capitalists in Egypt, hence enabling them to recognise the areas that require 
improvement.  
Entrepreneurs should improve their ability to recruit talented personnel and 
executives through their own networks rather than those of venture capitalists. 
Entrepreneurs should also focus on attaining unique education and experience 
opportunities that would allow them to create a competitive advantage for their firm. 
Nascent entrepreneurs should also seek education in entrepreneurship, which is 
commencing in Egypt. These recommendations are discussed further in Chapter seven, 
section 3 (p.219). 
VC managers, on the other hand, should also focus on attaining distinctive 
education, to allow them to offer superior value-added advice and other services which 
other VC firm managers cannot. Results also show that most VC teams do not have a 
law expert on their management team, despite its importance in fulfilling required VC 
tasks (Dimov and Shepherd, 2005). Hence, it is advisable for VC firms to have a person 
with a strong legal background on their management team. 
As for the selection of portfolio firms, venture capitalists should take into 
consideration characteristics of entrepreneurs. To enhance VC-backed firm 
performance, venture capitalists should select entrepreneurs with previous success 
(Gompers et al., 2006) or experience in the same field as the current venture (Bruderl 
et al., 1992; Chatterji, 2009). 
As for the services they provide, VC firms should work on increasing the advice 
they provide to their portfolio firms, as it is crucial to add value to portfolio firms; thus, 
it increases their survival chances and boosts their performance (Nofsinger and Wang, 
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2011; Wise and Valliere, 2014). Recommendations for VC managers are explained in 
more detail in Chapter seven, section 3 (p.219). 
The VC-E relationship is governed either by the contract binding both or by the 
extent of their relationship. Therefore, enhancing negotiation of contractual terms is 
crucial as results show that, in Egypt, entrepreneurs do not find the contractual terms to 
be favourable and hence this has a negative impact on performance. Additionally, the 
choice of securities has an impact on the incentives given to both venture capitalists 
and entrepreneurs, and hence the efforts of both (Kaplan and Stromberg, 2001; Hart 
and Moore, 2004). These choices can include convertible preferred securities and 
convertible bonds; however, in Egypt they mostly use equities in contracts between 
venture capitalists and entrepreneurs, and hence it is recommended for these firms to 
explore other options for securities.  
Venture capitalists and entrepreneurs should also comprehend the importance 
of the role played by the strength of the relationship between them. When considering 
the legal environment factors in Egypt, results show that entrepreneurs and venture 
capitalists tend to rely more on networks and personal relationships, since contract 
enforcement is weak; thus, the importance of trust arises. A more in-depth explanation 
of the areas of improvement required in the relationship of venture capitalists and 
entrepreneurs in Egypt is provided in Chapter seven, section 3 (p. 219). 
1.7 Research Data 
This study relies on survey research combined with correlational research to collect 
data. Survey research describes the characteristics of a group or population (Fraenkel 
et al., 2012). It is a quantitative research technique, in which a researcher administers a 
survey or questionnaire to a sample or to the entire population to describe their attitudes, 
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opinions, behaviours, experiences or other characteristics (Creswell, 2005). Moreover, 
survey research allows for the investigation of relationships between variables 
(Fraenkel et al., 2012; McMillan, 2012). In this case, correlational research is also used, 
to aid in the discovery and measurement of relationships between two or more 
variables, as well as the strength of the relationship. The outcome of this combination 
provides an understanding of certain related events, conditions and behaviours 
(explanatory correlational study), as well as strong indications that a variable may be 
causing another variable (causality correlational study) (Mertler, 2016).  
This study follows a cross-sectional type of survey research, which refers to data 
on two or more variables collected from samples or populations, at a single point in 
time (Boso, 2010; Mertler, 2016). The VC market in Egypt is relatively new; thus, a 
longitudinal study will not be required.  
The data in this study was analysed using very thorough descriptive statistics as 
well as t-tests, to compare means of components of each sub-variable, in order to 
recognise the importance of each, which would provide a better understanding of the 
data and enable its explanation, with the support of the literature.  
The measures used in the survey are borrowed from previous studies, hence 
Confirmatory Factor Analysis (Joreskog, 1969; Harrington, 2009) is used to examine if 
the original form of the measure is well adapted to the new population. Furthermore, it 
also allowed for the aggregation of highly correlated measures.  
After validation and aggregation of data measures, an Ordinary Least Square 
regression model is implemented to further analyse the data. Multiple regression is one 
of the most commonly used statistical techniques in research (Mason and Perreault, 
1991). Its inclusion in this study, conditional on statistically significant overall 
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prediction, is to draw conclusions about individual predictor variables (the independent 
variables in this study). It is used to test the hypotheses of the effect of each predictor 
on the dependent variable, and to evaluate their relative importance (Mason and 
Perreault, 1991).  
Finally, results are confirmed through Ordered Probit Regression, which is the 
model used when the dependent variable is an ordinal one (Likert scale). 
1.8 Structure of the Thesis 
This section explains how the remainder of this research is structured. Chapter two 
focuses on a review of the literature, which examines existing research on the role 
entrepreneurs play in affecting their firm’s performance, as well as the role VC firms 
play and the value they add or their ability to boost performance of the funded firm in 
a specific institutional setting. It also focuses on the importance of the relationship 
between the two and resolving all the conflicts of interest between both parties to ensure 
the portfolio firm’s success. This chapter also reviews previous studies on the Egyptian 
VC market and identifies the crucial need for research in this field, and thus highlights 
the contribution of this research. 
In Chapter three, the conceptual framework is presented, as well as key concepts 
and proxies for each variable. Furthermore, it provides an explanation of how the 
hypothesis for each variable was derived. 
A justification of the methodology used in this research is provided in Chapter 
four. An explanation of the model used, in addition to regression analysis applied, is 
provided. This chapter also provides information on sampling procedures, data 
collection method, questionnaire administration activities and assessments of survey 
bias. Data collection relies on distributing questionnaires to entrepreneurs and VC fund 
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managers in Egypt. The content of these questionnaires is discussed in detail, in 
addition to a full explanation of the scales and measurement items used. The chapter 
concludes with a review of the methodology, which assesses the research design, data 
analysis and robustness check technique used to confirm the consistency of study 
results. 
Chapter five provides descriptive statistics for the VC and portfolio firms used 
in the study. It furnishes the necessary information on each, to make the study clearer 
and more reliable. Descriptive statistics of responses provided to both questionnaires 
are also discussed in depth in this chapter for variables related to characteristics of 
entrepreneurs and venture capitalists only, after which an explanation of the data 
reduction technique and procedure for these two variables, is presented. The regression 
model analysing the effect of these two variables on VC-backed firm performance is 
also discussed. 
Chapter six provides descriptive statistics as well as data reduction explanation 
for VC-E relationship variables as well as Institutional Environment. The results of the 
regression model analysing the effect of all the variables in this study on VC-backed 
firm performance is also presented in this chapter. 
The key findings of the research are presented in Chapter seven. A comparison 
between findings and hypotheses is also demonstrated, in addition to the robustness 
results which ensure consistency of the derived results.  
In Chapter eight, the thesis concludes with a summary of findings, a discussion 
of the contributions of this study and recommendations for all practitioners in the field. 
This chapter concludes by discussing challenges faced, limitations to the research and 
implications for future research and VC practice. 
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Chapter Two 
 Literature Review 
2.0 Introduction 
The aim of this chapter is, first, to provide an understanding of VC as a concept, 
followed by overview of the VC markets’ literature, its previous perspectives and 
related key theories; and, second, to analyse the main drivers of VC-backed firms’ 
success, and the factors that have an impact on the extent of the success, as well as 
consider the persistence of their role in different contexts. The explanation of these 
drivers and their impact in different contexts will aid in the development of the 
conceptual framework of this study. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.1 Overview of Literature 
 
Section 2.1 will provide an overview about VC as a concept. After which the focus of 
this chapter will be on the literature available on VC research, related to this study. 
2.2 Theoretical Perspectives on VC 
-Macroeconomic Theory, Agency Theory, Financial Contracting 
Theory, Resource Dependence Theory, Human Capital Theory, Social 
Networking Theory, Institutional Theory 
 
 
2.3 Variables that Lead to Success of VC-backed Firms 
- Entrepreneur, VC, relationship between venture capitalists and 
entrepreneurs 
 
 
- 
2.4 Institutional Environment 
- Institutional Theory and Emerging Markets 
 
 
 
 
2.5 Literature on VC in a Particular Context 
-Case of Egypt 
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Figure 2.1 above highlights the three main areas of literature on which this chapter will 
focus. Firstly, in section 2.2 the main theories, that explain the existence of VC itself 
and hence validation of this research, are discussed. These theories are the ones that 
clarify the importance of VC financing and thus justify the need to understand the 
importance of success of V-funded firms. After which, section 2.3 focuses on each 
variable that has an impact on the performance of the funded firms, as well as any factor 
that increases, decreases or has an effect on this impact. Section 2.4 covers market 
context, how research results have differed or remained the same in different contexts. 
Therefore, Institutional Theory is discussed in this section, with the focus on the 
emerging market context. Section 2.5 narrows down the focus of the emerging context 
to previous literature available on VC in Egypt. Section 2.6 summarises all key theories 
discussed in this study and relates them to the research questions. Finally, section 2.7 
concludes this chapter by providing key insights of the literature review, which 
highlights the importance of this research, as it emphasises the determinants of success 
of VC-backed firms. 
 
2.1 Overview of Venture Capital as a Concept 
Venture capital funding is a type of financing, most commonly used by start-up 
businesses. These businesses receive capital from VC firms in exchange for shares and 
an active role in the company. This diverts from traditional forms of financing, such as 
personal bank loans, where debt is exchanged for the loaned capital (Rosenbusch et al., 
2013). VC firms operate as a fund, where they pool investments of individuals or 
institutions and in turn create a portfolio of potentially promising firms that they finance 
(Megginson, 2004).  A VC fund is a legal entity, mostly in the form of a limited 
partnership, which is formed to facilitate the investments in private companies with the 
objective of increasing their value over a given lifetime. A typical VC fund structure 
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consists of three entities, Management Company, VC Fund and General Partnership. 
The Main stakeholders and their roles in a VC firm are as illustrated in Figure 2.2 below, 
after which an explanation is provided.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.2 Structure of VC Firm2 
 
The VC fund is set up as a Limited Partnership. This requires certain conditions to be 
met. These conditions include the following: At least one partner needs to be a General 
Partner actively involved in the decisions of the fund. Limited Partners cannot actively 
participate in the management of the fund especially when their liability is limited by 
the funds contributed. A fund’s life must be agreed upon and established in the Limited 
Partnership Agreement (LPA). As explained above, the VC fund pools capital of 
investors (Bhandari, 2013). These investors consist of corporate and pension funds, 
large corporations, insurance companies and accredited investors etc. They participate 
as limited partners by committing to provide funding once called/requested by the 
General Partner to invest in a portfolio of companies. The General Partnership is the 
legal entity (usually a Limited Liability Company) which serves as General Partner to 
the VC fund and is responsible for the management of the partnership between the 
                                                 
2 World Bank Group: Venture Capital Workshop (2016) 
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different stakeholders, to make the capital calls (these calls must be made to the limited 
partners when investing in a new start-up), reporting, cash distributions and dispensing 
investment advice. In most structures the General Partner through their executive team 
act as limited partners by providing 1% or more of the Private Equity capital to invest 
alongside the investors based on the same terms to align the interests between the 
different stakeholders. The Management Company, mostly being the General Partner 
itself, is affiliated to choose the companies to invest in and manage these portfolio 
investments. It employs most of the staff and is responsible for all the operating 
expenses. All the financial documents are signed under the management company’s 
name. It is responsible for investing the money in the different portfolio companies and 
dispensing services to them (Bhandari, 2013).  
The existence of VC fills a financing gap in the market3. Firms that are already 
established have track records that allow them to obtain funding from traditional 
sources such as commercial banks, capital markets, foreign direct investments etc. 
Firms that have high-growth potential yet are less established have typically relied on 
ﬁnancing from sources other than traditional lenders during their early growth phases. 
In the more developed economies of the United Kingdom, Canada, and the United 
States, venture capitalists have ﬁlled this gap by providing capital to early stage 
ventures with good growth potential (Wright & Robbie, 1998). The availability of such 
capital has helped to promote the emergence of numerous high-growth ﬁrms in the 
United Kingdom, United States, and several other developed countries. This has led 
many to conclude that venture capital is a crucial factor in fostering a region’s economic 
growth (Jeng & Wells, 2000; Saxenian, 1994).  
                                                 
3 World Bank Group:  Venture Capital Workshop (2016) 
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VC firms invest in early-stage businesses to help them grow. VC firms offer more than 
just funding to the companies in their portfolios. They use their expertise to provide 
additional services that would include marketing assistance and strategic advice. 
VC investments have a life of about five to ten years, before they exit the fund and 
make a return. During this period, they expected businesses to grow and prepare 
themselves for exit phase whether through an Initial Public Offering (IPO), merger or 
acquisition or stock buybacks (Gravagna and Adams, 2013). While the organizational 
structure of VC firms in developed economies is very similar to those in emerging 
economies, the exit mechanisms differ. Exit mechanisms are dependent of the 
development of the financial market in the nation (Ekanem et al., 2019), such as how 
well-established the capital market is to allow for an exit through an IPO.  
Occasionally, funds will hold on to an investment to help the business grow even 
further. Businesses can often expect further investment rounds.4 Venture capitalists 
generally finance start-ups based on their capital needs over multiple stages known as 
rounds. In each round the start-up is valued, and new preferred shares are issued 
accordingly5. Shares issued in each of these financing rounds are labelled Series A, 
Series B, Series C, up until series E. Series E however is extremely uncommon 
(McGowan, 2018).6 Each round funding is generally raised to transition or grow the 
company from one stage to another within the company’s life cycle. Before a Series A 
there is a seed round. The purpose of each round is explained in the table below. 
  
                                                 
4 British Business Bank (2019) 
5 World Bank Group:  Venture Capital Workshop (2016) 
6 Series D and E are less common, as they may mean that the funded firm has not been meeting the 
expectations set, however in some cases they occur when the firm needs to raise extra capital to 
increase its valuation before going public, or that it has a new expansion opportunity.  
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Studies as early as Liles (1974) have referred to VC as a high-risk investment. 
This labelling refers to the nature of investments they make. Venture capitalists invest 
in any high-risk financial venture or in unproven ideas, products or start-up situations. 
They also invest in start-up companies that do not have a sufficient track record, or in 
large publicly traded companies where uncertainty is evident7. Their willingness to take 
such risk arises from their ability mitigate it through tools they possess, which will be 
discussed more in depth in section 2.2.2. 
2.2 Theoretical Perspectives of Venture Capitalists 
2.2.1 Previous Perspectives and the Evolution of Venture Capital Research 
In efforts to provide a literature review on VC-backed firms, it is best to start with the 
evolution and development, as well as the primary focus of previous publications, to 
better understand the importance of this research. 
Soni and Priyan (2013) observed that the institutional VC market was 
established by the end of the 1940s in the US. However, scholarly interest in VC began 
only in the 1970s and grew vastly in the late 1980s, while empirical research did not 
                                                 
7 World Bank Group:  Venture Capital Workshop (2016) 
Table 2.1: Purpose of Investment rounds 
Round Purpose 
Seed For proof of concept, it takes start-up from just an idea to first few steps. 
Series A Firm has a business plan and needs to get to the next level like finding a 
market or product fit. Expected to raise revenue. 
Series B Product development is maturing and firm needs marketing and sales 
expansion as well as a full team to accommodate the growing customer 
base. 
Series C Firm is established and looking for market or new product expansion, or 
to increase valuation before an IPO. 
Series D To increase valuation before an IPO, or found a new expansion 
opportunity, or want to stay private for a longer period. A series D is only 
negative if a firm has not met their expectations on the series C round. 
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exist before the 1990s (Mason and Harrison, 1999). The main focus of VC studies 
conducted in the 1970s was on examining the investment and screening process from a 
venture capitalist’s point of view (the supply side) (Tyebjee and Bruno, 1984; Brophy, 
1986). This interest in studying the VC process has continued in more recent years (ex: 
Sweeting, 1991; Bygrave and Timmons, 1992; Fried and Hisrich, 1994; Pandey and 
Jang, 1996; Isakkson, 2006; Klonowski, 2007). According to Tyebjee and Bruno (1984, 
p.1051), “investment process steps are deal origination, screening, due diligence or 
evaluation, deal structuring, post-investment activities and exit.” Sapienza and 
Villanueva (2007) have studied trends in VC research and also conclude that the 
available literature on VC focuses on VC, from the investor’s perspective and on the 
selection, as well as the monitoring stages, in the VC cycle (ex: Gompers, 1995; Amita 
et al., 1998; Kaplan and Stromberg, 2001). While most attention was paid to the 
selection and monitoring stages, some attention was paid to the other stages over the 
years, however, research on VC exits did not start till the early 2000s (Bascha and Walz, 
2001; Shwienbacher, 2005; Giot and Schweinbacher, 2007; DeTienne et al., 2008). 
Further, researchers began to take an interest in post-investment activities and 
understanding the value-added by venture capitalists beyond just providing financial 
support. Another major area of interest that later emerged was the performance of VC 
investments. Not many studies exist; however, a few studies emphasise the 
determinants of VC-backed firm performance (MacMillan et al., 1989; Wang and Ang, 
2004; Erli et al., 2006). Several studies calculated the annual rate of return on VC 
investments (ex: Flynn and Forman, 2001; Florin, 2005; Kaplan and Schoar, 2005; 
Dushnitsky and Lenox, 2006; Erli et al., 2006; Nahata, 2008; Smith et al., 2010). Hege 
at al. (2003) compared those determinants in the US with the determinants in Europe. 
These studies on determinants also include external factors, such as the impact of the 
24 
 
industry, the opportunities in the market, technological innovations, etc. Other studies 
on VC-backed firms’ performance either concentrate on the entrepreneur’s impact 
(Batjargal and Liu, 2004; Gompers et al., 2006; Hsu, 2007; Dimov, 2010; Unger et al., 
2011), or the VC firms’ impact (Hellmann and Puri, 2002; Kanniainen and Keuschnigg, 
2003; Rajan, 2010; Croce et al., 2013; Rosenbusch et al., 2013), or the relationship 
between the two (Casamatta, 2003; Elitzur and Gavious, 2003; Vergara at al., 2016). 
Research on determinants of VC funding itself has also been of interest as of 
the late 1990s (ex: Gompers and Lerner, 1998; Hege et al., 2003; Felix et al., 2011; 
Cumming and Li, 2013; Lerner and Tag, 2015). 
An evident factor in all previous research on VC is its dominance mainly in the 
developed market context. The most comprehensively studied model of venture capital 
is that of the US (Bruton et al., 2009; Mourougane, 2016). This considerable interest in 
the US was mainly because it has been hosting the most active and dynamic VC market 
in the world (Landstorm, 2007). In fact, research on VC in developing countries is 
relatively recent (Lerner and Schoar, 2002; Cumming and Fleming, 2002). Jeng and 
Wells (2000) initialised the examination of VC determinants across countries. Since 
then, a few studies have been conducted on emerging markets (Locket and Wright, 
2002; Bruton et al., 2002, 2004). 
In view of the abovementioned limitations, this study’s uniqueness is that it 
excludes any external factors when finding the determinants of VC-backed firm 
success; instead, it focuses on the impact stemming from the individuals (firm founders 
and venture capitalists) directly involved in the firm. Also, while many studies analyse 
entrepreneurs or VC managers separately or analyse only the relationship between 
them, neglecting the characteristics each must possess, this study contributes a fuller 
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picture by analysing both together as well as the relationship between them. 
Additionally, most studies with contradicting results have been conducted in different 
countries; hence, as explained by the Institutional Theory (Bruton and Ahlstrom, 2006) 
(addressed below), a different setting produces different results. Moreover, this study 
focuses on market context with greater emphasis on emerging markets and the 
institutional differences existing within them (addressed in section 2.3).  
2.2.2 Well-Established Theoretical Perspectives on VC 
The existence of the VC market is justified by the standard macroeconomic theory: to 
produce output, capital and labour need to be available (Lerner and Tag, 2013). The 
combination of capital and labour depends on the amount of output needed. With a 
given amount of input, output can be increased through innovation, which is brought to 
the market through young entrepreneurial firms. These firms with risky innovative 
ideas may have trouble raising the funds they need, from equity or banks (Aron and 
Lazear, 1990), due to two imperfections in the capital market: moral hazard and adverse 
selection (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Both imperfections are types of information 
asymmetries; a concept pioneered by Akerlof (1970) meaning one party lacks 
information (Mishkin and Eakins, 2015). Venture capitalists are experts at solving these 
problems and this explains why a VC is needed to provide capital for risky innovations, 
instead of other sources of finance. Venture capitalists exist because they are more 
superior at reducing these sources of market failures than other unspecialised investors 
(Amit et al., 1999). To illustrate further, moral hazard is defined as the concept that 
individuals have tendencies to modify their behaviour when other people can be held 
accountable for risk or bad decision-making (Pettinger, 2017). This in turn creates a 
conflict of interest between entrepreneurs and investors, which limits the ability of start-
ups or early stage firms to raise equity funding or access debt financing from banks. 
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This conflict of interest is also known as the principal-agent problem, where the venture 
capitalist is the principal and the entrepreneur is the agent. Some authors have, however, 
argued that these terms can be used either way (Gabrielsson and Huse, 2002). Indeed, 
the Agency Theory (AT) has been the dominant theory in explaining the VC-E 
relationship in entrepreneurship literature (Barney et al., 1989; Amit et al., 1990; 
Sapienza and Gupta, 1994; Sahlman, 1990). AT suggests actions that focus on the 
protection of the investment made by the principal against the harmful potential 
behaviours of the agent (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). The second imperfection that 
Lerner and Tag (2013) mention is asymmetric information, however it is better termed 
as adverse selection as it refers to the wrong investment choice, due to investor’s lack 
of information (Amit et al., 1998; Chan, 1983; Williamson, 1985; Burchardt et al., 
2014). This lack of information leads to fear by different investors. Equity investors’ 
fear that entrepreneurs would only issue equity when they perceive the firm as 
overvalued (Akerlof, 1970; Greenwald et al., 1984). In addition, bank financing might 
not be a feasible option either, in fear that, only high-risk entrepreneurs would apply 
for loans in cases of high interest rates. (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981).  
VC firms reduce these asymmetries using several measures: first, conducting a detailed 
screening process about the entrepreneur and the firm before selection (Chan, 1983) 
(mainly useful to solve adverse selection problem); second, stage funding (Admati and 
Pfleider, 1994); third, demanding seats on the board of the portfolio firm to monitor 
activities and provide advice (Hellman 1998; Cornelli and Yosha, 2003); and, finally, 
through the use of financial contracts, for example, requiring preferred stocks and 
issuing restrictive covenants (Kaplan and Stromberg, 2004). 
The impact of information asymmetry in VC financial contracting is widely 
recognised (Sahlman, 1990). The detailed contracts are used to govern the relation 
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between both parties, over the life of the investment, in an effort to solve the principal-
agent problem mentioned above (e.g., Cumming and Johan, 2009). Research on VC 
contracting covers the investment life cycle (i.e. selection, appraisal, contracting, 
monitoring) and exit of target companies. Thus, Financial Contracting Theory (FCT) is 
understood to be the key resolvent of the agency conflict (Kaplan and Stromberg, 2004). 
As per AT, the losses that result from moral hazard and adverse selection can be 
minimised through the use of contracts and monitoring efforts, which in turn can 
improve the portfolio performance (Berg-Utby et al., 2007). The restrictive covenants 
written in the contract between the entrepreneur and VC include, but are not limited to, 
control rights, cash-flow rights and liquidation rights, which aid in solving the conflicts 
between both parties. AT and FCT will be discussed in more depth in section 2.2.3. 
How these contracts are written and enforced depends on the institutional and legal 
environment of the country in which they exist. The strength of the legal framework 
and institutional stability determines the relationship between venture capitalists and 
entrepreneurs. An explanation for this is provided by the Institutional Theory, which 
states that institutions and cultures shape the actions of firms and individuals. Hence, 
venture capitalists would operate differently in different parts of the world (Bruton and 
Ahlstrom, 2003). This justifies the importance of this study in view of the impact of 
entrepreneurs, venture capitalists and the relationship between them on portfolio firms’ 
performance, in a different institutional setting. Institutional Theory will be discussed 
in more depth in section 2.3. 
In general, there is more theoretical work than empirical available in the 
literature on VC-E contracting. Kaplan and Stromberg (2000) provide an important 
empirical study that compares VC financial contracting theories to their counterparts in 
reality, where results show that the theories do reflect reality. However, contracts in 
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reality are more complex and the different kinds of rights such as cash-flow rights and 
control rights are actually interrelated in systematic ways (Kaplan and Stromberg, 
2000). 
 Another important theory for VC investing is the Resource Dependence Theory 
(RDT), which, for the entrepreneur, is based on ways of attracting and handling 
resources necessary for the success of the firm (Gabrielsson and Huse, 2002). 
According to this theory, resources provided by venture capitalists are not limited to 
financial capital, but include human and social capital as well. Researchers have thus 
begun to pay attention to the latter forms of capital. The former being their experience 
and expertise and the latter being their network. Entrepreneurs contribute key 
technological ideas; however, they are often commercially inexperienced. Therefore, 
venture capitalists provide them with managerial advice that draws on their industry 
knowledge and commercial expertise (Sapienza et al., 1996). The role of the venture 
capitalist as a resource provider in past research has shown to be most effective in 
substantive ways. The most prominent of these are assisting in strategic decision 
making, monitoring operational and financial performance, recruiting executives, 
access to networks, etc. (Timmons and Bygrave, 1986; MacMillan et al., 1988; Gorman 
and Sahlman, 1989; Gomez-Mejia, 1990; Ehrlich et al., 1994; Sweeting and Wong, 
1997; Busentiz et al., 2004; Dolvin, 2005; Maula et al., 2005). In alliance with the RDT, 
according to AT, venture capitalists require representation on the board of the portfolio 
firm, as a way to protect their investment (Gabrielson and Huse, 2002).  
The basic macroeconomic theory, AT, FCT and RDT are the main theories that 
explain the purpose and importance of VC. These theories will be discussed in more 
depth in section 2.2 with the variables. 
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2.3 Variables that Impact the Success of VC-backed Firms 
Variables related to parties directly involved in the VC-backed firms that can impact 
their success are discussed below, excluding any external factors which are controlled 
for. 
2.3.1 Entrepreneur 
Early research (Gompers, 1995) suggests that entrepreneurs are dependent on VC funds 
to resolve their liquidity constraints. Technological innovation leads to opportunities 
for creating new products; however, not everyone can seize these opportunities and start 
a new business, due to lack of funds and/or managerial expertise. Thus, venture 
capitalists can play a crucial role in providing both to entrepreneurs (Jeng and Wells, 
2000).  
Social Capital of Entrepreneurs 
As defined by Shane and Venkataraman (2000, p.220), “entrepreneurship consists of 
two related processes, discovery of entrepreneurial opportunities and exploitation of 
such opportunities.” The relevant one for this research is exploitation, as it focuses on 
leveraging social and capital resources. Social capital (SC), which constitutes social 
networking, is not only important to the entrepreneur, but also to the VC fund manager 
(Coleman, 2009). Previous studies found a link between organisational capital, which 
constitutes of the social or human capital of entrepreneurs, and venture performance 
(Bates, 1990; Bruderl et al., 1992; Shane and Stuart, 2002). SC has been defined in 
different ways throughout literature. According to Glaeser et al. (2002) and Hsu (2007), 
it refers to a person’s social characteristics, which include social skills, charisma and 
the size of the business contacts that allow him or her to obtain market and non-market 
returns. For new ventures, these networks can be important for recruitment, whether of 
executive officers or technical staff (Bygrave and Timmons, 1992), and for establishing 
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ties with venture capitalists (which are also crucial for enhancing venture performance, 
discussed in section 2.2.2) (Shane and Stuart, 2002). Despite the importance of venture 
capitalists, venture valuation is positively associated with the entrepreneur’s ability to 
recruit executives through their own social network, rather than the VC’s (Hsu, 2007). 
The SC of starting entrepreneurs has widely played an important role in the 
development and success of firms (Bruderl and Preisendorfer, 1998; Hallen, 2008), 
through the access to information, positive reputation-building, and enabling 
recognition of opportunities (Burton et al., 2002; Hsu, 2004). Aldrich and Zimmer 
(1986) categorised SC into two types, bonding and bridging, both crucial resources to 
exploit opportunities. Bonding social capital facilitates an individual’s evaluation, 
attainment and utilisation of resources necessary for exploitation, through networks. 
Bridging social capital refers to weak ties at the individual level that utilises what an 
individual has developed within their own connections. It also reflects their own worth, 
structure, primacies and resource distributions. This includes relationships that may 
obtain resources, such as capital, which would include friends, angel investors, venture 
capitalists (Greene and Brown, 1997), or information which is diffused through 
appropriate networks. Social networks are also viewed as valuable resources by other 
studies for different reasons they: smoothen economic activity (Nahapiet and Ghoshal, 
1998; Burt, 1992), increase entrepreneur efficiency and access to selective business 
opportunities (Batjargal, 2003), and also innovation enhancement (Zhang and Duan, 
2010; Cambra-Fierro et al., 2011; Goktan and Miles, 2011; Rowley et al., 2011). Other 
studies show that through SC firm success can be enhanced by strengthening the status 
of the entrepreneur, and the firm’s reputation and image (Burt, 1992, 1997; Belliveau 
et al., 1996; Leana and Van Buren, 1999). 
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Entrepreneurial Firm Resource- Based Capabilities 
Crucial to the firm’s success, in addition to possessing SC, several studies have 
examined the role of resource-based capabilities (RBCs) in contributing to firm success 
and creating competitive advantage for the firm (Barney, 1991; Grant, 1991; Mahoney 
and Pandian, 1992; Peteraf, 1993; Wang and Ang, 2004). This is founded on the 
Resource-based View of the Firm Theory (RBVF), which explains that only firms with 
certain resources, network links and characteristics will achieve competitive 
advantages, through different strategies, such as innovation, and therefore achieve 
superior performance (Barney, 1991; Camison and Villar-Lopéz, 2014; Tavassoli and 
Karlsson, 2015). These resources can also be named internal capabilities, which are 
defined by Erli et al. (2006, p.2) as “capacity for a coordinated set of resources to 
perform some tasks and activities”. They are skills needed to transform inputs into 
outputs (productivity) (Pennings et al., 1998). Basic inputs include capital, equipment, 
skills of individual employees, patents and brand names; all which, through internal 
capabilities, can produce outputs. Along with RBCs, firm strategy is also important to 
exploit fully and effectively these capabilities and the firm’s unique characteristics 
(Wang and Ang, 2004). Strategies are the ways by which ventures match their internal 
strengths and weaknesses with the opportunities and threats in the environment 
(McDougall et al., 1994). Entrepreneurial strategy making consists of innovativeness, 
risk-taking propensity and pro-activeness (Miller, 1983). Researchers suggest that, in 
the current dynamic world, where customer demand and technology are constantly and 
swiftly changing, entrepreneurial strategy is critical for company success (Dess et al., 
1997). Resources on their own are not sufficient to realise elevated performance; thus, 
having a good strategy is essential (Mahoney and Pandian, 1992). However, a strategy 
alone is not effective; a good strategy is one that makes better use of resources. 
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Performance is therefore a function of an adequate fit between the firm’s strategy and 
resources, as, without it, the result would be unfocused and unproductive efforts (Wang 
and Ang, 2004).  
Human Capital of Entrepreneurs 
 The VC funding process involves several steps, starting with the screening of 
firms, followed by selection, and continues until the firm exits the fund. Many studies 
assume that VC-backed firms perform better than non-VC-backed ones, since venture 
capitalists are more likely to select promising firms to fund. However, the performance 
of these firms is enhanced by post-investment, value-added activities provided by 
venture capitalists (Rajan, 2010; Croce et al., 2012; Rosenbusch et al., 2013). The 
assumption that venture capitalists tend to provide funding for more promising firms, 
is justified by the Investment Theory. This theory states that rational investors only 
invest when the calculated present value of their expected returns surpasses their 
investment amount (Brealey and Myers, 1996). Hence, venture capitalists are more 
likely to select potentially promising investments, regardless of social and cultural 
context (Batjaral and Liu, 2004). This is applicable to already existing firms; on the 
other hand, when selecting from new firms to fund, it is a very risky action as there is 
a considerable liability of newness and no performance track record (Stinchcombe, 
1965), making the outcome of the project uncertain (Timmons, 1994). In this case, the 
abilities, experience, technical skills, reputation and integrity of the entrepreneurial firm 
team are crucial to the VC investment decision (Sorenson and Stuart, 2001). In most of 
these uncertainty situations, venture capitalists would choose to fund entrepreneurs 
with whom they have previously engaged in transactions (Podolny, 1994), or with 
whom they have particular ties, i.e. any enduring relationships (Granovetter, 1973), 
given that any other investment decision criteria have been met. This occurs because 
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they seek partners about whom they have better knowledge and are therefore more 
likely to be satisfied with their results (March, 1988). Not only is a second-time 
entrepreneur more reassuring for venture capitalists, and more likely to receive funding 
in earlier stages, it also is a factor that increases the chances of firm success and a 
determinant of firm performance (Gompers et al., 2006; Allinson et al., 2000).  
Previous experience of entrepreneurs in start-ups is labelled as entrepreneur 
skill. The empirical results of Gompers et al. (2006) show that entrepreneurs who have 
succeeded in a preceding venture have a 30% chance of succeeding in their subsequent 
venture. Results also show that a start-up owned by an entrepreneur with a track record 
of success (i.e. an entrepreneur with skill) has a higher success chance regardless of 
whether it is funded by a top- or lower-tier VC firm. Several other studies show the 
positive effect of entrepreneurial experience on performance, and Eesley and Roberts 
(2006) confirm it by measuring firm revenues. Serial entrepreneurs are also more likely 
than first-time entrepreneurs to obtain more favourable control provisions in contractual 
agreements with venture capitalists, as the latter feel less of a need to protect 
themselves. These provisions include control, vesting, and liquidation rights, as well as 
access to more upfront capital (Gompers et al., 2006). Another advantage for serial 
entrepreneurs is that they have higher tolerance for decision uncertainty (Allinson et 
al., 2000). 
In addition to entrepreneurial experience, industry experience (Bruderl et al., 
1992; Chatterji, 2009) also increases the likelihood of firm success. Both are referred 
to as human capital (HC); more precisely, specific HC. HC can be categorised as 
general or specific: the former refers to overall education and life experience, and the 
latter relates to education and experience in a particular activity or context (Dimov, 
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2010). HCT (Becker, 1975) states that the greater the HC the better the performance at 
a particular task. Previous studies found that general HC tends to increase the chances 
of venture survival and success (Bates, 1990; Brudel et al., 1992; Cooper at al., 1994), 
and the specific HC characteristics (entrepreneurial and industry experience) have an 
impact on the venture’s success (Davidsson and Honig, 2003; Rotefoss and Kolvereid, 
2005). HCT, which was originally developed to explain the discrepancy in financial 
returns of employees, suggests that, in general, people want to maximise their economic 
welfare over their lifetime, and would want to be compensated for their HC 
investments. On that note, entrepreneurs as well would seek to gain more returns from 
their start-ups based on their HC investments, which should be reflected in the scale 
and growth of their firms (Cassar, 2006). HC should therefore reflect and impact the 
venture’s financial performance. It is important to note, however, that financial 
performance could be measured by different dimensions (Venkatraman and 
Ramanujam, 1986), such as firm size (Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven, 1990; Frese et al., 
2007), profitability, growth and/or stock market performance (Combs et al., 2006). 
Dimov (2010) studied the impact of entrepreneur HC but focused on nascent 
entrepreneurs. The results showed that, compared to entrepreneurial experience, 
industry experience has a more direct positive effect on venture emergence. Dimov’s 
results also show that, in addition to both abovementioned specific HC characteristics 
(Delmar and Shane, 2003; Honig and Karlsson, 2004), early planning effort is also 
crucial in the case of nascent entrepreneurs. Even though entrepreneur experience, 
industry experience and early planning efforts are all important factors that determine 
venture emergence and success of nascent firms, their effect is mediated by the crucial 
variable opportunity confidence. Opportunity confidence is found to be crucial for 
venture emergence and it also decreases the likelihood of its discontinuation (Dimov, 
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2010). Opportunity confidence covers two aspects, belief in the feasibility of the 
opportunity and start-up self-efficacy; the latter is defined as the belief in one’s 
knowledge and ability to execute actions (Bandura, 1977; Chen et al., 1998; Markman 
et al., 2002; Mitchell et al., 2002). Hence, confidence in terms of both those facets is 
necessary for an entrepreneur to surpass all obstacles and continue the venture (Dimov, 
2010). 
HCT (Becker, 1964) also explains that HC investment (education and 
experience) should be differentiated from HC outcomes (knowledge and skills). This 
differentiation is important, because the acquisition and transfer of HC does matter 
(Reuber and Fischer, 1994; Sohn et al., 2006); however, acquiring HC does not 
necessarily mean it will lead to a HC outcome, i.e. experience may or may not lead to 
skills (Sonnentag, 1998). The study of Unger et al. (2009), which measures the 
relationship between entrepreneur HC and success, found that outcomes of HC 
investments have a greater impact on success than HC investments do. This is because 
the former are direct indicators of HC, while the latter are indirect (Davidsson, 2004). 
HCT does not explain how the transfer occurs, however; it simply states that HC 
investment does improve knowledge and skills. HC investments are also related or non-
related to a specific task. Task relatedness of HC helps explain the diverse effects of 
HC on success, since successful transfer is easier when knowledge is similar to the task 
being performed (Cooper et al., 1994; Gimeno et al., 1997; Lerner and Almor, 2002). 
These findings, however, were inconsistent with study of Chandler (1996). The study 
of Unger et al. (2009), which was conducted using meta-analysis to clarify the opposing 
results, concluded that HC with high task relatedness has a greater impact on 
entrepreneur success than HC with low task relatedness. Task-related HC is also 
categorised as process specific (related to daily tasks of running a business) or content 
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specific (related to the industry of the owner’s business) (West and Noel, 2002). The 
former includes tasks that cover environment scanning, selecting opportunities and 
formulating strategies for exploitation of opportunities, as well as organisation 
management and leadership (Mintzberg and Waters, 1982; Chandler and Jansen, 1992; 
Shane and Venkatraman, 2000), all of which increase the likelihood of success. 
Additionally, studies have found that entrepreneurs who start a business in the same 
field as their past operations are more likely to succeed (Sirinivasan et al., 1994) as, 
when prior knowledge possessed by the entrepreneur is in a field related to the current 
business context, it facilitates the acquisition of new knowledge (Cohen and Levinthal, 
1990). 
In addition to entrepreneur and industry experience, managerial experience 
shows the managers’ past experiences in leadership and management (Hallen, 2008), 
which could enhance the performance of the venture. Chambers et al. (1988) examine 
the performance of 100 new firms in the US and find that managerial experience has a 
positive effect while previous founding experience does not. However, a study by 
Kolvereid and Bullvag (1993) which compares 250 entrepreneurs finds that 
experienced entrepreneurs are more resourceful, and tend to get involved in a more 
competitive business environment, but show no difference in terms of performance. 
The focus of this research is on emerging economies; hence, it is important to 
consider that previous studies have suggested that the extent of effectiveness of HC 
possessed by entrepreneurs depends on the development of the nations in which they 
operate (Unger et al., 2009). In developing economies, HC may have a greater impact 
on success for two reasons. First, it is more likely that education level is variant; hence, 
entrepreneurs may possess unique HC that is likely to create a competitive advantage. 
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Additionally, necessity entrepreneurship is more abundant in developing countries, 
where individuals (from different levels and educational backgrounds) could find no 
employment options and therefore be forced into creating their own start-ups (self-
employment) (Reynolds et al., 2002). From the researcher’s perspective, it is also more 
difficult to find the relationship between education and success in more developed 
nations, where education level is somewhat uniform (Hunter and Schmidt, 1990; Lerner 
et al., 1997). 
SC and HC of entrepreneurs are both important, yet they are not necessarily 
separate investments. Coleman (1988) argued that SC can contribute to HC, and more 
recently Hsu (2007) explained that HC can also contribute to SC, i.e. while professional 
experience contributes to what you know it can also contribute to who you know. 
In summary, the important entrepreneur characteristics that can influence the 
venture’s success and performance on different dimensions are: entrepreneur’s HC, 
especially task related, and SC, as well as RBCs of the firm combined with firm 
strategy. Moreover, the amount of influence depends on the development of the nation 
studied.  
2.3.2 VC Fund Managers  
VC firm performance is considered one of the key drivers to the success of the 
entrepreneurial firms, since VC firms provide essential performance elements, 
particularly financial resources and managerial expertise, which the entrepreneurs may 
lack (Teece, 1986). This is the case specifically in high-tech industries, where 
entrepreneurs may have the technological know-how, but lack the skills necessary to 
run a business (Gans and Stern, 2003). Therefore, more attention in research has been 
given to investigating the impact of VC firms on performance of the portfolio company, 
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where results have mainly concluded that VC-backed firms develop more rapidly, have 
more patents, are more productive and are more likely to go public than non-backed 
ones (Wright and Robbie, 1998; Kortum and Lerner, 2000). The conflict in previous 
literature is in the causality of the impact of VC on firm performance. While some 
researchers find the screening by the VC fund to be the reason for superior firm 
performance (Chan, 1983; Tyebjee and Bruno, 1984; Amit et al., 1998), others find it 
to be related to post-selection and post-investments activities of the VC. When 
considering the impact of the VC’s screening ability on firm success, it is also important 
to note the high percentage of VC-backed firm failures (Gifford, 1997), as this 
survivorship bias may limit the validity of previous work. In efforts to determine this 
causality effect, Croce et al. (2012) summarised the results of all previous studies 
comparing the effect on portfolio firm performance of screening or value-added 
activities. Results were mixed, but most of them found that value-added activities have 
a greater effect screening has no positive effect (Engel, 2002; Davila et al., 2003; 
Balboa et al., 2006; Colombo and Grilli, 2010; Bertoni et al., 2011). However, one 
study found that VC-backed firms outperform non-VC backed firms; nonetheless, it 
could not answer the causality query (Baum and Silverman, 2004), and therefore 
attributes performance to both, while yet another study also concludes that both have a 
positive effect on performance (Chemmanur et al., 2011). 
Moreover, if screening is controlled for, the question is whether performance is 
enhanced by funding or monitoring (Sahlman, 1990; Lerner, 1995; Kaplan and 
Stromberg, 2003) or other value-added activities (Sapienza et al., 1996; Sorenson, 
2007) provided by VC (Croce et al., 2012). Venture capitalists do have the ability to 
select winners, as previously justified by the Investment Theory, and because they are 
more capable of dealing with information asymmetries, than other financial 
39 
 
intermediaries (Amit et al., 1998), which allows them to provide the financing 
necessary to utilise the opportunities they have (Chan, 1983; Tyebjee and Bruno, 1984; 
Amit et al., 1998). Venture capitalists have more efficient screening abilities than other 
financial intermediaries that may result in superior firm performance (Tyebjee and 
Bruno, 1984; Shepherd and Zacharakis, 2002). Furthermore, they can also create 
successful firms by providing them with mentoring (Jain and Kini, 1995; Hellmann and 
Puri, 2002), monitoring (Sahlman, 1990; Lerner, 1995; Kaplan and Stromberg, 2003), 
and access to valuable business contacts (Hsu, 2006; Lindsey, 2008). These provisions 
are known as value-added activities. Goodstein et al. (1994) have classified VC 
provisions as networking, monitoring and strategic decision-making. Venture 
capitalists are often represented on the board of directors or in direct managerial 
positions within the firm. Wijbenga et al. (2003) analyse the influence that venture 
capitalists can have while on these boards in each of the aspects categorised by 
Goodstein et al. (1994). Their results show that, through networking, they are able to 
secure critical resources and link the portfolio firm to its external environment. Through 
monitoring, they can screen and approve investment proposals (Tirole, 2001), as well 
as train or replace ineffective management teams. Finally, through strategic decision-
making, they can participate in the strategic decision-making process, to a certain 
extent. 
Human Capital of Venture Capitalists 
Venture capitalists can use their specific industrial knowledge and expertise 
(HC), as well as their contacts (network) to assist portfolio firms in strategic and 
operational planning, personnel and supplier selection, marketing, financing and 
participating in other roles where required (MacMillan et al., 1989; Erli et al., 2006). 
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Strategic advice is found in some studies to be one of the most valued 
contributions from venture capitalists (Gorman and Sahlman, 1989; Manigart and 
Struyf, 1997). The venture capitalists’ general business knowledge (general HC 
discussed below) and ability to help entrepreneurs through short-term crises is a crucial 
factor in strategic value-added advice. 
HCT is also applied to VC managers. HCT suggests that VC managers with 
more superior HC (assessed through better education and experience (Becker, 1975)) 
achieve higher performance in executing relevant tasks, such as activities prior to and 
after the investment of the VC fund (Dimov and Shepherd, 2005). However, it is still 
important to note that different aspects of human capital differ in impact on each 
performance criterion.  
The HCT, which considers investment managers’ HC as a predictor of 
investment performance, is also consistent with Upper Echelon Theory (UET) 
(Hambrick and Mason, 1984; Finkelstein and Hambrick, 1996). UET states that top 
management teams make a difference in firm performance. Hence, in the case of a VC 
fund, characteristics of fund management teams should be able to predict performance 
of the fund (Zarutskie, 2007). Similar to entrepreneurs, VC managers’ HC can also be 
categorised, as general HC and Specific HC. Specific knowledge, which divides into 
industry specific and task specific, can yield a competitive advantage for the VC firm 
(Barney, 1991, Wright et al., 1995) as it refers to knowledge that is more relevant to the 
firm. In the context of this study, specific HC would refer to experience and education 
that is relevant for the execution of VC-related activities. This could be in the fields of 
business, law or consulting, for instance. The two HC types can be defined differently 
in alternative contexts (e.g. Pennings et al., 1998).  
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Before discussing further, the impact of HC characteristics on the performance 
of portfolio companies, it is important to first understand how the link between HC and 
firm performance arises and accordingly why outcomes differ. Venture capitalists are 
engaged in pre- and post-investment activities with entrepreneurial firms. Pre- 
investment activities involve all decisions taken by a VC firm, including screening of 
portfolio firms and structuring a contract with the selected firm, up until the signing of 
the contract. These decisions are made according to the VC firm’s perception of 
potential risk and return (Tyebjee and Bruno, 1984). On the other hand, post-investment 
activities, which are made according to the VC firm’s perception of opportunities and 
threats (Tyebjee and Bruno, 1984), include monitoring of firm activities, hiring top 
quality management, and dispensing advice (Lerner 1994, 1995). Whether these 
perceptions differ based on the awareness of the situation (Sitkin and Pablo, 1992) or 
the key resources available (Jackson and Dutton, 1988), or any other explanation, all 
depends on the relevant knowledge that the VC top management team possesses 
(Dimov and Shepherd, 2005). Relevant knowledge includes knowledge already 
attained and the ability to accumulate new knowledge, which is based on what already 
exists (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990). This knowledge can be formally acquired, through 
educational institutions, or gained from experience in a particular field, both of which 
form the underlying aspects of VC fund managers’ relevant HC. The knowledge 
possessed differs from one VC firm to another (Spender, 1996) and hence it is crucial 
to understand performance. This is better justified by the RBVF (Barney, 1991), which 
associates superior performance with the possession of resources that are valuable, rare 
and not substitutable. Hence, the theory supports that fund management must obtain 
HC that differentiates them from others, in order for certain fund management teams to 
outperform the rest (Zarutskie, 2007).  
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Previous studies have mainly paid attention to the quantitative nature of HC, 
such as the number of years or degree of education (Bruderl et al., 1992; Cooper et al., 
1994; Gimeno et al., 1997) or experience (Evans and Leighton, 1989; Bruderl et al., 
1992). However, Dimov and Shepherd (2005) highlighted the importance of 
considering qualitative aspects of HC, such as the field of education, to understand 
which HC characteristics are associated with better performance. Additionally, while 
most studies focus on what enhances the performance of a venture, it is important to 
note that those factors differ from factors that improve its survival chances (Rander and 
Shepp, 1996; Dimov and Shepherd, 2005). Results of Dimov and Shepherd (2005) 
show that general HC is positively associated with portfolio companies that went public 
(homeruns), while specific HC is not positively associated with homeruns; however, it 
is negatively associated with those that went bankrupt (strikeouts). A more in-depth 
explanation is that specific HC focuses on detecting risks and therefore prevents 
strikeouts. For example, experience and education in business and law are specific to 
task requirements of VC and they allow for critical analysis of business plans, 
negotiation of contract structures, etc., all to detect and minimise risks. General HC, in 
contrast, focuses on detecting opportunities rather than risks, through accumulation of 
new knowledge, which increases opportunity sets (Gimeno et al., 1997). However, it is 
also associated with strikeouts, which contradicts previous studies that showed general 
HC being positively related to survival (Bruderl et al., 1992; Cooper et al., 1994; 
Gimeno et al. 1997; Pennings et al., 1998). With these results, it is clear that further 
analysis of HC is required, and different educational backgrounds should be considered, 
as their results solely focused on US firms and large venture capitalists, and did not 
control for VC deal size, which can impact performance itself. Zarutskie (2007) built 
on Dimov and Shepherd’s model by using a larger data set and analysing first-time 
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funds, and by taking the study further and categorising specific HC into industry 
specific and task specific. The results of analysing first-time funds are important, as 
they highlight the types of venture capitalists needed for a successful VC market 
(Zarutskie, 2007). Task specific covers two VC-related tasks, managing the VC fund 
and managing a start-up. Fund managers with previous experience in running funds 
have been exposed to trial and error, and therefore have the hands-on experience, which 
cannot be attained elsewhere, not even through education, needed to enhance the 
performance of the VC fund (Lazear, 1995; Gibbons and Waldman, 1999, 2004). In 
addition, fund managers with experience in running a start-up can add value to start-
ups selected as portfolio companies by giving better advice or hiring better calibre staff 
for their management. Contrary to the task-specific characteristics, industry-specific 
HC matters in the case of first-time fund managers. Industry-specific HC comes through 
experience in tasks and skills attained in prior industries in which VC fund managers 
have previously worked (Kletzer, 1989; Neal, 1995). They are also important to venture 
capitalists, since they are active investors who became involved in the governance and 
strategic decisions of their portfolio companies, either by being on their board of 
directors (BOD) or by helping them identify good managers or advisors (Sapienza, 
1992; Lerner, 1995; Gompers and Lerner, 2001; Kaplan and Stromberg, 2001 and 
Botazzi et al., 2007). VC managers that have undertaken previous experience in either 
strategy and management consulting, non-venture finance, or professional science and 
engineering can have positive impacts on VC fund performance (Zarutskie, 2007). 
These results extend the model of Dimov and Shepherd (2005); however, both studies 
are conducted on US firms and hence an international context is necessary to confirm 
the results. 
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A study by Wise and Valliere (2014) compares the impact of the SC (the extent 
of their connectedness in the ecosystem) of fund managers to the impact of their HC (in 
terms of start-up experience) on the performance of portfolio firms. The study tries to 
reveal how both lead to the mitigation of risk failure of portfolio firms i.e. minimising 
unsuccessful exits. Results show that experience does have an impact while 
connectedness is insignificant. Results also explain that the start-up experience of fund 
managers has five outcomes. First, more experienced managers are able to screen and 
select portfolio firms better. Second, they can assist and advise firms with 
implementation of strategies and business plans. Third, experienced managers have an 
awareness of the need of flexibility in implementation and hence they can advise the 
entrepreneurs when they would need to forgo previous plans and apply new ones. 
Fourth, more experienced managers also have more credibility with their entrepreneurs. 
Finally, they may be able to spot opportunities and foresee potential for connection at 
an operational level.  
Value-added Services by Venture Capitalists 
Since HC of VC managers positively affects the performance of VC funds, it is 
important to understand what VC funds provide using their HC, which impacts the 
degree of portfolio firms’ success. VC funds allow better resource attainment for the 
portfolio companies (value-added activities) and they provide incentives for managers 
of their portfolio companies (monitoring) (Croce et al., 2012). The Agency Cost Theory 
(AT) (Jensen and Meckling, 1976), supports the impact of monitoring (Admati and 
Pfleiderer, 1994; Lerner, 1995), as it allows managers to discover potential problems in 
their portfolio firms, after their investment. This also results in reducing agency costs 
and increasing portfolio firm performance. On the other hand, the impact of the value-
added activities is justified by the RBVF (Barney, 1991). Venture capitalists provide 
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value-added services to their portfolio companies, which in turn increases their 
financial (Hellman and Puri, 2002) and managerial (Sorenson, 2007) resources. These 
services, which include aid in strategic and operational planning, management 
recruitment and compensation, and access to their network of contacts (e.g. banks, 
managers at supplier, costumer and competitor firms, etc.) (Gorman and Sahlman, 
1989; Sahlman, 1990; Sapienza et al., 1996; Gompers and Lerner, 1998; Sorenson, 
2007), are valuable resources for the portfolio firm (Shepherd et al., 2000). 
Croce et al. (2012) control for reverse causality to determine whether 
outperformance of VC-backed European firms is due to VC screening or value-added 
activities. They also isolate value-added effect from financial effect. Contrary to some 
previous studies, they find that productivity growth is not higher in VC-backed firms 
than matched non-VC-backed firms before the first round of VC financing. This 
contradiction provides evidence that screening abilities of US VC firms are stronger 
and hence more effective (Hege et al., 2003). Results also show that value-added 
activities are a greater driver of portfolio firm performance and that venture capitalists 
have an imprinting effect on firm performance, since productivity growth does not 
decrease even after the exit of the VC fund. Contradicting this view, Rosenbusch et al. 
(2013) find that VC funding loses value after the firm goes public. 
Traditional Financial Intermediation Theory focuses on the role of financial 
intermediaries in alleviating information asymmetries (Fama, 1985; Stiglitz, 1985), 
which emphasises the role of monitoring. However, venture capitalists provide 
additional roles which support in building up the organisation (Hellmann and Puri, 
2002). This would mean that value-added services have the most effect on portfolio 
firm performance. These additional roles include human resources and recruitment 
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processes, involvement in strategic and financial planning such as stock options, and 
provision of beneficial contacts. In an effort to clarify past inconsistencies, Rosenbusch 
et al. (2013) tested the extent to which VC affects portfolio firms. They find that VC 
can have an effect in terms of profitability, growth and stock market performance. 
Moreover, the VC impact on success may depend on the context, such as age, pre- and 
post-IPOs and cultural uncertainty avoidance.  
Consistent with empirical literature, a panel discussion by Rajan et al., (2010)8 
that comprised venture capitalists, an entrepreneur and an academic to discuss the 
interrelation between venture capitalists and portfolio firm performance. Results of 
panel discussion showed that context, as well as the knowledge transferred from the 
previous experience of the general partners in the VC, can influence the ways in which, 
venture capitalists contribute to the efficiency of their portfolio companies (Rajan, 
2010). This confirms that the HC of VC managers matters. 
VC Firm Networks  
One of the most important value-added services provided by venture capitalists as 
mentioned above is providing portfolio firms with access to all its business contacts, 
referred to as the VC’s network or SC, which is vital for the success of VC-backed 
firms (Lin, 1999). An organisation’s network ties allow it to gain access to resources 
that may have been difficult to access otherwise (Granovetter, 1985; Burt 1992; Hallen, 
2008). Network ties come in many forms including alliances, board interlocks ad equity 
investments between organisations (Mizruchi, 1996; Hallen, 2008; Santos and 
Eisenhardt 2009), through which organisations are exposed to many benefits. These 
                                                 
8 Panellists: Rajan, T. (Anchor); Emani, R. (Co-founder and CEO, Insta Health Solutions); Kumar, S. 
(Managing Director, Inventus Advisory Services); Sabaronathan, G. (Associate Professor, Finance and 
Control, Indian Institute of Management Bangalore); Subramaniam, G. (Managing Partner, IL & FS 
Investment Managers Ltd.). 
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benefits may include exchange of industry information (Burt, 1992), access to financial 
capital (Sorenson and Stuart, 2001) and collaboration to foster innovation (Baum et al., 
2000). Venture capitalists with network ties or that participate in different networks are 
exposed to higher-quality relationships, various investment opportunities and are able 
to access more information, while improving the firm’s cash-flows (Hochberg et al., 
2007). This explains why it is important to understand SC thoroughly. It refers to 
investment in social relationships with expected returns (Lin, 1999). It is when 
individuals or organisations engage in interactions and networking to produce profits. 
Networks can be defined as a particular group of connections between a specified set 
of actors, where these connections may be used to analyse the social behaviour of the 
actors involved (Mitchell, 1969). In recent years, Complex Network Theory has been 
developed through the study of complex networks in science and social fields (Barbasi 
and Albert, 1999; Newman 2003; Boccaletti et al., 2006). A network is considered 
complex if it consists of various interacting agents (Barabasi, 2002), who may possess 
divergent proficiencies and serve different purposes in the network. This theoretical 
framework, which Watts (2004) called ‘the new science of networks’, is also helpful in 
the analysis of industrial and innovative clusters. Empirical studies were conducted in 
VC research to examine the bridging and clustering relations that comprise the VC 
network (Zheng, 2004; Hochberg et al., 2007).  
VC network studies can be mainly traced to the network theory called Social 
Network Theory (SNT) (Laudan, 1977). It is centrally concerned with structured 
relations among persons who create, distribute and utilise various types of knowledge 
(Dunn, 1983). Social networks play an important strategic role for firms (Burt, 1982; 
Gulati et al., 2000; Westphal et al., 2006, Lim and Cu, 2010). A firm’s social network 
is only possible through the SC it possesses, and therefore SNT is in line with the SCT 
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(Bordieu, 1983; Coleman, 1988; Putman, 1993), which suggests that a firm’s external 
network is a major contributor to its performance. A firm’s ability to mobilise 
extramural resources, attract customers and identify entrepreneurial opportunities is 
conditional on external networks (Granovetter, 1985; Lee et al., 2001; Liu et al., 2006). 
SC is productive, as it permits the accomplishment of certain outcomes that would seize 
to exist in its absence (Coleman, 1988). VC social networks hold opportunities for the 
funded start-ups and for the VC firms themselves, primarily for the superior information 
they access through the network (Lin, 1999). Information can be acquired through the 
use of social relations that are maintained for other purposes (Katz and Lazarsfeld, 
1955). The willingness of venture capitalists’ investment in firms increases with the 
greater access to information as well as potential opportunities concerning those firms 
(Alexy et al., 2012). Those venture capitalists with better-quality relationships (network 
positions that are more influential) enjoy more access to information, as well as 
investment opportunity sets (Hochberg et al., 2007). 
There are three main VC networks: syndicates for co-investment (Lerner, 1994; 
Hochberg et al., 2007; Mas et al., 2008, Jin et al., 2015), service providers such as head 
hunters, patent lawyers, investment bankers, etc. – to help the company succeed 
(Gorman and Sahlman,1989; Sahlman, 1990) – and institutional investors, as well as 
other investors (Lindsey, 2003; Hsu, 2004). However, most of the available literature 
on VC networks is based on syndication. A syndicate network is formed when two or 
more VC firms connect with each other because of at least one common investee 
(Zheng, 2004; Kogut et al., 2007). The reason this type has received more attention is 
that syndication relationships are believed to have a positive impact on both main 
drivers of VC performance, the VC’s ability to select a promising company to fund 
(pre-investment) (Burt, 2005) and its ability to add value to it (post-investment) (Pratch, 
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2005; Hsu, 2006). Three explanations have been put forward for this: first, when 
venture capitalists form syndicates, they would invite one another to co-invest in 
promising deals (Lerner, 1994). Second, it is useful for them to make better selection 
decisions as they receive signals from one another’s willingness to invest in potential 
companies (Wilson, 1968; Sah and Stiglitz, 1986). Finally, each VC may have expertise 
in distinct industries or sectors and hence this would expand their abilities to invest, add 
value to their investments and diversify them (Stuart and Sorensen, 2001). In addition, 
syndication increases sharing of resources and information among venture capitalists, 
and also gives them access to each other’s networks. For instance, a VC in a syndicate 
may have access to another VC’s service providers (head hunter, investment banks, 
etc.) and hence expand its own network (Bygrave, 1988). Having access to more 
information would also enhance the performance of the VC firm as it allows for a more 
positive valuation of its portfolio companies (Tyebjee and Bruno, 1984). 
In addition to these two direct benefits of VC syndication networks, VC 
networks in general also have an indirect effect on the ventures they fund, by providing 
these ventures with access to their networks (social capital). In this case, the VC 
becomes an information or resource broker to the funded firm, enabling it to access 
professionals or experts as well as other venture capitalists from the VC’s own networks 
(Sapienza et al., 1996; Dimov and Shepherd, 2005; Pratch; 2005; De Clerq et al., 2006). 
The impact of the direct and indirect roles of VC syndicate networks on funded 
companies’ performance (measured through successful exits, mainly IPOs and sales to 
other companies) was studied by Hochberg et al. (2007) through a US-based sample 
(1980 to 2003), using cross-sectional measures. A five-year window was used, since a 
VC network is not static, as some venture capitalists enter and exit over time. Their 
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findings mainly show that a better-networked VC at the time a fund is raised leads to 
better fund performance. The centrality measures of degree, closeness and betweenness 
are both used to determine how well networked a fund is. First, Degree centrality refers 
to the number of relationships an actor has in the network; the more ties, the more 
central or influential the VC would be. Second, Closeness is the quality of these 
relationships, measured by the importance or centrality of the other actors in this 
network, which is termed eigenvector centrality (Bonacich, 1987). Finally, 
‘betweeness’ is the term used for the indirect measure in which the VC acts as an 
intermediary connecting other actors in the network. Results find that degree centrality 
has the most economic effects, where VC firms with more influential positions in a VC 
network will exhibit better investment performance at both fund and portfolio company 
levels. The measure of least economic significance is betweeness, which shows that 
indirect relationships play a lesser role in the VC market. These results are derived from 
regression analysis and do not provide explanations. It is also important to note that 
these are attributed to US firms only, and hence might not hold in other contexts.  
While most literature has focused more on VC networks from the entrepreneur’s 
perspective or its impact on their performance (Hsu, 2004, 2007; Hochberg et al., 2007; 
Pratch 2005; Hallen, 2008), Alexy et al. (2012) focused on the impact that VC networks 
have on the VC firm itself, measured by investment sum (amount they invest in start-
ups). Their longitudinal study with five-year moving windows, on US high-tech sector 
firms only, measures VC networks based on structural and relational aspects. More 
studies in the literature are available on structural aspects (Alexy et al., 2012), which 
include number and intensity of connections (Uzzi, 1997) and position of VC in the 
network (Burt, 2005). Relational aspects cover who the VC connects with, and whether 
characteristics of other venture capitalists in the actor’s network are similar or different 
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(Reagan and McEvily, 2003; Morgan, 2005). Findings on structural aspects show that 
the structural position of the VC in a network influences its investment sum in start-
ups. This is consistent with previous findings, which show that a firm’s position in the 
network, whether open (Burt, 2005; Jesppesen and Lakhani, 2010) or closed (Coleman, 
1990), gives it privileged access to information and hence positive outcomes (Ahuja, 
2000; Rodan and Galunic, 2004; and Fleming et al., 2007). The number of connections 
in a VC’s network has a positive effect on investments made, while brokerage 
connections also have significant effects (unlike Hochberg et al. (2007), who found no 
significant effects on portfolio firm). It is important to understand, as noted in previous 
studies, that, at a certain point, given that management attention and information 
processing capability are limited (Ocasio, 1997), the marginal value-added by an 
additional connection in the network will decrease (Uzzi, 1997); the findings of Alexy 
et al. (2012) could not confirm this.  
As for relational aspects, positive association has been found between either 
high specialisation or high diversity amongst network partners (in terms of past 
investment portfolios of each), where a mix is not recommended (Alexy et al., 2012). 
These results provide no explanation for such outcomes and do not solve the conflict in 
previous literature. Some studies find diversity of connections of the venture capitalists 
in a syndicate to provide a better source of information (Granovetter, 1985; Almeida 
and Kogut, 1997; Reagans and McEvily, 2003), while others find similarity to be more 
effective for the VC to process information (Gulati, 1995; Uzzi, 1997) and extract more 
reliable and higher-quality information (Dimov and De Clercq, 2006). Apart from 
analysing the connections of each VC firm in a syndicate, it could be effective to 
analyse the HC or experience of the VC’s top management in a syndicate. One study 
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that explored this idea, but not in depth, found that the importance of the experience of 
each VC in a network is reduced and sometimes eliminated (Hochberg et al., 2007). 
The abovementioned studies have focused on VC networks in the US. Some 
research on VC in emerging economies did find networks to have an important role 
(Ahlstorm et al., 2000; Locket et. al., 2002; Batjaral and Liu, 2004). Bruton and 
Ahlstorm (2003) add that networks have a greater role in emerging economies, as they 
substitute for formal institutions, such as market for corporate control and rule of law, 
which are known to be weaker or unorganised there (Meyer, 2001; Peng 2000). 
Ahlstorm and Bruton extended their study in 2006 to see if venture capitalists will be 
as reliant on their personal networks when institutions become more formal, or not. 
Their findings explain that economies with weak financial institutions become more 
dependent on their personal relationships and networks in all aspects of the VC process, 
starting with selection. For instance, the entrepreneurs they know more are the ones to 
be selected. Consistent with Guthrie (2002), the more the formal institutions exist, the 
less dependent the VC would be on networks. This implies that context is important 
when studying the impact networks have on the success of venture capitalists. 
2.3.3 VC-E Relationship  
In addition to the characteristics of the venture capitalist and the entrepreneur, the 
relationship between the two (VC-E relationship) also affects VC performance and VC 
markets. For a VC-backed firm to succeed, it requires effort from its venture capitalists 
and entrepreneurs, and joint inputs of both to interact well (Keuschnigg, 2004). Joint 
collaboration between the venture capitalist and entrepreneur is important for the 
success of the VC-backed firm (Cable and Shane, 1997). Entrepreneurs contribute key 
technological ideas; however, they are often commercially inexperienced 
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(Braunerhjelm, 2010). Venture capitalists therefore provide them with managerial 
advice that draws on their industry’s knowledge and commercial expertise. The 
importance of the VC-E relationship began to receive attention in the US in the early 
1990s (Sapienza et al., 1996), when researchers studying the value-added effect of VC 
activities found that there is no value to be added through VC involvement unless the 
entrepreneur is attentive and willing to react to VC advice (Barney et al., 1994). The 
relationship was found to be crucial, to the extent that Fried and Hisrich (1995) labelled 
venture capitalists as ‘relationship investors’. 
Most of the previous literature on the VC-E relationship has been based on the 
Agency Theory (AT), although some research has relied on Stewardship Theory (ST) 
(Fox and Hamilton, 1994; Davis et al., 1997). The latter assumes that goals of both the 
principal (VC) and the steward (Entrepreneur) are aligned.  
The VC-E relationship is mainly governed by the financial contract that exists 
between both parties, mainly to alleviate the existent principal (VC) -agent 
(entrepreneur) problems (Holmstrom, 1979), which arise due to information 
asymmetries as well as behavioural uncertainties related to the interaction with the 
investment target (Amit et al., 1998). These asymmetries stem from either hidden 
information (adverse selection problem) or hidden actions (moral hazard problem) 
(Elitzur and Gavious, 2001). Contractual favourableness (or the degree to which an 
entrepreneur is content with the contract) is associated with fewer post-investment 
disagreements between both parties. Economic theory also suggests that difficulty 
faced by entrepreneurs in obtaining finance due to the high risk arising from the 
information asymmetries, leading to conflicts of interest between the principal and the 
agent, can be overcome through investor monitoring, structuring of financial contracts 
and contractual rights, staging of capital and risk-sharing solutions (Denis, 2004; 
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Nofsinger and Wang, 2011). Hence, research on VC contracting covers the investment 
life cycle, i.e., selection, appraisal, contracting, monitoring and exiting of target 
companies (Kaplan et al., 2001). It is worthy of mention that literature covering FCT 
and other issues related to VC-E contractual relationship is very broad and hence only 
previous studies related to the scope of this research will be covered. 
The structure of the contract between principal and agent aids in mitigating 
conflicts of interest between them, through selection of security, control rights and 
cash-flow rights. For proper contract implementation, the contract design must also 
consider the incentives of both agents and hence provide expected returns equal to at 
least their investment (Casamatta, 2003). The first conflict arising in the VC-E 
relationship is adverse selection, which can be addressed through the type of security 
selected. The extent of the problem, or the degree of information asymmetry and agency 
costs faced by the VC firm, is not constant across different types of entrepreneurial 
firms (Burchardt et al., 2016); hence, these firms will have varying contract preferences 
accordingly. Consequently, securities used can be designed within contracts, to deal 
with agency problems based on the specific characteristics of the firm seeking financing 
(e.g., Cumming and Johan, 2009). Choice of securities can also differ based on the stage 
of financing of the firm (early or later stage) (Cumming and Johan, 2007). Previous 
theoretical literature has taken two tracks: the first characterises convertible preferred 
securities9 as the optimal form of financing for entrepreneurial firms (Chan, 1983; Amit 
et al., 1990; Berglöf, 1994; Gompers, 1997; Bergemann and Hege, 1998; Marx, 1998; 
Trester, 1998; Casamatta, 2003; and Schmidt, 2003); while the second suggests that 
convertible securities are not uniquely optimal (Barney et al., 1994; Landstrom et al., 
                                                 
9 Convertible preferred stock is a share of a company’s equity that gives the holder the right to exchange his/her stocks into 
common stocks 
and is preferred in case of bankruptcy and dividend payments. 
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1998; Manigart et al., 2002; Cumming, 2006; Cumming and Johan, 2009); while 
previous literature, mostly empirical, shows these convertibles to be the only optimal 
choice. Convertibles are used by 100% of the sample tested by Sahlman (1990) and 
Bengtsson and Sensoy (2011); 94.5 % of the sample tested by Kaplan and Stromberg 
(2003) and 80% by Trester (1998). The common ground between these studies is that 
all the samples are based on US firms. Gilson and Schizer (2003) offer a tax-related 
explanation, which does apply to the US only, for the remarkable similarity of capital 
structures in US venture finance. Companies issuing convertible-preferred equity are 
able to offer favourable tax treatment on their incentive compensation payments to 
employees (especially to the founder). On the other hand, studies based on European 
(Bottazzi, et al., 2004, 2009; Cumming, 2008; Schwienbacher, 2008; Hege et al., 2009) 
or Canadian (Cumming, 2004, 2005) venture capitalists find variant results with regard 
to both the choice of financial instrument and the distribution of cash-flow and control 
rights. Common stock is used more than convertible preferred equity, followed by 
mixed debt equity and straight debt or straight-preferred debt. In the hope of further 
explaining the heterogeneous results, Kaplan et al. (2007) study an international sample 
and, even though the findings show that the majority of investments are in fact financed 
with convertible preferred equity, it still remains much less common than in the US. 
Another explanation could be attributed to the association between the choice of 
financial instrument and agency costs related to the context of the stage of financing 
(start-up or seed) (Cumming and Johan, 2009). Moreover, adverse selection costs are 
more significant for firms in start-up and expansion stages, due to the presence of more 
risks (systematic, unsystematic and informational risks). Moral hazard costs are also 
high for start-up firms, due to the flexible nature of their assets, which enhances the 
ability for entrepreneurs to extract private benefits. Combined with the advantage that 
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preferred stockholders have over common stockholders in cases of bankruptcy and 
liquidation (Besley and Brigham, 2014), this explains the favouring of convertible 
preferred equity when investments are riskier. Another factor that would make 
convertible preferred equity more favourable according to risk is the type of industry in 
which the entrepreneurial firm operates. For example, venture capitalists are exposed 
to greater agency costs when investing in high- technology entrepreneurial firms (Hart 
and Moore, 1994; Noe and Rebello, 1996).  
The agent is not the only criterion to be considered when selecting securities; 
the type of security can also depend on the venture capitalist’s experience. The more 
experienced the venture capitalists are, the less concerned they are with clauses in the 
contract that would hedge their risk (Bengtsson and Sensoy, 2011). Venture capitalists 
with better governance abilities avoid clauses involving costs of risk sharing and focus 
more on influencing venture development, such as negotiating more on board 
representation rights.  
The variation in research results can also stem from the different uses of contract 
provisions (e.g. liquidation preference), for a given security, which can result in a 
similar payoff for the investor (Metric and Yasuda, 2010; Bengtsson, 2011). Moreover, 
some combinations of different classes of securities can also substitute others (Kaplan 
and Stromberg, 2001). For example, debt-equity combination is equivalent to 
convertibles, according to the models of Bergemann and Hege (1998) and Marx (1998). 
The extent of adverse selection problem may also fluctuate according to the 
strength of IPR (Intellectual Property Rights) protection (Ueda, 2004). The stronger it 
is, the more reassurance to entrepreneurs that their idea would not be given away to the 
venture capitalists, and thus they would not feel the need to avoid revealing critical 
information.  
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The second major conflict in the VC-E relationship is moral hazard (Burchardt 
et al., 2014), which includes lack of effort on the entrepreneur’s behalf after VC funds 
are committed, entrepreneurs’ engaging in opportunistic behaviour due to excess 
private information they have over the VC (informational rents), and the risk of threat 
to breach contract and withdraw HC when it is particularly important to the firm (hold- 
up problem) (Hart and Moore, 1994). Efficient contract design can help to align the 
incentives of the venture capitalist and the entrepreneur, and therefore mitigate those 
moral hazard issues, by the separate allocation of different rights such as cash-flow and 
control rights, which give entrepreneurs an incentive to act optimally (Kaplan and 
Stromberg, 2001). Allocation of cash-flow rights suggests that entrepreneur equity 
compensation is more sensitive to performance when information asymmetry increases 
(Holstrom, 1979; Lazear, 1986). This should secure the VC an attractive return on 
investment, while still providing sufficient financial incentives for optimal exertion of 
effort from the entrepreneur’s side. Control rights, such as voting, liquidation and board 
rights, are allocated differently, whereas, if company performance is poor, then the VC 
would obtain full control. While these rights are conditional to the firm’s performance, 
they are more common in the early stages of the VC and E relationship (Aghion and 
Bolton, 1992; Dewatripont and Tirole, 1994). Venture capitalists can alleviate the hold-
up problem, specifically by including non-compete and vesting provisions in their 
contracts (Hart and Moore, 2004). Built on Traditional Corporate Finance Theory, 
which explains why agency costs are associated with obtaining external financing, 
Casamatta’s (2003) model finds a relationship between the level of financial 
participation of the VC firm and the type of claim issued by the firm. Common stocks 
are used in the case of small investments, while convertible bonds are utilised for large 
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investments. This model is also supported by the work of Fenn et al. (1998), as well as 
Kaplan and Stromberg (2003). 
Taking cash-flow rights a step further, when dealing with the moral hazard 
problem, agency costs and control risks are mitigated through stage financing (Wang 
and Zhou, 2004). In VC financing, this refers to segmenting the provision of funds to 
maintain the possibility of abandoning the project. Instead of committing all the 
necessary capital at once, venture capitalists invest on separate stages to keep the 
venture under control, by obliging entrepreneurs to continue to exert effort to receive 
the subsequent fund. When financing high-risk companies with pervasive moral 
hazards, staged financing allows venture capitalists to gather information and to 
monitor the progress of projects, while maintaining the option to quit (Gompers, 1995). 
This minimises risk for venture capitalists as it reduces losses from inefficient 
continuation and creates an exit option for them. Elitzur and Gavious (2001) rely on a 
multi-period game theoretic model to study the VC-E relationship and how the VC 
deals with the problem of entrepreneur’s hidden effort, through stage financing. In the 
model, the contract is set in the first period, while the relationship lasts several years, 
split into stages, allowing for the derivation of the strategic behaviour of both parties 
over time. Their findings show that all incentive payments should be back-loaded to the 
entrepreneur as much as possible and that a straight debt contract is the optimal one in 
venture financing. The drawback in the studies of Elitzur and Gavious (2001) and 
Casamatta (2003) as well as others is that they work on the moral hazard problem; 
however, only focusing on the entrepreneur’s side. Smith (1998) was the first to argue 
that both parties participate in the establishment of the firm’s net worth and therefore a 
double-sided moral hazard problem exists. De Bettignies and Brander (2007) 
acknowledge that it is in fact a double moral hazard problem, where both the venture 
59 
 
capitalist and entrepreneur face moral hazard, and emphasise that efforts of both need 
to be aligned (consistent with ST), yet they fail to solve the moral hazard problem faced 
by entrepreneurs. Their conclusion shows that, when a VC owns a greater share in the 
firm, this in turn improves the VC’s effort level but reduces the entrepreneur’s. Building 
on their work, seeking to find a solution, Vergara et al. (2016) design an optimal 
contract in the context of double moral hazard, where efforts of both are complements, 
rather than substitutes. This is based on the previously mentioned concept of joined 
inputs from both the venture capitalist and the entrepreneur. Venture capitalists 
contribute marketing and networking support while, entrepreneurs possess skills in 
technological and production aspects as well as innovative ideas (Fairchild, 2011), 
hence they complement each other. The synergy generated by complementarity 
between the entrepreneur’s abilities and VC’s experience has a positive effect on the 
market value of the enterprise (Vergara et al., 2016). Contrary to Casamatta (2003) and 
De Bettignies and Brander (2007), the results of Vergara et al. (2016) show that the 
entrepreneurs’ efforts do not decrease with shares allocated to venture capitalists, and 
there is no efficiency wage; instead, the venture capitalists’ share is binding. Efforts of 
both are non-linear with respect to equity participation levels. The optimal share 
awarded to the VC depends on the elasticity and efficiencies as well as the 
complementarity of the efforts of both. The greater the complementarity, the greater the 
proportion of equity the entrepreneur is willing to give to the VC. The higher it is, the 
more it will result in shares being equal. This view is supported by previous work, 
where data from actual transactions showed venture capitalists to hold a 50% equity 
share in the ventures (Kaplan and Stromberg, 2003; Cumming et al., 2006; Goldfarb et 
al., 2013). 
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The work of Vergara et al. (2016) on complementarity effect addresses one of 
the recommendations of Arthur and Busenitz (2003). The work of the latter is based on 
the belief that both the AT and ST overlook the goals and motivation of the 
entrepreneurs and overemphasise the centrality of the VC. Neither of the theories 
explain the benefits that the entrepreneur can offer for venture or the relational rents 
possible through the VC-E relationship (De Clerq and Sapienza, 2000, 2001). They also 
find ST to be inadequate as it assumes subordination of E’s goals or self-interest to take 
the priority of the best interest of the principal. Therefore, it fails to explain the VC-E 
relationship. In an effort to correct both theories, their results suggest that research on 
the VC- E relationship should focus on three dimensions. First, going beyond separation 
of ownership and management, researchers need to consider the trust developed in the 
relationship between both and need to view VC involvement as a form of collaboration 
to nurture the venture. Hence, this study will focus on the trust between both rather than 
contract specifications. Second, going beyond financial ownership, where researchers 
should consider the way venture capitalists treat entrepreneurs. In other words, if 
venture capitalists treat entrepreneurs with respect and highlight their capabilities and 
the firm-specific skills they possess, then the entrepreneurs will be motivated to 
continue to exert effort even if their shares are diluted, as they receive more funding. 
Finally, centrality of the entrepreneur: VC input should be examined from a 
complementary perspective (as per Vergara et al., 2016), where the strengths and 
weaknesses of the venture capitalist and the entrepreneur should be balanced. This in 
turn highlights the importance of this study, as it combines the characteristics of 
entrepreneurs and their firms, and venture capitalists and their firms, as well as the 
relationship between both. 
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Empirical tests (Gompers, 1997; Gompers and Lerner, 2001; Kaplan and 
Stromberg, 2003, 2004; Cumming, 2006; Cumming and Johan, 2009) have shown 
different results for the optimal structuring of contracts. This could be explained, by the 
relative negotiation ability of the VC and the entrepreneur. All of the abovementioned 
studies fail to include the effect of bargaining and negotiation between venture 
capitalists and entrepreneurs, until the recent study by Fu et al. (2018), which covered 
it. Their results show the significance of bargaining power in influencing how the 
project output is shared, and in determining how the return from the project will be 
allocated. In addition, no work has included syndication in the VC-E contractual 
relationship. Furthermore, understanding the different aspects of the legal environment 
such as legal implementation and institutional context influence (Inderst and Muller, 
2004) is also important when assessing the VC-E relationship. 
Behavioural economists highlight that the VC-E relation may also be governed 
by psychological factors such as fairness and reciprocity (Bolton, 1991; Rabin, 1993; 
Fehr and Schmidt, 1999), empathy (Sally, 2001) and trust (Berg et al., 1995; Bolle, 
1995; Huang, 2000). Feelings may affect outcomes of negotiations and performance. 
Lehtonen et al. (2004) compare the agency approach to Procedural Justice Theory (PJ). 
This theory is based on fairness in decision-making where the fairer a party acts, the 
more likely it is to trust the other party. An increase in a person’s fairness perception 
leads to commitment to decisions, performance, behaviour and attitude (Kim and 
Mauborgne (1991, 1993). Venture capitalists often complain that entrepreneurs are 
hesitant to share information (Sapienza, 1989), whereas willingness to share 
information and provide timely feedback is an indication of openness and honesty 
(Sapienza and Korsgaard, 1996). 
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Trust as used in relevant research (Saparito and Chen, 2001; Zacharakis and 
Shepherd, 2001; Li et al., 2018) is defined by Saparito et al. (2004) as a psychological 
state that is derived from the intention of one party to accept vulnerability based on 
positive expectations of the intentions or behaviour of another. This definition includes 
the expectation of any future beneficial action, whether it is based on self-interest or on 
a relationship (Saparito et al., 2004). Additionally, institutional trust is defined by Hain 
et al. (2016) as the overall trust in the institutional structure and the honest behaviour 
of citizens. 
A high degree of trust and communication between the venture capitalist and 
entrepreneur can generate relational rents (De Clerq and Sapienza, 2001). Cable and 
Shane (1997) believe contractual control and trust to be substitutes in the VC-E 
relationship. Shepherd and Zacharakis (2001) view them as complements and find 
medium control to be optimal and to maximise trust. Fairchild (2006) takes those 
studies a step further to include empathy as a factor and to consider the impact of 
different contexts. Results show control and empathy/cooperation to be substitutes. 
Tough contracts (those with high penalties) destroy empathy and cooperation. They are 
optimal when culture closeness is low and legal system is highly effective, while soft 
contracts hold for the opposite. Other studies that capture the impact of trust in financial 
markets include Guiso et al. (2008), who emphasised the impact of trust in stock 
markets, and Bottazzi et al. (2016), who found it to significantly impact investment 
decisions. 
Furthermore, Li et al. (2018) study how the trust relationship between venture 
capitalists and entrepreneurs and a firm's performance are linked. Their research 
identifies three mechanisms through which trust can improve a firm's performance: 
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better use of complementary resources, reduction of costs associated with asymmetric 
information, and team spirit. Their work mainly assesses the effect of trust in 
developing economies, which have weaker legal systems, and show that, in those cases, 
trust is more prevalent than strict contracts or any other rights.  
2.4 Institutional Environment 
Institutions are defined by North (1990, p.3) as “the rules of the game in a society” that 
have a significant impact on the goals and beliefs of individuals, groups and 
organisations (North 1990; Scott, 2002). Building on this definition by North, as well 
as the work of DiMaggio and Powell (1991), Scott (2002) categorised both formal and 
informal institutions into three groups: Regulatory, normative and cognitive, regulatory 
being the most formal and cognitive the most informal. More explicitly, regulatory 
institutions represent the standards provided by laws and other sanctions. Normative 
institutions represent roles or actions expected of individuals. They often exist through 
accepted authority systems like accounting or medical professional societies. They are 
either codified or understood practices of a work function or profession. Cognitive – or 
often referred to as cultural-cognitive – institutions are beliefs that guide behaviour. 
They are established by individuals in a society through their social interactions. They 
are considered to be rules that are ‘taken for granted’. The influence of normative and 
cognitive institutions is through the culture, as they are the more informal institutions 
(Scott, 2002; Bruton and Ahlstron, 2006).  
 Organisations are not only embedded in the institutional arrangement of their 
own industry but also in their country-specific institutional settings (Busenitz et al., 
2000; Bruton and Ahlstrom, 2006). Institutional differences in countries range from 
differences in culture, business norms, laws and regulations, and enforcement (Orru et 
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al., 1991; Kostova, 1997; Bruton and Ahlstom, 2006). VC does not differ from any 
other industry or organisation, in a sense, in that certain institutions common to the 
industry would have impacts that lead venture capitalists to act uniformly (Fried and 
Hisrich, 1994). Institutions will also have an impact on the formation of goals and the 
processes of VC firms (Wright et al., 1992), their organisational practices and routines 
(Biggart and Guillent, 1999), and their strategic choices (Hitt et al., 2004). Furthermore, 
as institutions in emerging markets (EMs) differ to those in developed markets (DMs), 
then traditional VC mechanisms may need modification to be implemented (Bruton and 
Ahlstrom, 2003). EMs are countries undergoing rapid growth and reforming their 
economies to increase the number of transactions governed by market forces. They are 
known for their fundamental and complete institutional transformation as they begin to 
mature, hence their VC firms function differently from those in DMs (Bruton and 
Ahlstrom, 2006). 
The variation in EMs and DMs, specifically differences in laws, regulations and 
enforcement, leads to alterations in the widely studied settings of VC in DMs mainly in 
the US, as the behaviour of entrepreneurs would differ if they do not feel their 
innovations are protected (Yasar et al., 2011). Furthermore, the use of networks in VC 
activities would be necessary to substitute more formal institutions (Bruton and 
Ahlstrom, 2006) and the VC-E relationship would rely more on trust than contract 
covenants (Li et al., 2018). 
2.4.1 Institutional Differences and the Entrepreneur 
The institutional environment of the country in which it exists generally affects 
entrepreneurship. Amoros (2011), who studies the impact of institutions on 
entrepreneurship in developing nations, finds positive relationships between both 
control of corruption and political stability and productive entrepreneurship. To explain 
65 
 
further, in high-income countries, if existing government institutions are of adequate 
quality then real opportunity venture can be allocated. This means that, in developing 
nations, in order to facilitate the right type of entrepreneurship, certain institutions have 
to be adopted first (Boettke and Coyne, 2009). 
The court system is the main representative of the legal environment of any 
nation. The court system determines the ability to protect the intellectual property rights 
of entrepreneurs, through the existence of legitimate enforcement mechanisms (Smith 
and Ueda, 2006). The legal environment has an impact on the way entrepreneurs do 
business (Ueda, 2004) and the services provided by venture capitalists (Li et al. 2018). 
Entrepreneurial effort and transparency, as well as the provision of VC services in 
developed countries such as the US and Europe rely on the assumption that the rule of 
law will prevail; in other words, their ownership rights will be guaranteed and their 
contracts will be enforced by the court system (Li et al., 2018). However, in 
environments such as EMs with weak legal systems, this assumption is unlikely to hold. 
Entrepreneurs’ innovation decisions (which include product, technological, process and 
management innovation) also depend on their perception of the legal environment (Jiao 
et al., 2015). The role of law and property rights is to stabilise entrepreneurs’ 
expectations. Therefore, the more transparent and predictable the rules and laws are, 
the more likely it is for a firm to be innovative (Jiao et al., 2015). Law enforcement 
contributes to the increase of patent applications. Li (2006) shows that the degree of 
patent protection plays a significant role in promoting innovation activities. Lahr and 
Mina (2016) also show that institutional differences matter, as their results find firms 
based in the US to have higher chances of success (in terms of patent applications being 
granted) than firms located in the UK, due to the different patenting regimes. This has 
an impact on the innovation RBCs of entrepreneurs. 
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Not only do institutional differences affect entrepreneurs, but also VC firm 
effort and activities. This will be discussed in the following sections.  
2.4.2 Institutional Differences and Venture Capitalists 
VC investments are characterised by a high level of risk. Investors try to minimise this 
risk by properly screening and selecting new ventures, actively monitoring them and 
by timely exiting portfolio companies. To do so, an effective and efﬁcient legal system 
is of utmost importance (Bonini and Alkan, 2012). Furthermore, EMs offer little 
protection for investors or private property (2001), which makes portfolio firm selection 
and monitoring processes more difficult (Bruton and Ahlstrom, 2003; Pruthi et al., 
2003). 
Using Search Theory, Silveira and Wright (2016) predict that the legal 
environment is positively related to market activity. Their model demonstrates that a 
better legal environment reduces the cost of entry into a market or the time spent on 
monitoring an investment. This increases market tightness, which leads to a higher 
number of deals. In addition, differences in legal systems increase information 
asymmetries, the cost (legal and contractual), and the risk of investment. Hence, law 
quality can have a significant effect on the costs and beneﬁts associated with monitoring 
the entrepreneur (La Porta et al., 1998, 2000). With evidence from 39 countries, 
Cumming et al. (2010) found that a stronger legal environment facilitates board 
representation in the portfolio firm, as marginal benefits of monitoring are higher, due 
to better information available regarding the firm’s activities. Furthermore, a stronger 
legal environment also leads to faster deal screening, as writing enforceable contracts 
is easier and government procedures are executed faster. The legal environment also 
affects effort provisions. The better the legal environment, the more reassuring and 
67 
 
motivating it is for venture capitalists to give non-contractible support to entrepreneurs, 
as venture capitalists are assured that their efforts will pay off (Bottazzi et al., 2009). 
Consistent with the Institutional Theory (Bruton and Ahlstrom, 2003), venture 
capitalists rely on a steady institutional regime with a foreseeable rule of law and 
enforcement regime to ease simplify and safeguard their investments (Cardis et al., 
2001). VC firms perform better in countries with a stronger legal system, since legal 
recourse is open to investors if the information they receive is not accurate or other 
ﬁnancial shenanigans occur. In addition, ofﬁcial corruption in such settings becomes 
more addressable through legal protection (Peng, 2003). This institutional stability and 
predictability, decreases ambiguity and risk and increases the possibility of success in 
start-ups. 
 Venture capitalists in DMs rely on laws and regulations such as shareholder and 
creditor protection and property rights, (Daily et al., 2014) company and bankruptcy, 
investor protection and/or reorganisation laws (Smith and Ueda, 2006), which are all 
affected by the structure of the legal system in place, to safeguard their investments. 
With lack of institutional stability in EMs, they rely on other aspects in the VC market, 
such as networks and trust. Even though networks are important to all venture 
capitalists (Bygrave, 1987, 1988; Staurt et al., 1999; Shane and Cable, 2002), they are 
of particular importance in EM settings (Bruton et al., 2002, 2004; Lockett et al., 2002; 
Wright et al., 2002), where institutional stability is not strong or is largely unknown. 
Thus, they can act as a substitute for laws, regulations and enforcement (Butler et al., 
2003; Hoang and Antoncic, 2003; Peng, 2003) and take on more importance. For 
example, to minimise risk of investment in weaker legal systems, venture capitalists 
would rely on syndication (explained in section 2.2.2.1) as different venture capitalists 
may have complementary know-hows and expertise, which could better equip a 
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syndicate to cope with the inefficient legal framework (Manigart et al., 2006; Tykvova, 
2017). 
While the Institutional Theory adds a social and cultural view, which explains 
how networks in an institutional context impact the function of venture capitalists 
(Scott, 2002), other studies have also highlighted the role of networks in EM 
institutions. Zacharakis et al. (2007) categorise institutions into rule based and 
relationship based, where the former refers to transactions where exchanges are 
personal and the latter refers to impersonal exchanges. Their study examines the 
influence of economic institutions on VC decision policies, by comparing three 
different economic institutions: the US (a mature economy), South Korea (an emerging 
economy) and China (a transitional economy at that time). Their results found that the 
US relied on rule-based institutions, while the other two were relationship based. 
Furthermore, China put more weight on HC information (e.g. networks) than the other 
two. Nevertheless, in research it has been found that more developed economies rely 
more on market-oriented information, whereas transitional and emerging economies, 
with weaker law enforcement, rely more on HC information, such as networks and 
social influence (Marquis and Raynard, 2015). Additionally, in some economies the 
two may co-exist (Zacharakis et al., 2007). However, to conclude, they explain that, in 
cases like screening, research has shown that all venture capitalists from different 
economies rely on the same decision factors (Knight, 1994; Rah et al., 1994); however, 
they do not rely on the information in the same way, due to the influence of economic 
institutions. Differences in economic institutions introduce variations regarding which 
information is relied upon more heavily (Zacharakis et al., 2007).  
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2.4.3 Institutional Differences and the VC-E Relationship 
The legal environment has an impact on the VC-E relationship and the efficiency of 
contract writing and enforcement (Lerner and Tag, 2015). The legal environment is 
represented by the court system, which consists of legitimate enforcement mechanisms 
to govern the contractual relationship between the entrepreneur and the venture 
capitalist (Fairchild, 2006). These mechanisms influence the nature of legal obligations 
that parties to an agreement have to each other, as well as how courts interpret and 
enforce these obligations (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). 
The stronger the law system the more likely it is for parties to abide by their contractual 
agreement, as breach of contract penalties are more likely to be enforced. This has an 
impact on how entrepreneurs are compensated, how venture capitalists screen and 
monitor them, and on the effort exerted by both (Lerner and Tag, 2015). 
The way entrepreneurs are compensated is explained through choice of security. 
Lerner and Schoar (2005), who studied the impact of the legal environment on private 
equity firms in developing nations, found that in weaker legal environments (i.e. more 
difficult contract enforcement) these firms tend to rely more on direct ownership rather 
than on more complex convertible preferred stocks. It is also found that lower returns 
and valuations arise when investments occur within weak legal environments (Lerner 
and Schoar, 2005; Hazarika et al., 2009). Based on Institutional Theory, researchers are 
beginning to consider the characteristics of VC contracts around the world, particularly 
comparing VC in developed, well-established economies such as the UK or US with 
less-developed EMs, due to the different results found in many aspects.  
 Besides the variations in contracts across different contexts, trust is more 
prevalent in mitigating conflicts of interests in the VC-E relationships, in environments 
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with weak legal systems (Arthur and Busenitz, 2003; Vergara et al., 2016; Li et al., 
2018).  
As explained above, the institutional environment and stability of the nation in 
which the VC market exists have varying implications on the effect of entrepreneur 
characteristics, VC characteristics and the VC-E relationship, on portfolio firm 
performance. The core of this study is determined by those differences, as it is 
conducted on the emerging economy of Egypt, in which more informal institutional 
settings and a weaker legal system prevail. 
2.5 Literature on Venture Capitalists in the Context of Egypt 
The main focus of this research is the Egyptian emerging economy. There is almost no 
literature available on the VC market in Egypt. No studies have covered the impact of 
venture capitalists themselves, entrepreneurs, or the relationship between the two, on 
the performance of the portfolio companies. Hence, none are relevant to this research. 
However, a briefing on the available literature on VC markets in Egypt is provided 
below. 
The first research conducted related to venture capitalists in Egypt focused on 
private equity activities in general and covered not only Egypt but the entire MENA 
region. This study, by Ismail (2009), focused on the fast growth of private equity 
activities in Egypt and the impact of private equity firms on their portfolio companies, 
as well as the economic development implications for their countries. The point relevant 
to this study is the impact of private equity firms on their portfolio companies. Results 
show that, in most transactions, “private equity firms acted as a catalyst for initiating, 
consolidating (multiple small companies into larger, more competitive ones), 
professionalising (mainly hiring experienced management teams), growing and 
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globalising their portfolio companies” (Ismail, 2009, p.18). In doing so, they increased 
their competitiveness and expanded their operations in regional and globalised markets, 
which in turn means private equity firms had a positive impact on portfolio or acquired 
companies. 
A second study, conducted by Kenawy and Abd-el-Ghany (2012), analysed the 
obstacles facing the development of VC institutions and the important rules and policies 
necessary to support the success of this type of financing in developing countries. An 
important finding in this study showed that VC-backed projects in Egypt outperformed 
non-VC-backed ones; however, no explanation is provided for the outperformance. 
Another study focused only on Egypt was conducted by El-Siefy (2013), in an 
attempt to test the applicability of determinants for VC in the US on Egypt, to check 
for consistency in results, and to find a proper system to facilitate the growth of VC 
investments and investigate the role they play in economic growth. The motive behind 
the study was the lack of experienced financial and labour markets, which made VC 
less active in Egypt. Even though this is not a relevant topic to the research area covered 
in this study, it is important to note that some of the indicators for variables used in 
previous literature were not found, due to the absence of data on Egypt.  
 Eisa (2014), through a sample of 13 VC-related establishments in Egypt out of 
an estimated total of 17, attempted to find economic implications of venture capitalists, 
determinants of VC development, and the effect of government support on the 
development of the industry in Egypt. As noted from this study, there is a problem with 
disclosure in the VC market in Egypt, which if required and enforced should lead to 
enhancement of the industry. To date, there remains no directory of the Egyptian VC 
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industry. Despite struggles with data collection, results have shown that VC in Egypt 
does have a positive economic impact. 
The final study which included Egypt presented a public policy framework for 
supporting the emergence of the VC industry in Egypt, the UAE and Saudi Arabia 
(KSA) (Seoudi and Mahmoud, 2016).  
 There is a visible shortage of literature on VC in Egypt, especially relating to 
determinants of portfolio companies’ performance, which emphasises the importance 
and contribution of this research. All the existing studies also highlight that there is a 
lack of disclosure of information on VC in Egypt.  
This study is based on the Egyptian VC market, which makes it necessary to 
have a briefing on it.  
2.5.1 VC Market in Egypt 
The VC market in Egypt is relatively very recent. While the first private VC fund in the 
world was established in the US in the mid-1940s, which was called the American 
Research and Development (ARD) fund (Hsu and Kenney, 2005), the first VC fund 
established in Egypt, named Ideavelopers, dates back to only 2004 (Cousin, 2016). It is 
important to note that there is no directory in Egypt for the VC industry, so, 
approximately, to date there are 16 VC firms (listed in the appendix) in Egypt and three 
large angel investor groups. The difference between angel investors and venture 
capitalists is mainly that the former invest smaller amounts, are involved less in the 
ventures, typically fund only start-ups or seed investments, and invest their own money 
rather than that from investors (Mason and Harrison, 2000). 
As supported by evidence in the sectors funded, the largest industry financed by 
VC funds (in terms of number of transactions) in Egypt is the telecommunications and 
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information technology sector, while the industry with the biggest size transactions is 
the basic materials, such as cement (Ismail, 2009). 
In this study, Egypt is viewed as an emerging economy and is accordingly 
considered to lack institutional stability and have a weak legal system (Hassan, 
2010).The only study conducted on the Egyptian market that is relatively relevant to 
this research is by Hassan (2010), and explores the operation of private equity (PE) and 
VC firms in Egypt. It explores this in terms of the structure of these firms, the selection 
of potential investee companies and the roles of these firms after providing funds.  
As for the structure of PE and VC firms in Egypt, Hassan (2010) explored them 
in terms of origin, sources of finance, industry and stage of development. PE and VC 
firms in Egypt were found to originate from developed markets operating in the 
Egyptian market or were domestic (from Egypt) and either competing with other 
Egyptian firms or with other emerging markets.  
The sources of finance that Hassan (2010) found PE and VC firms in Egypt to rely on 
are either independent or captive (Manigart, and Wright, 2013). Independent firms are 
those that raise capital from a variety of sources including private investors and private 
financial institutions. Captive firms are those that are subsidiaries or divisions of larger 
financial institutions.  
Some PE and VC firms in Egypt choose to specialise in investing in only one 
industry, such as technology or tourism, while others choose to diversify their portfolios 
by investing in any industry (Hassan, 2010). These latter firms at the time of the study 
chose to invest mostly in firms in later or expansion stages. They accepted the concept 
of funding early-stage companies or start-ups; however, the major obstacle they faced 
in doing so was finding the right entrepreneurs to fund, due to the lack of HC and 
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expertise in building start-ups in Egypt. Hence, they mostly resorted to selecting 
entrepreneurs based on personal connections and networks. In DMs, venture capitalists 
have a choice between passive and proactive investments (Boocock and Woods, 1997; 
Wright and Robbie, 1998; Busenitz et al., 2005); however, in EMs only the latter exists. 
Passive selection refers to investees approaching venture capitalists with offers to 
receive funding, where no effort is exerted by venture capitalists to find investment 
opportunities. On the other hand, proactive selection is when venture capitalists search 
for investees themselves through consultants or in the industries in which they are 
seeking to invest. In Egypt, passive investments are very rare, due to the limited 
information available on PE/VC firms online, lack of understanding of the VC industry 
amongst the public and the absence of an Egyptian VC association (Hassan, 2010). 
Instead, in Egypt it is more common for venture capitalists to reach investment offers 
through referrals from different parties, such as intermediaries, other successful 
entrepreneurs and other VC firms. Moreover, accountants play a major role in 
investment deals, by signing a statement confirming their responsibility for the financial 
section of the proposed business plans. The Institutional Theory explains that networks 
can be used as a substitute for regulations in the PE/VC industry in EMs (Peng, 2000; 
Bruton and Ahlstrom, 2003). Venture capitalists in Egypt confirm this by relying on 
networks and personal connections to find trusted investees.  
The final section in the study of Hassan (2010) is related to the roles of private 
equity and venture capital firms in their portfolio companies in Egypt. Results show 
that the most difficult role they face, after the selection and funding phases, is 
persuading them that their goals are aligned, and that the main objective for both is the 
growth of the portfolio company. The role of monitoring the portfolio firms in Egypt is 
not as vigorous as it is in DMs, due to the lack of regulation in the former, and hence 
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venture capitalists find that building an early relationship is the most crucial factor to 
the success of the portfolio company. 
Hassan’s (2010) study has a few limitations that this study addresses. First, at 
the time of the Hassan’s study, there were only 14 VC firms; however, the results were 
based on only seven interviews conducted with managers of both PE and VC firms, 
while at the time of this study there are 16 active VC firms, 14 of which are included in 
the results. Second, Hassan’s study was conducted in 2010 and since then conditions in 
Egypt, as well as the capacity of investees available, have changed. Finally, Hassan’s 
study only covered the views of some of the VC firms and neglected the demand side 
of VC, which refers to the entrepreneurs receiving funds. However, this study takes into 
consideration the views of both venture capitalists and entrepreneurs and hence reflects 
a fuller and more realistic picture of the VC market in Egypt.  
The perspective that Egypt has a weak legal system and lacks institutional 
stability is supported by the Global Competitiveness Report (2018), which shows the 
most problematic factors in Egypt. For the factors relevant to this study, policy 
instability was ranked as the first problem, corruption came third and inefficient 
government bureaucracy was fourth.10 In addition, out of 137 countries covered by this 
report, Egypt ranked 77 in terms of Efficiency of Legal Framework in Settling Disputes 
(scored 3.5 in rating out of 7) and 106 in Legal Rights Index (scored a 2 out of 10 in 
the rating value for this index). 
However, the business environment is Egypt is improving: in 2018, Egypt 
strengthened minority investor protection by increasing shareholder rights and role in 
major corporate decisions11. 
                                                 
10 This data was derived from the World Economic Forum’s Executive Survey.  
11 This data was derived from the World Bank’s Doing Business Report (2018). 
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To understand the rationale for focusing on non-contractual forms in the VC-E 
relationship, the following table explains the extent of contract enforcement and hence 
dependability in Egypt.  
 
This justifies why the study perceives Egypt to have a weak legal system and 
hence relies on non-contractual measures in mediating the VC-E relationship. 
2.6 Summary of Venture Capital Related Theories 
The theory that justifies the purpose of this study is the Institutional Theory which 
explains that the characteristics that leverage a successful VC market in a developed 
nation will not necessarily hold in an emerging context (Bruton and Ahlstrom, 2006; 
Meyer and Peng, 2016). This is attributed to the different environments that exist in 
emerging markets, particularly weak legal systems and lack of formal institutions.  
VC funding is known as risky capital as they are known to fund young entrepreneurial 
firms with innovative ideas, that have no track-record to enable them to receive funding 
from traditional sources such as banks (Aron and Lazear, 1990). This is an information 
asymmetry problem. It is explained by the Agency Theory, and it is applicable to both 
                                                 
12 This data was derived from the World Bank’s Doing Business Report (2018). 
Table 2.2: Information on Business Environment in Egypt 
Business Index Rank out of 190 
Minority Investor Protection 81 
Starting a business 103 
Ease of doing business 128 
Table 2.3.: Information on Enforcing Contracts in Egypt12 
Enforcing contracts in Egypt 
Rank out of 190 countries 160 
Score (0-100) 42.75 
Time (days)  1,010 
Cost (% of claim) 26.2 
Quality of Judicial Process Index (0-18) 5.5 
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developed and emerging economies, as this market imperfection problem exists 
everywhere. The Agency Theory (Akerlof, 1970) explains the misalignment of goals 
of the venture capitalists and entrepreneurs, particularly with the lack of information 
that is present. Venture capitalists are known to be experts at solving information 
asymmetry problems because of the tools they possess which enable them to do so 
(Pettinger, 2017). These tools include their ability to screen and monitor those firms, 
their ability to finance at different stages as an incentive for entrepreneurs to increase 
returns and the contractual agreements. Contractual agreements based on the Financial 
Contracting Theory (Kaplan and Stromberg, 2004) allow venture capitalists and 
entrepreneurs to select contract covenants and agree on different terms that increase 
incentives to both, and hence, the willingness to exert effort. As explained by 
Institutional Theory that not all theories can be applied to emerging economies (Meyer 
and Peng, 2016), Financial Contracting Theory is one of them. Understanding this 
difference and how firms in emerging economies can substitute the reliance on such 
contracts, enables the response to the second research question: What impact does the 
relationship between the entrepreneur and the VC have on the success of VC-backed 
firms in Egypt (an emerging economy)? 
 The weak legal environments existing in emerging economies and the poor or lack of 
contract enforcement that exists in those nations, makes the contractual agreements 
unreliable to both parties. Instead in those nations, they resort to relying on other means 
to ensure the exertion of effort by both entrepreneurs and venture capitalists. Networks 
as explained by the Social Networking Theory (Laudan, 1997) are very important in 
such economies, where in many cases they are substitutes for the lacking formal 
institutions. The crucial role that networks play in emerging economies is emphasised 
by the Institutional Theory (Milosevic, 2018). Other studies also explain that in contexts 
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where contractual agreements are important to provide incentives to both entrepreneurs 
and venture capitalists to exert effort, and particularly in contexts when they are 
ineffective, both parties should view their roles as complements rather than substitutes. 
As supported by the Resource Dependence Theory (RDT) (Gabrielsson and Huse, 
2002) (in both developed and emerging contexts), while entrepreneurs contribute their 
innovative ideas and the know-hows to produce them, they lack managerial expertise 
and other necessary aspects to run a business, that venture capitalists can provide them. 
According to this theory, resources provided by venture capitalists, include human and 
social capital as well. Which integrates with the Human Capital Theory (Becker, 1975) 
and again Social Capital/ Social Networking Theory (Hochberg et al., 2007). Other than 
the relative importance of the reliance on networks which differs between developed 
and emerging economies. The level of education available as well as the experience 
opportunities and hence, HC possessed by both entrepreneurs and venture capitalists in 
both economies may differ and in turn have different impact on the success of VC-
backed firms (Unger et al., 2009). Investigating the differences between both allows for 
the investigation of the first research question: What role do characteristics of 
entrepreneurs and VC firms each play in the success of VC-backed firms in Egypt (an 
emerging economy)?  
 The brief explanation of the Institutional Theory as well as the differences 
between developed and emerging economies that impact the VC market, mentioned 
above, is a stepping stone to the explanation of how the third research question will be 
explained: How does the impact of entrepreneur characteristics, VC firms and the VC-
E relationship change with the institutional environment in which they exist? 
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2.7 Chapter Summary 
Previous literature shows that the performance of VC-backed firms can be enhanced by 
characteristics of the entrepreneurial firm and its founding team (Shane and Staurt, 
2002; Davidsson and Honig, 2003; Wang  and Ang, 2004), characteristics of VC firm 
managers (Dimov and Shepherd, 2005) and the value-added of non-financial activities 
they carry out for the firm (Croce et al., 2012), as well as the relationship between 
entrepreneurs and venture capitalists (Casamatta, 2003; Li et al., 2018). This 
relationship is determined by the effort they each exert and the contractual agreement 
between them (Vergara et al., 2016). The different results found in the literature13 are 
mainly attributed to contextual differences stemming from different institutional 
settings/stability. Hence, it is important to understand that the impact of those variables 
can differ from one economy to another (Bruton and Ahlstrom, 2006). The focus of this 
study is on the emerging economy of Egypt. Therefore, the legal environment in Egypt 
may impact the contractual agreement, the transparency of the entrepreneur and the 
effort exerted by the venture capitalists. Additionally, the institutional setting in Egypt 
can lead to different results and create a greater emphasis on the role of networks 
(Bruton and Ahlstrom, 2016) and trust (Li et al., 2018) for the VC firms. Accordingly, 
the following chapters will explain the model and hypotheses to be tested, as well as 
the examination methods that will enable the achievement of the objectives of this 
study. This will create an understanding of the impact of each variable on VC-backed 
firms’ performance within the emerging economy of Egypt.  
  
                                                 
13 A summary of the literature and its relation to this study is provided in Appendix A Table A1. 
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Chapter Three 
 Conceptual Framework and Hypotheses Development 
3.0 Introduction 
Some previous research in DMs (Kortum and Lerner, 2000; Baum and Silverman, 
2004; Rajan, 2010; Chemmanur et al., 2011) and EMs (Guo and Jiang, 2013; Otchere 
and Vong, 2016) including Egypt (Kenawy and Abd-el-Ghany, 2012) concludes that 
VC-backed firms outperform non-VC-backed ones. While some studies have failed to 
find causality for this outperformance (Baum and Silverman, 2004; Kenawy and Abd-
el-Ghany, 2012), others have found the screening effect by or the value-added effect by 
venture capitalists (Engel, 2002; Davila et al., 2003; Balboa et al., 2006; Colombo and 
Grilli, 2010; Bertoni et al., 2011) or both (Chemmanur et al., 2011) to be the reason for 
this outperformance. VC firms’ contribution is not limited to a financial one. How 
effective their non-financial contributions are on the performance of portfolio firms 
could also be determined by the relationship between the venture capitalists and the 
founders of those firms (Elitzur and Gavious, 2001; Casmatta, 2003; Vergara et al., 
2016). 
The main aim of this research is to determine the factors that affect the success 
of VC-backed firms in Egypt, i.e. why some firms are more successful than others. The 
determinants of the portfolio firms’ success have been discussed in previous literature. 
The results of previous studies have shown different variables to have an impact on the 
performance of firms. Some have found that entrepreneurs (Bates, 1990; Bruderl et al., 
1992; Shane and Stuart, 2002) affect venture success through SC (Bruton et al., 2000; 
Hsu, 2004), HC (Cooper et al., 1994; Davidson and Honig, 2003; Rotefoss and 
Kolvereid, 2005; Dimov, 2010), or the RBCs of the venture (Barney, 1991; Grant, 
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1991; Mahoney and Panadian, 1992; Peteraf, 1993; Wang and Ang; 2004). Others have 
found VC firms to be the determinant of the portfolio firm’s success, either through 
monitoring and funding (Sahlman, 1990; Lerner, 1995; Kaplan and Stromberg, 2003) 
or value-added activities (Sapienza et al., 1996; Sorenson, 1997). Additionally, other 
studies have found the relationship between entrepreneurs and venture capitalists to 
impact portfolio firm success (Elitzur and Gavious, 2001; De Bettignies and Brander, 
2007; Vergara et al., 2016), whether the interrelation between them is in terms of joint 
effort (Keuschnigg, 2004), cooperation (Cable and Shane, 1997), or the contract 
between them (Casamatta, 2003).  
Some studies have found contradicting results to the abovementioned (Chan, 
1983; Tyebjee and Bruno, 1984; Hunter and Schmidt, 1990; Gifford, 1997; Lerner et 
al., 1997; Amit et al., 1998; Unger et al., 1999; Inderst and Muller, 2004). The 
inconsistency in results is due to various reasons; the most crucial to this study is that 
they are conducted in different nations (different contexts), where developmental and 
institutional differences exist. Therefore, this research will test the impact of these 
variables on the venture-backed firms’ success in Egypt to detect which has a more 
significant influence. The variables and interrelations are presented in section 3.1; the 
variables are explained in section 3.2, where the hypotheses are derived accordingly 
and the proxies that will be used to measure each variable are also included. Section 3.3 
concludes the chapter with a summary of all the proxies for each variable. 
 
 
 
 
 
82 
 
 
 
 
 
3.1 The model14 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.1: Conceptual Framework Model 
 
 
 
                                                 
14 Detailed explanation of this framework is provided below. 
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 Figure 3.2: Disaggregate Model 
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3.2 Hypothesis Development and Proxies to Measure Variables 
3.2.1 Dependent Variable(s) 
1) VC-backed Firm Performance 
The main aim of this study is to understand the effect that entrepreneurs, venture 
capitalists and the interrelation between them has on VC-backed firms’ performance, 
within an institutional framework. This makes the performance of the VC-backed firm 
the dependent variable. Studying the factors that enhance firm performance is important 
in order to provide an understanding that enables such potential firms to succeed, which 
in turn plays a vital role in the prosperity of the economy, through increasing 
innovation, productivity and employment (Saxenian, 1994; Jeng and Wells, 2000). 
3.2.2 Independent Variables 
1) Entrepreneur Characteristics (Independent Variable) 
Evidence in previous literature shows that different aspects of the entrepreneurial firm 
or founding team characteristics, which include the entrepreneur’s social SC (Bruderl 
and Preisendorfer, 1998; Hallen, 2008), RBCs of the entrepreneurial firm (Mahoney 
and Pandian, 1992; Wang and Ang, 2004), and the entrepreneur’s HC (Davidsson and 
Honig, 2003; Rotefoss and Kolvereid, 2005; Dimov, 2010), impact the success of the 
venture. In this section, these aspects are discussed as their impact on firm performance 
is measured in this study. 
Social Capital (SC) 
An entrepreneur’s SC refers to their network, or contacts, which enables them to exploit 
opportunities. These networks refer to either bonding capital or strong ties, which 
constitute personal business networks and relationships or bridging capital, which are 
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weak tie relationships with individuals in the business community (Aldrich and 
Zimmer, 1986; Davidson and Hong, 2003). The SC of starting entrepreneurs has widely 
played an important role in the evolution of firms and their eventual success (Bruderl 
and Preisendorfer 1998; Hallen 2008), through the access to information, positive 
reputation-building, and enabling recognition of opportunities (Burton et al., 2002; Hsu, 
2004). These networks assist entrepreneurs in obtaining resources, such as capital (Hsu, 
2007), information to facilitate transactions (Hsu 2004) and talented personnel 
(Bygrave and Timmons, 1992). An entrepreneur’s network allows that entrepreneur to 
access capital from sources that include friends, angel investors and venture capitalists 
(Greene and Brown, 1997). Start-ups are perceived as riskier investments, as they may 
lack the credit history required by traditional sources of funding. Therefore, social 
connections and previous ties enable them to receive funding from other sources. For 
example, entrepreneurs are more likely to receive funding from venture capitalists 15 
with which they have had previous relationships (Hsu, 2007; Lim and Cu, 2012). 
Previous studies have also found these networks to be important for recruitment, 
whether of executive officers or technical staff (Bygrave and Timmons, 1992), and for 
establishing ties with venture capitalists (Shane and Cable, 2002) and establishing 
business networks that facilitate transactions (Davidsson and Honig, 2003), which are 
fundamental for enhancing venture performance. 
Ability to recruit executives and talented personnel is analysed by Hsu (2007) 
as the share of non-founder executives recruited through any of the founding team’s 
                                                 
15 The analysis of the entrepreneurs’ ability to obtain financial capital namely from VCs through their social networks will be 
excluded from this study. Funding from VCs is facilitated through previous relations with VC, whether direct or indirect (Shane 
and Cable, 2002; Batjaral and Liu, 2004; Hallen, 2008). It shows the E’s ability to receive funding from VC or the strength of the 
relationship between them, which would enhance the likelihood of success. In this research, the impact of VC funding is analysed 
from a post-funding perspective, where non-financial add-ons of VCs are relevant, rather than the financial. Moreover, this study 
focuses on the contribution of venture capitalists and entrepreneurs to the performance of their venture, assuming that funding has 
already occurred. The focus is not on the likelihood of the entrepreneur receiving funding from VC.  Therefore, in this study, 
assuming the venture has already received VC funding, then the previous relation with VC will be more relevant when assessing 
the nature and impact of the relationship between the VC and the entrepreneur (Lim and Cu, 2012). 
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network. It shows the E’s ability to use their own SC to recruit executives, rather than 
rely on the network of the VC firm (Hsu, 2007). It is important especially in the earlier 
stages of new venture development, where founders’ models of employment relations 
and HR practices and policies are essential. Network ties that allow entrepreneurs to 
recruit talented personnel or executives, result in more successful ventures, through the 
performance of those recruited (Collins and Clark, 2003). Hence, an ‘A-rated’ quality 
team with a ‘B-rated’ quality idea is better than an ‘A-rated’ quality idea with a ‘B-
rated’ quality team (Baron et al., 2016). 
Other studies highlight the role of the entrepreneur’s SC in facilitating the 
access to information (Koka and Prescott, 2002), as well as the importance of belonging 
to a social network to improve information exchange (Uzzi, 1997; Gulati et al., 2000) 
and to reduce those costs involved in accessing information (Baker, 1990). 
Additionally, Smeltzer et al. (1991) show that both the amount and quality of SC have 
a positive effect on access to and optimal use of information.  
The above discussion leads to the following hypothesis: 
• H1a: Entrepreneur social capital has a positive impact on the performance 
of the VC-backed firms  
Resource-based Capabilities (RBCs) 
The idea that RBCs of the firm allow it to achieve higher performance is originally 
based on the Resource-Based View of the Firm Theory (RBVF), which explains that 
each firm may develop its own resources and capabilities differing from others in the 
industry in terms of value and rarity (Barney, 1991). This in turn enables each firm to 
position itself differently in the market by establishing its own competitive advantage. 
These advantages enable the building and improving of short- and long-term firm 
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performances (Barney, 1991; Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000; Powell, 2001; Ferreira and 
Fernandes, 2017). 
In addition to RBVF, several studies have examined the role of RBCs in 
contributing to firm success and creating a competitive advantage for the firm (Barney, 
1991; Grant 1991; Mahoney and Pandian, 1992; Peteraf, 1993; Wang and Ang, 2004, 
Ferreira and Fernandes, 2017).  
Wang and Ang (2004) highlight that RBCs are what position a firm in the 
market and therefore compose its competitive strategies. In their studies, they segregate 
RBCs into three separate scales supportive of the three competitive strategies 
(innovation, quality and cost-leadership) (Chandler and Hanks, 1994). Innovation is 
one of the vital causes of the maintainable competitive advantage, as well as, success 
and survival of firms (Jimenez and Sanz-Valle, 2011). It consists of knowledge about 
how to enhance things in forms that are more efficient than the existing ones (Teece, 
1986). According to Schumpeter (1934), there are four types of innovations: product, 
process, organisational and marketing. This study, as with most of the prior studies 
(Karlsson and Tavassoli, 2015), will focus on technological innovations (product and 
process), as they are mostly provided by entrepreneurs with no input from venture 
capitalists.  
As explained in the literature, RBCs are not sufficient unless supported by a 
good strategy. Resources alone would turn out to be insufficient to attain a competitive 
advantage or high performance levels. These are only achievable if a company is able 
to link between those resources and a good strategy that can transform them into 
capacities (Ferreira and Fernandes, 2017). Accordingly, strategy is measured for each 
category of the abovementioned RBCs (innovation, quality and cost leadership 
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respectively). Firms may gain a sustainable competitive advantage if they choose the 
right strategy to implement for each of their available resources (Kuratko et al., 2005). 
Instead of just measuring the resource capabilities of each, the focus becomes on 
combining them with strategies that the firm follows to maintain an advantage in any 
of the three categories, hence a fit between both (strategies and RBCs) is also necessary.  
In the light of the above discussion, the next hypothesis is stated as:  
• H1b: The RBCs and strategies of venture-capital-backed firms have a 
positive impact on the performance of the VC-backed firms 
 
Human Capital (HC)  
HC refers to the characteristics of a person, mainly education and experience, that can 
contribute to their productivity (Dimov, 2010). Based on the HCT (Beckher, 1975) and 
the results of previous work, HC has an impact on firm performance. The HCT states 
that the greater the HC the better the performance at a particular task. The study of 
Unger et al. (2009), which measures the relationship between entrepreneur HC and 
success, explains it further. Education and experience are HC investments, while 
knowledge and skills are the outcomes of those investments. It is actually knowledge 
and skills that improve the performance, as they are the direct indicators; however, they 
are attained and improved through HC investments. HC investments can be general as 
well as specific, and previous studies have found both general (Bates, 1990; Brudel et 
al., 1992; Cooper at al., 1994) and specific (Davidsson and Honig, 2003; Rotefoss and 
Kolvereid, 2005) to increase the chances of a venture’s survival and to have an impact 
on its success. The types of experience that matter most to firm success are previous 
entrepreneurial experience (Allinson et al., 2000; Eesley and Roberts, 2006a; Gompers 
et al., 2006) and industry experience (Bruderl et al., 1992, Chatterji, 2009), and hence 
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it is important to understand the background of the entrepreneur, whether s/he has 
previous experience in business start-ups or in the industry of the current start-up. To 
take it a step further, previous experience could be more valuable if it was successful 
experience (Hsu, 2007), as many studies have confirmed that a venture is more likely 
to succeed if its founders have had a previously successful venture (Allinson et al., 
2000; Eesley and Roberts, 2006; Gomper et al., 2006). Size of the founding team should 
also be considered, as it is related to the amount of founding experience available 
(Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven, 1990) and can be used as an additional HC proxy (Baum 
and Silverman, 2004).  
Previous education of the entrepreneur is another indicator of HC (general) 
(Hallen, 2008). Variation in HC is shown through the formal education attained, 
whether it is a master’s or a doctorate degree (Hsu, 2007). An MBA degree can also be 
considered general managerial training, whereas a PhD can signal venture credibility 
and can also have a straightforward, scientific or specialised knowledge effect, which 
is especially valuable in technology-related new ventures in the field of the business’s 
industry (Colombo and Grilli, 2005). Roberts (1991) argues that the relationship 
between education level and venture performance is an inverted U- shape one, because 
PhDs are more research oriented than commercially oriented. Additionally, for specific 
HC it is important to know if at least one of the founders has a relevant postgraduate 
degree in a relevant field, because specialised education may allow founders to identify 
unique technical opportunities (Shane, 2000).  
Another aspect of HC is managerial HC, which shows the managers’ past 
experiences in leadership and management (Hallen, 2008), which could enhance the 
performance of the venture. 
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The evidence of the role of HC characteristics found in the aforementioned 
studies leads to the following hypothesis: 
• H1c: Entrepreneur human capital has a positive impact on the performance 
of VC-backed firms 
2) VC Managers’ Characteristics (Independent Variable) 
This study will focus solely on the impact of value-added activities, as portfolio firms 
have already been screened and selected and the aim of the study is to analyse the 
impact of entrepreneur characteristics, VC characteristics and the VC-E relationship 
performance of the portfolio firm. Before discussing value-added activities, it is 
important to understand the characteristics of those individuals carrying out those 
activities (Dimov and Shephered, 2003). 
Human Capital (HC) 
Based on the HCT (Becker, 1975), similar to entrepreneurs, VC managers with higher 
HC (in terms of education and experience) achieve higher performance in executing 
relevant tasks, such as pre- and post-investment activities. Also based on UET, 
characteristics of the team should predict fund performance (Zarutskie, 2010). This 
study, similar to the model of Dimov and Shepherd (2005), will separate HC of VC 
managers into task specific (education and experience related to VC tasks) and industry 
specific HC (education and experience related to industry of company funded), as with 
entrepreneurs. This shows their past experience in VC-related activities or in the 
industry of the funded firm, as well as general HC (which is education or experience 
either in the VC industry or in the industry of the portfolio firm). 
The education of the VC management team is also a part of their HC 
characteristics, and therefore it is important to study the impact of their education field 
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and degree. Dimov and Shepherd’s (2005) results show that general HC is positively 
associated with portfolio firms that go public, while specific HC is positively associated 
with a lower level of firms going bankrupt.  
Experience in finance (experience in commercial, investment or merchant 
banking and firms that provide financial consulting), consulting, law and 
entrepreneurial experience is related to VC work, and hence adds more value to the VC 
management team (Sapienza et al., 1996). Aside from prior work in VC, if any or more 
than one of the team members have an education or previous experience in the industry 
of the firm they are funding, it adds more value to the firm (Sapienza et al., 1996). More 
value is added because those fund managers with more experience in the VC market 
have the ability to select better portfolio companies, which in turn perform better (they 
will be excluded in this study). They also influence and add value to those companies 
in several ways (Sorenson, 2007): firstly, they will be more advanced at monitoring and 
managing the companies. Additionally, they are more likely have access to larger 
networks (Hellmann and Puri, 2002; Hochberg et al., 2007). Finally, the reputation of 
an experienced VC may lead to increase in the market value of the funded company 
(Megginson and Weis, 1991), where reputable VC firms give credibility to the IPOs.  
Aside from the individual experiences of the management team, the experience 
of the VC firm itself matters. How experienced the venture capitalists are is a measure 
of their ability to influence and add value. In the literature, several proxies have been 
used to measure overall VC firm experience, including firm age, cumulative total 
amount invested (Gompers, 1996) and number of companies previously funded 
(Kaplan and Schoar, 2005; Hochberg et al., 2007). Firm age is a less favourable 
measure, since it does not differentiate between active and inactive investors. 
Alternatively, the number of investment rounds indicates the number of times the VC 
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has made an investment. Participating in more investments allows investors to learn 
more about managing and monitoring companies and to expand their network with 
managers, suppliers and customers. In this case, investment increases experience. 
Number of investment rounds is a better indicator than the number of companies 
funded, as it distinguishes between the stages of the funded companies. Funding earlier 
stages shows more influence by the VC on the firm’s performance outcome, as opposed 
to later stages, which involves higher funding with less influence from the VC and 
hence is less indicative of the VC’s abilities (Sorenson, 2007). This occurs because, in 
the former, the VC is more involved and provides more non-financial services than in 
the latter. Furthermore, as defined by Clingingsmith and Shane (2017), experienced 
investors are ones that make enough early-stage investments to have private 
information about the distribution of quality of early-stage companies, while 
inexperienced investors are ones that do not make enough early-stage investments to 
have private information about the distribution of quality of early-stage investments. 
The following hypothesis is derived from the findings discussed above: 
• H2a: VC human capital has a positive impact on the performance of VC-
backed firms 
Value-added Activities 
According to Carter et al. (1996), one of the most significant factors influencing the 
new venture’s success is the interaction with external advisors such as venture 
capitalists (Bygrave and Timmons, 1996), which can make valuable contributions to 
the new venture (Sorheim et al., 2005). Venture capitalists can contribute or add value 
to their portfolio companies through financing, monitoring strategic and operational 
planning, management recruiting, and networking (Gorman and Sahlman, 1989). 
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Which of these activities the VC firm offers more, depends on the country and 
the type of economy in which it operates (Sapienza et al., 1996). Networks, for example, 
play a crucial role for venture capitalists in emerging economies that lack institutional 
stability (Bruton and Ahlstrom, 2006). This study is conducted in an emerging 
economy, and hence networking should be of upmost importance. Recruitment ability 
in this study will be combined with networking, as a VC’s ability to recruit reputable 
managers depends on the connections it possesses. Accordingly, this section will 
discuss monitoring as well as strategic and operational planning, while networking will 
be covered in the following section.16 
As a way to protect their investments, venture capitalists usually demand seats 
on the board of the portfolio firm to monitor activities and provide advice (Hellman, 
1998; Cornelli and Yosha, 2003). In Goodstein et al.’s (1994) work, when classifying 
the functions of VCs on the board, they referred to the monitoring function as a way to 
screen and authorise investment proposals (Tirole, 2001), and discipline or even remove 
ineffective management teams. Strategic decision-making allowed them to participate 
in the strategic decision-making process to a certain extent (Fama and Jensen, 1983). 
The strategic activities of VC firms are generally regarded as their major 
contribution to their portfolio companies (Gorman and Sahlman, 1989; MacMillan et 
al., 1988; Sapienza et al., 1996). Nevertheless, it is still ambiguous which specific 
strategic activities or other value-adding activities of the venture capitalist contribute to 
their portfolio company’s performance. The strategic activities included are assessed 
by the venture capitalists’ involvement in the portfolio firm, which enables them to play 
a role in the modernisation and restructuring of the recruitment policy, and the adoption 
                                                 
16 The effect of funding will be excluded from this study in order to focus on the effect of the other VC activities, which would 
not be provided by other sources of financing. 
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of stock options and the professionalisation of management teams (Ed-dafali, 2016). 
Venture capitalists also engage in monitoring of their portfolio firms, and other support 
and control activities. 
This involvement of venture capitalists in the invested companies, whether for 
monitoring or strategic decision-making, can be used as a support by the venture team 
when managing various business risks and enhancing venture performance (Wijbenga 
et al., 2003). The above leads to the following hypothesis: 
• H2b: Value-added services of venture capitalists have a positive impact on 
the performance of the VC-backed firm 
 Networking 
One of the most important value-added services provided by venture capitalists, as 
mentioned above, is networking (Lin, 1999). An organisation’s network ties allow it to 
gain access to resources (investment opportunities and information) that may have been 
difficult otherwise (Granovetter, 1985; Burt, 1992; Hallen, 2008), and hence to provide 
better services to portfolio companies. Networking determines the VC’s ability to affect 
the performance of the portfolio company by providing access to resources and services 
critical to the firm’s success (Wijbenga et al., 2003). In addition, as this study is 
conducted on an emerging economy that lacks formal institutions, venture capitalists’ 
networks are substitutes for those institutions (Bruton and Ahlstrom, 2006) and hence 
crucial to strengthen the role venture capitalists play in the firm’s success, which should 
make them of upmost importance in an emerging economy.  
Through networking activities, venture capitalists help to link the portfolio firm 
with its external environment and secure critical resources (Wijbenga et al., 2003). 
There are three main VC networks: syndicates for co-investment (Lerner, 1994; 
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Hochberg et al., 2007; Mas et al., 2008, Jin et al., 2015), service providers such as head 
hunters, patent lawyers, investment bankers and so on, to help the company succeed 
(Gorman and Sahlman, 1989; Sahlman, 1990), and institutional investors, as well as 
other investors (Lindsey, 2002; Hsu, 2004). One measure of a VC’s network with 
service providers, which shows its value-added provision of services and resources, is 
called high networking resources rating, where the entrepreneur rates the VC’s network 
resources (Hsu, 2004).  
A VC’s network of service providers allows it to recruit executives who may 
add expertise to the firm (Ed-dafali, 2016), such as the hiring of a vice-president of 
sales and marketing and replacing the founder with an outside CEO, if necessary. In 
addition, venture capitalists use their business networks to help the entrepreneur find 
suppliers, customers and potential partners. Through this relationship capital of the 
venture capitalist, the entrepreneur’s accessibility to the external resources becomes 
easier (Ed-dafali, 2016). 
Most of the previous literature on networking focused on syndicates. One of the 
reasons behind this emphasis is the positive impact syndication has on VC performance, 
and the venture capitalists’ ability to add value to the portfolio firm (post-investment) 
(Pratch, 2005; Hsu, 2006). One of the explanations for this positive impact is that each 
VC firm has its own area of expertise; therefore, combining several VC firms increases 
the aggregate available knowledge and areas of expertise, which in turn increases each 
one’s ability to invest and add value to their investments (Stuart and Sorensen, 2001). 
Moreover, another direct benefit of syndication is that it increases sharing of resources 
and information among venture capitalists, and allows them access to each other’s 
networks. Having access to more information would also enhance the performance of 
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the VC firm as it allows for a more positive valuation of their portfolio companies 
(Tyebjee and Bruno, 1984; De Clerq et al., 2006). 
An indirect effect of VC networking on portfolio companies is that the latter 
gain access to professionals, or experts or other venture capitalists from the VC’s 
networks (Sapienza et al., 1996; Dimov and Shepherd, 2005; Pratch; 2005; De Clerq et 
al., 2006). 
• H2c: VC networking service is positively significant with performance of the 
VC- backed firm 
A VC’s wide network or efforts in value-added activities is not sufficient on its 
own, unless combined with efforts from the entrepreneur, which is why the VC-E 
relationship, the third independent variable, is important for the success of the funded 
firm. 
4) VC-E Relationship (Independent Variable) 
Some young innovative firms fail because they are commercially inexperienced, 
whereas their survival chances would be much higher if they sought the managerial 
advice of an experienced VC. Entrepreneurs contribute key technological ideas, while 
venture capitalists provide them with managerial advice that draws on their industry’s 
knowledge and commercial expertise. Entrepreneur’s effort is critical, but combining it 
with VC advice, which adds value, increases a firm’s survival chances and boosts its 
performance (Keuschnigg, 2004). Mutual cooperation between the venture capitalist 
and the entrepreneur is important for project success (Cable and Shane, 1997; Fu et al., 
2018). Neither entrepreneur effort nor VC advice are contractible or verifiable; 
therefore, a double moral hazard problem exists, and these inputs must be elicited by 
financial incentives (Keushnigg, 2004). According to Casamatta (2003), both parties 
97 
 
choose effort level (expected to maximise their utility), then choose the financial 
contract (which determines their payoffs), i.e. it specifies the financial contribution of 
each party and the share of revenue allocated to each party in each state of nature.  
The way the cash-flow is shared determines the effort each party will expend. 
Cash-flow rights vary with firm performance, depending on the instruments used in the 
contractual agreement. For example, if a firm’s performance rises, and the VC has 
convertible bonds, while the entrepreneur has common stocks, then the former’s cash-
flow rights decrease while the latter’s increase. Hence, it is crucial to recognise the type 
of security used by both parties, and cash-flow rights, and incentivise accordingly 
(Casamatta, 2003). In efforts to mitigate moral hazard problems, venture capitalists rely 
on control rights, which include voting rights, liquidation and board rights, which allow 
for monitoring of the portfolio firm (Casamatta, 2003; Cumming and Johan, 2007). 
Another way to deal with moral hazard is through stage financing. It allows venture 
capitalists to split the financing of the venture in successive rounds, and hence grants 
them the option to terminate the investment (Bergemann and Hege, 1998), which in 
turn decreases the risk. At each of the rounds, the entrepreneur is given just enough 
financial resources to achieve the next intermediate development stage (Hege et al., 
2003). This also increases the effort incentives of both, as venture capitalists are more 
at ease with less risk, while entrepreneurs want to achieve higher results, in order to 
attain another financing round, in turn enhancing the firm’s performance. 
• H3a: The contractual agreement between VC and entrepreneur can have a 
negative impact on the performance of the VC- backed firm 
In emerging economies, more specifically in Egypt, type of security and in turn 
cash-flow rights may not be significant enough to mediate the VC and E relationship, 
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as there may not be much variation in types of securities attainable, where all contracts 
may rely on equities as convertibles are not commonly used (Hassan, 2010). The legal 
environment is weak and the financial market is not fully developed yet, in terms of 
availability of sufficient exit mechanisms for portfolio firms and types of securities for 
the investment (Hassan, 2010). These two factors make contract enforcement unreliable 
(Bruton and Ahlstrom, 2006), which accordingly makes the dependency on strength of 
VC-E relationship and trust between them more efficient. This is based on a similar 
environment captured by the study of Li et al. (2018) on VC-E relationships in China. 
In VC markets of developed economies, like those of the US and in Europe, researchers 
have found venture capitalists to provide valuable services to their portfolio companies, 
while relying on the prevalence of the rule of law, that their contracts will be enforced 
and their ownership rights will be preserved. In developing economies such as that 
captured in their study (China), this rule of law is unlikely to hold, and hence this reason 
is not sufficient for venture capitalists to contribute and add value to the portfolio firm. 
Instead, their study foregoes dependence on contractual agreements and analyses the 
value-adding effects of alternative non-contractual mechanisms, such as strategic 
consideration, trust and teamwork between the entrepreneurs and the venture 
capitalists. Their results show that indeed trust between venture capitalists and 
entrepreneurs contributes to the performance of new ventures. Moreover, their 
assessment of the impact of trust on the portfolio company performance was based on 
different types of trust or mechanisms (also used by Lewicki and Bunker, 1996) that 
enhance a firm's value. These types are strategic reputation-based (C-trust), knowledge-
based (K-trust) and identification-based (I-trust). C-trust is based on a strategic 
consideration of the trade-off between the benefit of maintaining the relationship and 
the cost of terminating the trust and its effect on reputation (Kreps et al., 1982). More 
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specifically, this would be that venture capitalists and entrepreneurs will cooperate to 
increase the chances of the firm’s success because of their mutual desire to obtain high 
returns and avoid financial loss as well as damage to reputation. This will therefore 
drive both of them to abide by the contractual obligations and each will expect the same 
of the other party (Li et al., 2018).  
K-trust comes from the mutual trust built throughout the relationship. In this 
case, information relating to the other party is sought through observation of the way 
they react in different situations. Information asymmetry is reduced by time, as the other 
party’s actions become predictable, which in turns leads to better decision-making and 
higher performance of portfolio companies. Finally, I-trust, which is the highest type 
of trust, is built on a close relationship between the venture capitalist and the 
entrepreneur, where there is a mutual understanding between them that could lead them 
to align their preferences, to the extent that both parties would cooperate in adverse 
situations even if one of them is to incur short-term losses. They both understand that 
the payoff arising from their cooperation is the increased likelihood of long-terms gains 
for both of them because of superior firm performance (Li et al., 2018). I-trust is also 
associated with positive team spirt in the portfolio companies (Campbell, 1993). Team 
spirit also improves firm performance as it leads to the adoption of cooperative 
behaviour, which subsequently increases overall performance (Li et al., 2018). 
Hain et al. (2016) explain that as relational trust is built between venture 
capitalists and entrepreneurs they both move towards a more aligned information. Their 
findings also suggest that high geographical, cultural and institutional distance, is 
overcome by relational trust. Bruton and Ahlstrom (2003) also point out, through their 
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investigation of the Chinese VC market, that institutional factors in a different setting 
can create a VC industry with its own characteristics. 
These previous findings and illustrations of VC-E relationships in different 
institutional settings lead to the following hypothesis: 
• H3b: The extent of the VC-E relation has a positive impact on the performance 
of the VC-backed firm 
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3.2.3 Moderating Variable 
1) Institutional Environment 
As explained thoroughly in the literature, organisations are impacted by the institutional 
arrangement of their industries as well as their own country-specific settings (Busenitz 
et al., 2000; Bruton and Ahlstrom, 2006). Hence, VC mechanisms need modification 
when implemented in EMs, as opposed to the more developed ones which have been 
the core of most VC research (Bruton and Ahlstrom, 2006). The deviation between EMs 
and DMs, specifically in the legal environment, which is represented by laws and 
regulations to protect entrepreneurs, investors and contractual rights, the court system, 
and consists of legitimate enforcement mechanisms, leads to alterations in the 
behaviour of entrepreneurs and venture capitalists, and in the relationship between 
them. These alterations include the behaviour of entrepreneurs who do not feel their 
innovations are protected (Yasar et al., 2011), difficulty in screening and monitoring 
activities by venture capitalists (Bonini and Alkan, 2012), the use of networks in VC 
activities to substitute for lack of formal institutions (Bruton and Ahlstrom, 2006), and 
the VC-E relationship relying more on trust than on contract covenants (Li et al., 2018). 
Institutional Differences and the Entrepreneur 
Entrepreneur’s innovation is affected by the patenting laws in a country. Results from 
Lahr and Mina (2006) show that firms based in the US have a higher chance of success 
(in terms of patent applications being granted) than firms located in the UK due to the 
differences in patenting regulations of both nations. Patenting and intellectual property 
rights protection affect the way entrepreneurs do business (Smith and Ueda, 2006). The 
more available, transparent and predictable those laws and rules are, the more stable the 
entrepreneurs’ expectations are and hence the more likely they are to engage in 
innovations (Li, 2006; Jiao et al., 2015). Law enforcement also contributes to the 
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increase of patent applications and in turn innovations (Jiao et al., 2015). When these 
legal environment characteristics are stronger, entrepreneurs are more likely to disclose 
information to their VC funders, whereas in an environment that lacks those strong laws 
and enforcement they would rather withhold it, in fear that their innovative idea would 
be exploited (Ueda, 2006). 
In addition, in environments with low legal protection, venture capitalists place 
a heavier weight on entrepreneur experience (Nofsinger and Wang, 2011). 
• H4a: The positive impact of innovation on VC-backed firms’ performance 
becomes negative when moderated by laws and regulations in a weak legal 
environment. 
Institutional Differences and Venture Capitalists 
An effective and efﬁcient legal system is of utmost importance, to enable venture 
capitalists to properly screen and monitor new ventures (Bonini and Alkan, 2012). 
Studies from the late 90s have shown that law quality can signiﬁcantly affect the costs 
and beneﬁts associated with monitoring the entrepreneur (La Porta et al., 1998, 2000). 
Furthermore, EMs offer little protection for investors or private property (2001), which 
makes portfolio firm selection and monitoring processes more difficult (Bruton and 
Ahlstrom, 2003; Pruthi et al., 2003). Based on Search Theory, Silveira and Wright 
(2007) show that a better legal environment reduces the cost of entry into a market or 
the time spent monitoring an investment. 
Cumming et al. (2010) conducted a study on 39 different countries to show the 
impact of the legal environment. Their results show that a stronger legal environment 
facilitates board representation in the portfolio firm, as marginal benefits of monitoring 
are higher, due to better information available regarding the firm’s activities; it leads to 
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faster deal screening, as writing enforceable contracts is easier and government work 
procedures are faster. 
In addition to screening and monitoring, venture capitalists provide value-added 
services to portfolio companies. The legal environment also affects effort provision: the 
better the legal environment, the more reassuring and motivating it is for venture 
capitalists to give non-contractible support to entrepreneurs, as it ensures that VC 
efforts will pay off (Bottazzi et al., 2009). The VC services, or the level of effort exerted 
by venture capitalists, are affected by investor protection rights. Those rights help 
protect the investor’s funds. In this case, the higher the protection rights available in a 
context should decrease the risk faced by the VC and hence should increase the amount 
of effort exerted in the relationship (Sanz, 2006).  
One of the services provided by venture capitalists is access to their business 
contacts (networks). Venture capitalists in DMs rely on laws and regulations such as: 
shareholder and creditor protection and property rights (Daily et al., 2014), company 
and bankruptcy laws, investor protection and/or reorganisation laws (Smith and Ueda, 
2006), which are all affected by the structure of the legal system in place to safeguard 
their investments. With the lack of institutional stability in EMs, they rely on other 
aspects in the VC market, such as networks and trust. Even though networks are 
important to all VC firms (Bygrave, 1987, 1988; Staurt et al., 1999; Shane and Cable, 
2002), they are of particular importance in EM settings (Bruton et al., 2002, 2004; 
Lockett et al., 2002; Wright et al., 2002), where institutional stability is not strong or is 
largely unknown. Therefore, they can act as a substitute for laws, regulations and 
enforcement (Butler et al., 2003; Hoang and Antoncic, 2003; Peng, 2003) and take on 
more importance.  
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• H4b: The positive impact of monitoring and networking activities on VC-
backed performance becomes more positive when moderated by a weak legal 
environment. However, the positive impact of advice dispensed and services 
provided becomes negative. 
Institutional Differences and the VC-E Relationship 
The legal environment has an impact on the VC-E relationship and the efficiency of 
contract writing and enforcement (Lerner and Tag, 2015), through legitimate 
enforcement mechanisms (Fairchild, 2006). These mechanisms influence the nature of 
legal obligations that parties to an agreement have to each other, as well as how courts 
interpret and enforce these obligations (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). Laws also matter 
in the relationship, as investor protection rights help protect the investor’s funds. In this 
case, the higher the protection rights available in a context, the lower the risk the VC 
should face, which hence could impact the amount of effort exerted in the relationship 
and the leniency of contractual rights (Sanz, 2006). Intellectual property rights also 
influence the degree of information asymmetry and how willing entrepreneurs are to 
share information with venture capitalists (Ueda, 2004). 
One way conflicts are mitigated in DMs is the contractual agreement between 
venture capitalists and entrepreneurs. The way entrepreneurs are compensated is 
explained through the choice of security agreed upon in the contract, and hence, in an 
environment with a weaker legal system, these firms tend to rely more on direct 
ownership than on more complex convertible preferred stocks (Lerner and Schoar, 
2005). Other than security and compensation selection, as well as other variations in 
contracts, due to different institutional settings, previous studies have found that the 
strength of the VC-E relationship and the trust between both firms is more prevalent 
than contract provisions, in environments with weak legal systems (Arthur and 
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Busenitz, 2003; Vergara et al., 2016; Li et al., 2018). Individuals in those environments 
tend to rely more on networks (interconnections between them) to resolve conflicts and 
negotiate contracts (Meyer, 2001). 
• H4c: The negative impact of contract dependency on VC-backed firm 
performance becomes more negative when moderated by a weak legal 
environment. However, the positive impact of the extent of the dependency in 
the VC and entrepreneur relationship becomes more positive 
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VC Managers 
HC 
Value-adding 
Strategic and Operational Planning 
(Involvement and advice) 
Networking 
3.3 Summary of Information Sought 
To sum it up, this figure shows the information needed for each variable to reach the 
objectives of this study. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.3: Summary of Proxies 
  
Entrepreneur  
SC 
RBCs 
Personal business networks and 
relationships with individuals in the 
business community; access to 
information. 
Capabilities and strategy in the 
dimensions of innovation, product 
and cost leadership strategies 
Education (degree attained and 
specialisation); experience 
(previous experience, success of 
previous experience, size of team, 
industry experience); managerial 
HC 
Previous experience (task and 
industry), Education (degree and 
field) 
VC-E 
Relationship 
Institutional 
Environment 
Laws such as IPR, investor 
protection, Political instability, 
corruption, contract enforcement and 
legal framework for settling disputes. 
Contractual 
Security, control rights, cash-flow 
rights and stage financing 
Disagreement; prior relation; 
contractual favourableness; 
contractual flexibility; trust; team 
spirit 
Extent of 
Relation 
HC 
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Chapter Four 
Research Methodology 
4.0 Introduction 
This chapter presents the entire research design, which includes all the data collection 
and methodology used to organise and perform tests using the appropriate data to 
achieve the objectives. The research design is important because it ensures that the 
evidence collected is suitable for theory testing (Boso, 2010). The research plan is 
necessary to test the hypotheses and reach this research’s objectives. To do so, the 
research design issues are categorised into five parts. Section 4.1 will cover general 
data collection matters, sampling procedures and an explanation as to why a cross-
sectional research design is used, and the survey administration methods were selected, 
as well as the choice of respondents. In section 4.2, the questionnaire design and 
administration activities are explained. Additionally, an explicit description of the 
content of questions and forms of response to both questionnaires is provided. Section 
4.3 covers the pre-testing phase and the entire process implemented to achieve it. In 
section 4.4, issues relating to the main survey study are discussed, including survey bias 
assessments, after which, in section 4.5, the data analysis procedure is introduced, and 
methodological explanations for all the analysis tools applied is provided. This chapter 
then concludes with a summary of the methodology followed in this research. 
4.1 Data Collection 
The main aim of this study is to find the impact that the entrepreneurs themselves, the 
VCs that fund them and the interrelation between both has on the performance of those 
venture-backed firms. This study relies on primary data collected directly through a 
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questionnaire, as explained thoroughly in the upcoming sections, to gather all relevant 
information to test the hypotheses and achieve the required objectives.  
4.1.1 Research Design and Survey Administration Methods 
Data collection is one of the most thoroughly established aspects in quantitative 
research and must be well developed prior to the study (Mertler, 2016). This study 
follows a descriptive non-experimental research design approach. It is non-
experimental, as it includes no manipulation of any of the variables, and descriptive, as 
it describes and interprets the status of individuals, settings, conditions or events 
(Mertler, 2016). There are different types of quantitative descriptive non-experimental 
approaches. The method that serves the purpose of the current research is a combination 
of survey research and correlation research. Survey research is a quantitative research 
technique that describes the characteristics of a group or population (Mertler, 2016), in 
which a researcher administers a survey or questionnaire to a sample or to the entire 
population to describe their attitudes, opinions, behaviours, experiences or other 
characteristics (Creswell, 2005). Survey research can further be used to investigate 
relationships between variables (Mertler, 2016) and correlational research design. 
Correlational studies aid in the discovery and measurement of relationships between 
two or more variables, as well as the strength of the relationship. The outcome of such 
study can either provide an understanding of certain related events, conditions and 
behaviours (explanatory correlational study), predict future conditions or behaviours in 
a variable (predictive correlational study), or sometimes can even provide strong 
indications that a variable may be causing another variable (causality correlational 
study) (Mertler, 2016).  
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When conducting surveys there are several data collection modes; 
interviews/surveys were adopted in this study. Although this is the costliest and most 
time-consuming approach, it guarantees the highest response rate, which is crucial for 
the purpose of this study. Moreover, given the small size of the VC market in Egypt, 
this will guarantee a response rate that is almost equal to population size. In addition, 
interview/survey research data collection is conducted in a conversational style, which 
increases the chance of more accurate answers, as any required clarification is available 
and leads to more information through discussions, which can also provide certain 
enhancements in understanding relationships and causes.  
This study follows a cross-sectional type of survey research, which refers to 
data on two or more variables collected from samples or populations at a single point 
in time (Boso, 2010; Mertler, 2016), as opposed to a longitudinal type. Two reasons for 
choosing the cross-sectional type are lack of time to collect data and that the VC market 
in Egypt is relatively new, thus a longitudinal study will not be required.  
4.1.2 Choice of Respondents 
As mentioned above, the objective of this study is to understand the impact that 
entrepreneurs, VC firms and the interrelations between them has on the performance of 
venture-backed firms. In order to reach this understanding, both VC firms and 
entrepreneurs need to respond to questions in the distributed questionnaire. Hence, a 
different questionnaire was prepared for each party, targeting the information relevant 
to each. However, some questions on the relationship between them were common in 
both questionnaires.  
The potential respondents for the VC survey comprise of a total of 16 firms in 
Egypt that provide VC services, given that they are based in Egypt, have all their 
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operations in Egypt and provide funding for Egyptian firms. There are 119 firms 
operating in Egypt that are funded by VC firms based in Egypt; constituting the target 
population for the entrepreneur survey. 
4.2 Questionnaire Design 
As previously determined, this study relies on questionnaires to collect data; therefore, 
this section provides a detailed description of the questionnaire design process, which 
includes issues related to the derivation and set-up of the questions included in the 
questionnaire, which help test the hypotheses and reach the main objectives of this 
study. The procedures followed to design the questionnaire of the current study 
resemble those used by Churchill (1979) and Boso (2010). After having determined the 
needed information (in section 3.2 and summarised in 3.3), the type of questionnaire 
and the choice of administration method (in section 4.1), Figure 4.1 below shows the 
steps to follow in order to design an adequate questionnaire.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Step 2 
Determine form of response to each 
question 
 
Step 1 
Determine content of individual 
questions using existing literature 
 
Step 4 
Determine sequence of questions 
 
Step 3 
Determine wording of each question 
 
Step 5 
Determine physical characteristics of 
questionnaire 
 
Step 6 
Re-examine steps 1-5 and revise if 
necessary 
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Figure 4.1: Questionnaire Design17  
 
4.2.1 Content of Questions and Form of Response 
To seek the information required to conduct this study, outlined in Figure 4.1, the 
existing literature was used to pinpoint suitable scales or proxies to measure the 
required aspects of each variable. Accordingly, each of the following sections provides 
a detailed explanation of the proxies used to measure each variable.  
Each question has a different response type, whether YES/NO (a binary 
variable), which is transformed into a dummy of 0/1, a Likert Scale (an ordinal 
variable), a different rating or a numerical answer (continuous variable), depending on 
the content of the question. Likert-type scales and other attitude and opinion measures 
contain either five or seven response categories (Bearden et al., 1993). This study relies 
on the five response categories, as they are used to increase response rate, response 
quality and reliability, mainly because they are less confusing (Babakus and Mangold, 
1992) and it is quite simple for the respondent or the interviewer to read out the 
complete list of scale descriptors (Dawes, 2008). Accordingly, it reduces respondents’ 
‘frustration level’ (Babakus and Mangold, 1992; Buttle, 1996). 
4.2.1.1 Venture-backed Firms’ Performance (Dependent Variable) 
The dependent variable is the performance of the VC-backed firms. Firm performance, 
as suggested by Chandler and Hanks (1994), can be measured from a growth 
perspective or a business volume perspective. Growth includes perceived growth in the 
market share, cash-flows and sales. Business volume perspective includes sales, 
earnings and net worth. Even though there are several ways to measure firm 
performance, this study has used measures similar to those of Amankwah‐Amoah et al. 
                                                 
17 Steps for questionnaire design, adapted from Churchill (1979). 
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(2018) to collect information on performance directly from the firm founders, through 
the questionnaire, rather than relying on any secondary data. To measure performance, 
information was collected on growth of sales, sales volume, return on assets (ROA), 
return on sales (ROS), growth in productivity, market share, growth in market share, 
profitability, growth in profitability and overall company performance. This 
information was collected based on subjective rather than objective data, as with most 
studies of the same nature. The reasons that this information was not objectively 
collected are, first, most small firms are unable or unwilling to provide objective 
information. Second, the firms surveyed in the study are for the most part unlisted and 
hence it would be difficult to check for accuracy of presented figures. Third, these 
entrepreneurial firms are from different industries, so comparison may be misleading 
as figures are attained for companies from different industries, and accounting data may 
be affected by industry-related factors.  
4.2.1.2: Entrepreneur Characteristics (Independent Variable) 
As derived from previous literature and used to develop the hypotheses, the different 
aspects of the entrepreneurial firm or founding team that may be positively related to 
the portfolio firm’s success include SC (Bruderl and Preisendorfer, 1998; Hallen, 
2008), HC (Davidsson and Honig, 2003; Rotefoss and Kolvereid, 2005; Dimov, 2010) 
and RBCs (Mahoney and Pandian, 1992; Wang and Ang, 2004). 
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Social Capital 
SC refers to the entrepreneur’s network or contacts. In this study, the span of the 
entrepreneur’s contacts was measured by collecting information on the bonding ties, as 
well as the bridging ties (Aldrich and Zimmer, 1986; Davidson and Honig, 2003). The 
means to measure those network types were captured from the work of Davisson and 
Honig (2003). Bonding ties were measured through the entrepreneur’s personal 
business networks and relations; a dichotomous variable was used for YES or NO 
questions. A dummy equal to one was assigned if the entrepreneur had answered with 
a ‘YES’ to any of the following: if he/she has a parent that has owned a business before, 
close friends or neighbours that run their own businesses, and/ or family, spouse, 
relatives and close friends that were encouraging him/her to start business. A zero was 
assigned if the answer to all three is a ‘NO’. 
 
Bridging ties were measured through the entrepreneurs’ relationships with individuals 
in the business community. Three YES or NO questions were used to indicate the 
entrepreneurs’ connection with business organisations. The first is if the respondents 
were involved in any business networks, such as trade associations, chambers of 
commerce or service clubs, such as the Rotary. The second is if the entrepreneur has 
specific contacts with organisations that dispense business advice assistance. The final 
question asked in this area was whether the entrepreneur was a member of a start-up 
team, as opposed to having previous experience in a solo start-up. For all three 
questions, a dummy of one would indicate a ‘YES’ and zero otherwise.  
Table 4.1: Venture-Backed Firm Performance Proxies 
Information 
Sought 
Proxies (to be answered by 
founders of start-ups) 
Measure Source 
Firm 
Performance 
Ten items were used to measure 
firm performance. 
Likert Scale 1 to 5 AmankwahAmoah et al. 
(2018) 
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Other measures used to understand the extent of the entrepreneur’s ties or 
connections that can facilitate business were captured from the work of Adomako 
(2015). A Likert scale of 1 to 5 was used where the entrepreneur was asked to rate the 
extent to which he/she has utilised ties or connections with sources, such as political 
leaders, officials in regulatory institutions, top managers of other firms, etc. 
Relevant literature has shown those networks to assist entrepreneurs in 
recruiting executives and other talented personnel (Bygrave and Timmons, 1992), as 
well as accessing information to facilitate transactions (Hsu 2004).  
Entrepreneur SC captured through executive recruitment: the entrepreneur’s 
ability to recruit executives was measured through the share of non-founder executives 
recruited through any of the founding team. Based on the work of Hsu (2007), data on 
the ability to recruit was gathered from the questionnaire through five items that show 
sources of recruitment of non-executive founders. The number gathered from each 
source was then divided by the total number of non-founder executives. After gathering 
results for all of the observed firms, the median was then calculated and any observation 
below the median was assigned a zero in the dummy and any above it was assigned a 
one (meaning it is in the top half of the sample).  
Entrepreneur SC captured through access to information measures was 
captured from the work of Fornini et al. (2012). Entrepreneurs were asked to rate their 
perception of the number of contacts they have that would be able to provide them with 
information relevant to their business, how easily they can contact them and if they 
have actually helped them to access information. 
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Table 4.2: Entrepreneur Social Capital Proxies 
Information 
Sought 
Proxies (to be answered by 
founders of start-ups) 
Measurement 
Type 
Source 
Personal Business 
Networks 
If founders have any parents, 
relatives, close friends or neighbours 
who have either owned a business or 
encouraged them to open a business. 
Dummy 0/1 Davidson and Hong 
(2003) 
Relationships with 
individuals in the 
business 
community 
If the founders have contacts with 
business organisations, such as 
chambers of commerce, or 
organisations that dispense business 
advice, or have previously been on a 
start-up team. 
Dummy 0/1 Davidson and Hong 
(2003) 
The extent of contact the founders 
have had in the past three years with 
eight different sources that can 
facilitate business transactions such 
as government officials, top 
managers at competitor firms, etc. 
Likert Scale 1 to 5 Adomako (2015) 
Executive 
Recruitment 
The number of non-executive 
founders recruited through the 
founders, their friends, co-workers, 
advisors or others. 
Dummy 0/1 Hsu (2007) 
Access to 
Information 
The availability of contacts that may 
provide access to information that is 
required for the business operations, 
the ease of communication with 
those individuals and their ability to 
provide information. 
Likert Scale 1 to 5 Fornoni (2012) 
 
Resource-based Capabilities (RBCs) 
Measurement of RBCs were derived from the study of Wang and Ang (2004), which is 
based on the idea that RBCs of the firm are what position it in the market and therefore 
compose its competitive strategies. They are categorised into three separate scales 
supportive of the three competitive strategies (innovation, quality and cost leadership) 
(Chandler and Hanks, 1994). For each of the three scales, questions were included in 
the questionnaire related to the items that explain them. Entrepreneurs were asked to 
answer those questions based on a 1 to 5 Likert Scale, where ‘1’ represents strongly 
disagree and ‘5’ represents strongly agree. Questions on the six following items were 
included in the entrepreneur’s questionnaire, to determine a firm’s RBCs that support 
its innovation strategy: whether the firm has innovative marketing personnel, 
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employees that are good at marketing, marketing expertise, product development 
expertise, technical expertise and innovative employees. The five items that were used 
to determine a firm’s RBCs that support its quality strategy were whether its employees 
provide superior customer service, expertise in customer service, quality customer 
service training, managerial expertise and flexibility to adapt. The five items that were 
used to determine a firm’s RBCs that support its cost-leadership strategy were whether 
the firm depends on low-cost materials, low-cost distribution channels, low-cost labour, 
low-cost factors of production, availability of capital, highly productive employees and 
leading-edge facilities.  
As explained in the literature, RBCs are not enough without a good strategy. To 
measure a firm’s competitive strategy, it is segregated into the same three scales. A 
Likert-type scale of 1 to 5, where ‘1’ represents strongly disagree and ‘5’ represents 
strongly agree, was formed to collect data on the following information: innovative 
competitive strategy. This study tests only technical innovative strategies, which are 
limited to product and process innovation (Schumpeter, 1934; Karlsson and Tavassoli, 
2015). Those measures have been derived from the study of Wang and Ang (2004), 
combined with measures from Karabulut (2015). Entrepreneurs were asked to give a 
score from 1 to 5 to reflect whether the venture strives to be the first to introduce new 
products, stresses new product development, researches new product opportunities 
continually, develops quality and performance of current products continually, makes 
changes in product development methods, and/or encourages innovation and engages 
in novel marketing. 
For measures related to product/service quality, level of strict quality control, 
level of meeting quality requirements, level of customer service, level of product 
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quality and level of meeting customer needs were tested. Finally, for cost leadership, 
degree to which the firm focuses on cost reduction in all facets of business operations, 
improvements in employee productivity and efficiency, development of lower 
production cost via process innovations and reducing production cost via investing in 
machinery were assessed. To measure if there is a fit between the strategy and RBCS, 
the results of both on each separate category were multiplied, after which 
complementarity moderated regression analysis was used to test the form of moderation 
(Venkatraman, 1989; Wang and Ang, 2004). 
Table 4.3: Proxies for RBCs of Entrepreneurial Firm 
Information 
Sought 
Proxies (answered by founders of 
start-ups) 
Measurement 
Type 
Source 
RBCs related to 
innovation 
Five items were used, related to resources 
available in the firm to enable innovation. 
Likert Scale 1 to 5 Wang and Ang 
(2004) 
RBCs related to 
quality 
Five items were used, related to resources 
available in the firm to assist in quality-related 
issues. 
Likert Scale 1 to 5 Wang and Ang 
(2004) 
RBCs related to 
cost leadership 
Seven items were used, related to resources 
available in the firm allowing it to cut its 
costs. 
Likert Scale 1 to 5 Wang and Ang 
(2004) 
Proxies for Strategies related to resources of Entrepreneurial Firm 
Information 
Sought 
Proxies (answered by founders of 
start-ups) 
Measurement 
Type 
Source 
Strategies 
related to 
innovation 
Three items were used, related to the extent 
of the firm’s reliance on product innovation 
strategies. 
Likert Scale 1 to 5 Wang and Ang 
(2004) 
In addition to the items derived from Wang 
and Ang (2004), four more items were used, 
to measure the firm’s product and process 
innovation strategies. 
Likert Scale 1 to 5 Karabulut 
(2015) 
Strategies 
related to 
quality 
Five items were used to assess the extent that 
the firm is keen on quality measures in its 
strategies. 
Likert Scale 1 to 5 Wang and Ang 
(2004) 
Strategies 
related to cost 
leadership 
Four items were used, to assess the extent 
that the firm strives to cut costs through its 
cost leadership strategies. 
Likert Scale 1 to 5 Wang and Ang 
(2004) 
 
Human Capital (HC)  
HC investments, education and experience (Becker, 1975; Unger et al., 2009; Dimov, 
2010), based on HCT and previous studies, have been found to enable HC outcomes, 
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knowledge and skills, which increase performance. It is, however, education and 
experience that determine the improvement of skills and knowledge. 
Education and experience can both be general or specific to running the 
business. Experiences which matter most to firm success are previous entrepreneurial 
experience (Allinson et al., 2000; Eesley and Roberts, 2006a; Gompers et al., 2006), 
and industry experience (Bruderl et al., 1992; Chatterji, 2009).  
The HC characteristic previous entrepreneurial experience, was assessed based 
on the same measures used by Burton et al. (2002), Baum and Silverman (2004) and 
Hsu (2007). Two questions are necessary: if any of the founding team members have 
had experience in starting up a business, and the number of start-ups previously founded 
by the entrepreneurs. For the former, which is also a dichotomous variable, a 0/1 
dummy was used. For the latter, a count of the start-ups collectively started by the 
founding team was gathered through the survey; however, multiple founders from a 
previous start-up team were collectively treated as one previous start-up. For 
entrepreneurial experience, other studies have used prior work experience in start-ups; 
however, the impact is different as founding experience includes experience in fund 
raising and employee recruitment, etc., which is not the case in the former.  
For the HC characteristic successful experience, according to the study of Hsu (2007), 
a measure of previous start-up return may be included by finding its Internal Rate of 
Return (IRR). The dummy equals one if the start-up had liquidated with an IRR of 
100% or higher on a series ‘A’ investment, and equals zero otherwise. 
To capture the HC characteristic industry experience, the question asked was if 
at least one member of the founding team has had previous work or start-up experience 
in the industry of the current start-up; the answers were coded as 0/1. 
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The HC characteristic size of the founding team, which signifies the amount of 
founding experience available (Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven, 1990), was also enquired 
about (Baum and Silverman, 2004).  
Previous education of the entrepreneur is another indicator of HC. Education in 
this study is based on formal education attained and specialised education. 
Formal education attained (general HC) shows the variation in each 
individual’s HC, whether he/she holds a master’s or doctorate degree (Hsu, 2007). To 
measure education level, a dummy equal to one was created if the founder has a 
master’s degree, and zero otherwise. This was repeated for PhD or MPhil level. Another 
dummy was created to show if any of the founders hold a Chartered Financial Analyst 
(CFA) or a Certified Management Accountant (CMA) certificate.  
Specialised education (specific HC): the question asked is if at least one of the 
founders has a postgraduate degree in a relevant field to the industry of the firm (Shane, 
2000); this was also measured with dichotomous variable 0/1. 
Another aspect of HC is managerial HC, which had three measures, according 
to Hallen (2008). First, if any of the founding team has previously managed a public 
company. The answer was in the form of a dummy variable, assigned a ‘0’ or ‘1’. 
Second, if the management team is functionally diverse, meaning each one has a 
different area of expertise. For example, one is experienced in management, another in 
the field of the venture and yet another in marketing. Third, founders were asked if they 
have any joint experience in a previous start-up (meaning if any of them have been on 
a start-up team together before the current one); answers were also recorded as 0/1. 
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Table 4.4: Entrepreneur HC Proxies 
Information 
Sought 
Proxies (answered by founders of start-ups) Measurement 
Type 
Source 
Size of Founding 
Team 
To know amount of experience available  Specify # Baum and 
Silverman 
(2004) 
Experience Two questions were asked to understand the 
entrepreneurs’ previous entrepreneurial experience, one 
question about the success of this previous experience 
and two questions about the industry experience of the 
founding team members. 
Dummy 0/1 Hsu (2007) 
Managerial HC Three items were used to gather if any of the founding 
team members have previous experience in managerial 
positions. 
Dummy 0/1 Hallen (2008) 
Education Four questions were used concerning the degree and 
field of education of the entrepreneur.  
Scale Hsu (2007) 
 
4.2.1.3 VC managers (Independent Variable) 
As derived from previous literature and used to develop the hypotheses, the different 
aspects of VC firms that may be positively related to the portfolio firm’s success 
include: i) HC of the VC management team (Dimov and Shepherd, 2005; Zarutskie, 
2010) and ii) value-adding activities (Sorenson, 2007; Bertoni et al., 2011), particularly 
iii) networking, in emerging economies (Bruton and Ahlstrom, 2003). 
i) Human Capital 
This study, similar to the model of Dimov and Shepherd (2005), separates HC of VC 
managers into task-specific HC (education and experience related to VC tasks) and 
industry-specific HC (education and experience related to industry of company funded). 
Information on the education and experience of the VC management team was collected 
through the survey and biographies of VC management team members, when available, 
for reassurance. The team would include general partner, highest ranks in hierarchy 
partners, managing directors, directors and principals (Dimov and Shepherd, 2005).  
Information on education (the HC aspect), was collected by asking whether 
each of the top management team members has a degree (master’s, or doctorate) in 
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business, law or finance, or any other industry relevant to performing VC functions, in 
addition to whether any of the members have a general degree such as science 
(mathematics, natural science or engineering) or humanities (in art or social science 
excluding economics). For each field, members that have attained education in that field 
received a score, after which the total score was calculated. For example, if there were 
five members in the team and two had a law degree, then the score for law would be 
‘0.4’. This allows members to hold more than 1 degree (Wiersema and Bantel, 1992).  
For industry experience of management team (HC aspect), questions are 
included on industry of previous work and position held by each respondent. Industries 
such as finance (experience in commercial, investment or merchant banking and firms 
that provide financial consulting), consulting, law and business management show 
experience related to VC functions. In contrast, entrepreneurial experience (whether 
any of the team members has previously founded a business) as well as other experience 
not related to the previously mentioned ones is more general, and not specific to VC 
functions. In the same manner as that for fields of education, a score for experience in 
each industry for all partners was computed. If any or more than one of the team 
members have education or previous experience in the industry of the firm they are 
funding, it adds more value to the firm as they become more knowledgeable in the 
firm’s operations, and hence can advise in that area (Sapienza et al., 1996). If a 
respondent had worked in any of the fields related to VC work, a dummy of ‘1’ was 
given for task-related experience and zero otherwise. If a respondent had worked in the 
field of the funded firm’s industry, a dummy of ‘1’ was given for industry-related 
experience and zero otherwise. 
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ii) Value-added activities 
VC value-added activities can add value to the firm in several aspects, whether it be 
financial18, strategic, interpersonal or networking.  
The strategic and operational planning value-added activities are measured by 
the degree of the VC managers’ involvement in the portfolio-company, as well as the 
level of advice they administer. First, there are six involvement measures, according to 
the work of Hege et al. (2003). These measures are boards (also supported by Hsu 
(2004)) (percentage of ventures in which VC has been present on BOD), reports 
(average number of monitoring reports requested from ventures/year), rounds (average 
number of investment rounds till exit for already achieved exits), convertibles 
(percentage of ventures in which convertible securities were used), replace (% of 
companies in which former entrepreneur was replaced before exit of the VC), and total 
number of meetings each month (Lim and Cu, 2012). Second, advice-level measures 
were also supported by the work of Cumming and Johan (2007) and Sapienza et al. 
(1996). Entrepreneurs were asked to evaluate the amount of advice received from 
                                                 
18 Financing value-added activities are excluded from this study; thus, this study focuses on post-
funding activities. 
Table 4.5: VC Managers’ HC Proxies 
Information 
Sought 
Proxies (to be answered by VC 
management team) 
Measurement 
Type 
Source 
Education 
 
How many of the VC management team 
have attained an MBA or any degree in 
law or finance (VC related)? 
How many hold a degree in the field of 
the firm’s industry (industry related)? 
How many hold other unrelated 
degrees? 
Scale  
 
Dimov and 
Shephered 
(2003) 
 
Experience  
 
If any of the management team have any 
past experience in business 
management, finance, law or 
consultancy (VC-related) or in the 
industry of the firm (industry-related). 
Dummy 0/1 Dimov and 
Shephered 
(2003) 
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venture capitalists in nine major areas in which the venture capitalists add value. For 
each area, a scale from ‘1’ to ‘5’ was used to rate advice given, ‘5’ being the highest 
rating, and N/A was used if advice was not given in a specified area. The nine aspects 
in which the extent of advice dispensed is assessed in this study are: strategic, 
marketing, finance, R&D, product development, HR, exit strategy, interpersonal and 
networking.  
Table 4.6: Proxies for Strategic and Operational Planning Value-added Activities 
Information 
Sought 
Proxies (to be answered by entrepreneurs) Measurement 
Type 
Source 
Involvement 
Measures 
VC managers were asked to provide information on 
boards, reports, rounds, convertibles, replaces and 
total number of meetings per month. 
Scale Hege et al. 
(2003), Hsu 
(2004), Lim and 
Cu (2012) 
Advice 
Measures 
Entrepreneurs were asked to rate the level of advice 
received from venture capitalists in relation to 
strategic, marketing, financial, R&D, product 
development, HR, exit strategy, interpersonal and 
networking advice. 
Likert Scale 1 to 
5 
Sapienza et al. 
(1996), 
Cumming and 
Johan (2007) 
 
iii) Networking  
One of the most important value-added services provided by venture capitalists, as 
mentioned above, is networking (Lin, 1999). The VC has three main networks: i) 
service providers, ii) government officials and iii) syndicates. 
a) Service Providers 
To measure the VC’s network of service providers, a Likert Scale was created to assess 
the following: recruiting resources; contacts with customers and suppliers; and contacts 
with investment bankers (Hsu, 2004). A Likert scale was also used to determine if the 
VC or any of its businesses and professional contacts were used to hire or recruit senior 
managers, administrative and management personnel, and/or sales and marketing 
personnel (Hellmann and Puri, 2002). A final question was if the VC has had any 
influence in shaping the HR management or policies.  
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b) Government Officials 
To measure the VC’s network of government officials, a Likert Scale was created to 
examine whether venture capitalists are capable of networking, maintaining 
relationships, and frequently contacting government officials and regulatory 
departments. Additionally, whether the VC firm has introduced the portfolio firms to 
government officials or used its government network to meet the growing needs of the 
portfolio firms. 
c) Syndicates 
The analysis of the effect of VC syndication networking was based on the work of 
Hochberg et al. (2007), which is borrowed from the graph theory (Wasserman and 
Faust, 1997), which measures the relative centrality of each actor in the network. Those 
centrality measures cover five aspects of a VC firm’s influence. First is the number of 
VCs with which it has relationships; this is a proxy for information, deal flow, expertise, 
contacts and pools of capital to which it has access. This is known as ‘degree centrality’, 
where the more ties a VC firm has, the more important it is (Jin et al., 2015), as it allows 
it to gain more opportunities for exchange and makes it less dependent on other VCs 
for information or deal flow. If the VC firm has a tie with at least one other VC firm, 
then the number of relations is recorded, or otherwise zero. Degree centrality does not 
distinguish between receiver and initiator of the tie, which are the following two aspects 
referred to as indegree and outdegree respectively. Second, ‘indegree’ is measured by 
enquiring about the frequency with which the VC firm is invited to co-invest in other 
VC deals, as this expands its investment opportunity set and resources, which it would 
not have had access to otherwise. Third, ‘outdegree’ was measured by enquiring about 
the VC’s frequency in initiating investments with other VCs, which indicates its ability 
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to generate co-investment opportunities by syndicating its own deals today. Fourth, is 
called ‘closeness’, which considers the quality of the ties, and it is measured by 
eigenvector centrality (Bonacich, 1972,1987). This weighs the VC firm’s ties to others 
by responsive centralities. Thus, it shows the extent to which it is connected to better-
connected VCs. Fifth, is the VC firm’s ability to act as an intermediary who can bring 
together other VCs with complementary skills or investment opportunities, where the 
other VCs do not have a direct relationship with each other and are only connected 
through the original VC firm. This aspect is referred to as ‘betweenness centrality’. 
Table 4.7: Proxies for VC Networks 
Information 
Sought 
Proxies (to be answered by VC 
management team) 
Measurement 
Type 
Source 
Service 
Provider 
Networks 
1) If the firm has access to recruiting 
resources, contacts with customer, 
supplier or investment bankers, 2) and if it 
has used any of its contacts to hire. 3) If 
the VC firm had influence in shaping the 
venture’s HR management or policies. 
Likert Scale 1 to 
5 
1) Hsu (2004) 
2,3) Hellmann 
and Puri 
(2002) 
Government 
officials 
Five items on the ability of venture 
capitalists to rely on government officials 
in their scope of work. 
Likert Scale 1 to 
5 
Kotabe et al. 
(2011) 
Syndicates The VC’s relations with other VCs in 
terms of: degree centrality, indegree, 
outdegree, closeness, and betweeness 
centrality.  
Scale Hochberg et 
al. (2007) 
 
4.2.1.5 VC-E Relationship (Independent Variable) 
As derived from previous literature and used to develop the hypotheses, the strength of 
the VC-E relationship impacts the success of the venture (Keuschnigg, 2004). This 
relationship in more developed economies is normally refereed by the type of security 
chosen and accordingly cash-flow rights, to alleviate adverse selection problems, as 
well as control rights (which include voting rights, liquidation and board rights), and 
stage financing (Casamatta, 2003) to minimise the moral hazard problem. The literature 
available on VC firms in less developed economies shows that, when a lack of strong 
institutional environments exists, the extent of the relationship itself and the trust 
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between the VC and the entrepreneur is what determines the success of the venture. 
Moreover, it pushes them to align their incentives and makes their efforts 
complementary (Bruton and Ahlstrom, 2003; Hain et al., 2016; Li. et al., 2018). This 
was measured through the questionnaire by seeking information from both the venture 
capitalists and the entrepreneurs on different relational aspects, as explained in the 
following table: 
Table 4.8: Proxies for VC and E Relationship 
Information 
Sought 
Proxies (to be answered by 
venture capitalists and 
Entrepreneurs) 
Measurement 
Type 
Source 
Complementary 
Roles 
1) Both were asked to rank three 
items that would explain the 
complementarity of their roles in 
the relationship 
2) Both were asked to rank if their 
expectations of effort from each 
other are met. 
Likert Scale 1 to 
5 
1) Li et al. (2018) 
2) Panda and Dash 
(2016) 
 
 
Level of 
Disagreement 
Both were asked to rank how they 
perceive the level of disagreement 
between them in eight different 
aspects. 
Likert Scale 1 to 
5 
Lim and Cu 
(2012) 
Ease of 
Negotiation 
Both were asked four questions to 
rank how they perceive their ability 
to negotiate on new issues together. 
Likert Scale 1 to 
5 
Li et al. (2018) 
Contractual 
Flexibility* 
Entrepreneurs were asked to rank 
the degree to which they perceive 
contract flexibility to be 
concerning the major business 
areas. 
Likert Scale 1 to 
5 
MacMillan and 
Subbanarasimha 
(1987), Lim and 
Cu (2012) 
Contractual 
Favourableness* 
Entrepreneurs were asked to 
evaluate eight different contractual 
provisions in terms of their 
favourableness. 
Likert Scale 1 to 
5 
Landstrom et al. 
(1998), Hsu 
(2004), Lim and 
Cu (2012) 
Trust Venture capitalists were asked to 
rate 12 items on how they perceive 
trust in their relationships with 
entrepreneurs, in terms of C-trust, 
K-trust and I-trust. 
Likert Scale 1 to 
5 
Li et al. (2018) 
Team Spirit Venture capitalists were asked to 
rate five items on how they 
perceive the team spirit of their 
portfolio companies to be.  
Likert Scale 1 to 
5 
1) Campbell 
(1993) 
2) Li et al. (2018) 
 
 
*Contractual favourableness refers to the degree of favourableness the 
entrepreneur can perceive in certain contractual terms, which depends on how the 
entrepreneur views the relationship he/she has with the VC. Entrepreneurs who have a 
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higher degree of trust in the VC should be more willing to include investor provisions 
in the contract (Manigart et al., 2002). 
*Contractual flexibility, which shows the degree of flexibility around major 
contractual terms, was measured by asking entrepreneurs to rank how flexible the VC 
was around key business areas. 
4.2.1.6 Institutional Environment (Moderating Variable) 
Entrepreneur innovation and transparency depend on property rights and their 
enforcement (Ueda, 2004). Investor protection rights and the strength of the legal 
environment impact screening, monitoring, value-added services (Bonini and Alkan, 
2012) and the extent of networks reliance (Bruton and Ahlstrom, 2003). The 
institutional and legal environment also affects the relation between venture capitalists 
and entrepreneurs, and the extent to which they both rely on trust, rather than contract 
enforcement (Li et al., 2018). How entrepreneurs and venture capitalists perceive the 
strength of the legal environment in their country and how it impacts their business and 
innovation were assessed through the following: 
Table 4.9: Proxies for Institutional Environment 
Information 
Sought 
Proxies (to be answered by 
Venture capitalists and 
Entrepreneurs) 
Measurement 
Type 
Source 
Legal 
environment in 
Egypt 
Four items were asked to understand 
the legal environment itself in Egypt. 
Likert Scale 1 to 
5 
1) Li et al. 
(2018) 
2) Panda and 
Dash (2016) 
Law 
enforcement 
Two items were used to show the 
extent to which firms perceive law 
enforcement to protect their rights. 
Likert Scale 1 to 
5 
Yasar et al. 
(2011) 
Impact on 
business 
Two items were used to assess the 
impact of legal environment on the 
business itself. 
Likert Scale 1 to 
5 
Akrofi (2016) 
Impact on 
innovation 
Four items were used to show the 
impact of the institutional 
environment on the extent of 
innovation of the firm. 
Likert Scale 1 to 
5 
Akrofi (2016) 
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4.3.1 Pre-testing Process 
The questions in both the questionnaire prepared for VC managers and that for the 
entrepreneurs were all derived from different empirical studies, yet in some cases 
adjusted for context. The first step in pre-testing was that the thesis supervisors 
provided comments and advice on the number of questions and the scales used. This 
led to some changes and an increase in the number of questions that measure certain 
variables. After which, both questionnaires were sent to an expert researcher, who is 
particularly experienced in the design and scaling of questionnaires. As a result, some 
of the questions were rephrased for consistency, in aspects such as the way of 
addressing the respondents, some questions in certain categories were added and one 
scale was changed. The final step in the pre-testing phase involved the questionnaire 
being administered to an expert in the Egyptian financial market. The cognitive method 
used to do so is called Cognitive Interviewing, which focuses on the mental processes 
respondents use to answer survey questions (Collins, 2010). The Cognitive 
Interviewing technique used in this research is Probing, rather than Think Aloud. 
Although the latter is used more often with questionnaires, the former is interview-
driven and hence places a lower burden on the respondent. Probing involves the 
interviewer asking the respondent how s/he went about answering the questions. 
Questions asked included: how easy or difficult the respondent perceived the answering 
of questions to be, what was understood by certain terms used in the questionnaire, and 
if the answer that came to mind was found in the choices given. 
The outcomes of this process were very beneficial. Some questions were 
eliminated as it was pointed out that their resemblance to other questions would confuse 
respondents. Some comments were also made about the selection of wording for the 
cover letter and hence it was amended. This led to executing another cognitive pre-
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testing technique called Paraphrasing, which is used to identify comprehension 
problems. The field expert was also asked to paraphrase all questions which she did not 
understand as intended, in a structure/form that would facilitate comprehension of the 
questions for all other respondents. 
Alongside pre-testing, it is also important to consider response rate. Only a few 
VC firms exist in Egypt, and hence obtaining a full VC firm population response is 
crucial to the success of this study. Several measures were taken to enhance the 
response rate. A letter from the university was made available to all firms for 
reassurance concerning the purpose of this research. A cover letter was also provided 
with the questionnaire, which explained the research topic and nature and, most 
importantly, guaranteed confidentiality. The letter also explained that a summary report 
providing results of the research, when completed, would be sent to the firms. This 
report can be used as a reference or a guidance for those firms to enhance the outcome 
of their portfolios, or their performance. 
4.3 Pre-Testing 
Survey questionnaires should be tested to ensure they meet their purpose (Collins, 
2001). Pre-testing aims at improving the primary questionnaire and the response rate 
(Faux, 2010). It is necessary, especially when items are borrowed from previous studies 
(Hair et al., 2006) and even more when they are being applied to new contexts.  
Several stages were needed for the questionnaire construction. In the earlier 
stages, questions were revised several times, to ensure that the questions provided are 
related to the concepts being tested (Faux, 2010). Additionally, general issues related 
to the flow of the questions, the usefulness of instructions and readability of the 
questions were also considered prior to the pre-testing.  
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During the pre-testing phase, four issues related to the questionnaire design 
were considered: content, form, instrument, and procedures and process (Faux, 2010). 
While these issues are important, it was also necessary to ensure that all respondents 
comprehended the questions, all respondents uniformly understood questions, and that 
respondents were able and willing to answer such questions. Cognitive questionnaire 
testing methods can be used to test those three assumptions and accordingly deliver 
better surveys and questionnaires (Collins, 2001). 
Pre-testing with experienced researchers is crucial, but it is also important to 
pre-test on potential respondents, particularly to test assumptions about how they would 
perceive the questions. In this study, as explained in the following section, 
questionnaires were reviewed by an experienced researcher and an expert in the 
Egyptian financial market.  
4.4 The Main Survey  
After the questionnaire had been pre-tested and all the necessary amendments had been 
finalised, the main survey commenced on November 24th, 2018 and ended on March 
4th, 2019. Before discussing the response rate and how the data was collected, it is 
important to first understand the research environment in Egypt. 
4.4.1 Research Environment in Egypt 
Data collection in Egypt is extremely challenging for many reasons. Firstly, the VC 
market in Egypt is relatively new; thus, there is no database that lists the VC firms, nor 
the entrepreneurial firms that are receiving VC funding. Some of those VC firms do not 
provide contact information on their websites, while others have phone numbers that 
are no longer working, as well as only general customer service emails, which do not 
enable enquirers to contact any of the fund managers or board members. This imposed 
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a problem in being able to reach the firms to begin with. Another problem is the lack 
of interest in research in Egypt, where in some instances the researcher received some 
replies from potential respondents stating ‘Sorry, we are not interested in helping 
research students’ or ‘Sorry, we do not have time for research purposes’. This leads to 
two points, one would be that in Egypt most people over-work; they do not have set 
working hours and hence can work more than 12 hours a day; each individual is taking 
on too many responsibilities. Two, in the business environment most work is done in 
return for monetary incentives; however, from a research perspective a monetary 
incentive issued for a survey response would be unethical. The incentive should be the 
complementary report offered that summarises the results, which would be beneficial 
to their scope of work. These struggles make it very difficult for anyone to collect 
primary data in Egypt; however, the Egyptian culture is known for relationships and 
connections: people in Egypt tend to get everything done through social connections, 
which was the only option that enabled the researcher to collect most of the data. These 
were the obstacles faced when administering the questionnaire to both the VC firms 
and the companies in their portfolios. Furthermore, another issue that was faced with 
entrepreneurs was their hesitancy to discuss their anything related to the funding they 
have received. Ninety percent of the companies in the Middle East are family 
businesses that contribute to 80% of the national income, account for 75% of the private 
sector and employ 70% of the workforce (Hassan, 2015). Individual entrepreneurship 
levels have begun to rise after the 2011 revolution in Egypt19; however, not only is the 
concept of entrepreneurship relatively new but so is receiving funding from 
untraditional sources such as VC firms, rather than relying on personal assets, funding 
from parents or bank loans. Hence, some entrepreneurs were not comfortable about 
                                                 
19 GEM (Global Entrepreneurship Monitor): Egypt National Report 2015-2016. 
132 
 
disclosing any information related to their deals. This remained the case in some 
instances even after the researcher explained the confidentiality of the study, or its 
academic purpose, and that the questions do not involve any financial disclosures. One 
of the responses for illustration on this matter is as follows: ‘Regarding [the researcher’s 
name], I am not very comfortable disclosing the details of my investment deal. I have 
discussed it with my investors as well, and I think I will refrain from completing her 
survey.’ 
4.4.2 Population, Samples and Response Rate 
There are 16 VC firms in Egypt (population); 14 of them agreed to complete the 
questionnaire. The researcher approached the two remaining firms, but one of them did 
not complete it, even after several reminders. The other one’s fund managers were 
abroad for the entire data collection period, as their funding is not restricted to Egypt; 
however, the researcher’s data collection deadline could not wait for their return and 
they were not able to complete the survey while they were abroad, as they explained 
that their trip was running on a very tight schedule. The portfolios of the 16 VC firms 
that did complete the survey consisted of a total of 159 companies; however, only 119 
of them are based in Egypt or have any operations in Egypt. Therefore, only the 119 
are relevant to the study, as the focus is on performance of VC-backed firms in Egypt, 
which means the entrepreneurial firms need to be in Egypt and the VC firms need to at 
least have a base in Egypt, in cases where they are not completely founded in Egypt. 
The researcher was able to reach only 92 of the 119 firms. The remaining 27 were not 
reached, either because they provided no contact information, did not respond to 
messages via their websites, or the founders were unknown and their names were not 
listed anywhere. However, two of those firms had exceptional circumstances, as the 
researcher came to know that the founders had recently passed away. Out of the 92 
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firms that were contacted, only 52 have filled in the survey and returned it, which means 
that over 56% of those who were contacted completed the survey, and almost 44% of 
the entire population responded to the survey. Of the 92 firms contacted, 18 refused to 
answer it, whether because they were not interested in the study, had no time or simply 
did not reply to phone calls, emails or messages. On the other hand, 22 firms that agreed 
to fill out the survey and return it, failed to do so after three rounds of reminders.  
4.4.3 Response Rate Improvement 
As mentioned in section 4.4.1, the research environment in Egypt holds many obstacles 
for primary data collection, and Egypt is a country that usually relies on connections 
for almost anything. At the start of the survey administration process, the researcher 
tried to contact each firm, to set up an appointment with one of the fund managers to 
fill out the survey or to agree to have it sent by mail. That was very unsuccessful, as the 
responses would either be a set of questions about the research and why a fund manager 
is specifically needed, then the phone call would end with an agreement to call back, 
after discussing with the managers; however, in most cases the phone calls were not 
returned. The researcher then tried to obtain the addresses of these firms, either from 
Google Maps or from their websites, in attempt to show up at the firms’ premises to set 
up an appointment or ask for contact information to reach the fund managers. However, 
the idea of showing up was not appealing to the firms. After about a month of such 
unsuccessful attempts, only one respondent agreed to give the researcher an 
appointment to fill out the survey face to face. This respondent is a VC firm manager 
from a management team that consists of five managers who was particularly interested 
in the research topic and filled it out (he was not Egyptian, but he manages the fund in 
Egypt).  
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The previous failed attempts left the researcher with no option but to resort to 
connections. The researcher then derived a list of all the VC fund managers or board 
members (they were available on the VC firm websites for the most part), created a file 
with their names and photographs (where available), and sent it out to people in the 
researcher’s network that have connections in the capital market. This mechanism led 
to two new responses, one through a work colleague and one through a friend; both 
respondents filled in the questionnaire through meeting the researcher in person. 
However, the response rate was still low; consequently, the researcher looked up each 
one of those names on the social media application known for connecting people, 
Facebook, to try and find mutual connections or common links which would facilitate 
the process of reaching the individual fund managers. This worked to reach the rest of 
the intended participants and receive the surveys back, filled out, to total to 14 out of 
the 16 VC firms (87.5% of the population). The other two were approached by phone 
and through close connections; however, as explained above, one did not respond 
despite several reminders, and the other firm’s managers were abroad. 
The same approach was applied to gather the data from the portfolio companies 
through the questionnaire aimed at entrepreneurs; however, it was much harder as very 
few of the VC firms provide a list of the founders of their portfolio firms. It was a very 
time-consuming, rigid process to find who the founders of those firms are. Some were 
identified through Google by searching for founder of FIRM NAME. The names of one 
or two of the co-founders would then appear, either in an article (covering the funding 
round they came out of), in images (if they were speakers at an entrepreneurial event, 
such as Rise-Up Summit Egypt), or mentioned with their firm information on a database 
called Crunchbase, or finally through an application named LinkedIn, which is a 
network for business connections. The latter was the most efficient search method. The 
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researcher purchased a premium membership, to enable a larger number of searches. 
Through LinkedIn, entering the firm name provides a list of all employees who have an 
account in that firm and what their positions are, which assisted in acquiring the names 
of some of the co-founders. However, most of them have blocked receiving messages 
on LinkedIn. Their names were then looked up on Facebook, either to reach them on 
facebook directly, if they allow notifications from people with whom they are not 
connected (which was not the case in most instances), or to find a common connection 
and reach them through others. Moreover, some of the respondents were then reached 
through the Facebook page of their companies. Connections were exploited to reach 21 
out of the 52 firms, who have sent their responses to the survey. 
Another solution to improve response rate was suggested by the third 
respondent from the entrepreneurs. At the start of the data collection phase, the intent 
of the researcher was to collect data from the VC firms entirely, before proceeding to 
administer the other questionnaire to the entrepreneurs. However, receiving responses 
from the VC firms exceeded the estimated time; thus, the initiation of the administration 
of the questionnaire to the entrepreneurs was due. It was first sent to the entrepreneurial 
firms constituting the portfolios of the VCs that had already responded. The first two 
entrepreneurs chose to receive the questionnaire by email as an editable Word 
document rather than face to face. The third entrepreneur requested the researcher to 
transform the questionnaire into a Google survey form, which would expedite and 
facilitate the process of filling it out. The researcher agreed and accordingly the 
entrepreneur filled it out within 20 minutes. As of that point, the response rate increased 
and entrepreneurs exhibited a stronger will to respond than did the VC firms. The 
researcher then converted the VC questionnaire into a google survey format and resent 
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it to all the VC firms that had not yet responded; subsequently, the six remaining firms 
swiftly returned the questionnaire with full responses. 
Table 4.10 Response Analysis Summary 
Questionnaire Population Approached Returned 
survey 
Agreed, but 
did not return 
survey 
Refused/No 
response 
VC 16 16 14 2 0 
Entrepreneur 119 92 52 22 18 
 
4.4.4 Survey Bias Assessment 
Survey Bias Assessment was conducted by assessing non-response bias and common-
method bias, which are the two most relevant to research relying on surveys. 
Non-Response Bias Assessment 
When relying on samples, it is important to be certain that the sample is representative 
of the entire population. To do so, the possibility of having non-response bias must be 
excluded (Hair et al., 2006). As explained above, different practices have been followed 
to reduce the non-response rate itself, which is the best way to handle non-response bias 
(Hair et al., 2006; Boso, 2010). The VC questionnaire received a response from almost 
90% of the population and hence non-response bias assessment was not necessary. 
However, for the entrepreneur questionnaire, only 44% of the population responded 
and hence the impact of non-response bias on the sample quality can be estimated 
(Rindfleisch et al., 2008; Boso, 2010). To do so, the sample must be separated into early 
and late respondents, where the late respondents would represent the non-respondents, 
as they are assumed to be firms that respond less readily (Armstrong and Overton, 1977; 
Churchill, 1995). In this research, firms did not receive the questionnaires at the same 
time. As explained above, the research environment in Egypt turned out to be very 
challenging and hence receiving responses was mainly dependent on contacting 
entrepreneurs through personal connections or trying to reach them directly. However, 
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early and late can be assessed as those who responded before the first reminder was 
sent to them (within 10 days of receiving the questionnaire) and those who responded 
after a first or second reminder was sent. T-tests were performed to compare the means 
and standard deviations of the early and late respondents on all variables. Results 
showed differences in the means not to be significant, at a 5% level. Hence, it can be 
said that mean differences between the two observed samples are due to chance 
(Churchill, 1995). Furthermore, the t-test results confirm that non-response bias is not 
an issue in this study. Represented below in Table 4.11 are the t-test results showing no 
significant differences for the first variable in each group. 
 
Common-Method Bias Assessment 
Recent studies have emphasised the importance of assessing the potential problem of 
Common-Method Bias (CMB). CMB is the measurement of error that is reflected by 
the tendency of respondents to want to provide positive answers (Chang et al., 2010). 
Table 4.11 Comparison of Means for Early and Late Respondents 
  
 
Early Respondents 
N=20 
Late Respondents  
N=35  
 
T-Test Result 
 Variables Mean Std. Deviation Mean Std. Deviation Sig (2-tailed) 
Political leaders 1.65 0.988 1.59 0.798 0.811 
TM customers 2.60 1.353 3.09 1.329 
0.205 
Religious leaders 2.00 1.298 2.06 1.318 
0.873 
Innovative marketers 3.40 0.995 3.13 1.157 
0.393 
Superior cust. serv. 3.55 1.234 3.53 0.983 
0.949 
Low-cost materials 3.10 1.021 3.31 1.330 
0.549 
New products 3.95 1.050 3.94 0.840 
0.97 
Quality control 3.95 0.999 4.00 0.880 
0.851 
Cost reduction 4.05 0.826 4.28 0.888 
0.355 
Strategic Advice 2.45 1.317 2.47 1.047 
0.952 
Resources 3.45 0.999 2.97 1.031 
0.105 
Strategy disagreements 2.35 0.988 2.59 0.946 0.386 
Strategy flexibility 3.60 0.940 3.09 0.928 0.061 
Co. Valuation 3.10 0.852 3.13 1.070 
0.916 
Negotiation 3.50 1.000 3.13 1.040 
0.211 
Trust court system 2.55 1.099 2.81 1.281 
0.456 
Political stability  3.65 1.226 4.13 1.008 0.156 
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CMB is a greater potential concern when data for the dependent and independent 
variables is collected from the same respondents, as it could lead to false internal 
consistency (Chang et al., 2010; Adomako, 2015). CMB can be tackled through several 
procedures, both ex-ante and ex-post (Podsakoff et al., 2003; Boso, 2010; Adomako, 
2015). This study relies on intensive ex-ante procedures to ensure that no CMB exists 
or to minimise the possibilities of it. Ex-post procedures could not be applied, as they 
require a follow-up study, which is not a feasible option in Egypt, given the research 
environment explained above and how difficult data collection is. 
Ex-ante procedures refer to those applied before the main survey. Six ex-ante 
measures are used to prevent CMB in this study. First is the application of different 
techniques when writing-up the questionnaire. The questions were mixed and breaks 
were included to allow temporal delays that enable recalled information to leave a 
participant’s short-term memory before answering new questions. Different 
measurement scales were applied, for example, Likert Scale, Dichotomous Variable, 
etc. Using different response formats, as opposed to the same response format, can 
decease the average correlation between independent and dependent variables, as 
evident in studies as early as Kothandapana (1971). Reverse coded items were also used 
(Adomako, 2015). Second, there were two questionnaires, one administered to the VC 
firms, which only contained questions that would refer to independent variables and did 
not include any items to measure the dependent variable. Third, one of the three 
independent variables, as well as the moderating variable items, was asked for in both 
the VC and entrepreneur questionnaires, to increase reliability. Fourth, respondents 
were reassured of the complete confidentiality of the information they provided (Chang 
et al., 2012; Boso, 2010; Adomako, 2015). Fifth, respondents were reminded to provide 
answers at their own discretion, as there were no right or wrong answers to the 
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questionnaire (Podsakoff et al., 2003; Boso, 2010; Adomako, 2015). Lastly, honesty 
and accuracy when answering the questions were requested from all respondents 
(Podsakoff et al., 2003; Boso, 2010). 
After using t-tests to compare means and ensure that the sample is free of non-
response bias and then applying the abovementioned six steps to procedurally prevent 
the occurrence of CMB, data analysis can be conducted to analyse data and check for 
validity of the hypotheses.  
4.5 Data Analysis Procedure 
The data in this study was analysed using very thorough descriptive statistics, as well 
as t-tests, to compare means of components of each sub-variable, in order to recognise 
the importance of each, which would provide a better understanding of the data and 
enable its explanation, with the support of the literature.  
 Descriptive statistics for all data include frequencies and percentages of 
responses to understand the data and the tendency of responses for each measure. 
Means and standard deviations are also calculated for all non-binary measures to further 
illustrate the responses. Parametric one sample t-tests are also calculated for all non-
binary measures to rank the means of all the measures of one variable to understand 
their importance. For example, there are different types of entrepreneur networks, mean 
rankings would clarify which networks types are more important and which are the 
weakest. Parametric tests are selected as the data of this study is suitable for their 
assumptions, data is independent, collected randomly and approximately normally 
distributed (Armitrage and Berry, 2001). The normal distribution of different measures 
was assured using histograms with normal distribution curves. Non-parametric tests 
however, are used when data is not approximately normally distributed. One sample t-
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tests compare the mean of a sample to a hypothesised or set mean. Through the t-test 
value and the value of significance provided by the results, it can be determined whether 
the sample mean is significantly different to the predetermined mean, at a given 
confidence level. The t determines the t-quantile with 𝑛 − 1 degrees of freedom 
(Dupont, 1990). The t-test value is calculated as follows: 
𝑡 =  (?̅? − 𝜇)/(𝜎/√𝑛),                                                                                         (4.1) 
Where, ?̅? refers to the sample mean, 𝜇 is the specified population mean, 𝜎 is the 
standard deviation of the sample, and 𝑛 is the sample size (Armitrage and Berry, 2001).  
When using questionnaires in research, pre-existing measures are borrowed 
from previous surveys to allow for comparability across studies, instead of deriving 
new ones. Therefore, construct validation and an analysis of whether these measures 
are invariant across groups or time is then necessary. Additionally, the questionnaire 
contains a vast number of questions or items to be analysed, which need to be reduced 
into variables or constructs. Those items that provide a proper fit or measure for a 
construct are aggregated. Moreover, this allows for a smaller number of variables. All 
constructs should be valid, reliable and unidimensional. Construct validation and data 
reduction in this study are both achieved through Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA) 
(Joreskog, 1969; Harrington, 2009).  
CFA is used to examine if the original form of the measure is well adapted to 
the new population. Construct validity is defined by Cronbach and Meehl (1955) as an 
examination of a measure of an attribute (or construct) that is not operationally defined 
or measured directly. During the process of establishing construct validity, researchers 
test hypotheses about how measures are related to each other, based on a certain theory. 
Construct Validity consists of convergent, discrimination and theoretical (also known 
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as nomological) validity (Koeske, 1994). Discrimination validity refers to low 
correlation between constructs, which means the measures within a concept are 
different. Furthermore, questions in the survey related to a certain concept are different 
(Bagozzi et al., 1991). Convergent validity refers to having no problems with shared 
method variance; therefore, measures of the same construct are highly correlated, but 
are using different methods (Koeske, 1994; Bagozzi et al., 1991), which means 
questions in the survey are measuring the same concept in a similar way but using a 
different method or from a different perspective.   
In addition to construct validation, CFA is also used to determine scale 
reliability (Harrington, 2009). As explained above, researchers most commonly 
administer two or more measures (referred to as a scale) that are alternative indicators 
of the same construct (Bhattacherjee, 2012). A composite score is calculated as an 
unweighted sum of the respondents’ score of these measures, which provides an 
estimate of the corresponding construct (Petresc, 2013). A composite score, however, 
is only meaningful if each of the measures is unidimensional, which means that a single 
trait or construct commonly exists between the measures. It is important to note that the 
meaning of a measure as intended by the researcher may not be the same as that 
comprehended by the respondent; therefore, the scale assessment process should 
include an assessment of whether the multiple measures that define a scale are 
acceptably regarded as alternative indicators of the same construct. CFA is applied in 
this study to evaluate unidimensionality, as it carries out a relatively stricter 
interpretation of it than other approaches (Boso, 2010). 
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CFA is of better use when the variables have a strong theoretical base (Williams, 
1995), which is the case for this research. It enables the examination of expected causal 
connections between variables.  
To conduct CFA, Pearson’s Correlation Matrix is calculated first, to determine 
correlations between variables and subsequently allow for an indication to group 
variables into appropriate indices. This systematically ensures that the data is free from 
multicollinearity problems, as all correlated variables are grouped into one main 
variable. Furthermore, as the model of this study is based on variables as well as sub-
variables, which include different measurement aspects, accordingly two-step factor 
analysis is applied. All the highly correlated indices that represent sub-variables are 
grouped into an index that represents the variable itself. Moreover, in some instances, 
more than one index is created to represent the different measurement aspects of a sub-
variable. Therefore, correlations for these indices are measured in order to create a new 
index comprising those indices that have high significant correlations, possibly 
representing the sub-variable.  
 After validation and aggregation of data measures, a multiple regression model 
is then implemented to further analyse the data. Multiple regression is one of the most 
commonly used statistical techniques in research (Mason and Perreault, 1991). The 
application of multiple regression in this study, conditional on statistically significant 
overall prediction, is to draw conclusions about individual predictor variables (the 
independent variables in this study). In other words, it is used to test the hypotheses of 
the effect of each predictor on the dependent variable, and to evaluate their relative 
importance (Mason and Perreault, 1991), which is why most researchers rely on it.  
They often seek to investigate the effect one variable has on another, e.g. how the 
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change in X would affect the change in Y, as per their hypotheses. Not only is it used 
to establish relationships between two variables but also to determine the statistical 
significance of the relationship (Best and Wolf, 2015).  
One of the frequently found limitations of the OLS model is misinterpretation 
of coefficients due to collinearity between independent variables (referred to as X- 
variables) (Best and Wolf, 2015). However, multicollinearity is not an issue in this 
study as correlations are measured between variables and all correlated variables are 
grouped into indices through CFA. 
 Another assumption of OLS is that the data is free from autocorrelation. 
Autocorrelation refers to the degree of correlation between the values of the same 
variables across different observations in data. It is an issue when dealing with time 
series data (Baum, 2006), in which observations occur at different points in time. This 
study however, relies on cross-sectional data and hence, autocorrelation is not an issue 
in the data.  
Another assumption in OLS is that the error term has a constant variance meaning no 
heteroscedasticity. Heteroscedasticity occurs more often in datasets that have a large 
range between the largest and the smallest observed values (Gujarati and Porter, 2009). 
In this study almost, all measures were either based on binary values, Likert scales from 
1 to 5, or continuous variables with responses in the form of a scale that ranges from 0 
to a maximum of 7. Hence, a large range is not possible and therefore, 
heteroscedasticity assumption is not violated.  
A final assumption of OLS regression is the normal distribution of the error term. A 
normality test was conducted to assure its normal distribution. Skeweness- Kurtosis test 
(Joanes and Gill, 1998) was applied rather than a Jarque -Bera normality test (Jarque 
and Bera, 1980; Best and Wolf, 2015) as the latter is used for very large samples, as it 
144 
 
yields more robust results with larger samples.. Skewness-Kurtosis test shows a normal 
distribution of residuals for the variables used in this study. Results are shown in Table 
A2 in appendix A. 
The linear relationship between the dependent and predictable variables in a 
multiple regression model is measured as follows: 
𝑦 =  ∑ 𝛽𝑖  𝑥𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=0 ,                                                                                                        (4.2) 
 𝑦 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1   𝑥1 +  𝛽2   𝑥2  + ⋯ + 𝛽𝑛   𝑥𝑛 + 𝑢𝑖,                                                                (4.3) 
In the above equations the 𝑦 denotes the dependent (endogenous) variable and the 𝑥′𝑠 
refer to the independent (exogenous) variables. 𝛽0  signifies the intercept, which is the 
value of 𝑦 at which the regression line intercepts the 𝑦 axis. The 𝛽1  to 𝛽𝑛  refer to the 
coefficient or slope which determines how shallow or steep the regression line is. 
Therefore, for each unit of change in variable 𝑥1 , 𝑦 changes by the amount of 𝛽1 
(Diamond and Jefferies, 2001; Best and Wolf, 2015). 
𝜷𝒏 =
∑(𝒙−?̅?)(𝒚−?̅?)
∑(𝒙−?̅?)𝟐
,                                                                             (4.4) 
 
Finally, 𝑢𝑖  symbolises the error term or residual. It is equal to the difference between 
the observed values of 𝑦 and the values predicted by the independent variables.  
 Researchers (such as Ehrlich et al., 1994; Pruthi et al., 2003; Dimov and 
Shepherd, 2005; and Florin, 2005) have relied on analysis of variance (ANOVA), which 
is a statistical technique that assesses potential differences in a continuous dependent 
variable by a categorical variable or set of variables (Muller and Fetterman, 2003). 
Thus, most studies that use ANOVA have a set of categorical independent variables, 
while other studies that have continuous independent variables use regression analysis. 
In this study, the independent variables were initially a hybrid set of binary, ordinal and 
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continuous variables. After which they were all reduced through CFA to form indices 
that are used in the model as continuous variables, which in turn makes regression more 
fit for the analysis of this study. Regression analysis is used to assess the quantitative 
relation between variables (the explanatory and the dependent), which is very relevant 
to the nature of this study. ANOVA on the other hand allows the assessment of the 
impact of the explanatory variables on the residuals, meaning how much of the variance 
in the data is explained or reduced by those variables. Moreover, ANOVA is mainly a 
test of equal population means for more than three variables (Maxwell et al. 2017), 
which is not relevant to the objectives of this study. 
4.5.1 Robustness  
The questionnaire in this study has many different types of questions (Scale, Ordinal 
and Nominal). The dependent variable in this study is an Ordinal one (Likert Scale), 
hence, it is best analysed using Ordered Probit Regression, whereas, in Ordinary Least 
Square (OLS) regression, the dependent must be a continuous (scale) variable; 
therefore, it is represented by an index, created through CFA. This index includes the 
grouping of the performance measures selected for this study.  
 For a robustness check, the best measure of the dependent variable has been selected 
and ordered probit regression was applied to confirm results of the regression analysis. 
Ordered probit is put to use when the dependent variable is an ordinal one (Mckelvey 
and Zavoina (1975).  Order Logistic Regression can also be used when the dependent 
variable is an ordinal one, however, Ordered Probit is used for robustness as it is more 
suitable for a random effects model such as the one used in this study, whereas ordered 
logistic is more commonly used when the data is fixed. Additionally, ordered probit 
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assumes that residuals in this model follow a normal distribution while ordered logistic 
regression does not (Boes and Winkelmann, 2005): 
.  The reason ordered probit regression was not the main analysis method in this 
study is because it can only rely on one measure for the dependent variable. However, 
the VC-backed firms investigated by this study are mostly start-ups that may have not 
realized all measures of performance yet. Moreover, the dependent variable is 
subjective and not objective as explained in section 4.2.1 and hence having a set of 
measures to represent performance is more reliable in this case. 
 For robustness using ordered probit, one of the ten performance measures included in 
this study is selected.  The selection of the best measure was based on three criteria: 1) 
no respondents have omitted the question, 2) the measure that is most highly correlated 
with all other measures and 3) the measure with the highest factor loading found using 
CFA.  
The relationship between variables is determined using ordered probit as follows: 
The observed dependent variable is 𝑌𝑖, 𝑖 = 1, … 𝑛 where 𝑛 is the number of 
observations. The values of 𝑌𝑖 are determined by a latent or unobservable variable (𝑌 ∗). 
The observable dependent variable is the entrepreneurs’ responses to the question: 
‘Compared to your industry average, how would you grade your company’s 
performance on Sales Growth?’ Is it 0 (below average), 1 (average) and 2 (above 
average)? A higher value indicates higher sales growth. 
The outcome equation can be expressed as a function of a vector of explanatory or 
independent variables (𝑋𝑖) weighted by a vector of unknown parameters (𝛽), using the 
following relationship: 
𝑌𝑖 ∗= 𝑋
′
𝑖𝛽 + 𝑢𝑖 ,                                                                                                  (4.5) 
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Where, 𝑢𝑖 is a normally distributed variable, with a variance normalised to 1. In this 
case, the observed 𝑌 is related to the unobserved 𝑌 ∗ using 𝜃𝑗 as thresholds partitioning 
the real line into series of regions corresponding to the various ordinal categories. The 
observable 𝑌 can take 3 distinct values, 0 (‘far below average’, ‘below average’ and 
‘neutral’), 1 (average), 2 (above average). Therefore, this would be (Boes and 
Winkelmann, 2005): 
 
𝑌𝑖 = 0 𝑖𝑓 − ∞ < 𝑌𝑖 ∗≤ 𝜃0= −∞ < 𝑋
′
𝑖𝛽 + 𝑢𝑖 ≤ 𝜃0 ,                               (4.6) 
𝑌𝑖 = 1 𝑖𝑓 𝜃0 < 𝑌𝑖 ∗≤ 𝜃1 = 𝜃0 < 𝑋
′
𝑖𝛽 + 𝑢𝑖 ≤ 𝜃1,                                     (4.7) 
𝑌𝑖 = 2 𝑖𝑓 𝜃1 < 𝑌𝑖 ∗≤ +∞ =  𝜃1 < 𝑋
′
𝑖𝛽 + 𝑢𝑖 < +∞                                 (4.8) 
Where 𝑢𝑖~𝑁 (0, 𝜎
2) 
The probabilities of observing 𝑌 = 0, 1 𝑜𝑟 2 can be defined as follows where Φ refers 
to the cumulative distribution function operator for the standard normal  
Pr(𝑌 = 𝑗) =  Φ (𝜃𝑗 − 𝑋
′
𝑖𝛽) −  Φ (𝜃𝑗−1 − 𝑋
′
𝑖𝛽)   for j= 0,1,2,              (4.9) 
Maximum likelihood estimation is then used to estimate the above model, and the log- 
likelihood function is given as: 
L= ∑ ∑ 𝛿𝑖𝑗𝐿𝑛 [
2
𝑗=𝑜
𝑛
𝑖=1 Φ (𝜃𝑗 − 𝑋
′
𝑖𝛽) −  Φ (𝜃𝑗−1 − 𝑋
′
𝑖𝛽)],                     (4.10) 
Where 𝛿𝑖𝑗 is an indicator variable = 1 if the 𝑖
𝑡ℎindividual’s response falls within the 𝑗𝑡ℎ 
category, and = 0, otherwise.  
 
4.6 Chapter Summary 
This study relies on primary data collected through a survey originally intended to be 
administered in person and through email, depending on the preference of each firm. A  
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very detailed descriptive analysis is relied upon to understand and explain the data. 
Comparison of means is used to rank the measures and detect their relative importance. 
The survey questions were derived from the work of previous researchers, after which 
they were tested by two experts, a researcher who is specialised in questionnaires and 
an expert from the market. CFA is used to aggregate the measures into related groups 
to narrow them down as well as validate them and eliminate unnecessary ones, after 
which the data is analysed using OLS multiple regression and results are confirmed 
through ordered probit regression. 
The following chapters will present the descriptive statistics and provide a 
discussion of the results of this analysis, from which the findings of this studies will be 
drawn. 
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Chapter Five 
Characteristics of Entrepreneurs and Venture Capitalists 
Variables, Descriptives, and Results 
5.0 Introduction 
This chapter presents the descriptive analysis of the sample results and the variables 
used in regression analysis. First, in section 5.1, descriptive statistics are presented for 
measures related to the characteristics of entrepreneurs and VC managers as well as the 
services provided by venture capitalists. Descriptive statistics for the performance of 
VC-backed firms are also presented in this section. The chapter demonstrates the CFA 
process used for dimensionality and validity assessment, as well as data reduction 
procedures for these measures, in section 5.2. Section 5.3 summarises all the new 
aggregated variables related to entrepreneur and VC characteristics, which are used in 
the regression model. Finally, section 5.4 explains the results for the OLS regression 
conducted on these two independent variables and their effect on the performance of 
VC-backed firms.  
5.1 Descriptive Statistics 
This section shows the general characteristics of the respondents, which provides 
information for this study, and details of their responses. Frequencies and percentages 
are calculated for all the measures related to the characteristics of entrepreneurs and 
venture capitalists as well as the services provided by the latter. Means and standard 
deviations are calculated for all non-binary variables (for ordinal and scale variables). 
Parametric tests (t-tests) are also implemented to derive mean rankings.  
As previously explained, this study relies on data collected from two different 
questionnaires. One questionnaire was sent to the funded entrepreneurs. It consists of 
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131 questions that focus on the characteristics of the entrepreneurs, as well as the 
resources held by their firms (independent variable one), the value-added services 
provided by venture capitalists from the entrepreneurs’ perspective (independent 
variable two), the VC-E relationship (independent variable three) and the institutional 
environment in Egypt (moderating variable). The other questionnaire was distributed 
to the venture capitalists. It consists of 79 questions, which focus on VC fund managers’ 
characteristics and the services they provide (independent variable two), the VC-E 
relationship (independent variable three) and the institutional environment in Egypt 
(moderating variable). This chapter will focus on responses related to independent 
variables one and two only, as well as the dependent variable. 
5.1.1 Entrepreneur Descriptive Statistics 
 The questionnaire distributed to the entrepreneurs that have received VC funding for 
their firms was filled out and returned by 52 respondents. Details of the age, size and 
industry of each firm are provided in the appendix A in Table A3, while an overview 
will be given in this section. 
Table 5.1 Firm Age and Size Descriptives 
Variable Obs.  Mean Std. Dev. Min  Max Mode 
Firm Age 52 32.08 24.23 2 119 12 
Firm Size 52 33.94 53.06 3 250 5 
Firm age is measured through number of months the firm has been operating.  
Firm size is measured through number of employees in each firm.  
This table shows minimum and maximum firm age and size for all 52 firms, as well as mean mode 
and std. deviation. 
Firm age (a control variable) is measured through the number of months that 
the portfolio firm has been operating. Responses show the oldest firm to have been in 
operation for almost 10 years, while the newest firm has been operating for just two 
months. Moreover, the most common firm age in the sample is one year. The difference 
in age could have an impact on results (Evans, 1987; Hall, 1987; Brown, 2005) and 
performance; however, it is a control variable in this study and the focus is on other 
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variables. Firm size is another control variable that could otherwise have an impact on 
performance (Botman et al., 2004; Pommet, 2011). The number of employees in the 
firm measures firm size in this study. It shows great variance amongst firms, with the 
largest firm having 250 employees, whilst the smallest has as little as three employees. 
The most common response to the number of employees, however, is 5, whereas the 
mean of the number of employees in each firm is about 34 employees.  
These 52 firms are from diverse industries, as shown in Figure 5.1 below. The industries 
to which these firms belong are also controlled for in this study.  
 
Figure 5.1 Industries of Entrepreneurial Firms 
Questionnaire responses of these 52 firms are presented in the following 
sections. The questionnaire contains a section on the dependent variable which is the 
performance of the VC-backed firm.  The questionnaire includes a section on 
Entrepreneur HC and SC, as well as the RBCs of the firm, which are all categorised 
under Entrepreneur characteristics (independent variable one). Another section focuses 
very briefly on the value-added services provided by venture capitalists from the 
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entrepreneurs’ perspective (independent variable two), followed by a section on the 
VC-E relationship (independent variable three), and a final section on the institutional 
(legal) environment (moderating variable).  
Dependent Variable 
i) Company Performance  
The dependent variable company performance is measured through the 10 following 
indicators: growth of sales, sales volume, return on assets, return on sales, growth in 
productivity, market share, growth in market share, profitability, growth in profitability, 
and overall company performance. Ten Likert-scale questions asked entrepreneurs to 
grade their company performance based on those 10 indicators in comparison to 
industry averages.  
Table 5.2 Company Performance Mean Ranking and Standard Deviation 
 1 2 3 4 5 Total 
Sales Growth 11.5 13.5 40.4 25 9.6 100 
Sales Vol 15.4 19.2 40.4 21.2 3.8 100 
ROA 13.5 19.2 42.3 15.4 7.7 98.1 
ROS 11.5 11.5 50 21.2 1.9 96.2 
Productivity Growth 7.7 5.8 34.6 44.2 7.7 100 
Market Share 28.8 17.3 25 19.2 9.6 100 
Growth Market Share 11.5 21.2 32.7 25 7.7 98.10 
Profit 19.2 36.5 25 13.5 3.8 98.1 
Profit Growth 21.2 23.1 34.6 13.5 5.8 98.1 
Company Performance 5.8 7.7 55.8 28.8 1.9 100 
Company Performance Mean Ranking and Standard Deviation 
 Test value=3 Mean Std. Deviation 
Productivity Growth 3.38*** 0.993 
Company Performance 3.13 0.817 
Sales Growth 3.08 1.118 
Growth in Market Share 2.96 1.131 
ROS 2.9 0.953 
ROA 2.84 1.102 
Sales Volume 2.79 1.073 
Market Share 2.63* 1.344 
Profit Growth 2.59** 1.152 
Profit 2.45*** 1.083 
The scale for these 10 performance indicators ranges from ‘1’ to ‘5’, where ‘1’ represents far below 
average and ‘5’ represents far above average. 
Results in Table 5.2 show that the performance measure with the highest rate of 
‘above average’ and ‘far above average’ responses is ‘growth in productivity’. 
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Approximately 52% of entrepreneurs believed their firm’s growth in productivity is 
above or far above the industry average. This is also reflected in mean ranking, as 
growth in productivity also has the highest mean (3.38) amongst the 10 measures. It is 
also the only measure that is significantly (at 1% level) higher than the set test mean of 
‘3’. The second-highest measure in terms of performance is ‘overall company 
performance’. Approximately 31% of the entrepreneurs perceive their company’s 
performance to be above or far above average. This measure has the second-highest 
mean ranking (3.13), not because of the above average responses alone but also because 
it has very low responses in the below and far below average categories. The only other 
measure that has a mean ranking above the set test mean of ‘3’ is growth in sales (3.08). 
Sales growth and overall company performance both have means higher than the set 
test mean; however, they are not significantly higher.  
It is also important to note that many responses are neither above nor below industry 
average, instead they are at the average. However, the performance measures that are 
perceived by entrepreneurs to be the lowest are ‘profitability’ (significant at the 1% 
level) and ‘growth in profitability’ (significant at the 5% level). These two measures 
have the lowest means (see Table 5.2).  
Independent Variable 
i) Entrepreneur Characteristics  
SC of Entrepreneurs 
The entrepreneur questionnaire covered questions used to understand the SC of the 
entrepreneurs. In the questionnaire, this was grouped into three sets of questions related 
to the entrepreneurs’ ability to recruit executives, their personal and community 
business networks, and their ability to utilise their networks. 
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The entrepreneurs’ ability to recruit executives was measured by a continuous 
variable, to know how many non-founder executives exist in the portfolio firm (PF), 
how many of those were recruited through the founder, a friend of the founder, the 
founder’s co-workers and how many through other means.  
Table 5.3 E-SC Ability to Recruit Percentages 
 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 Total 
# non-exec 30.8 17.3 9.6 19.2 9.6 5.8 7.7 100 
Through founder 26.9 23.1 21.2 17.3 3.8 3.8 3.8 100 
 Through friend 55.8 30.8 5.8 5.8 1.9 0 0 100 
Though co-worker 69.2 26.9 0 0 0 0 3.8 100 
Other 63.5 17.3 11.5 3.8 1.9 0 1.9 100 
E-SC Ability to Recruit Mean Ranking and Standard Deviation 
 Test value=3.5 Mean Std. Deviation 
# non-exec 2.08*** 1.949 
Through founder 1.75*** 1.607 
Other 0.71*** 1.226 
Through friend 0.67*** 0.964 
Through co-worker 0.5*** 1.196 
The responses from these measures vary from ‘0’ to ‘6’, where ‘0’ refers to none and ‘6’ refers to any number 
of non-founder executives higher than 5. This table shows response % in each category. 
For mean ranking ***,**,* denote statistical significance, at 1, 5, 10% levels, respectively. 
  
As shown in the percentages as well as mean rankings in the table above, the 
entrepreneurs’ ability to recruit non-founder executives is not very high. However, it is 
important to note that 31% of the entrepreneurs do not have non-founder executives in 
their firms yet. The highest form of recruitment is through the founder him or herself 
and the lowest form is through co-workers. However, it is evident that 73% of the 
entrepreneurs have relied on recruitment through the founder for at least one of their 
non-founder executives, while only 30% approximately have relied on recruitment 
through co-workers for at least one of their non-founder executives. These percentages 
are in line with mean rankings. The highest mean was for the measure recruitment 
through founder him or herself (1.75) and the lowest was through co-workers of the 
founder (0.5). Overall, all recruitment measures are too low and they are all 
significantly (at the 1% level) lower than the set test mean of ‘3.5’. 
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Regarding the personal or community business networks of the entrepreneurs, 
three binary variables are used to capture personal business networks: whether any of 
the entrepreneurs’ parents or close friends have ever owned a business and if they have 
been encouraged by friends or family to start their businesses. Three other binary 
variables measure the business networks in relation to business community itself: 
whether any of the co-founders have been involved in a business network, have any 
contact with business advisory organisations or have previously been part of a start-up 
team.  
Table 5.4 E- SC Business Network Percentages 
   0 1 Total 
Parents 42.3 57.7 100 
Friends 19.2 80.8 100 
Encouragement 28.8 71.2 100 
Business networks 65.4 34.6 100 
Business Advisories 51.9 48.1 100 
Previous Start-ups 48.1 51.9 100 
These six measures are based on YES or NO if the measure exits a ‘1’ is given and if does not exist 
a ‘0’ is given. This table shows % response in each category. 
 Results show that more than 80% have close friends that own businesses and more than 
70% have been encouraged by friends and family to start a business, whilst almost 60% 
have parents that own businesses. In Egypt, 75% of the private sector are family-owned 
businesses (Hassan, 2015); hence, having parents who own businesses does lead to 
personal experience, as well as connections. Responses show that personal business 
networks (percentages of parents, friends and encouragement, see Table 5.4) exist at a 
greater scale than community business networks (percentages of business networks, 
business organisations and previous start-ups, see Table 5.4) of entrepreneurs in Egypt. 
The lowest rate of response was for any of the co-founders being involved in a business 
network such as chambers of commerce or service clubs such as Rotary; 65% of the co-
founders were not involved with any associations of that sort. 
156 
 
The final aspect of the entrepreneurs’ SC is their ability to utilise networks or 
the connections they have with government officials (political leaders, officials in 
regulatory institutions, metropolitan/municipal/district chief executives, and regional 
and national government politicians), business contacts (top managers at customer 
firms, top managers at supplier firms, top managers at competitor firms and members 
of trade associations) and community leaders (religious leaders, close friends with 
political connections and close friends with business connections. This was conducted 
through Likert-scale questions used to ask respondents about the extent to which they 
have utilised connections with anyone in the 11 positions mentioned above throughout 
the past three years.  
Table 5.5 E–SC Network Use Percentages 
 0 1 2 3 4 5 TOTAL 
Political leaders 1.9 61.5 9.6 17.3 9.6 0 100 
Regulatory officials 1.9 55.8 23.1 17.3 1.9 0 100 
Chief executives 1.9 57.7 11.5 17.3 9.6 1.9 100 
Politicians 1.9 53.8 23.1 13.5 7.7 0 100 
Top Managers (TM) at customer 0 19.2 15.4 28.8 23.1 13.5 100 
TM suppliers 0 23.1 11.5 30.8 21.2 13.5 100 
TM competitors 1.9 36.5 15.4 23.1 13.5 9.6 100 
Trade associations 1.9 48.1 25 19.2 5.8 0 100 
Religious leaders 1.9 69.2 5.8 21.2 1.9 0 100 
CF political connections 1.9 50 11.5 19.2 13.5 3.8 100 
CF business connections 0 3.8 19.2 17.3 25 34.6 100 
E- SC Network Use Mean Ranking and Standard Deviations 
Test value=3  Mean Std. Deviation 
CF business connections 3.67*** 1.248 
TM customers 2.96 1.313 
TM suppliers 2.9 1.347 
TM competitors 2.38*** 1.402 
CF political connections 2.04*** 1.298 
Chief executives 1.81*** 1.172 
Trade associations 1.79*** 0.977 
Political leaders 1.71*** 1.091 
Politicians 1.71*** 0.997 
Regulatory officials 1.62*** 0.867 
Religious leaders 1.52*** 0.918 
These items are based on a scale from ‘1’ representing very low to ‘5’ representing very high. This table 
shows response % in each category. 
For mean ranking ***,**,* denote statistical significance, at 1, 5, 10% levels, respectively 
Results in Table 5.5 show that the measure of utilisation of resources with the 
most responses (60%) in the ‘high’ and ‘very high’ categories is close friends that have 
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business connections. However, the category with the most responses in the ‘high’ or 
‘very high’ categories is business contacts, followed by community contacts, and the 
one with the least responses is contacts with government officials. Moreover, mean 
rankings confirm that close friends that have business connections (mean of 3.67) is the 
most utilised type of connection by entrepreneurs. It is significantly greater than the 
other measures and is the only measure than has a mean that is significantly higher (at 
the 1% level) than the set mean of ‘3’. The two following measures in the ranking are 
top managers at customer and supplier firms, chronologically, which have means 
almost equal to the set test mean. All other network use measures are significantly (at 
the 1% level) below the test mean. The most unutilised connection is that with religious 
leaders in the community. This shows that responses for those measures were mostly 
below average at ‘low’ or ‘very low’. 
Resource-based Capabilities of Entrepreneurial Firms 
The second category that measures entrepreneurs’ characteristics is RBCs of 
entrepreneurial firms. These RBCs and the firm strategies that match them are each 
split into three categories (innovation, quality and cost leadership).  
 Innovation RBCs rely on five measures: whether the firm has innovative 
marketers, employees good at marketing, marketing expertise and/or product 
development expertise, and innovative employees.  
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Table 5.6 E-Innovative RBCs Percentages   
 1 2 3 4 5 Total 
Innovative marketers 5.8 15.4 28.8 28.8 21.2 100 
Good marketing 5.8 21.2 28.8 32.7 11.5 100 
Marketing expertise 9.6 13.5 38.5 21.2 17.3 100 
PD expertise 5.8 9.6 32.7 32.7 19.2 100 
Innovative employees 1.9 7.7 23.1 36.5 30.8 100 
E-Innovative RBCs Mean Ranking and Standard Deviations 
 Test value=3 Mean Std. Deviation 
Innovative employees 3.87*** 1.01 
PD expertise 3.5*** 1.094 
Innovative marketers 3.44*** 1.162 
Good marketing 3.23 1.096 
Marketing expertise 3.23 1.182 
These measures are based on a scale from ‘1’ to ‘5’ where ‘1’ represents strongly disagree and ‘5’ 
represents strongly agree. This table shows response % in each category. 
For mean ranking ***,**,* denote statistical significance, at 1, 5, 10% levels, respectively. 
Results presented in Table 5.6 show that 67% of entrepreneurs have selected 
‘agree’ or ‘strongly agree’ for innovative employees. This is the highest selection, 
which shows that entrepreneurs believe that the category innovative employees is the 
strongest innovation RBC their firms possess. It also has the highest mean, 3.87. The 
highest selection of ‘strongly disagree’ and ‘disagree’ is for having marketing expertise. 
Approximately 23% of the entrepreneurs believe that their firms do not have marketing 
expertise. In turn, it also has the lowest mean, 3.23. Additionally, mean rankings show 
that all five measures have means greater than the set test value of ‘3’, which means 
that, overall, entrepreneurs possess innovation RBCs that are above average. However, 
innovative marketers, product development expertise and innovative employees are 
significantly (at the 1% level) above the set test mean of ‘3’. Employees good at 
marketing and marketing expertise have means higher than ‘3’ but not significantly 
higher.  
In relation to quality RBCs, four measures are used to understand whether the 
venture provides superior as well as quality customer service, has managerial as well 
as customer service expertise, and has flexibility to adapt.  
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Responses in Table 5.7 show that 48.1% of the entrepreneurs strongly agree that the 
venture has flexibility to adapt. This was the highest response rate for ‘strongly agree’, 
out of the four quality RBC measures. This measure also has the highest mean ranking, 
4.15. This confirms that flexibility to adapt is perceived by entrepreneurs to be the most 
important quality RBC their firms possess. The lowest response rate for strongly agree 
is 15.4%, which is for providing quality customer service. This measure also had the 
lowest mean ranking (3.04). Furthermore, all four measures, as shown in Table 5.7, are 
higher at the high end of the scale and accordingly their means are significantly (at 1% 
level) greater than the set test mean of ‘3’. The only exception is quality customer 
service, which has a mean higher than ‘3’ but not significantly higher. 
 Cost leadership measures are the final set of RBCs that a firm can possess. These 
measures explain whether the venture depends on low-cost materials, distribution 
channels, labour and/or factors of production (FOP), in addition to whether it depends 
on availability of capital, highly productive employees and/or leading-edge facilities.  
  
Table 5.7 E-Quality RBCs Percentages 
 1 2 3 4 5 Total 
Superior CS 3.8 3.8 26.9 40.4 25 100 
Expert CS 3.8 11.5 32.7 30.8 21.2 100 
Quality CS 13.5 15.4 40.4 15.4 15.4 100 
Managerial expert 3.8 5.8 26.9 42.3 21.2 100 
Flexibility 1.9 5.8 15.4 28.8 48.1 100 
E-Quality RBCs Mean Ranking and Standard Deviations 
Test Value=3  Mean  Std. Deviation 
Flexibility 4.15*** 1.017 
Superior CS 3.79*** 0.997 
Managerial expert 3.71*** 0.997 
Expert CS 3.54*** 1.075 
Quality CS                           3.04 1.22 
These measures are based on a scale from ‘1’ to ‘5’ where ‘1’ represents strongly disagree and ‘5’ 
represents strongly agree. This table shows response % in each category. 
For mean ranking ***,**,* denote statistical significance, at 1, 5, 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 5.8 E-Cost Leadership RBCs Percentages 
 1 2 3 4 5 Total 
Material 3.8 26.9 34.6 23.1 11.5 100 
Distribution 9.6 15.4 36.5 19.2 19.2 100 
Labour 28.8 26.9 23.1 19.2 1.9 100 
FOP 17.3 23.1 34.6 13.5 11.5 100 
Availability of Capital 7.7 11.5 36.5 32.7 11.5 100 
Productive Employees 0 3.8 19.2 32.7 44.2 100 
Facilities 7.7 23.1 26.9 28.8 13.5 100 
E-Cost Leadership RBCs Mean Ranking and Standard Deviations 
 Test value=3 Mean Std. Deviation 
Productive Employees 4.17*** 0.879 
Availability of Capital 3.29** 1.073 
Distribution 3.23 1.215 
Facilities 3.17 1.167 
Material 3.12 1.06 
FOP 2.79 1.226 
Labour 2.38 1.157 
These measures are based on a scale from ‘1’ to ‘5’ where ‘1’ represents strongly disagree and ‘5’ represents 
strongly agree. This table shows response % in each category. 
For mean ranking ***,**,* denote statistical significance, at 1, 5, 10% levels, respectively. 
Results of entrepreneurs’ cost leadership RBCs are presented in Table 5.8 
above. Approximately 77% of the entrepreneurs have agreed that their venture 
possesses productive employees. This is the cost leadership measure they have agreed 
on the most, and hence has the highest mean of 4.17, which is significantly (at 1% level) 
above the test mean of ‘3’. It is followed by availability of capital, which is also 
significantly (at the 5% level) above the test mean. The measure the entrepreneurs have 
disagreed on the most (56%), is that ‘venture depends on low-cost labour’. Accordingly, 
it is the measure with the lowest mean, 2.38, which is significantly (at 1% level) below 
the test mean of ‘3’. The only other measure with a mean below the set test mean of ‘3’ 
is FOP; however, it is not significantly lower. The three remaining measures are 
whether the firm depends on low-cost materials and distribution and whether it depends 
on leading-edge facilities. They have means that are above the average set mean; 
however, not significantly above. 
 It is also worthy of mention that the measure ‘depending on highly productive 
employees’ has the highest mean (4.17) amongst all the three types of RBCs and 
accordingly the highest percentage of respondents (77%) in the ‘agree’ and ‘strongly 
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agree’ categories combined. This makes it the most important RBC to entrepreneurs. 
Overall, the means of the quality RBCs measures are greater than those of innovation 
and cost reduction RBCs, making quality RBCs the highest RBCs that funded firms 
possess generally. 
However, possessing RBCs is not sufficient to achieve superior performance, 
unless accompanied with a strategy that supports it (Wang and Ang, 2004). Therefore, 
there are three groups of strategies that correspond to the RBCs possessed by the 
ventures. All are measured by 5-point Likert-scale questions, with ‘1’ being strongly 
disagree and ‘5’ being strongly agree. 
For innovation strategies, seven Likert-scale questions are used to understand 
whether the strategies of the venture focus on: being the first to introduce new products, 
new product development, engaging in novel marketing, researching new product 
opportunities, developing quality and performance of current products, changing PF 
method and encouraging innovation activities.  
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Table 5.9 E-Innovation Strategy Percentages 
 1 2 3 4 5 Total 
 New products 1.9 7.7 21.2 40.4 28.8 100 
 New PD 0 9.6 15.4 46.2 28.8 100 
 Novel Marketing 0 7.7 34.6 40.4 17.3 100 
 Product opportunities 0 1.9 19.2 40.4 38.5 100 
 Quality performance 0 1.9 7.7 34.6 55.8 100 
 Change PD 
0 3.8 7.7 38.5 50 100 
 Innovation 0 1.9 7.7 32.7 57.7 100 
E-Innovation Strategy Mean Ranking and Standard Deviation 
 Test value=3 Mean Std. Deviation 
Innovation 4.46*** 0.727 
Quality performance 4.44*** 0.725 
Change PD 4.35*** 0.789 
Product Opportunities 4.15*** 0.802 
New PD 3.94*** 0.916 
New products 3.87*** 0.991 
Novel marketing 3.67*** 0.857 
These measures are based on a scale from ‘1’ to ‘5’ where ‘1’ represents strongly disagree and ‘5’ represents 
strongly agree. This table shows response % in each category. 
For mean ranking ***,**,* denote statistical significance, at 1, 5, 10% levels, respectively. 
 
As shown in Table 5.9, the measures with the most ‘agree’ and ‘strongly agree’ 
responses are innovation (approximately 90%), quality performance (approximately 
90%) and change PD (approximately 89%). This means that the most important 
strategies that portfolio firms work to achieve are strategies that focus on innovation 
activities and the development of current products as well as enhancing product 
development methods. These three measures also have the highest mean rankings, 4.46, 
4.44, and 4.35 respectively. The lowest mean ranking (3.67) is for the measure novel 
marketing, which shows that the ventures’ strategies focus the least on engaging in 
novel marketing. The lowest innovation RBC possessed by entrepreneurs is marketing 
expertise. The highest innovation RBCs possessed by entrepreneurs are innovative 
employees and PD experts. This shows that innovation strategies are compatible with 
the innovation RBCs (see Table 5.6, p. 158) possessed by entrepreneurial firms.  
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Five measures are used to capture the quality strategies on which these firms 
rely: whether they focus on implementing strict quality control, as well as meeting 
quality requirements, a strong customer service level, a high level of product quality, 
and customer needs. Responses to these measures are shown below in Table 5.10. 
 
All measures of quality strategies are above average, as evident by their means. 
All means are significantly (at the 1% level) above the set test mean of ‘3’. The strategy 
with the highest mean ranking, 4.37, is the strategy that focuses on meeting customer 
needs. The quality strategy that is least implemented by entrepreneurs and has the 
lowest mean ranking, 3.71, is applying strict quality control. Quality strategies are also 
matched well with quality RBCs for firms (see Table 5.7, p. 159). Customer services 
RBCs have high mean ranking, while the quality RBC with the lowest mean ranking is 
quality control.  
This strategy supports the customer service RBCs, which also have high 
ranking. Also consistent with mean ranking for RBCs, the quality RBC with the lowest 
ranking is ‘quality CS’ and the quality strategy with the lowest mean ranking is ‘quality 
control’. These results show that there is a fit between the RBCs that firms possess and 
Table 5.10 E -Quality Strategy Percentages 
 1 2 3 4 5 Total 
Quality Control 0 11.5 28.8 36.5 23.1 100 
Quality Requirements 0 7.7 19.2 40.4 32.7 100 
Customer SL 0 5.8 9.6 42.3 42.3 100 
HL product Quality 0 3.8 9.6 44.2 42.3 100 
Customer Needs 1.9 0 11.5 32.7 53.8 100 
E-Quality Strategy Mean Ranking and Standard Deviation 
Test value=3  Mean Std. Deviation 
Customer needs 4.37*** 0.841 
HL product quality 4.25*** 0.789 
Customer SL 4.21*** 0.848 
Quality requirements 3.98***  0.918 
Quality Control 3.71*** 0.957 
These measures are based on a scale from ‘1’ to ‘5’ where ‘1’ represents strongly disagree and ‘5’ represents 
strongly agree. 
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the strategies on which they rely, which would enable the RBCs to have an impact on 
the performance of the ventures. 
The final category for firm strategies is cost reduction, which measures whether 
the firm focuses on: cost reduction, improvement of employee productivity, 
development of lower production cost through process innovation and/or investing in 
machinery.  
Table 5.11 E-Cost Reduction Percentages 
 1 2 3 4 5 Total 
Cost reduction 5.8 17.3 28.8 23.1 25 100 
Employee productivity 0 5.8 11.5 40.4 42.3 100 
Process innovation 5.8 5.8 28.8 34.6 25 100 
Invest machinery 32.7 15.4 19.2 21.2 11.5 100 
E-Cost Reduction Mean Ranking and Standard Deviation 
 Test value=3 Mean Std. Deviation 
Employee productivity 4.19*** 0.864 
Process innovation 3.67*** 1.098 
Cost reduction 3.44** 1.211 
Invest machinery 2.63* 1.428 
These measures are based on a scale from ‘1’ to ‘5’ where ‘1’ represents strongly disagree and ‘5’ 
represents strongly agree. This table shows response % in each category. 
For mean ranking ***,**,* denote statistical significance, at 1, 5, 10% levels, respectively. 
 
The cost reduction strategy with the highest ‘agree’ and ‘strongly agree’ 
responses is employee reduction (83%). It also has the highest mean rank, 4.19. This 
means that entrepreneurs aim to focus in their firms on improving employee 
productivity and efficiency. The strategy entrepreneurs focus on after employee 
productivity is process innovation, which also has a mean (3.67) that is significantly (at 
1% level) higher than the set test mean of ‘3’. The strategy they thrive the least to 
implement is investing in machinery. Only 33% agreed that they focus on lowering 
production costs through investing in machinery. It is the only cost-reduction strategy 
measure with a mean (2.63) significantly (at 10% level) lower than the set test mean of 
‘3’. Cost-reduction strategies are aligned with the cost-reduction RBCs that exist in the 
165 
 
firm. As results in Table 5.8 (p. 160) show, the most important cost-reduction RBC is 
employee productivity. 
Overall, when comparing mean rankings from tables 5.9, 5.10 and 5.11, cost-
reduction strategies have the lowest means, which explains that entrepreneurial firms 
focus the least on cost-reduction strategies. This is also the case for RBCs, as the lowest 
RBCs that these firms possess are cost-reduction RBCs.  
Results show that RBCs that firms possess are matched well with the strategies 
that these firms follow. This means that RBCs are effective since they are supported by 
strategies. Firm strategies are necessary alongside RBCs to fully and effectively support 
these capabilities and the firm’s unique characteristics (Wang and Ang, 2004). 
Strategies are the ways by which ventures match their internal strengths and weaknesses 
with the opportunities and threats in the environment (McDougall et al., 1994). 
Performance is found in previous studies to be a function of an adequate fit between 
the firm’s strategy and resources, as without it the result would be unfocused and 
unproductive efforts (Wang and Ang, 2004).  
HC of Entrepreneurs 
 The final aspect related to entrepreneur characteristics is HC. In this study, HC 
refers to the previous experience as well as education of the entrepreneurs.  
The five previous experience (entrepreneurial or industrial) measures are: if any 
of the co-founders have been on the management team of a previous start-up, have 
previously started a business, have previously started a business that was successful, 
have previously worked in the industry of their current start-up or have previously 
owned a business in the industry of their current start-up. The three previous managerial 
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experience measures are: whether they have previously managed a public company, 
started a business together and/or if they consider the start-up team to be functionally 
diverse.  
Table 5.12 E HC-Experience Percentages 
 0 1 Total 
Managed start-up 32.7 67.3 100 
Previous start-up 32.7 67.3 100 
IRR 100% 92.3 7.7 100 
Previous industry work 46.2 53.8 100 
Previous industry start-up 75 25 100 
Public company 84.6 15.4 100 
Business together 63.5 36.5 100 
Functional diversity 17.3 82.7 100 
These eight measures are based on dichotomous variables (YES or NO questions). The selection of 
‘1’ represents that any of the founders of the firm have the specified experience, and ‘0’ means they 
do not. This table shows response % in each category. 
  
Responses show that entrepreneurial experience is higher than industrial 
experience. Entrepreneurial experience measures show that approximately 67% of the 
entrepreneurs have previously started up or managed businesses. Industry experience 
measures show that only 25% of those who had previous start-ups had them in the same 
industry as the current one, and approximately 54% have had previous work experience 
in the same industry. These results are not in line with previous studies that conclude 
that previous experience in the industry of the current start-up has a greater effect on 
the venture than entrepreneurship experience (Sirinivasan et al., 2004). Previous studies 
also explain that, while previous experience in entrepreneurship is important, it is more 
effective on performance when the previous experience is a successful one (Gompers 
et al., 2006). However, results in Table 5.12 show that, even though 67% of the 
entrepreneurs have previous entrepreneurial experience, only approximately 8% were 
successful in terms of being liquidated with an IRR of 100% or higher. The success of 
previous start-up in terms of IRR is the weakest measure of experience as it has the 
lowest rate.  
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As for managerial experience, measures show a low response rate (see last three 
measure in Table 5.12) with the exception of ‘functional diversity’, as 83% of the 
respondents consider their start-up management team to be functionally diverse. 
However, only 15% approximately have previously managed a public company, and 
36% of the co-founders have previously started a different business together. 
Other than experience, education also constitutes the HC of entrepreneurs. Four 
continuous variables are used to measure the educational background of the business 
founders. The degrees enquired about to measure education are doctorate, master’s, 
professional qualification (such as Chartered Financial Analyst, Certified Managerial 
Accountant etc.) or a degree in the field of their current start-up.  
Table 5.13 E- HC Education Percentages 
 0 1 2 3 4 Total 
Doctorates 88.5 9.6 1.9 0 0 100 
Masters 57.7 30.8 11.5 0 0 100 
 Professional qualification 86.5 9.6 1.9 1.9 0 100 
Field of start-up 46.2 32.7 17.3 3.8 0 100 
E-Education Mean Ranking and Standard Deviation 
 Test value=2 Mean Std. Deviation 
 Field of start-up  0.79*** 0.871 
 Masters 0.54*** 0.699 
 Professional qualification 0.21*** 0.667 
 Doctorates 0.13*** 0.397 
Responses range from ‘0’ to ‘4’. A ‘0’ is selected when none of the co-founders of the venture hold a 
degree in the enquired about category, the choice are chronological till ‘4’. Where ‘4’ is selected if more 
than 3 of the co-founders hold a degree in the enquired about category. This table shows response % in 
each category. 
For mean ranking ***,**,* denote statistical significance, at 1, 5, 10% levels, respectively 
 
Results shown above in Table 5.13 show that diversity in education of entrepreneurs is 
very low in Egypt. Most responses are very similar: 88.5% of the entrepreneurs do not 
hold a doctorate degree and 86.5% do not hold a professional qualification. Almost 
60% do not have any co-founders who hold a master’s degree while 30% have one 
founder that does. Approximately 46% of the portfolio firms do not have any co-
founders who hold any degree in the field of their venture. 
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            For education to have an impact, it needs to have variation and hence it is only 
effective in nations where this happens (Unger et al., 2009). Not only is the lack of 
variation in education amongst entrepreneurs a factor that may have an adverse effect 
on performance, the lack of appropriate education amongst entrepreneurs is also a factor 
(Davidsson and Honig, 2003; Dimov and Shepherd, 2005; Rotefoss and Kolvereid, 
2005; Dimov, 2010). This lack is evident in the low percentages as well as means. The 
highest ranking for each education measure is ‘4’; however, all firms scored a ‘0’ in the 
highest category. This is also supported by the very low means for each measure shown 
in the table above, which are all significantly (at the 1% level) below the set mean of 
‘2’.  
5.1.2 VC Firm Descriptive Statistics 
Fund managers from 14 different VC firms filled out the VC questionnaire sent to 
venture capitalists. It is important to show the number of fund managers in each firm 
(see Table 5.14 below), before providing details about venture capitalists’ responses. 
Table 5.14 VC Firm Size 
VC Firm20 VC1 VC2 VC3 VC4 VC5 VC6 VC7 VC8 VC9 VC10 VC11 VC12 VC13 VC14 
No. of 
Fund 
Managers 
10 4 10 12 10 8 4 4 3 5 8 5 7 15 
 
The average number of fund managers is 8.2. These firms generally invest in 
various sectors. Detailed information about the responses provided by VC managers on 
their HC characteristics, value-added services (independent variable two), VC-E 
relationship (independent variable three) and perception of the legal environment in 
                                                 
20VC firm names will not be mentioned in this study as complete confidentiality of their responses and 
their identities was guaranteed to them. 
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Egypt and its impact on their scope of work (moderating variable) is presented in the 
following sections.  
i) VC Management Characteristics  
 The HC and SC of the VC management team, as well as the value-added services that 
they provide measure the VC management characteristics.  
HC of VC Managers 
HC is measured by the education and experience of the team managers. 
Education is captured through scale variables to understand how many of the team 
members have degrees in the field of the start-ups they fund, post-graduate degrees, as 
well as degrees in finance, law, medicine, engineering and any other field. 
 
 
Results presented in Table 5.15 show that educational backgrounds of fund 
managers do not show a high degree of variation from firm to firm. For each type of 
degree, it is either held by the majority of fund managers, or not held by the majority 
Table 5.15 VC Management Education Percentages 
 0 1 2 3 4 Total 
Deg . Field 14.3 7.1 21.4 7.1 50.0 100.0 
Post grad 7.1 21.4 14.3 28.6 28.6 100.0 
Finance Degree 7.1 14.3 21.4 50.0 7.1 100.0 
Law degree 42.9 28.6 7.1 21.4 0 100.0 
Med/Eng. Degree 42.9 35.7 7.1 7.1 7.1 100.0 
 Other degree 35.7 7.1 28.6 14.3 14.3 100.0 
Mean Ranking and Standard Deviations for VC Education 
Test Value= 2  Mean Std. Deviation 
Deg. Field 2.71 1.541 
Post grad 2.5 1.345 
Finance degree 2.36 1.082 
Other degree 1.64 1.499 
Law degree 1.07** 1.207 
Med/ Eng. Degree 1*** 1.24 
This table shows VC management teams’ education. Responses vary from ‘0’ to ‘4’, where a ‘0’shows 
that none of the fund managers in the VC firm hold such degree. ‘4’ shows that a VC firm has four or 
more fund managers that hold a certain degree. This table shows response % in each category. 
For mean ranking ***,**,* denote statistical significance, at 1, 5, 10% levels, respectively. 
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of fund managers. To explain this further, 57.1% of the VC firms have three or more 
fund managers that hold a degree in the field of the start-ups they fund. It is the same 
case for fund managers that hold a post-graduate or finance degree. However, 
approximately 43% of the VC firms have ‘0’ fund managers that hold a degree in law, 
medicine or engineering.  
Mean rankings show that the three degrees with highest mean rankings and 
above the stated test mean are degrees in the field of the start-up, post-graduate degrees 
and degrees in finance. However, they are all insignificantly above the mean. Degrees 
in law (significant at 5% level), medicine/engineering are the lowest (significant at 1%) 
and are below the stated test mean, with means of 1.07 and 1 respectively. As shown 
above, the stated mean shows that the majority of VC managers’ responses are above 
average. These mean rankings are consistent with response percentages; both 
emphasise the lack of variation amongst VC managers in education, where the majority 
hold a degree in the field of the start-ups funded, and the majority also hold post-
graduate as well as finance degrees (however, they are all insignificantly higher than 
the set mean of ‘2’). None of these three degrees possessed by fund managers would 
create a unique competitive advantage for them. A background in law is one of the 
requirements relevant to task requirements of venture capitalists, which allows for 
critical analysis of business plans, negotiation of contract structures, etc., all to detect 
and minimise risks (Gimeno et al., 1997). However, as evident in Table 5.15, 43% of 
the VC firms do not have any fund managers that hold a law degree, which means that 
43% lack an essential factor that assists in execution of VC tasks.  
  In addition to education, HC is also determined by experience. The previous 
experience of the VC management team is captured by five binary questions. The 
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questions collected data about the VC managers and whether or not they had experience 
in: the industries in which their portfolio firms operate, business management, law, 
finance or consultancy. The results relating to respondents’ previous experience are 
shown in the table below.  
Table 5.16 VC Management Experience Percentages 
 0 1 Total 
Industry experience 7.1 92.9 100 
Business experience 0 100 100 
Law experience 64.3 35.7 100 
Finance experience 7.1 92.9 100 
Consulting experience 14.3 85.7 100 
A ‘0’ represents none of the VC managers in the firm have previous experience in the stated field, 
and a ‘1’ if any of the VC managers do. This table shows response % in each category. 
 
The results of VC management experience are consistent with their educational 
background. Experience of VC managers across firms is very similar and hence does 
not give firms a competitive advantage. Results show that 93% of the firms have at least 
one of their management team with previous experience in their start-up’s industry and 
at least one with experience in finance. All the VC firms (100%) have at least one of 
the management team with experience in business. Although business experience is 
relevant to the execution of the tasks of VC managers, having a 100% response rate 
makes the measure ineffective.  
  Almost 86% of the VC firms have at least one person on the VC management 
team with consulting experience, while only 36% of them have at least one VC manager 
with experience in the field of law. This gives those firms an added value as law 
experience is useful in structuring and negotiating contracts, and analysing business 
plans, which minimises business risks (Gimeno et al., 1997; Pennings et al., 1998). 
Overall, results show that there is a lack of variation in the HC (experience and 
education) of VC managers, as results are to a great extent consistent across 
respondents. However, HC is more effective when it is variant, so the degree of 
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competency between managers can vary across firms and hence create a competitive 
advantage for their firm, through the unique education or knowledge they possess 
(Zarutskie, 2008).   
Value-added Services of Venture Capitalists 
Another measure of the VC characteristics, other than HC, is the value-added 
services they provide. Value-added services are measured by the services that VC firms 
provide and VC involvement in the portfolio company. These services include: aid in 
strategic and operational planning, management recruitment and compensation, and 
access to their network of contacts (Gorman and Sahlman, 1989; Sahlman, 1990; 
Sapienza et al., 1996; Gompers and Lerner, 1998; Sorenson, 2007). The extent to which 
venture capitalists provide services is not only measured by the provision of the service 
itself, but also by the extent to which the venture capitalists are involved in their 
portfolio firms, while the access to their networks is measured by the SC of the VC 
managers, as well as their ability to network with government officials and syndicate 
networks.  
The questionnaire distributed to VC managers captured most of the measures of 
value-added services they provide, with the exception of advice. Advice is the only 
criterion used in the questionnaire distributed to entrepreneurs related to the value-
added services they receive. Likert-scale questions are used for the entrepreneurs to rate 
the level of advice they receive from their VC funders in nine different aspects 
(strategic, marketing, financial, R&D, product development (PD), HR, exit strategy, 
interpersonal and networking). 
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Table 5.17 Value-added Service: Advice Percentages 
 1 2 3 4 5 Total 
Strategic advice 9.6 19.2 19.2 38.5 13.5 100 
Marketing advice 25 25 34.6 9.6 5.8 100 
Financial advice 13.5 13.5 26.9 28.8 17.3 100 
R&D advice 30.8 26.9 25 7.7 9.6 100 
PD advice 23.1 21.2 32.7 11.5 11.5 100 
HR advice 25 28.8 23.1 13.5 9.6 100 
Exit advice 28.8 19.2 25 15.4 11.5 100 
Interpersonal advice 21.2 15.4 28.8 26.9 7.7 100 
Networking advice 9.6 13.5 25 21.2 30.8 100 
Value-Added Service: Advice Mean Ranking and Standard Deviation 
 Test value=3 Mean Std. Deviation 
Networking advice 3.5*** 1.321 
Strategic advice 3.27 1.206 
Financial advice 3.23 1.277 
Interpersonal advice 2.85 1.258 
PD advice 2.67* 1.279 
Exit advice 2.62* 1.36 
HR advice 2.54** 1.275 
Marketing advice 2.46*** 1.146 
R&D advice 2.38*** 1.27 
The scale for these nine measures of advice, ranges from ‘1’ very low to ‘5’ very high. This table shows response 
% in each category. 
For mean ranking ***,**,* denote statistical significance, at 1, 5, 10% levels, respectively. 
As shown in Table 5.17, entrepreneurs state that the highest form of advice they 
receive from venture capitalists is networking advice. Mean ranking results show that 
networking advice has the highest mean, 3.5, which is significantly (at 1% level) higher 
than the set mean of ‘3’. This outcome is consistent with the Institutional Theory 
(Bruton and Ahlstrom, 2003) and with previous studies which explain that, in emerging 
economies or economies with weaker institutional settings, networks tend to be more 
important and people rely more on their networks and connections. Moreover, some 
studies on more developed nations find strategic advice to be one of the most valued 
contributions from the VC (Gorman and Sahlman, 1989; Manigart and Struyf, 1997). 
In this study, strategic advice is ranked second after networking, as it is conducted in 
an emerging economy. Literature also explains that, for venture capitalists to dispense 
strategic advice, it is more valuable when they have general business knowledge. In this 
case, referring to VC education (see Table 5.15, p.169), it is found that many VC 
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managers do hold a business or finance degree, which enables them to give strategic 
advice to their funded firms. 
Entrepreneur responses show that financial advice is ranked third, with a mean of 3.23. 
It is the only other advice aspect, aside from networking and strategic advice, that has 
a mean above the set test mean of ‘3’. Strategic and financial advice, however, are 
higher than the set mean but not significantly higher. The means of all other aspects are 
lower. The lowest is R&D advice. 
To measure VC involvement, VC managers were asked to respond through 
continuous variables on the average total meetings they had each month with their 
portfolio companies, the average number of boards each manager is placed on, the 
average number of reports they receive from the portfolio firms each year and the 
average number of investment rounds till exit. VC management responses were as 
follows: 
 
The highest response for the average meetings per person is four, which means 
that 36% of the VC firms have someone on their management team that meets with 
portfolio firm managers once a week. The majority of the remaining firms met less than 
once a week, 43% met once a month or bi-weekly combined, while the remaining few 
Table 5.18 VC Involvement Percentages 
   0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 Total 
Meetings per month 0 21.4 21.4 0 35.7 7.1 0 0 14.3 100 
Average boards 7.1 0 21.4 0 21.4 14.3 0 7.1 28.6 100 
Average reports 0 0 0 0 64.3 0 0 0 35.7 100 
Average rounds 0 28.6 28.6 28.6 14.3 0 0 0 0 100 
Mean Ranking and Standard Deviations for VC Involvement 
Test Value=4  Mean Std. Dev. 
Average Reports 5.43*** 1.989 
Average Boards 4.79 2.694 
Meetings per month 3.57 2.311 
Average Rounds 2.29*** 1.069 
VC involvement measures are based on a scale from ‘0’ to ‘8’ where ‘0’ refers to none and ‘8’ refers to 
any number more than seven. This table shows response % in each category. 
For mean ranking ***,**,* denote statistical significance, at 1, 5, 10% levels, respectively. 
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(approximately 21%) met more than once a week. The majority of firms had a below 
average number of meetings per month (less than once a month). This reflects the extent 
to which VC firms are involved in and aware of the portfolio company activities, hence 
how much they monitor them.  
For the average number of boards in portfolio firms on which each VC manager 
sits, the highest response rate was 30%. This rate was given for more than seven boards, 
which means that managers are sitting on many boards of their portfolio companies. 
However, other managers who did not attend as many boards, sat on as few as two or 
four boards per manager. The more boards on which each VC manager sits may show 
their involvement in VC firms, but the more the boards per person the less the focus on 
each firm (Hege et al., 2003).  
As for responses related to the number of reports requested from the portfolio 
firm per year, almost 65% chose four times a year, which is a quarterly report, while 
the remainder responded with more than seven reports, as many firms also ask for 
monthly reports. The higher the number of reports requested the more the VC is 
involved in the portfolio firm and the stricter monitoring is.  
  As for number of rounds in which VC managers participate till exit, there were 
no responses exceeding four rounds. VC firms responded with approximately 30% to 
each of one, two and three rounds till exit, while the remaining 14% of the VC firms 
have participated or agreed to participate in four funding rounds till they exit their 
portfolios. Funds can be given all at once or at different stages. The financing stage is 
a type of monitoring of the portfolio firms by venture capitalists and it also increases 
entrepreneurs’ incentive to exert effort (Casamatta, 2003). Mean and standard 
deviations are calculated for these continuous measures and t-test results show mean 
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rankings (see Table 5.18 above). Reports per year has the highest mean (5.43), which 
is the only measure that is significantly (at 5% level) higher than the set test mean of 
‘4’. It is followed by average boards per month, which has a mean of 4.79, which is 
insignificantly higher than the test mean of ‘4’. Meetings per month and average rounds, 
however, have means below the set mean of ‘4’. The mean of the measure meetings per 
month is 3.57, which is only slightly below average, hence insignificantly lower than 
the test mean, while the mean of average rounds till exit is 2.29, which is significantly 
(at 1% level) lower than the test mean of ‘4’. 
To measure value-added activities of venture capitalists, in addition to the extent 
of VC involvement, the services provided were investigated. The measures related to 
services provided by venture capitalists and the networks they use to provide them are 
captured through questions that identify whether the VC firm has introduced the 
portfolio company to any recruitment firms, customers and/or suppliers (networking 
services); and whether the VC firm has had influence in shaping their HR management 
team or policies, or has been involved in senior management and/or administrative and 
management personnel or in shaping financial policies. The percentage responses for 
these measures as well as the ranking of their means are shown in the table below. 
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Table 5.19 VC Services Percentages 
 1 2 3 4 5 Total 
Recruit Intro. 14.3 7.1 28.6 28.6 21.4 100 
Intro. To Customers 7.1 0 7.1 28.6 57.1 100 
Intro. To Suppliers 7.1 7.1 1.1 35.7 42.9 100 
HR mgt. 7.1 21.4 28.6 21.4 21.4 100 
HR policy 7.1 21.4 50.0 7.1 14.3 100 
Mgt. Recruit 21.4 28.6 21.4 14.3 14.3 100 
Recruit admin. 35.7 21.4 21.4 14.3 7.1 100 
Recruit Sales 14.3 42.9 28.6 14.3 0 100 
Financial Policy 14.3 0 35.7 28.6 21.4 100 
Mean Ranking and Standard Deviation VC Services 
  Mean Std. Deviation 
VC introduced to customers 4.29*** 1.139 
VC introduced to suppliers 4*** 1.24 
Financial policy 3.43 1.284 
VC introduced to recruitment firms 3.36 1.336 
HR management 3.29 1.267 
HR policy 3 1.109 
Management recruit 2.71 1.383 
Recruit sales 2.43* 0.938 
Recruit admin 2.36** 1.336 
VC services measures are based on a Likert scale from ‘1’ to ‘5’, where ‘1’ represents strongly disagree and ‘5’ 
represents strongly agree. This table shows response % in each category. 
For mean ranking ***,**,* denote statistical significance, at 1, 5, 10% levels, respectively. 
As shown in Table 5.19, services related to networks (which are VC introducing 
portfolio firms to customers, supplier or recruitment firms) have higher responses in 
higher scales than other services. The two highest means are introducing the portfolio 
firm to customers (4.29) and suppliers (4), which are both networking services. They 
are the two measures that are significantly (at the 1% level) higher than the set mean of 
‘3’. Below these two measures is the venture capitalists’ involvement in shaping 
financial policies (3.43), then another networking service, which is introducing 
portfolio firms to recruitment firms. These results are consistent with previous studies 
which found access to contacts (use of networks) to be the most important value-added 
service provided by venture capitalists, especially in countries with emerging 
economies (Bruton and Ahlstrom, 2003). Aside from networking, results in Table 5.19 
show VC involvement in financial and HR policies to be above average and their mean 
rankings are above the test mean of ‘3’. However, the only measures below average are 
the VC firms’ involvement in recruiting staff inside portfolio firms. Venture capitalists’ 
participation in recruitment of management (2.71), sales staff (2.43) and administrative 
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staff (2.36) is all below the set mean of ‘3’. These mean ranking results are also 
confirmed by percentage responses, where these three recruitment measures have more 
responses in ‘strongly disagree’ and ‘disagree’, than in ‘neutral’, ‘agree’ or ‘strongly 
agree’. Recruitment of management, however, is insignificantly lower than the set 
mean.  
Government networking is also a form of networking provided by venture 
capitalists. Five other measures are used to understand it. These measures explain the 
VC managers’ ability to: network with government, maintain relationships with 
government officials, contact government officials for portfolio company-related 
issues, introduce portfolio firms to government officials and use government networks 
to meet the needs of portfolio companies. Venture capitalists have responded to these 
measures as follows: 
Table 5.20 Government Networking Percentages 
 1 2 3 4 5 Total 
Gov’t network 14.3 0 21.4 21.4 42.9 100 
Gov’t officials 7.1 14.3 14.3 21.4 42.9 100 
Contact government 21.4 0 35.7 14.3 28.6 100 
Introduction government 7.1 28.6 21.4 14.3 28.6 100 
Gov’t needs 7.1 21.4 21.4 14.3 35.7 100 
Mean Ranking and Standard Deviation Government Networking 
Test Value=3 Mean Std. Deviation 
Network with gov.  3.79** 1.424 
Gov. officials  3.79** 1.369 
Contact government 3.5 1.401 
Introduction government 3.29 1.49 
Gov’t needs  3.29 1.383 
VC government networking measures also are based on a scale from ‘1’ to ‘5’, with ‘1’ being strongly disagree 
and ‘5’ strongly agree. This table shows response % in each category. 
For mean ranking ***,**,* denote statistical significance, at 1, 5, 10% levels, respectively. 
On a scale from one to five, with five being the highest, five was scored most 
often for the venture capitalists’ ability to maintain a network with government and 
relationships with government officials. However, five was scored less with measures 
related to the use of those maintained networks (contact government officials for 
portfolio company-related issues, introduce portfolio firms to government officials, and 
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use government networks to meet the needs of portfolio companies). This is also 
reflected in the mean ranking evident above in Table 5.20. All government networking 
measures had means higher that the set test mean of ‘3’, which means that responses 
were more towards ‘agree’ and ‘strongly agree’ for all five measures. However, the 
venture capitalists’ ability to maintain a network with government and to maintain 
relationships with government officials had the two highest means (both at 3.79). While 
all measures are above the set mean, these are the only two measures that are 
significantly (at 5% level) higher.  
The final networking aspect is the VC’s syndicate network. Its measures are: 
degree centrality, closeness, out-degree, in-degree and betweenness. These measures 
are labelled as connections, well-connected, invite, initiate and connect through, 
respectively. 
Table 5.21 Syndicate Networking Percentages 
  0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Total 
Connections 0 0 0 0 7.1 14.3 7.1 71.4 100 
Well Connected 7.1 0 7.1 14.3 14.3 21.4 7.1 28.6 100 
Invite 7.1 0 21.4 7.1 14.3 14.3 0 35.7 100 
Initiate 0 0 21.4 21.4 14.3 0 0 42.9 100 
Connect through 71.4 7.1 0 14.3 0 0 0 7.1 100 
Mean Ranking and Standard Deviation Syndication 
Test value=4 Mean Std. Deviation 
Connections 6.43*** 1.016 
Well connected 4.64 2.134 
Initiate  4.64 2.205 
Invite 4.43 2.377 
Connect through 1*** 2.038 
These five measures of syndication are continuous variables. Where ‘0’ is selected if no such connection exists 
and ‘7’ is selected for any number larger than 6, which means the VC firm has more than six of that specific 
connection measure. This table shows response % in each category. 
For mean ranking ***,**,* denote statistical significance, at 1, 5, 10% levels, respectively. 
Results as presented in Table 5.21 show that 71.4 % of the VC firms have more 
than six connections with other VC firms. Having connections with other firms is 
referred to as degree centrality and this is the syndication measure for which VC firms 
have mainly selected ‘7’. It is also the syndicate measure that has the highest mean 
ranking, 6.43, which is well above the set test mean of ‘4’, as it is significant at the 1% 
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level. However, how well connected (closeness) these VC connections are perceived to 
be is not as high (insignificant). For instance, while 71% of VC firms have more than 
six connections with other VC firms, only 28.6% believe that they have more than six 
connections with other VC firms that are well connected. Results show that out-degree 
(initiating a joint investment) is more common than in-degree (being invited to co-
invest) syndication. This is evident in the higher percentages for initiate and higher 
mean ranking. Finally, more than 70% of the venture capitalists do not have any other 
VC firms that are only connected to each other through them. Hence, betweenness is 
very weak or not evident in many instances. This is also confirmed in mean ranking 
results, as betweenness has a mean equal to ‘1’, which is far below (significant at 1%) 
the means of the other measures and far below the set test mean of ‘4’. 
These syndication results show that syndication in the Egyptian VC market is 
more evident in the measure of degree centrality. Initiating co-investments is more 
common than being invited to co-invest and betweenness is very weak. 
 After measuring the HC and value-added services of VC managers including 
their SC or networking services, their relationship with entrepreneurs is then measured 
in the following section.  
 
After presenting and explaining the responses of both questionnaires, the data is then 
reduced, to enable its analysis. An overview of the reduction method and results is 
presented in section 5.2. 
5.2 Confirmatory Factor Analysis 
To understand how the variables are grouped, this section will start with a review of 
segmentation of the questions presented in each survey, related to VC-backed firm 
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performance measures, followed by the characteristics of entrepreneurs and venture 
capitalists as well as value-added services provided by the latter.   
5.2.1 Data Reduction for VC-backed Firm Performance Measures 
The dependent variable, company performance is captured in the questionnaire 
through 10 indicators. These indicators are combined into one continuous, instead of 
each of the indicators existing as ordinal variables, to run an OLS regression analysis 
in this study. Correlation results for these indicators are as follows (see Table 5.22): 
Table 5.22 Company Performance Indicators Correlations 
 Sales 
Growth 
Sales 
Volume 
ROA ROS Product 
Growth 
Market 
Share 
G. M. 
Share 
Profit Profit 
Growth 
Co. 
Perf 
Sales 
Growth 
1.00          
Sales Vol. 0.815* 1.00         
ROA 0.678* 0.692* 1.00        
ROS 0.673* 0.664* 0.780* 1.00       
Product 
Growth 
0.644* 0.575* 0.616* 0.672* 1.00      
Market 
Share 
0.542* 0.490* 0.439* 0.411* 0.563* 1.00     
Growth 
M.Share 
0.728* 0.654* 0.580* 0.514* 0.685* 0.860* 1.00    
Profit 0.494* 0.426* 0.524* 0.621* 0.415* 0.288* 0.336* 1.00   
Profit  
Growth 
0.641* 0.569* 0.643* 0.718* 0.449* 0.427* 0.508* 0.729* 1.00  
Co. Perf. 0.740* 0.682* 0.662* 0.661* 0.587* 0.510* 0.612* 0.570* 0.650* 1.00 
* Denotes statistical significance at 10% level 
 
All 10 indicators have positive, significant correlations; however, Sales G (sales 
growth) mostly has the relatively highest correlations with all other indicators. 
Additionally, if they were to be combined into one variable, it has the highest factor 
loading, 8.76, while the lowest is profit, with 0.633. However, there were missing 
responses for ROA, ROS, market share growth, profit and growth of profit. Therefore, 
an index is created to include only the performance indicators that have responses from 
the full sample, whereas indicators that any of the respondents have omitted are 
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excluded. The New Company Performance variable created by factor analysis, has an 
eigenvalue of 3.08 and the factors loadings are as follows: 
 
5.2.2 Data Reduction for Entrepreneur Characteristics Measures 
This section provides all details of data reduction for all entrepreneur characteristics 
(independent variable one), extracted from the questionnaire administered to the entrepreneurs 
or portfolio firms (PFs). This consists of all measures related to the SC and HC of entrepreneurs 
as well as the resources held by their firms. 
Factor loadings for all the indices representing the variables and sub-variables capturing the 
entrepreneurs’ characteristics are listed in Table 5.24 below, after which they are all explained 
thoroughly. 
 
Table 5.23 Variables in Company Performance and their Factor Loadings  
New company Performance          3.08  
Sales G 0.897 
Sales Vol. 0.837 
Product. G 0.730 
M. Share 0.636 
Co. Performance 0.798 
This table presents the factor loading of each variable in the VC-backed firm Performance index. 
The eigenvalue of the index is presented next to the index. 
Table 5.24 Variables in Each Factor and their Factor Loadings (Entrepreneur 
Characteristics Indices) 
E- Business networks         1.30 E- previous experience                            1.73   
Parents 0.456 Managed start-up 0.859 
Close friends 0.489 Previous start-up 0.829 
Encouragement 0.589 IRR 100% 0.060 
Business Networks 0.367 Previous industry work 0.330 
Business advisories 0.608 Previous industry start-up 0.443 
  
E- Network use                   1.57 RBC and Strategy Fit                               1.36 
Govt official networks 0.839 Moderated Innovation 0.658 
Business contact networks 0.502 Moderated Quality 0.489 
Community networks 0.781 Moderated Cost-leadership 0.142 
  
E- proportional Education 1.3  
Doctorates Degree 0.683   
Master’s Degree 0.278   
CFA 0.731   
Degree in industry   0.468   
This table presents all indices (factors) in which the different variables are aggregated. As well 
as, the factor loading of each variable in the index. The eigenvalue of each index is presented 
next to the index name.  
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The first independent variable entrepreneur characteristics is reflected in the 
questionnaire in the sections relating to entrepreneur SC, RBCs of the firm and entrepreneur 
HC.  
The SC of entrepreneurs extended from aspects of ability to recruit executives, their personal 
and community business networks, to their ability to utilise their networks. 
The four continuous variables representing the forms of recruitment measuring the 
entrepreneurs’ ability to recruit executives are divided by the number of founders in each firm, 
to make the figures comparable across different firms. All four means of recruitment are 
positively and significantly correlated; however, they could not be combined into a factor, as 
their eigenvalue is less than one, which makes the index too weak. An average is calculated for 
the means of recruitment in each firm, after which it is standardised to allow for consistency 
when used with other indices.  
In relation to the entrepreneurs’ business networks, the three binary variables used for 
entrepreneurs’ personal business networks were all significantly correlated with the three 
binary variables used for entrepreneurs’ community business networks. Correlations were 
calculated for the six binary variables together. They are all significantly correlated, except for 
the last variable, whether they have been part of a start-up team21. Therefore, they were 
combined into variable created by factor analysis called E-business network, which had an 
eigenvalue of 1.3 and the following factor loadings shown in the table above. 
Regarding the entrepreneurs’ ability to utilise networks, Likert-scale questions were 
used to ask respondents about the extent to with they have utilised connections in the past three 
                                                 
21 The measure “whether they have been part of a start-up team” has been dropped from the E-business network 
as it is not correlated with the other measures. 
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years with government officials (four measures), business contacts (four measures) and 
community leaders (four measures). Each set of questions from each of the three categories 
had high significant correlations and hence are grouped into indices named government official 
networks, business contacts networks and community networks, respectively. These three 
indices had high correlations and hence two-step factor analysis is used to reduce them further 
into one variable called Network Use, with an eigenvalue of 1.57 and the following factor 
loadings shown in the table above. 
 The second section in the questionnaire related to entrepreneur characteristics is to 
understand the RBCs of the PF through Likert-scale questions. RBCs, as explained in the 
literature, are not sufficient to lead to performance enhancement unless accompanied by a good 
strategy (Mahoney and Pandian, 1992; Wang and Ang, 2004). An average is calculated for 
each of the following: the seven innovation-related RBC measures, the five quality-related 
RBC measures and the seven cost- leadership-related RBC measures. An average was also 
calculated for the seven innovation-related strategy measures, the five quality-related strategy 
measures and the four cost-leadership-related strategy measures. To calculate the fit between 
the RBCs and the strategy, the average of the RBC and the average of the corresponding 
strategy are multiplied and named moderated innovation, moderated quality and moderated 
cost-leadership respectively. These variables were then combined into a variable with an 
eigenvalue of 1.367, called Fit RBC Strategy, and it had factor loadings as shown in Table 
5.24, p. 182. 
The final aspect of entrepreneur characteristics in the questionnaire is related to HC of 
entrepreneurs, which is their previous experience and education. The five measures of previous 
experience are incorporated into one variable created through factor analysis named previous 
experience founders, with an eigenvalue of 1.735. 
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To measure if any of the co-founders have had previous experience in management, a 
score of ‘1’ is given if they have previously managed a public company, previously started a 
business together or believe they are functionally diverse. The score is then standardised 
(named Z previous managerial experience) to enable consistency when combined with other 
indices used in the model.  
For education of founders, the number of those who held a doctorate degree, a master’s 
degree, CFA or a degree in the field of their current start-up is each divided by the number of 
founders in the PF, to allow each founder to have more than one degree. After which, those 
proportions were combined, as they were shown to be correlated, into one variable named 
proportional education. This variable has an eigenvalue of 1.3, and the measures had loaded as 
shown in Table 5.24, p. 182. 
5.2.3 Data Reduction for Measures of VC Managers’ Characteristics and Services 
This section provides all details of data reduction for all characteristics of venture capitalists 
and the services they provide (independent variable two). These measures are extracted from 
the questionnaire administered to the venture capitalists as well as one section from the 
questionnaire administered to entrepreneurs. This includes HC characteristics of VC managers 
and all the value-added services they provide including networking. Factor loadings for the 
indices representing the abovementioned variables and sub-variables are listed in Table 5.25 
below, after which they are all explained thoroughly. 
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  Most measures of independent variable two (VC characteristics and services) are 
found in the questionnaire distributed to VC firms. There is only one section related to 
this variable in the entrepreneur questionnaire, which is VC advice. The effect of value-
added activities of the venture capitalists from the perspective of the entrepreneurs, are 
measured through the nine aspects of advice, which are all significantly and positively 
correlated and loaded into factor analysis variable called Advice, with an eigenvalue of 
4.52. 
The first section covered in the questionnaire refers to the VC fund managers’ 
HC education and experience. For education measures, the respondents’ choice of each 
of the five continuous variable questions about the different degrees held by the VC 
management team was divided by the number of founders in the firm to allow for 
comparability between firms and allow each founder to hold more than one degree. 
First, the correlations between those firms were calculated, to group those that are 
highly correlated. The only measure that is negatively correlated with the remaining 
Table 5.25 Variables in Each Factor and their Factor Loadings (VC Indices) 
VC Education                               1.85 VC Gov’t Network                          4.04 
Prop. Degree in field 0.53 Gov. Needs 0.828 
Prop. Post grad degree 0.810 Gov. officials  0.944 
Prop. Finance degree 0.808 Contact gov for PF issues 0.903 
Prop. Law degree 0.263 Intro. PF to gov off 0.867 
Prop. Medical/ Eng. Degree 0.442 Network with gov.  0.946 
 
VC Experience                              1.49 VC involvement                               1.15 
Experience in same field 0.853 Average boards 0.131 
Law Experience 0.182 Average reports 0.766 
Consultancy experience 0.859 Average rounds 0.741 
 
VC services                                      2.72 Advice                                               4.52 
Meetings per month 0.384 Strategic advice 0.833 
Intro. To recruitment firms 0.432 Marketing advice 0.645 
Intro. To customers 0.629 Financial advice 0.645 
Intro. To suppliers 0.772 R&D advice 0.774 
Shaping HR management 0.580 PD advice 0.776 
Shaping HR policies 0.660 HR advice 0.715 
Recruit senior managers 0.513 Exit strategy advice 0.742 
Recruit admin                   0.380 Interpersonal advice                               0.583 
Shaping financial policies 0.884 Networking advice 0.625 
This table presents all indices (factors) in which the different variables are aggregated. As well as, the 
factor loading of each variable in the index. The eigenvalue of each index is presented next to the 
index name.  
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five measures is degree in any other field.22 Moreover, a variable named VC Education 
is created, through factor analysis, with the five positively correlated education 
measures, which has an eigenvalue of 1.85 and the factor loadings shown in the table 
above. 
As for experience of the VC management team, two of the five binary variables 
could not be grouped with the rest to form a variable.23 Therefore a variable is created 
which includes previous experience in the industry of the portfolio firms, and law and 
consultancy experience. This variable is named VC Experience and has an eigenvalue 
of 1.49, as shown in the table above. 
VC characteristics also include the value-added activities provided by the VC 
firms, which consist of strategic and operational value-added activities and the 
networking the venture capitalists provide. The former is measured by the involvement 
of venture capitalists in the portfolio firms and the latter is measured by the services 
they provide, as well as, the networks on which they rely to provide them. Networking 
activities also involve the venture capitalists’ government networking and syndication. 
Initially, in the questionnaire to measure VC involvement, VC managers were 
asked to respond through the four continuous variables, previously described in section 
5.1.2. related to Table 5.18, p. 174. A variable named VC Involvement was created 
containing the three significantly correlated involvement measures.24 This variable had 
an eigenvalue of 1.15 and the factor loadings provided in Table 5.25, p. 186. The 
                                                 
22 Degree in any “other field” is not correlated with all other degrees, hence loads negatively in the VC-
education index. It is therefore dropped from the index.  
23 Experience in the business management field is dropped from the model, as all respondents answered 
with a yes, hence there is no variation in the answers and it would have no impact. Experience in finance 
is also dropped as it is negatively correlated with all the other measures, and hence produces a negative 
loading on the proposed index. 
24 The number of meeting per month is not correlated with the three other measures of VC involvement 
and therefore is dropped from the VC involvement variable. 
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average meetings per month was, however, positively and significantly correlated with 
the other group of questions covering the value-added activities of venture capitalists 
in the questionnaire. These are the questions representing the services that venture 
capitalists provide and the networks they use to provide them; hence, how many times 
they meet their portfolio companies is highly correlated with the extent of the services 
they provide. Moreover, there are nine measures for services and networks provided 
by, which are mostly significantly positively correlated. Hence, they could all load into 
one factor except for whether the VC firm has been involved in recruiting sales or 
marketing personnel, as it had no significant correlation with any of the other measures. 
It loads negatively into the variable. Therefore, this variable created through factor 
analysis is named VC Services and includes only the eight positive measures, plus the 
number of meetings per month. It has an eigenvalue of 2.72 and the following factor 
loadings shown in Table 5.25, p. 186. The highest factor loadings are introduction to 
suppliers, customers and shaping financial policies, which are also the measures with 
the highest mean rankings, however not in the same order.  
All five government networking measures have high, positive and significant 
correlations and hence load into a variable called VC Government Networks, which has 
an eigenvalue of 4.04 and the factor loadings shown in Table 5.25. 
As for the five measures of syndicate networks, only number of connections and 
number of times the firm has been invited to invest or initiated an investment were 
significantly correlated. However, when syndication measures were reduced into a 
factor, it showed to be relatively weak with an eigenvalue of less than one and hence it 
could not be created. Furthermore, an average was calculated for the three correlated 
variables, to show the average of each respondent’s syndicate network. However, since 
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this measure is to be compared with indices, the values were standardised for 
consistency during analysis.  
5.3 Data Reduction Summary 
 
Through CFA, the measures related to the characteristics of entrepreneurs and venture 
capitalists as well as, services provided by the latter are all reduced into 14 independent 
variables. Table 5.26 above represents these variables as well as the dependent variable 
and the 2 control variables. 
5.4 Regression Results (Characteristics of Entrepreneurs and Venture 
Capitalists) 
The quantitative analysis of this study is conducted through multiple linear regression 
analysis and its estimation using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS), being the most widely 
used tool given the continuous nature of the dependent variables (Schmidheiny, 2018). 
It allows for the estimation of the relation between a dependent variable and a set of 
Table 5.26 Final Variables after Reduction (Entrepreneur and VC characteristics) 
Variable  Type of variable 
New Comp. Perf. Dependent  
VC education Independent 
VC experience Independent 
VC involvement Independent 
VC services Independent 
VC gov’t network Independent 
Avg. Connections Independent 
Executive Recruitment Independent 
E- Business Network  Independent 
Network use Independent 
Fit RBC strategy Independent 
Previous experience founders Independent 
Previous managerial experience Independent 
Proportion education Independent 
Advice Independent 
Firm Size Control 
Firm Age Control 
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independent or explanatory variables, assuming a linear (in parameters) relationship 
between the dependent the explanatory variables. 
 These 14 independent variables representing the characteristics of entrepreneurs 
and venture capitalists as well as the services provided by the latter, were fit into a 
regression model to predict their effect on the performance of VC-backed firms. The 
results are shown in Table 5.27 below.  
Table 5.27 Characteristics of Entrepreneurs and VCs- OLS Regression Results 
Variables Coefficient 
(Std. error) 
Executive Recruitment .0536 
(.1489) 
E- Business Network .1243 
(.1297) 
Network use .0531 
(.1399) 
Fit RBC strategy     .4522** 
  (.1828) 
Previous experience founders -.1484 
(.1564) 
Previous managerial experience -.1442 
(.1386) 
Proportion education -.0241 
(.1383) 
Advice .2481* 
(.1356) 
VC education .0432 
(.1711) 
VC experience .0576 
(.2951) 
VC involvement -.2555 
(.2748) 
VC services -.0010 
(.2252) 
VC gov’t network -.0757 
(.2261) 
Avg. Connections .03795 
(.2052) 
Firm age .3471 
(.2664) 
Firm size   .7071*** 
(.2520) 
R-Squared 58.58% 
Adjusted R-Squared 36.94% 
No. of observations 52 
Standard errors in provided in parenthesis 
***,**,* denote statistical significance at 1, 5, 10% levels, respectively. 
NA represents cells in which no coefficients or stand errors are calculated, as no moderators are 
applicable to that certain model. 
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Advice by VC firms is shown to have a positive significant impact on the performance 
of VC-backed firms, and the RBCs of VC-backed firms matched to their firm strategies 
also have a positive significant impact on the performance of VC-backed firms. This 
model showed R-squared of 58.5% and an adjusted R-squared of 39.6%. Which means 
that 58.5% of the variation in the performance of VC-backed firms is explained by the 
entrepreneurs’ characteristics variables, the venture capitalists’ characteristic variables 
and variables related to VC services. However, another regression analysis is performed 
using all the variables in this study (those included here as well as the variables related 
to VC-E relationship and institutional environment). Results of the second regression 
shows an increase in the R-squared and the adjusted R-squared value which shows that 
including all the variables together explains the change in the performance of the VC-
backed firms, more than relying on variables related to characteristics of entrepreneurs 
and venture capitalists only. This supports the contribution of this study, that including 
all the variables in the model provides more rigorous results than when analysing them 
separately. Thus, the results of the second model will be discussed in section 6.4, as 
they provide a better explanation.  
5.5 Chapter Summary 
This chapter demonstrated the responses of entrepreneurs and venture capitalists to both 
questionnaires. A description of responses was presented through descriptive statistics. 
Parametric t-tests were used to rank the means of all measures and in turn highlight the 
most important ones, after which a depiction of all CFA steps was provided. All indices 
created for the analysis model and their factor loadings were listed. The results of the 
regression model and an explanation of the significance of all the variables included 
are explained in Chapter six, as well as a clarification to why this model will not be 
relied on for the results of this study. 
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Chapter Six 
VC-E Relationship and Legal Environment 
Variables, Descriptives, and Results 
 
6.0 Introduction 
This chapter presents the descriptive analysis of the sample results and the variables 
used in regression analysis. First, in section 6.1, descriptive statistics are presented for 
measures related to the VC-E relationship (independent variable three) from the 
perspective of both entrepreneurs and venture capitalists. As well as descriptive 
statistics the legal environment in Egypt (moderating variable), from the perspective of 
both entrepreneurs and venture capitalists. After which this chapter demonstrates the 
CFA process used for dimensionality and validity assessment, as well as data reduction 
procedures for these measures, in section 6.2. Finally, all the new aggregated variables 
which are added to the regression models are summarised in section 6.3. Results of the 
second regression analysis which includes all the variables related to entrepreneur 
characteristics, VC characteristics and services, VC-E relationship as well as legal 
environment are presented in section 6.4.  
6.1 Descriptive Statistics 
This section shows the general characteristics of the respondents, which provides 
information for this study, and details of their responses. Frequencies and percentages 
are calculated for all the measures related to the VC-E relationship and to the legal 
environment in Egypt. Means and standard deviations are calculated for all non-binary 
variables (for ordinal and scale variables). Parametric tests (t-tests) are also 
implemented to derive mean rankings.  
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This chapter will focus on responses from the two questionnaires to explain the 
perception of both entrepreneurs and VCs, of the VC-E relationship, as well as their 
perception of the legal environment in Egypt.  
 
6.1.1 VC- E Relationship Descriptive Statistics 
 
i) VC-E Relationship (from entrepreneurs’ perspective) 
The third independent variable, VC-E relationship, is measured based on five categories 
from the entrepreneurs’ perspective: VC-E complementarity, VC-E disagreements, 
contract flexibility, contract favourableness and VC-E ease of relationship. Each of 
those categories is presented through a set of related questions in the survey. 
VC-E complementarity measures rely on questions covering the venture 
capitalists’ perception of the extent they: each contribute different resources, have 
complementary strengths, have abilities that can be combined, and find VC managers 
meet their expectations.   
Table 6.1 E-Complementary Percentages 
 1 2 3 4 5 Total 
Resources 5.8 19.2 25 34.6 15.4 100 
Strengths 7.7 15.4 38.5 30.8 7.7 100 
Abilities 3.8 17.3 36.5 23.1 19.2 100 
Expectations 13.5 19.2 32.7 25 9.6 100 
E-Complementary Mean Ranking and Standard Deviation 
 Test value=3 Mean Std. Deviation 
Abilities 3.37** 1.103 
Resources 3.35** 1.136 
Strengths 3.15 1.036 
Expectations 2.98 1.18 
These four complementarity measures are based on a Likert scale where ‘1’ represents very low and ‘5’ 
represents very high. This table shows response % in each category. 
For mean ranking ***,**,* denote statistical significance, at 1, 5, 10% levels, respectively. 
Table 6.1 above shows the entrepreneurs’ responses; the highest responses were 
at the neutral section of the scale, meaning neither low nor high. The measure for which 
respondents have selected ‘very high’ the most (19.2%) is ‘abilities’. Entrepreneurs 
believe that their abilities can be combined with the abilities of venture capitalists. 
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Overall, as evident in the mean ranking above in Table 6.1, complementarity does exist 
between the VC and E, as all means are above the set level of ‘3’, showing that their 
responses are mostly on the ‘high’ or ‘very high’ side, for the measures related to 
abilities, resources and strengths. Therefore, entrepreneurs believe that their abilities, 
resources and strengths complete or add on to those possessed by VC firms. The only 
measure that is insignificantly below the mean is expectations, as it is almost equal to 
3. 
To measure the VC-E disagreements that the VC managers perceive themselves 
to have with the portfolio company, they were asked about several related issues: 
strategy, marketing, financial, R&D, product development (PD), human resources 
(HR), chief executive officer (CEO) and other issues. The lower the responses, the 
better, as a lower rate of disagreements makes the extent of the relationship stronger. 
Table 6.2 E- Disagreements Percentages 
 1 2 3 4 5 Total 
Strategy disagreements 15.4 21.2 40.4 17.3 5.8 100 
Marketing disagreements 19.2 25 42.3 13.5 0 100 
Financial disagreements 17.3 23.1 28.8 19.2 11.5 100 
R&D disagreements 30.8 13.5 36.5 17.3 1.9 100 
PD disagreements 19.2 25 40.4 7.7 7.7 100 
HR disagreements 25 21.2 42.3 3.8 5.8 100 
CEO disagreements 53.8 13.5 23.1 5.8 3.8 100 
Other disagreements 36.5 17.3 40.4 3.8 1.9 100 
E- Disagreements Mean Ranking and Standard Deviation 
 Test value= 3 Mean Std. Deviation 
Financial disagreements 2.85 1.258 
Strategy disagreements 2.77 1.096 
PD disagreements 2.6** 1.125 
Marketing disagreements 2.5*** 0.96 
R&D disagreements 2.46*** 1.163 
HR disagreements 2.43*** 1.1 
Other disagreements 2.17*** 1.043 
CEO disagreements 1.92*** 1.169 
 Likert-scale questions were also used to show the extent of disagreements from very low ‘1’ to very 
high ‘5. This table shows response % in each category. 
For mean ranking ***,**,* denote statistical significance, at 1, 5, 10% levels, respectively. 
Results in Table 6.2 show that the highest rate of disagreements as perceived by 
VC managers is on financial issues. Approximately 31% of the VC managers perceive 
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that disagreements with entrepreneurs on financial issues are high or very high. 
Financial disagreements also has the highest mean, 2.85. This is followed by 
disagreements on strategy-related issues, which has a mean of 2.77. The lowest rate of 
disagreements perceived by entrepreneurs is on CEO-related issues and the second 
lowest is on other issues than the stated seven. However, all disagreements are below 
average, as evident by their means, which are all significantly lower than the set test 
mean of ‘3’, except for financial and strategy disagreements, which are insignificantly 
lower. 
To measure the contractual relationship between the VC and E, the 
entrepreneurs were asked to provide their perception concerning the degree of contract 
flexibility on certain issues and how favourable they believe the contract to be, on based 
on different terms.  
First, contract flexibility is assessed from the perspectives of strategic, 
marketing, financial, R&D, product development and HR issues. The respondents’ 
percentages as well as mean ranking and standard deviations for the measures are 
provided in Table 6.3 below. 
Table 6.3 Contract Flexibility Percentages 
 1 2 3 4 5 Total 
Strategy flexibility 5.8 13.5 44.2 23.1 13.5 100 
Marketing flexibility 3.8 11.5 48.1 25 11.5 100 
Financial flexibility 9.6 11.5 42.3 25 11.5 100 
R&D flexibility 11.5 17.3 40.4 21.2 9.6 100 
PD flexibility 7.7 11.5 46.2 23.1 11.5 100 
HR flexibility 7.7 17.3 44.2 21.2 9.6 100 
Contract Flexibility Mean Ranking and Standard Deviation 
 Mean Std. Deviation 
Marketing flexibility 3.29** 0.957 
Strategy flexibility 3.25* 1.046 
PD flexibility 3.19 1.049 
Financial flexibility 3.17 1.098 
HR flexibility 3.08 1.045 
R&D flexibility 3 1.12 
The six measures of flexibility are based on a scale from ‘1’ very low to ‘5’ very high. This table shows 
response % in each category. 
For mean ranking ***,**,* denote statistical significance, at 1, 5, 10% levels, respectively. 
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The total responses for ‘high’ and ‘very high’ are almost equal for marketing 
(36.5%), strategic (36.6%) and financial (36.5%) issues. However, marketing had the 
fewest ‘very low’ and ‘low’ responses (approximately 15%) and hence it has the highest 
mean ranking (3.29). Financial issues had the highest rate of low and very low 
responses and accordingly is rated the lowest of the three. PD issues also exceeded 
financial issues in ranking, even though PD has fewer ‘high’ responses, but also fewer 
‘low’ responses. Overall, as shown in Table 6.3, entrepreneurs perceive contractual 
terms with venture capitalists to be most flexible on marketing and strategy-related 
issues (both have means significantly higher than the set test mean of ‘3’) and least 
flexible on R&D and HR-related issues. 
The contractual terms assessment comprised the rating of the entrepreneurs’ 
contract favourableness according to their perception of: company valuation, type of 
security, amount and timing of investments, number of directors, voting rights, vesting 
founder stocks, management control and conversion rights. 
Table 6.4 Contract Favourableness Percentages 
 1 2 3 4 5 Total 
Company Valuation 3.8 5.8 51.9 23.1 15.4 100 
Type of security 5.8 15.4 50 19.2 9.6 100 
Amount of investments 5.8 25 36.5 25 7.7 100 
No. of directors 9.6 11.5 48.1 21.2 9.6 100 
Voting Rights 7.7 7.7 51.9 17.3 15.4 100 
Vesting Founder Stocks 5.8 9.6 48.1 19.2 17.3 100 
Management Control 5.8 5.8 59.6 15.4 13.5 100 
Conversion Rights 5.8 7.7 61.5 13.5 11.5 100 
Contract Favourableness Mean Ranking and Standard Deviation 
Test value= 3  Mean Std. Deviation 
Company Valuation 3.4*** 0.955 
Vesting founder stocks 3.33** 1.061 
Voting rights 3.25* 1.064 
Management control 3.25* 0.968 
Conversion rights 3.17 0.944 
Type of security 3.12 0.983 
No. of directors 3.1 1.053 
Amount of investments 3.04 1.028 
These eight items’ contract favourableness measures were assessed on a scale where ‘1’ represents strongly 
disagree and ‘5’ represents strongly agree. 
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As shown through mean ranking in Table 6.4, entrepreneurs find the most 
favourable contractual terms to be the valuation of their companies by venture 
capitalists (3.4), followed by the vesting of founder stocks (3.33), while the least 
favourable are the number of directors (3.1) as well as the amount of investments 
granted by the VCs (3.04). All measures were slightly above the set mean of ‘3’, but 
only company valuation, vesting founder stocks, voting rights and management control 
are significantly above the mean of ‘3’. However, contractual favourableness cannot be 
labelled as favourable by entrepreneurs as the highest response rate category for all the 
measures was neutral, whereas favourableness was neither high nor low. 
The VC-E ease of relationship from the entrepreneurs’ perspective is the final 
category to measure the extent of the VC-E relationship. It is measured through five 
questions: ease of negotiation, speed of agreement on issues not in contract, ease of 
agreement on major new venture issues, speed of agreement on major new venture 
issues, and whether they need a third party to resolve their conflicts.  
 
Table 6.5 VC-E Relationship Ease Percentages 
 1 2 3 4 5 Total 
Negotiation ease 7.7 5.8 42.3 30.8 13.5 100 
Non- contract agreement speed  5.8 13.5 40.4 28.8 11.5 100 
New venture ease of agreement 5.8 11.5 38.5 32.7 11.5 100 
New venture agreement speed 7.7 11.5 40.4 32.7 7.7 100 
Third party 3.8 7.7 34.6 17.3 36.5 100 
VC-E Relation Ease Mean Ranking and Standard Deviation   
 Test Value=3 Mean Std. Deviation 
Third party 3.75*** 1.153 
Negotiation ease 3.37** 1.048 
New venture ease of agreement 3.33** 1.024 
Non- contract agreement speed 3.27* 1.031 
New venture agreement speed 3.21 1.016 
The answers ranged from ‘1’ to ‘5’ where ‘1’ represents strongly disagree and ‘5’ represents 
strongly agree. This table shows response % in each category. 
For mean ranking ***,**,* denote statistical significance, at 1, 5, 10% levels, respectively. 
As shown in Table 6.5 above, the highest measure of VC-E relationship ease on 
which entrepreneurs agreed is third party. Approximately 54% of venture capitalists 
agree that they do not need a third party to resolve any conflicts with entrepreneurs. 
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Third party also had the highest mean ranking (3.75). Entrepreneurs’ responses, as 
reflected in mean ranking, show that the ease of reaching an agreement or negotiating 
on new venture decisions is less of an issue than the time the agreement takes. Means 
for the five measure are significantly above the set test mean of ‘3’, except for new 
venture agreement speed, which is insignificantly higher than the set mean. 
 
ii) VC-E Relationship (from venture capitalists’ perspective) 
Five categories are used to measure VC-E relationship from the VC perspective: VC-E 
complementarity, VC-E disagreements, VC-E ease of relationship, venture capitalists’ 
perception of their portfolio companies’ team spirit and the extent that the VC firm has 
trust in the portfolio firm. These categories are similar to those in the questionnaire 
distributed to entrepreneurs; however, these capture the VC-E relationship from the 
perspective of VC managers. A set of related questions in the survey is used to explore 
each of those categories. 
VC-E complementarity measures cover the venture capitalists’ perception of the 
extent to which they: each contribute different resources, have complementary 
strengths, have abilities that can be combined and find portfolio companies meeting 
their expectations.  
Table 6.6 VC-E Complementarity Percentages 
 1 2 3 4 5 Total 
Resources 0 7.1 21.4 28.6 42.9 100 
Strengths 0 0 28.6 35.7 35.7 100 
Abilities 0 0 35.7 50.0 14.3 100 
Expectations 0 0 57.1 35.7 7.1 100 
 VC-E Complementarity Mean Ranking and Standard Deviation 
 Test value=3 Mean Std. Deviation 
Resources 4.07*** 0.997 
Strengths 4.07*** 0.829 
Abilities 3.79*** 0.699 
Expectations 3.5** 0.65 
These complementarity measures are enquired about in the form of a scale, were ‘1’ represents very low and 
‘5’ represents very high. This table shows response % in each category. 
For mean ranking ***,**,* denote statistical significance, at 1, 5, 10% levels, respectively. 
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The highest response rate for ‘strongly agree’ by venture capitalists is 43%, 
which is for the extent to which the VC believes that itself and the portfolio company 
both contribute different resources. When combining responses of high and very high, 
then VC firms would perceive funded firms to have complementary strengths and 
abilities of about 70% and 65% respectively. The lowest response rate for very high is 
the extent to which VC firms perceived funded companies to meet their expectations; 
the majority of VC firms (57%) responded with neutral.  
The highest mean rankings are for the measures complementary resources and 
strengths (both at 4.07). The lowest mean (3.5) is for the measure expectations, which 
is still significantly (at 5% level) above the set mean of ‘3’. The three other measures 
are above the set test mean of ‘3’, but significant at the 1% level. Although responses 
to the entrepreneur questionnaire (see Table 6.1, p.193) show that the measure of VC 
firms meeting portfolio firm expectations also has the lowest mean ranking, it was 
below the set mean of ‘3’. This shows that VC managers perceive portfolio companies 
to meet their expectations more than portfolio companies perceive VC managers to 
meet theirs. Additionally, VC managers perceived that they and their funded firms had 
the highest complementary levels, in terms of resources and strengths, while 
entrepreneurs of those firms perceive it to be in terms of abilities. 
Overall, from the perspective of both entrepreneurs and venture capitalists, 
complementarity appears to be above average. These results are in line with previous 
studies which explain that efforts and resources of venture capitalists and entrepreneurs 
should be complementary rather than substitutes (Vergara et al., 2012).   
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To measure the VC-E disagreements that the VC managers perceive themselves 
to have with the portfolio company, they were asked about several related issues: 
strategy, marketing, financial, research and development (R&D), product development 
(PD), human resources (HR), chief executive officer (CEO) and other issues. 
Disagreements are different to all previous measures: the lower the means and the 
selected responses on the Likert scale the better. Disagreements have an inverse effect 
on VC-E relationship: the lower the disagreement rate the stronger the relationship is. 
Table 6.7 VC-E Disagreement Percentages 
 1 2 3 4 5 Total 
Strategy disagreements 28.6 21.4 42.9 7.1 0 100 
Marketing disagreements 14.3 14.3 71.4 0 0 100 
Financial disagreements 14.3 14.3 35.7 28.6 7.1 100 
R&D disagreements 21.4 28.6 42.9 0 7.1 100 
PD disagreements 0 35.7 50.0 0 14.3 100 
HR disagreements 28.6 21.4 35.7 7.1 7.1 100 
CEO disagreements 14.3 21.4 35.7 21.4 7.1 100 
Other disagreements 50.0 7.1 28.6 14.3 0 100 
VC-E Disagreement Mean Ranking and Standard Deviation 
Test Value=3 Mean Std. Deviation 
Financial disagreements 3 1.177 
PD disagreements 2.93 0.997 
CEO disagreements 2.86 1.167 
Marketing disagreements 2.57 0.756 
R&D disagreements 2.43* 1.089 
HR disagreements 2.43* 1.222 
strategy disagreements 2.29** 0.994 
other disagreements 2.07** 1.207 
VC-E disagreement from perspective of VC managers are based on a scale to show the extent from very low ‘1’ 
to very high ‘5’ of disagreement on these eight issues. This table shows response % in each category. 
For mean ranking ***,**,* denote statistical significance, at 1, 5, 10% levels, respectively. 
The lowest level of disagreements between venture capitalists and 
entrepreneurs, as shown by the mean rankings in Table 6.7 above, is on ‘other issues’. 
However, from the seven specified, the lowest is disagreements on strategy-related 
issues, with a mean of 2.29, which is significantly (at 5% level) below the set mean of 
‘3’. The most disagreements are on financial issues, with a mean of 3, followed by 
disagreements on product development issues (3) and issues related to the CEO (2.86), 
which are insignificantly lower than the set mean. 
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All means are below the set test mean, which shows that the means of all 
disagreement issues were not higher than average, with the exception of financial 
issues, which had a mean exactly equal to the test value. Looking at percentages, 37% 
of the VC firms perceived disagreements on financial issues with portfolio firms to be 
high or very high. Most responses on disagreement level are average, neither low or 
very low, nor high or very high. The highest rate of response in the average category 
was for PD disagreements. Exactly 50% of the VC firms found disagreements on PD 
issues to be average.  
From the entrepreneurs’ perspective, disagreements on financial issues were 
also the highest, which confirms the consistency and robustness of the results. PD issues 
are also in the top three issues from the entrepreneurs’ perspective.  
To measure the VC-E ease of relationship, five questions were used: the ease of 
negotiation, speed of agreement on issues not in contract, ease of agreement on major 
new venture issues, speed of agreement on major new venture issues, and whether they 
need a third party to resolve their conflicts.  
Table 6.8 VC-E Ease of Relationship Percentages 
 1 2 3 4 5 Total 
Negotiation ease 0 21.4 28.6 42.9 7.1 100 
Non contract agreement speed  0 28.6 7.1 50.0 14.3 100 
New venture agreement ease  0 14.3 28.6 57.1 0 100 
 New venture agree speed  0 7.1 35.7 57.1 0 100 
 Third party 0 0 7.1 21.4 71.4 100 
VC-E Ease of Relationship Mean Ranking and Standard Deviation 
 Test Value=3 Mean Std. Deviation 
Third party 4.64*** 0.633 
Non contract Agreement speed 3.5** 1.092 
New venture agree speed 3.5** 0.65 
New venture agreement Ease  3.43** 0.756 
Negotiation ease 3.36 0.929 
These five ease of relationship measures from the perspective of VC managers are based on a 5 point scale, 
where ‘1’ stands for strongly disagree and ‘5’ stands for strongly agree. This table shows response % in each 
category. 
For mean ranking ***,**,* denote statistical significance, at 1, 5, 10% levels, respectively. 
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The highest rate of responses which show agreement is for third party: 93% of VC firms 
show that they do not need a third party to resolve conflicts with their portfolio firms. 
It is also confirmed in mean ranking (see Table 6.8 above), as not requiring a third party 
to resolve major issues between the VC and E has the highest mean, 4.64. Results show 
that, overall, there is an ease in dealing with portfolio firms, as means of the five 
measures are all above the test mean of ‘3’. However, agreeing on major new venture 
decisions is slightly easier than agreeing on issues that were not written in the contract 
initially. Moreover, responses on the five measures of ease of relationship were all 
significantly above the set mean of ‘3’, except for negotiation ease, which was above 
the mean but not significant. 
Ease of relationship from the entrepreneurs’ perspective (see Table 6.5, p. 197) 
also shows that the highest measure on which entrepreneurs agreed is third party, which 
confirms the consistency and reliability of responses. However, while the rest of the 
mean rankings are different, both venture capitalists and entrepreneurs find it easier to 
negotiate on issues not in the contract than on new venture decisions.  
Another measure of the VC-E relationship is team spirit. The way VC fund 
managers perceive portfolio firms’ (PF) team spirit is measured through five Likert-
scale questions: PF has a clear goal, PF team members work hard, PF team members 
put interests of their team first, PF team members try their best to improve their abilities, 
and PF team members accept personal responsibility for team success.  
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Table 6.9 Team Spirit Percentages 
 1 2 3 4 5 Total 
Clear Goal 0 0 14.3 64.3 21.4 100 
Work Hard 0 7.1 21.4 42.9 28.6 100 
Team Interest 0 0 50.0 35.7 14.3 100 
Try Best 0 0 14.3 78.6 7.1 100 
Responsibility 0 14.3 21.4 42.9 21.4 100 
Team Spirit Mean Ranking and Standard Deviations 
 Test Value=3 Mean Std. Deviation 
Clear goal 4.0788 0.616 
Work hard 3.93*** 0.917 
Try best 3.93*** 0.475 
Responsibility 3.71*** 0.994 
Team Interest 3.64** 0.745 
These five measures of portfolio firms’ team spirit are based on a scale from ‘1’ to ‘5’ where ‘1’ represents 
strongly disagree and ‘5’ represents strongly agree. This table shows response % in each category. 
For mean ranking ***,**,* denote statistical significance, at 1, 5, 10% levels, respectively. 
As evident in the percentage responses and mean ranking in Table 6.9, the most 
important team spirit measure is that the venture capitalists perceive their portfolio 
firms to have a clear overall goal that they can achieve. It has the highest mean ranking 
(4.07) and about 85% of the VC firms agree on this measure. On the other hand, the 
measure with the lowest mean ranking (3.64) is portfolio team members putting the 
interests of their team before their personal interests. This measure had the lowest mean 
ranking as it had the lowest responses for ‘agree’ or ‘strongly agree’ (approximately 
50%). The remaining VC firms (50%) perceived team interest to be ‘neutral’. None of 
the VC firms selected ‘disagree’ for this measure.  
Overall, percentage responses and mean ranking, which are all significantly 
higher than the set test mean, show that VC firms perceive portfolio firms to have a 
high team spirit. This is important, as it improves firm performance through the 
adoption of cooperative behaviour, which subsequently increases overall performance 
(Li et al., 2018). 
The final aspect in the questionnaire that focuses on the VC-E relationship is 
the level of trust VC firms have in their PFs. This is measured through eight Likert-
scale questions: whether the PF firm respects the contract because it knows the benefits 
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of doing so, or because it knows the economic consequences of not doing so; if the PF 
is dependable, and if it acts fairly and promptly; if the PF is open in describing its 
strengths and weaknesses; whether the VC firm has little reason to doubt the PF’s 
competence; if the PF responds constructively to concerns and problems; and, finally, 
whether both firms share common business values.  
Table 6.10 PF Trust Percentages 
 1 2 3 4 5 Total 
Benefits 0 7.1 7.1 57.1 28.6 100 
Economic Consequences 0 7.1 21.4 50.0 21.4 100 
Dependable 0 28.6 28.6 35.7 7.1 100 
Act Fairly 0 14.3 50.0 35.7 0 100 
PF-Openness 7.1 28.6 21.4 28.6 14.3 100 
No Doubt 0 21.4 28.6 28.6 21.4 100 
Responds constructively 7.1 7.1 35.7 50.0 0 100 
Common Bus. Values 0 7.1 21.4 50.0 21.4 100 
PF Trust Mean Ranking and Standard Deviation 
 Test Value=3 Mean Std. Deviation 
Benefits 4.07*** 0.829 
Economic Consequences 3.86*** 0.864 
Common Bus. Values 3.86*** 0.864 
No doubt 3.5 1.092 
Respond constructively 3.29 0.914 
Dependable 3.21 0.975 
Act fairly 3.21 0.699 
PF- openness 3.14 1.231 
These eight measures of trust are based on a scale that ranges from ‘1’ very low to ‘5’ very high. This table 
shows response % in each category. 
For mean ranking ***,**,* denote statistical significance, at 1, 5, 10% levels, respectively. 
Responses shown in Table 6.10 show that the highest responses were for the 
first measure of trust. Most VC firms believe that the portfolio company will respect 
the contract because it knows the benefits of doing so, 86% of the VC firms’ responded 
with ‘high’ or ‘very high’. This was followed by two factors: the economic 
consequences, which shows that portfolio firms respect the contract because they know 
the economic consequences of loss of reputation, and that both the VC firm and the PF 
share common business values. Over 71% of the VC firms responded with ‘agree’ or 
‘strongly agree’ to both those measures. These percentages are also confirmed by mean 
rankings. The measure that PFs will respect the contract because they know the benefits 
of doing so had the highest mean rank, 4.07. This was followed by the measures 
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economic consequences and common business values, which both had mean ranking of 
3.86. Although all measure of trust are higher than the set mean of ‘3’, these three 
measures are the only ones that are significantly (at 1% level) higher. As for the lowest 
measures of trust, portfolio firms’ openness about their strengths and weaknesses had 
the lowest mean, 3.14. 
It is important to note that the VC-E relation depends on a high level of trust, as 
shown by the fact that all eight measures of trust have a mean higher than the test mean 
of ‘3’. This shows that the means of their responses are all towards high and very high. 
Even though percentage responses show that act fairly has the lowest high and very 
high responses, according to mean ranking VC-openness has the lowest mean ranking 
as it has the most responses in the low and very low categories (36%). It is important 
to note the different types of trust explained in the literature and capture which of those 
are more important in Egypt. Strategic reputation-based (C-trust) is built on a strategic 
consideration of the trade-off between the benefit of maintaining the relationship and 
the cost of terminating the trust and its effect on reputation (Li et al., 2018), which is 
reflected by the first two measures, benefits and economic consequences. Knowledge-
based (K-trust) comes from the mutual trust built throughout the relationship, and is 
captured through measures three to six: common business values, no doubt, respond 
constructively and be dependable. Finally, identification-based (I-trust), which is the 
highest form of trust, is built on a close relationship between the venture capitalist and 
the entrepreneur, where there is a mutual understanding between both that could lead 
them to align their preferences (Li et al., 2018). As evident by mean ranking, C-trust is 
the most important type of trust in the VC-E relationship in Egypt, followed by I-trust 
and, finally, K-trust is lowest.  
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I-trust is also associated with positive team spirt in the portfolio companies 
(Campbell, 1993; Li et al., 2018). The results of this study show that I-trust items are 
positively significantly correlated with the team spirit measures explained above, 
‘interest’ and ‘accept responsibility’.  
Table 6.11 Correlations between I-trust and Team Spirit 
  
Clear 
Goal 
Work 
Hard 
Team 
Interest 
Try 
Best 
Responsibility 
Responds 
constructively 
Common 
Bus. 
Values 
Clear Goal 1             
Work Hard 0.5548* 1           
Team Interest 0.0599 0.0724 1         
Try Best 0.5451* 0.6944* 0.5750* 1       
Responsibility 0.4128 0.1446 0.3708 0.4423 1     
Responds constructively 0.3711 -0.0656 0.5004* 0.4054 0.6892* 1   
Common Bus. Values 0.3097 -0.1109 0.5119* 0.3482 0.6647* 0.7372* 1 
* Denotes statistical significance at 10% level 
 
6.1.2 Legal Environment in Egypt Descriptive Statistics 
 
i) Institutional (Legal) Environment (from entrepreneurs’ perspective) 
The final section in the questionnaire administered to entrepreneurs was used to enquire 
about the moderating variable, the legal environment in Egypt, how they perceive it and 
how they believe it would impact their businesses or scope of work. Seven Likert-scale 
measures are used to capture the perception of the entrepreneurs (trust in the court 
system, confidence in political stability, corruption is being mitigated, crime and theft 
are not common, laws and regulations affecting the business are predictable, confidence 
that contractual rights as well as property rights are enforced). The questions, however, 
are phrased in a positive form; hence, answers in ‘strongly disagree’, ‘1’, and ‘disagree’, 
‘2’, would show a weak legal environment. For example, the first measure, trust, is 
stated in the questionnaire as ‘The court system in Egypt can be trusted’. Therefore, if 
venture capitalists disagree this would mean the court system cannot be trusted (weak 
legal system), and if they agree it would mean the court system can be trusted.  
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Table 6.12 E- Legal Perception Percentages 
   1 2 3 4 5 Total 
Trust  23.1 23.1 36.5 13.5 3.8 100 
Confidence 23.1 13.5 40.4 15.4 7.7 100 
Corruption 21.2 23.1 40.4 13.5 1.9 100 
Crime 9.6 23.1 40.4 25 1.9 100 
Contract enforcement 17.3 19.2 51.9 7.7 3.8 100 
Investor Protection 19.2 15.4 50 11.5 3.8 100 
E- Legal Perception Mean Ranking and Standard Deviation 
Test value=3 Mean Std. Deviation 
Crime 2.87 0.971 
Confidence  2.71* 1.21 
Investor protection 2.65** 1.046 
Contract enforcement 2.62*** 0.993 
Trust 2.52*** 1.111 
Corruption 2.52*** 1.038 
The six legal perception measures ae based on a scale were ‘1’ represents strongly disagree and ‘5’ 
represents strongly disagree. This shows response % in each category. 
For mean ranking ***,**,* denote statistical significance, at 1, 5, 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 
Results in Table 6.12 show that only approximately 17% of the entrepreneurs 
believe that the court system in Egypt can be trusted, whereas 46% believe that it cannot 
be trusted. Approximately 23% have confidence in the political stability in Egypt, 
whereas 37% do not. Approximately 15% believe that corruption is being mitigated, 
while 44% do not. About 27% believe that crime and theft are not common in Egypt, 
which is the legal environment aspect that entrepreneurs perceived to be the strongest. 
Contract enforcement had the lowest agree responses, which means it is perceived by 
entrepreneurs to be the weakest legal factor. Entrepreneur responses related to the 
judicial system show that only 11.5% believe it can enforce their contractual rights and 
only 15.5% believe it can enforce their investor protection rights.  
As shown above in Table 6.12, all mean rankings for E- legal perception measures are 
below the set test mean of ‘3’. Furthermore, this explains that entrepreneurs perceive 
the legal environment aspects to be weak in all the aspects listed above. Mean rankings 
in this section are explained from lowest to highest; thus, the lowest mean is 2.52, which 
is the mean for the ‘corruption as well as trust measures’, which shows that the biggest 
issues from the perception of entrepreneurs are corruption in Egypt not being mitigated 
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and not trusting the court system. These are followed by the measure ‘contract and 
investor rights being enforced’ and, finally, the highest means are ‘confidence and 
crime’, which implies that having confidence in the political stability and the crime and 
theft rates in Egypt are the legal environment that entrepreneurs are least concerned 
about. However, crime is the only measure that is insignificantly lower than the set 
mean of ‘3’. It is important to note, however, that the highest rate of response in all 
measures was neutral, which shows that many entrepreneurs decided to give answers 
that are neither implying strong nor weak, due to the sensitivity of the issue discussed.  
The way entrepreneurs perceive the impact of the legal environment on their 
businesses is captured through eight scale questions. These questions enquire whether 
their businesses are affected by political stability and government legislation; whether 
external legal environment factors have affected their ability to provide innovative 
products, innovative ideas, and use modern technology to improve productivity and 
efficiency; and whether the innovative outcome of the business is impacted by patent 
laws, and the extent to which the legal environment conditions make them resort to 
relying on networks and/or personal relationships.  
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Table 6.13 E-Legal Impact Percentages 
 1 2 3 4 5 Total 
Stability  5.8 9.6 28.8 25 30.8 100 
Gov’t Legislation 3.8 5.8 23.1 26.9 40.4 100 
Innovative Products 1.9 1.9 28.9 38.4 28.9 100 
Modern Technology 1.9 1.9 36.5 30.8 28.9 100 
Innovative Ideas 0 5.8 32.7 25 36.5 100 
Patents 11.5 9.6 38.4 25 15.4 100 
Rely networks 0 1.9 34.6 11.5 51.9 100 
Rely relations 0 3.8 32.7 17.3 46.2 100 
E-Legal Impact Mean Ranking and Standard Deviation      
 Test value=3 Mean Std. Deviation 
Rely networks 4.13*** 0.971 
Rely relations 4.06*** 0.978 
Gov’t Legislation  3.94*** 1.11 
Innovative Ideas 3.92*** 0.967 
Innovative Products 3.9*** 0.913 
Modern Technology 3.83*** 0.944 
Stability  3.65*** 1.186 
Patents  3.23 1.182 
The eight legal impact measures are based on a scale where ‘1’ represents strongly disagree and ‘5’ represents 
strongly agree. This table shows response % in each category. 
For mean ranking ***,**,* denote statistical significance, at 1, 5, 10% levels, respectively. 
Responses of the entrepreneurs and ranking of means, as shown in Table 6.13, 
show that the most important measures for legal environment impact are that they do 
rely more on networks and relationships. Relying on networks and personal 
relationships had means of 4.13 and 4.06 respectively. This is consistent with the 
Institutional Theory and with previous studies which explain that networks have a 
greater role in emerging economies, as they substitute for formal institutions (Meyer, 
2001; Peng 2000). Additionally, economies with weak financial institutions become 
more dependent on their personal relationships and networks in all aspects of the VC 
process, starting with selection.   
The third mean, after relying on networks and personal relationships, is government 
legislation (3.94.), which shows that respondents do agree that government legislation 
does have an impact on their businesses. The lowest means are those of stability (3.65) 
and patents (3.23), which shows that entrepreneurs believe that political stability and 
patent laws in Egypt currently have a lower impact on their businesses than other legal 
environment measures. Moreover, mean rankings of all the measures are significantly 
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(at 1% level) above the set mean of three (expect for patents, which is insignificant), 
which shows that the legal environment does have an impact on the VC-backed firms 
in Egypt. 
i) Institutional (Legal) Environment (from VC perspective) 
The final section in the VC questionnaire is used to test the moderating variable legal 
environment, how VC managers perceive it and how they believe it would impact their 
businesses or scope of work. This section is very similar to the one administered to 
entrepreneurs, but it captures the entrepreneurs’ point of view instead. 
Seven Likert-scale measures (trust in the court system, confidence in political 
stability, corruption is being mitigated, crime and theft are not common, laws and 
regulations affecting the business are predictable, confidence that contractual rights are 
enforced, confidence that investor protection rights are enforced) were used to capture 
the perception of the VC managers.  
Table 6.14 VC Legal Perception Percentages 
 1 2 3 4 5 Total 
Trust 35.7 28.6 21.4 14.3 0 100 
Confidence 14.3 21.4 35.7 21.4 7.1 100 
Corruption 35.7 14.3 28.6 14.3 7.1 100 
Crime  14.3  35.7 21.4 14.3 14.3 100 
Laws 7.1 57.1 14.3 21.4 0 100 
Contractual rights 14.3 50 14.3 14.3 7.1 100 
Investor protection rights 28.6 28.6 14.3 21.4 7.1 100 
VC Legal Perception Mean Ranking and Standard Deviation 
Test value=3  Mean Std. Deviation 
Confidence 2.86 1.167 
Crime 2.79 1.311 
Laws 2.5 0.941 
Contractual Rights 2.5 1.16 
Investor protection 2.5 1.345 
Corruption 2.43* 1.342 
Trust 2.14** 1.099 
These seven measures of legal perception are based on a scale from ‘1’ representing strongly disagree to ‘5’ 
representing strongly agree. This table shows response % in each category. 
For mean ranking ***,**,* denote statistical significance, at 1, 5, 10% levels, respectively. 
The questions related to legal perception, are phrased in a positive form, as 
explained for entrepreneur legal perception (Table 6.12, p. 207). Hence, answers in 
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‘strongly disagree’, ‘1’, and ‘disagree’, ‘2’, would show a weak legal environment. It 
is evident that respondents do not perceive the legal environment in Egypt to be strong; 
the highest percentages of ‘strongly agree’ (which shows a strong legal environment) 
for any of the measures is 14%. This means that only 14% of the VC managers strongly 
agree that crime and theft is not common in Egypt. The highest percentage for ‘strongly 
agree’ and ‘agree’ combined is only 28%. This 28% appeared for three measures. Only 
28% of the VC managers have confidence in the political stability. Only 28% perceive 
crime and theft not to be common in Egypt (‘agree’ and ‘strongly agree’). Only 28% 
have confidence that the judicial system can enforce their investor protection rights, 
while 57% disagreed, showing that they do not have confidence, that their protection 
rights can be enforced. Moreover, only 14% agreed that they have trust in the court 
system in Egypt, while 64% disagreed or strongly disagreed, which shows that the 
majority do not have trust in the court system. VC managers’ responses show that 64% 
do not have confidence that their contractual rights will be enforced by the judicial 
system and believe that the laws affecting their operations and growth are 
unpredictable. The mean ranking of the seven VC legal perception measures (see Table 
6.14 above) reinforces these percentages of responses. All means are beneath the set 
test mean of ‘3’, implying that most of the responses to the positive statements were 
either ‘disagree’ or ‘strongly disagree’. Moreover, this concludes that the legal 
environment in Egypt is not perceived to be a strong one. In this case, mean rankings 
are explained from lowest to highest, where the lowest mean is that of trust, which 
shows that the biggest issue is that the court system cannot be trusted, followed by 
corruption being mitigated, and contractual as well as investor rights being enforced. 
The two measures that are significantly below the set test mean (showing a weaker legal 
environment) are trust and corruption, at 5% and 1% significantly. Confidence in the 
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political stability, however, has the highest mean, which implies it is the least of the 
problems that are currently perceived by venture capitalists in Egypt; however, it is still 
below the mean of 3. 
Overall responses conclude that, from the VC managers’ perception, the legal 
system in Egypt is considered weak. These results are extremely realistic, as they 
confirm the responses of entrepreneurs. Having similar perceptions, as seen in Table 
6.12, p. 207, through mean ranking from two different samples conveys that the results 
are realistic and do reflect the situation in Egypt.  
Regarding the other legal environment aspect, eight measures are used to 
capture how VC managers perceive the impact of the legal environment on their 
business. These are: whether stability of political systems and stability government 
legislation have an impact on their business; despite the external legal environment 
factors. Whether they have been able to provide various as well as sufficient value-
added services to portfolio companies; whether contract enforcement and investor 
protection laws have had an impact on the service level they provide; and whether it is 
more important to rely on networks and connections as well as personal relationships, 
due to the legal conditions in the country. These questions are very similar to those 
administered to entrepreneurs; however, they are only tailored to reflect the different 
natures of both businesses. 
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Table 6.15 VC Legal Impact Percentages 
 1 2 3 4 5 Total 
Stability 0 7.1 7.1 57.1 28.6 100 
Government Legislations 0 0 7.1 50 42.9 100 
Various services 0 0 14.3 57.1 28.6 100 
Sufficient services 0 0 14.3 78.6 7.1 100 
Contract enforcement 0 7.1 21.4 64.3 7.1 100 
Investor protection laws 21.4 21.4 42.9 14.3 21.4 100 
Rely on networks 0 0 14.3 57.1 28.6 100 
Rely on personal relationships 0 7.1 7.1 57.1 28.6 100 
VC Legal Impact Mean Ranking and Standard Deviation 
Test value=3  Mean Std. Deviation 
Gov. legislation 4.36*** 0.633 
Various services 4.14*** 0.663 
Rely on networks 4.14*** 0.663 
Stability 4.07*** 0.829 
Rely on personal relations 4.07*** 0.829 
Sufficient services 3.93*** 0.475 
Contract enforcement 3.71*** 0.726 
Investor protection Rights 3.5* 1.019 
These right measures of legal impact from VC perspective are based on a scale were ‘1’ represents strongly 
disagree and ‘5’ represents strongly agree. This table shows response % in each category. 
For mean ranking ***,**,* denote statistical significance, at 1, 5, 10% levels, respectively. 
Results presented in Table 6.15 show that 86% of the VC firms agree and 
strongly agree that the stability of political systems in Egypt does have an impact on 
their business. Approximately 93% agree and strongly agree that government 
legislation has an impact on their business. Moreover, 86% of them also agree that, 
despite external legal factors, they are able to provide various as well as sufficient 
value-added services to their funded companies. Approximately 71% of the VC firms 
agree and strongly agree that contract enforcement level has an impact on the service 
level they provide. Only 36% agree that investor protection laws have an impact on the 
service level they provide, while 43% disagree. It is important to note that, as explained 
in the VC legal perception section (see Table 6.14), VC firms do not appear to have 
confidence in contract enforcement and investor protection rights by the judiciary 
system, and hence this is interpreted as they would have a negative impact on the service 
level. The majority (86%) of the VC firms also agree that the legal conditions make it 
crucial for them to rely on their networks and connections as well as personal 
relationships. 
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Mean rankings also show that the highest mean is government legislation, which 
shows that respondents mainly agree that government legislation has an impact on their 
business, while the lowest is investor protection rights having an impact on their service 
level. Overall, the eight measures are significantly above the set mean of 3, showing 
that respondents agree that all the measures do have an impact on their services. These 
results are in line with the Institutional Theory (Bruton and Ahlstrom, 2003, 2006), 
which explains the importance of relying on networks and personal relationships, in 
environments with weak legal systems. These results are also in line with previous 
which show that firms tend to rely more on networks (interconnections between them) 
to resolve conflicts and negotiate contracts in cases where legal systems are weak 
(Meyer, 2001; Vergara et al., 2016). 
 In support of responses on the legal environment and how these responses show 
the legal environment in Egypt to be weak, some statistics and official worldwide 
indices are included in section 2.4.1. These show that responses of venture capitalists 
and entrepreneurs are not just perceptions; instead, they do reflect the reality of the legal 
and institutional environment in Egypt.  
 After presenting and explaining the responses of both questionnaires on VC-E 
relationship and the institutional environment in Egypt, the data is then reduced, to 
enable its analysis. An overview of the reduction method and results is presented in 
section 6.2. 
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6.2 Confirmatory Factor Analysis 
6.2.1 Data Reduction for VC-E Relationship Measures 
To measure VC-E relationship from the perspective of entrepreneurs, it is split 
into five categories: VC-E complementarity, VC-E disagreements, contract flexibility, 
contract favourableness and VC-E ease of relationship. Each of those categories is 
presented through a set of related questions in the survey. The factor loadings for the 
indices of those five categories are listed in Table 6.16 below. 
216 
 
 
                                                 
25  Looking at the coefficient scores to be loaded into regression, disagreements loads with a negative -
0.0086, which is consistent with data as the higher the disagreements between the VC and E the lower 
the extent of the relationship between them.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 6.16 Variables in Each Factor and their Factor Loadings (VC-E Relation Indices) 
E- flexibility                      3.95 E-Ease of Relationship      3.07 VC-E Relation             1.77 
Strategy flexibility 0.85 Negotiate 0.767 VC complementarity 0.421 
Marketing flexibility 0.814 Agreement speed  0.831 VC disagreements25 -0.008 
Financial flexibility 0.648 Ease of agreement 0.839 Ease of relation 0.681 
R&D flexibility 0.877 Agree speed on new venture 0.808 Team Spirit 0.6791 
PD flexibility 0.823 Third party 0.656 PC trust 0.8148 
HR flexibility       0.833   
 
E- complementarity            2.9 E-Extent of Relationship 1.12 VC- Complementarity   1.88 
Resources 0.84 E-Complementarity 0.655 Resources 0.942 
Strengths 0.862 Disagreements -0.438 Strengths 0.831 
Abilities 0.844 E-Ease of relation 0.707 Abilities 0.547 
Expectations 0.863     
 
E- disagreements              3.76         E-favourableness                       4.49 Trust                           4.20 
Strategy disagreements 0.753 Company Valuation 0.683 Benefits 0.885 
Marketing 
disagreements 0.703 Type of security 0.774 
Economic 
Consequences 0.636 
Financial 
disagreements 0.62 Amount of investments 0.5 Dependable 0.694 
R&D disagreements 0.876 No. of directors 0.805 Act Fairly 0.756 
PD disagreements 0.79 Voting Rights 0.854 VC-Openness 0.509 
HR disagreements 0.65 Vesting Founder Stocks 0.795 No Doubt 0.703 
CEO disagreements 0.711 Management Control 0.76 
Responds 
constructively 0.894 
Other disagreements 0.753 Conversion Rights 0.766 Common Bus. Values 0.637 
 
VC- Ease of Relationship 1.94 Team Spirit                           2.24 VC- Disagreements                2.58 
Negotiate 0.642 Clear Goal 0.638 
Strategy 
disagreements 0.822 
Agreement speed  0.812 Work Hard 0.702 
Marketing 
disagreements 0.649 
Ease of agreement 0.232 Team Interest 0.484 
Financial 
disagreements 0.471 
Agree speed on new 
venture 0.434 Try Best 0.926 R&D disagreements 0.552 
Third party 0.642 Responsibility 0.501 PD disagreements 0.705 
    HR disagreements 0.510 
    Other disagreements 0.435 
This table presents all indices (factors) in which the different variables are aggregated. As well as, the factor 
loading of each variable in the index. The eigenvalue of each index is presented next to the index name.  
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i) VC-E Relationship from Entrepreneurs’ Perspective 
The VC-E complementarity measures are significantly correlated. Therefore, 
they are loaded into a variable named E-complementarity, with an eigenvalue of 2.9.  
To measure the VC-E disagreements, Likert-scale questions are also used to 
show the extent (from very low to very high) of disagreements on different issues that 
the VC managers perceive themselves to have with the portfolio company. All eight 
issues are reduced into a factor named E-disagreements, with an eigenvalue of 3.76. 
To measure the contractual relationship between the VC and E, the 
entrepreneurs are asked to provide their perception on the degree of contract flexibility 
on certain issues and how favourable they believe the contract to be on different 
contractual terms. Contract flexibility on strategic, marketing, financial, R&D, product 
development and HR issues are measured through a Likert scale. The six variables are 
highly and significantly correlated and fit into an variable, named E- flexibility, with 
an eigenvalue of 3.95. 
The contractual terms included to rate the entrepreneurs’ contract 
favourableness are company valuation, type of security, amount and timing of 
investments, number of directors, voting rights, vesting founder stocks, management 
control and conversion rights. Those eight measures had significant correlations and fit 
into an variable called E-contractual Favourableness, with an eigenvalue of 4.49. 
The VC-E ease of relationship from the perspective of the entrepreneur is 
measured through five Likert-scale questions, which all have significant correlations 
and hence, fit into one variable named, E-ease of relation, with an eigenvalue of 3.07. 
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To measure the extent of the VC-E relationship, contract flexibility and 
favourableness were excluded to capture their effect separately, from the relationship 
factors that do not include any contractual agreements. Additionally, they could not be 
combined as the correlations between them were very low and they cannot fit into a 
variable. On the other hand, E-complementarity, E-disagreements and E-Ease of 
relation have significant correlations, hence were reduced further into one variable, 
called E-Extent of relation, with an eigenvalue of 1.12. 
It is important to note that disagreements naturally load negatively into the 
variable created by factor analysis, as the higher the disagreements the lower the 
extent of relationship. 
ii) VC-E Relationship from Venture Capitalists’ Perspective 
To measure VC-E relationship from the perspective of VC managers, VC-E 
relationship, is measured through five categories: VC complementarity, VC 
disagreements, Ease of relation, Team spirit and PC trust. A factor is created for each 
category, after which they are aggregated further through two-step CFA, as explained 
below. Factor loadings for all the indices are shown in Table 6.16, p. 216. 
The four measures of the first category VC-E complementarity, are significantly 
correlated except for meeting VC firm expectations26. The remaining three are 
combined into a variable named, VC complementarity, which, has an eigenvalue of 
1.88. 
                                                 
26 Meeting firm expectations was dropped from the index as it loads negatively. 
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All VC-E disagreement issues had significant correlations, except for, 
marketing issues27. All other seven issues were reduced into a variable named VC 
disagreements, with an eigenvalue of 2.58. 
All five measures of VC-E ease of relationship have significant correlations and 
hence fit into one variable named Ease of relation, with an eigenvalue of 1.94, without 
dropping any measures. 
All team spirit measures were positively and significantly correlated. Therefore, 
these five measures were grouped into one variable with an eigenvalue equal to 2.24. 
This variable was named Team spirit. 
The final aspect in the questionnaire used to understand the VC-E relationship is the 
level of trust that VC firms have in their PFs. These eight measures, were significantly 
and highly positively correlated and hence, grouped into a variable named, PC trust, 
with an eigenvalue of 4.20. 
Overall, the five indices related to VC-E relationship are positively significantly 
correlated, therefore, two- step factor analysis was applied, and a variable was created, 
and these indices were grouped into a new variable, called VC-E relationship with an 
eigenvalue of 1.77 and they had the factor loadings shown in Table 6.16, p. 216. The 
eigenvalues of these five indices show that the most important category in the VC-E 
relationship is trust, as it had the highest eigenvalue (4.20). This is consistent with the 
work of Li. et al. (2018), which emphasises the importance of trust between the VC and 
the entrepreneur in an emerging economy. 
                                                 
27 Disagreements on marketing issues was dropped from the index as it loads negatively. 
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6.2.2 Data Reduction for Institutional (Legal) Environment Measures 
To measure the legal environment, entrepreneurs and venture capitalists were 
asked to respond to different measures that investigate their perception towards the 
legal environment and the impact it has on their firms. Each of those categories is 
presented through a set of related questions in the survey. The factor loadings for the 
indices of those five categories are listed in Table 6.17 below 
 
The final section in the questionnaire administered to entrepreneurs is used to 
enquire about the moderating variable, Legal Environment in Egypt. The seven Likert-
scale measures used to capture the entrepreneurs’ perceptions are very highly and 
significantly positively correlated and hence are all loaded into a variable named E-
Legal Perception, with an eigenvalue of 3.48 and factor loadings shown in Table 6.17 
above. 
The way entrepreneurs perceive the impact of the legal environment on their 
business is captured through eight Likert-scale measures, most of which have 
Table 6.17 Variables in Each Factor and their Factor Loadings (Legal Environment 
Indices) 
E-Legal Perception           3.48 VC- Legal Perception              4.89 
Trust  0.757 Trust 0.869 
Confidence 0.765 Confidence 0.944 
Corruption 0.727 Corruption 0.842 
Crime 0.435 Crime  0.645 
Contract enforcement 0.886 Laws 0.622 
Investor Protection 0.904 Contractual rights 0.92 
  Investor protection rights 0.943 
 
E- Legal Impact              2.89 VC- Legal Impact              3.03 
Stability  0.46 Stability -0.257 
Govt Legislation 0.502 Government Legislations -0.229 
Innov. Prdt 0.713 Various services -0.66 
Modern Tech 0.678 Sufficient services -0.757 
Innov. Idea 0.784 Contract enforcement 0.878 
Patents 0.218 Investor protection laws 0.766 
Rely networks 0.669 Rely on networks 0.283 
Rely relations 0.595 Rely on personal relationships 0.671 
This table presents all indices (factors) in which the different variables are aggregated. As well as, 
the factor loading of each variable in the index. The eigenvalue of each index is presented next to 
the index name.  
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significant correlations and hence they are grouped into one variable called E-Legal 
Impact, which has an eigenvalue of 2.89.  
Venture capitalists responded to questions about the Legal Environment in 
Egypt as well, how they perceive it and how they believe it would impact their 
businesses or scope of work. The seven Likert-scale measures used to capture the 
perception of the VC managers of the legal environment were very highly and 
significantly positively correlated and hence were all loaded into a variable named VC 
Legal Perception with an eigenvalue of 4.89. 
The way VC managers perceive the impact of the legal environment on their 
business is captured through eight Likert-scale questions in the questionnaire they 
received. Most of these measures had significant correlations and hence they were 
grouped into one variable called VC Legal Impact, which had an eigenvalue of 3.03. 
The loadings of these measures are shown in Table 6.17, p.220; however, those that 
have loaded negatively have not been excluded due to the nature of the questions.  
Legal impact and legal perception were left as two separate indices, as they are 
not correlated and do not create a strong factor; additionally, there are only two factors 
which would not be sufficient to create a variable.  
 
6.3 Data Reduction Summary 
 
Table 6.18 Final Variables after Reduction 
Variable  Type of variable 
E-Extent of relation Independent 
E- contractual flexibility Independent 
E- contractual favourableness Independent 
VC-E relationship Independent 
E- Legal Perception Moderating 
E- Legal Impact Moderating 
VC- Legal Perception Moderating 
VC- Legal Impact Moderating 
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Through CFA, the measures related to the VC-E relationship were reduced into 4 
independent variables. The measures related the legal environment were reduced into 4 
moderating variables (2 from entrepreneurs’ perspective and 2 from venture capitalists’ 
perspective). Table 6.18 above represents these variables. 
6.4 Regression Results (All Variables) 
 
Multiple linear regression is applied but for all variables in this study (those 
listed in Tables 5.26 and 6.18), covering entrepreneur characteristics, VC 
characteristics and services, and VC-E relationship. Findings of this study will be based 
on results of this regression model as opposed to the model discussed in section 5.4, as 
the results provide a more comprehensive explanation of the variation in VC-backed 
firm performance. Starting with a smaller number of variables in a regression and then 
increasing the number of variables is referred to as step-wise regression (Diamond and 
Jefferies, 2001; Best and Wolf, 2015). When adding more variables, the R-squared 
increases, however, if the adjusted R-squared increases it shows that the increase is not 
just due to the rise in the number of variables but because they do provide a more 
complete explanation. In this study the adjusted R-squared of the regression presented 
in Table 6.19 (pg. 224), model 1 (with no moderators), the adjusted R-squared rose to 
46.19% compared to 39.1% in the regression analysis discussed in section 5.4. Thus, 
results of the first regression analysis are not considered as the second regression 
provides more reliable results.   
Table 6.19 below (pg. 224) presents the regression outcome for the four 
different specifications of the regression model. The first model represents results of 
the regression analysis without including moderating variables. The second and third 
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models add the moderating variables from the entrepreneur and the VC perspective, 
respectively. The fourth model adds the moderators from both the VC and 
entrepreneurs’ perspectives. Presented in the table are the coefficients, standard error 
and significance for each variable. The coefficients indicate the sign and the magnitude 
of the effect a variable is having on the dependent variable, Ceteris Paribus. Together 
the coefficient and the standard error indicate on the level of significance of the 
variable.  
As seen in Table 6.19 (pg. 224), the model is estimated for the 52 observations using 
the compiled list of variables. These 52 observations are the responses of the 
entrepreneur questionnaire matched with their corresponding (the entrepreneurs in the 
VCs portfolios) 14 responses for the VC questionnaire. This matching process ensures 
the investigation of the impact on VC-backed firms’ performance, when VCs and 
entrepreneurs co-exist and are interacting in the system. Hence, matching entrepreneurs 
with the VC that fund them in the analysis, leads to non-generic results. 
As evident in the table below, and for each of the four models, the variation in 
the performance of the VC-backed firms is well explained with the variation in the 
independent variables, ranging from R-squared values of 67.67% to 70.09%. Results 
presented in the table show that four out of the 18 variables are found to be significant 
at the 10% level. This means that 22.2% of the variables are significant.  
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Table 6.19 OLS Regression Results 
Variables No moderators E-moderators VC-moderators E&VC moderators 
 Coefficient 
(Std. error) 
Coefficient 
(Std. error) 
Coefficient 
(Std. error) 
Coefficient 
(Std. error) 
VC education -.0263 
(.1343) 
-.0216 
(.1726) 
.0066 
(.1890) 
.0053 
(.2020) 
VC experience .0883 
(.2832) 
.0860 
(.2147) 
.1247 
(.3594) 
.0384 
(.3488) 
VC involvement -.1924 
(.2219) 
-.2883 
(.2201) 
-.1832 
(.2544) 
-.2767 
(.2496) 
VC services .0425 
(.2218) 
.1413 
(.1794) 
.0245 
(.2257) 
.1657 
(.2549) 
VC gov’t network -.1735 
(.2185) 
-.2180 
(.1899) 
-.1978 
(.1721) 
-.2103 
(.1750) 
Avg. Connections -.0528 
(.1986) 
.0427 
(.1493) 
-.0226 
(.2257) 
-.0059 
(.1330) 
VC-E relationship -.0262 
(.1498) 
-.0295 
(.1300) 
-.0381 
(.1138) 
-.0059 
(.1330) 
Executive 
Recruitment 
.1837 
(.1534) 
.1742 
(.1987) 
.2058 
(.1958) 
.1698 
(.2077) 
E- Business Network .2427* 
(.1358) 
.2360** 
(.1142) 
.2474** 
(.1179) 
.2345* 
(.1178) 
Network use .1245 
(.1404) 
.1314 
(.1546) 
.1341 
(.1626) 
.1334 
(.1641) 
Fit RBC strategy .5765*** 
(.1853) 
.5967*** 
(.1888) 
.0066*** 
(.1890) 
.5827*** 
(.1917) 
Previous experience 
founders 
-.1654 
(.1497) 
-.1433 
(.1312) 
-.1725 
(.1407) 
-.1455 
(.1338) 
Previous managerial 
experience 
-.3071** 
(.1535) 
-.3184** 
(.1358) 
-.3078** 
(.1332) 
-.3067** 
(.1478) 
Proportion education -.0800 
(.1386) 
-.1040 
(.1010) 
-.0822 
(.0965) 
-.1009 
(.1056) 
Advice .1108 
(.1615) 
.1087 
(.1888) 
.0950 
(.1965) 
.1171 
(.1975) 
E-Extent of relation .3420 
(.2227) 
.3352 
(.2924) 
.3549 
(.3075) 
.3308 
(.3060) 
E- contractual 
flexibility 
.1876 
(.1595) 
.2455 
(.2061) 
.1861 
(.2143) 
.2511 
(.2154) 
E- contractual 
favourableness 
-.2871** 
(.1426) 
-.2419 
(.1708) 
-.2965* 
(.1660) 
-.2436 
(.1848) 
Firm age -.0096 
(.2776) 
.0799 
(.2958) 
-.0028 
(.3035) 
.0882 
(.3084) 
Firm size .6120** 
(.2430) 
.6685** 
(.3012) 
.5990* 
(.3163) 
.6582** 
(.3184) 
E- Legal Perception NA .1846 
(.1294) 
NA .1835 
(.4346) 
E-Legal Impact NA .1544 
(.1323) 
NA .1650 
(.1407) 
VC- Legal Perception NA NA .0571 
(.3183) 
-.0554 
(.2965) 
VC-Legal impact NA NA .0610 
(.10600) 
.0226 
(.1300) 
R-Squared 0.6767 0.7003 0.6786 0.7009 
No. of observations 52 52 52 52 
Standard errors in provided in parenthesis 
***,**,* denote statistical significance at 1, 5, 10% levels, respectively. 
NA represents cells in which no coefficients or stand errors are calculated, as no moderators are 
applicable to that certain model. 
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Firm age and size are not relevant to this scope of research, and therefore are 
included in the model as control variables. Firm size is significant at the 10% level in 
all four specifications of the model. For the sake of validating previously discussed 
hypotheses, the significance level of the variables, together with the sign of the 
coefficients are investigated. Entrepreneurs’ business networks show a positive and 
significant coefficient leading to accepting hypothesis 1a. In model one, where no 
moderator variables are included and in model four, where moderating variables are 
included from the perspective of venture capitalists and entrepreneurs, business 
networks is significant at the 10% level.  
In models two and three, where the moderating variables from entrepreneur and VC 
perspectives respectively are added, entrepreneur business networks are significant at 
the 5% level. The proper match between RBCs’ of the firms and their corresponding 
strategies shows a positive and significant effect (at the 1% level in all four implications 
of the model), which leads to accepting hypothesis 1b. Entrepreneurs’ previous 
managerial experience, on the other hand, is negative and significant (at the 5% level 
in all four implications of the model), which leads to rejecting hypothesis 1c. Finally, 
contract favourableness is negative and significant at the 5% level, when no moderators 
are added to the model and at the 10% level, when the moderating variable from the 
VC perspective is included. It shows no effect in the model where only the moderating 
variable from the entrepreneurs’ perspective is included and when the moderating 
variables from the perspectives of both are included. This leads to rejecting hypothesis 
3a. Hypotheses testing will be discussed in depth in Chapter seven. 
6.5 Chapter Summary  
This chapter presented a description of responses of both entrepreneurs and venture 
capitalists related to the VC-E relationship and to the legal environment in Egypt. A 
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ranking of the means for the measures of those variables is also provided. After which 
CFA was used to reduce the correlated measures into indices. The results of the 
regression model are presented however, a discussion of these results is provided in 
Chapter seven. 
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Chapter 7 
Discussion of Results  
7.0 Introduction 
 
7.1 Hypotheses Testing 
In this section, each hypothesis is presented and compared to the results derived from 
this study.  
7.1.1 Hypotheses for Independent Variable One (Entrepreneur Characteristics) 
• H1a: E- SC has a positive impact on the performance of the VC-backed firms 
  In this study, entrepreneurs’ SC is measured by their ability to recruit, their business 
network and their utilisation of all their networks (government networks, business 
contacts and community contacts). All three measures have a positive effect on the 
performance of the VC-backed firms. However, only business networks have a 
significant effect. The business networks of entrepreneurs are found to be significant 
across all models (whether moderators are included or excluded).  
Statistics in Table 5.3, p. 154 show that the entrepreneurs’ ability to recruit is very 
weak and needs to be improved, which explains why its effect in Egypt is not 
significant. However, entrepreneurs’ ability to recruit is found in the literature to have 
a positive and significant impact on VC-backed firm performance, especially in the 
early stages of the new venture. This occurs because recruiting talented personnel or 
executives leads to more successful ventures, due to their superior performance (Collins 
and Clark, 2003). As mentioned in the literature, a start-up with a quality ‘B-rated’ idea 
and a quality ‘A-rated’ team is more effective on a venture than a quality ‘A-rated’ idea 
with a quality ‘B-rated’ team (Baron et al., 2016).  
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  The significant effect of E-SC in Egypt is attributed to business network, which 
affects performance by allowing access to information, recognition of opportunities and 
reputation building (Burton et al., 2002; Hsu, 2004). Business networks of 
entrepreneurs in Egypt, which allow access to information, are quite strong, particularly 
personal business networks more than business organisations. The following 
percentages derived from the results of entrepreneurs’ responses (Table 5.4, p.155) 
show that the strength of business networks leads to enhanced performance of VC-
backed firms: 
• 58% had parents who already own businesses 
• 81% had very close friends who already own businesses 
• 71% were supported or encouraged by friends and family 
• 35% belong to a business network 
• 48% had close connections with firms that dispense business advice 
• 52% previously belonged to a start-up team. 
These figures show how the entrepreneurs are strongly surrounded by individuals 
in the business community, which enables their access to information and increases 
their chances for opportunity recognition, and hence increases the performance of their 
ventures (Bruton et al., 2002; Hsu, 2004).  
Do not reject hypothesis H1a 
• H1b: The RBCs and strategies of venture-capital backed firms have a 
positive impact on the performance of the VC- backed firms 
This hypothesis is not rejected, as the variable that represents a proper match between 
the resources the firms possess and their corresponding strategies, is found to be 
significant in all four models. This is consistent with RBVF, which states that each firm 
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possesses unique resources and capabilities. They form its competitive advantage in the 
market and increase its success chances and performance (Ferreira and Fernandes, 
2017). It is also consistent with previous studies which explain that firms with certain 
resources will achieve competitive advantages through different strategies and 
therefore achieve superior performance (Camison and Villar- Lopes, 2014; Karlsson 
and Tavassoli, 2018). Strategies make better use of resources through focused and 
productive efforts (Wang and Ang, 2004).  
Moreover, firms achieve a sustainable competitive advantage if the right 
strategy is selected for each of its available resources (Kuratko et al., 2005).  
Statistics prove that firms possess resources and strategies that have a good fit with 
those resources. The entrepreneurs’ responses and mean ranking confirm that RBCs 
with higher means also have corresponding strategies with higher means. The analysis 
also confirms that the alignment of resources and strategies has a significant positive 
impact on the firm performance. 
Do not reject hypothesis 1b 
• H1c: E-HC has a positive impact on the performance of VC-backed firms 
HC of entrepreneurs refers to the experience and education of those entrepreneurs, both 
of which are found in previous studies to have an impact on firm success (Dimov, 
2010). However, the results of this study are not in line with most previous findings, 
and hence this hypothesis is not accepted. Education of entrepreneurs is found to have 
an insignificant effect on venture-backed firm performance. Experience has a negative 
and insignificant effect; managerial experience, however, has a significant effect, yet it 
is a negative one. These results can be explained by the differences in the Egyptian 
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market, relative to other markets studied, which is captured through the descriptive 
statistics and can be supported by some previous studies.  
 First, the finding that education has an insignificant effect on firm performance 
can be explained by the work of Unger et al. (2009), which explains that the 
effectiveness of HC depends on the development of the nation in which it exists. 
Education is more effective in nations that have a higher diversity in the offered 
education. As seen in Table 5.13, p. 167, there is very little diversity in education 
amongst entrepreneurs in Egypt. Additionally, there is a lack in the higher education 
level, where the majority of the entrepreneurs do not hold any degrees higher than a 
bachelor’s degree.  
In addition to the study of Davidsson (2004), the work of Unger et al. (2009) 
also provides another justification for why education does not have an impact on the 
performance of the VC-backed firms in this study. Education is an investment and not 
an outcome and therefore does not necessarily or directly impact firm performance. It 
is the knowledge attained from this education that does. This study, however, does not 
measure knowledge or capture the effect of the outcomes of education and hence this 
can be tested for in future studies.  
Previous experience, on the other hand, also has an insignificant impact on the 
performance of VC-backed firms. This is also justified by the work of Unger et al. 
(2009): similar to the theory relating to education, experience is also dependent on 
whether the nation is developed or not. In nations that are not very developed and 
unemployment is high, many people are forced into entrepreneurship as an alternative, 
instead of being skilled individuals that are willingly making the choice to become 
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entrepreneurs (Reynold et al., 2002). Unemployment in Egypt is relatively high: in 2018 
the country was ranked 33 out of 181 in terms of unemployment.28  
 The results of the studies of Davidsson (2004) and Unger et al. (2009) are 
applicable to experience in the same way they are to education. The outcomes of 
experience are more essential in impacting performance than the experience itself. 
Previous experience is an investment, however, while the skills attained from the 
experience (the outcome of the experience) are necessary to achieve higher 
performance. This study does not test the outcome; it only attempts to measure 
experience (the investment).  
Additionally, the explanation as to why previous experience in this study does 
not have a positive and significant relationship with VC-backed firm performance can 
also be justified by the statistics evident in data collected in this study and supported by 
previous literature. First, as explained in earlier studies, industry experience is shown 
to have a more positive impact on venture emergence than entrepreneurship experience 
(Delmar and Shane, 2003; Honig and Karlsson, 2004; Dimov, 2010). In this study, 
however, entrepreneurial experience is more dominant than industry experience. 
Statistics in Table 5.12, p. 166 show that 67% of entrepreneurs examined in this study 
have previous experience in entrepreneurship, in terms of having a previous start-up, 
while only 25% have had this experience in the same industry or field of the current 
start-up. Having a previous start-up in the same industry as the current one increases 
the latter’s success chances (Sirinivasan et al., 2004). Furthermore, 67% have also had 
previous entrepreneurship experience in terms of working in a previous start-up or any 
job related to entrepreneurship, whereas 53% have previously worked in the industry 
                                                 
28 Source: The World Bank, TheGlobalEconomy.com. 
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of their current start-up. Second, not only does having a previous start-up, especially in 
the field of the start-up, have an impact on the performance of the VC-backed firm, but 
having a previous start-up that was a success gives a 30% chance that the current one 
will be successful (Gompers et al., 2006). According to the statistics related to 
experience of entrepreneurs in Table 5.12, p. 166, even though 67% of the entrepreneurs 
have had previous start-up experience, only 7.7% had successful experience in terms of 
achieving an IRR of 100% or higher. Finally, an additional aspect that should be taken 
into consideration when assessing why experience did not show a positive significant 
impact on VC-backed firm performance is the explanation provided by Dimov (2010). 
It states that neither entrepreneurship nor industry experience are sufficient without 
early planning efforts and opportunity confidence. This study does not measure early 
planning efforts and opportunity confidence. Hence, their effect can be examined as an 
extension of this study in future research. 
As for managerial experience, it has a negative but significant effect. The 
statistics coming from the entrepreneurs’ responses show that the percentage of 
responses are very high, above average, which shows no diversity, where the HC of 
entrepreneurs does not position them with a competitive advantage or present qualities 
that place them in a unique position to deliver better results. The majority, 64%, did not 
have a previous business together, 85% had never worked on the management team of 
a public company before, and, although 67% had previously managed a start-up, only 
7.7% of those start-ups were successful. Eighty-three percent of the firms believed their 
management team to be functionally diverse, in terms of tasks they perform within the 
firm. These statistics are high, which shows that they lack diversity amongst 
entrepreneurs; hence, they do have an effect but not a positive one. 
Reject hypothesis 1c 
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7.1.2 Hypotheses for Independent Variable Two (VC Characteristics) 
• H2a: VC- HC has a positive impact on the performance of VC- backed firms 
Results for HC characteristics relating to experience as well as education are fairly 
consistent among VC managers. As shown in Tables 5.15, p. 169 and 5.16, p. 171, 
variation in responses is very low, hence there is no impact on performance of VC firms. 
HC is more effective when it is variant, so degree of competency between managers 
can vary across firms and hence create a competitive advantage for their firms through 
the unique education or knowledge they possess (Zarutskie, 2008). Furthermore, this is 
a valid case in Egypt, as education is not variable, as with most developing nations 
(Unger et al., 2009).  
 Both education and previous experience can be task specific or general. Task 
specific can be more effective on performance, as it provides exposure to trial and error, 
as well as experience that cannot be gained elsewhere, not even through education 
(Zarutskie, 2007). Task-related HC, in the case of the VC managers, refers to business 
and law experience. Moreover, this explains further why the results are insignificant, 
business experience is ineffective and in turn excluded from the model to begin with, 
as all respondents have experience in business and only 35% have law experience, 
while 43% do not have anyone on the fund management team with a law degree.  
Since results show that education and experience backgrounds of the VC 
managers in Egypt are very similar then, based on RBVF (Barney, 1991), a significant 
impact on performance cannot be present. Superior performance is associated with 
possession of resources that are valuable, rare and not substitutable; therefore, it is 
necessary for fund managers of a firm to have unique or different HC to outperform the 
other firms.   
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Reject hypothesis 2a 
• H2b: Value-added services of Venture Capitalists have a positive impact on the 
performance of the VC-backed firm 
Literature extensively covered the contradicting views on the effect of VCs on 
performance of VC-backed firms regarding whether it is attributed to screening, 
funding, monitoring or value-added services. This study excludes screening and 
funding. Instead, it focuses on value-added services by venture capitalists and provides 
briefer insights on monitoring. Value-added services and monitoring both have a 
positive insignificant effect on VC-backed firms’ performance. Therefore, a future 
study can be conducted in Egypt to analyse if screening or funding are more effective 
than value-added services in the Egyptian VC market. 
Monitoring of the funded firms, as explained by the Agency Theory, provides 
portfolio firms with the ability to detect problems, reduce agency costs and increase 
portfolio firm performance, and hence adds value to the VC-backed firm. Monitoring 
is measured by how involved the VC is in the portfolio company. Monitoring in Egypt 
is relatively low and hence had an insignificant impact. For number of meetings per 
month, 35% responded with four times a month; however, 43% stated that meetings 
were held once or twice a week, while the remaining few responded with more than 
once a week. The majority of firms had a number of meetings per month that are below 
average. The number of rounds till exit provides a way of monitoring that minimises 
risk as, where funding is provided on several rounds instead of one, it also increases the 
effort incentive of entrepreneurs. Number of rounds among venture capitalists in Egypt 
is very low: most venture capitalists had one, two or three rounds equally and the 
maximum was four rounds till exit, which was provided by 14% of the VC firms. The 
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average number of boards on which each VC manager sits also shows involvement and 
a way of monitoring. Responses show that 36% are on seven or eight boards and another 
36% are on four or five boards (average) and the remaining are below average. 
However, a VC manager sitting on too many boards may mean less focus on each (De 
Clerq et al., 2006). The measure of involvement that reflects monitoring, and is above 
average in Egypt, is the number of reports the VC receives from the portfolio firm a 
year: 64% provide quarterly reports, while the remaining provide reports more than 
seven times a year, which could be monthly.  
Value-added services consist of involvement in strategic and operational 
planning through dispensing advice, management recruitment and providing the 
companies with access to contacts (networking). Literature has shown that these 
services are dependent on the venture capitalists’ knowledge and expertise to enhance 
the performance of VC-backed firms (Dimov and Shepherd, 2005; Erli et al., 2006; 
Zarutskie, 2007 and Croce et al., 2012). Fund managers that have previous start-up 
experience can also give better advice and hire better-calibre staff. Business knowledge 
of VC managers is important to providing strategic advice, which is the most crucial 
advice for helping entrepreneurs through short-term crises. Furthermore, results show 
that none of the VC firms hold a competitive advantage in terms of education and 
experience of the managers. Additionally, how involved the VC firm is in its portfolio 
companies is also an indicator of how much influence they have over strategic issues. 
Advice dispensed is measured through entrepreneur responses. Statistically, the nine 
different aspects of advice that were investigated have shown very low results, all below 
average, with three exceptions: networking, strategic and financial advice. However, 
networking is the highest measure, at 52%, strategic advice is 50%, while financial is 
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only 46%. The advice level provided by venture capitalists needs to improve in Egypt, 
in order to have an impact on VC-backed firm performance.  
Results also show that venture capitalists’ involvement in recruitment of 
different members in portfolio companies is below average. Recruitment of different 
personnel was as low as 14%. Networking services provided by venture capitalists have 
the highest results, which is consistent in responses of both venture capitalists and 
entrepreneurs. 
Reject hypothesis 2b 
• H2c: VC networking service is positively significant with performance of the 
VC-backed firm 
Although the networking services provided by venture capitalists did not show a 
significant impact, it is still consistent with Institutional Theory, which explains that, in 
developing nations with low institutional environments, networking becomes more 
important and firms rely on it more than on other variables. This is evident in measures 
of advice dispensed by venture capitalists, where networking has the highest rank. 
Moreover, when comparing all services provided by venture capitalists, networking 
services are also by far ranked the highest, in terms of introducing their portfolio 
companies to customers and suppliers, which is providing them with access to contacts, 
hence networking services. Responses of venture capitalists show that 85% of VC firms 
introduced their portfolio companies to customers. The final aspect of networking 
provided by venture capitalists is government networking. Its impact was insignificant, 
which is attributed to the fact that responses show that the networks or contacts that 
venture capitalists posses with government officials are higher than the use of those 
connections on behalf of their portfolio firms. Having the contacts does not have an 
impact on performance; it is the utilisation of those contacts which does.  
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Reject hypothesis 2c 
7.1.3 Hypotheses for Independent Variable Three (VC-E Relationship) 
• H3a: The contractual agreement between VC and E can have a negative 
impact on the performance of the VC-backed firms  
The structure of the contract between principal and agent aids in mitigating conflicts of 
interest between them, through the selection of security, control rights and cash-flow 
rights. For proper contract implementation, the contract design must also consider 
incentives of both agents and hence provide expected return equal to at least their 
investment (Casamatta, 2003). It mitigates information asymmetry problems and hence 
leads to both the entrepreneur and venture capitalist being more confident in exerting 
efforts as incentives are clear and more aligned (Kaplan and Stromberg, 2001; De 
Bettignies and Brander, 2007; Vergara et al., 2016).   
  In Egypt, contracts are not expected to have a positive impact on performance 
of VC-backed firms, not only because the legal environment in Egypt is not perceived 
as a strong one, hence, contract enforcement is not reliable, but also because many 
contract provisions such as different types of securities available for VC funding 
elsewhere do not exist in Egypt. In emerging economies, more specifically in Egypt, 
the type of security used and in turn cash-flow rights may not be significant to mediate 
the VC-E relationship, as there may not be much variation in the types of securities 
available (shown in survey responses), where all contracts may rely on equities, as 
convertibles are not available. Hence, the VC market is not fully developed yet. The 
majority of answers to measures of contract favourableness fell into the very low, low 
or average, categories, while very few were evident in high or very high. Therefore, 
contract favourableness was shown to have a negative impact on VC-backed 
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performance, meaning the level of contractual favourableness in Egypt (perceived by 
entrepreneurs as unfavourable) has a negative impact on VC-backed firms’ 
performance. For example, the highest level of high and very high responses combined 
for any of the measures was 38% for how favourable entrepreneurs perceived company 
valuation to be. The majority of responses for all measures of favourableness were 
average.  
Many of the main contract covenants should have an impact on incentives 
provided to venture capitalists and entrepreneurs. Hence, contract covenants determine 
their effort level, which in turn has an effect on firm performance (De Bettignies and 
Brander, 2007). For example, the greater the share of VCs in the firm, the greater their 
effort, but the lower the effort of the entrepreneur. The type of security agreed upon 
between the venture capitalist and the entrepreneur determines the incentives they both 
receive and hence the effort they both exert, as well as allocation of cash-flow and 
voting rights. Allocation of cash-flow rights is sensitive to performance (Holstrom, 
1979; Lazear, 1986). While these rights are conditional to the firm’s performance, they 
are more common in the early stages of the VC-E relationship (Aghion and Bolton, 
1992; Dewatripont and Tirole, 1994). In descriptive statistics shown in this study, none 
of these rights are found to be highly favourable by entrepreneurs.  
It is important to note that the negative impact of contractual favourableness 
was not significant in all four models. It only appears as significant when no moderators 
are included in the model or when moderators from the VC perspective only are 
included but those from the entrepreneurs’ perspective are excluded. This will be 
discussed further with hypothesis 4c, in section 6.2.4 when the institutional 
environment is considered. 
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  Another aspect when viewing contractual environment is contract flexibility. 
Results show that contract flexibility has a positive impact on performance; however, a 
non-significant one. All six aspects of flexibility considered do show mean rankings 
slightly above the set mean, except for R&D flexibility (shown in Table 6.3, p. 195), 
which is exactly equal to the set mean. Hence, the non- significance is justified by the 
fact that they are only slightly above the mean, which means that agree and strongly 
agree responses were not too high. However, as evident in the results, shown in the 
descriptive statistics, most of the responses were neutral rather than agree or disagree, 
and hence not strong enough to have an effect on performance.   
Do not reject hypothesis 3a 
• H3b: The extent of the VC-E relation has a positive impact on the 
performance of the VC-backed firm 
The VC-E relationship from the perspective of venture capitalists and entrepreneurs 
does not have a significant impact on the performance of VC-backed firm. 
Mutual-cooperation and the relationship between venture capitalists and 
entrepreneurs itself are important for VC-backed firms’ success (Fu et al., 2018). 
Vergara et al. (2016) emphasise the importance of complementarity in the VC-E 
relationship, where they find that efforts of both should be complements rather than 
substitutes. This is based on the previously mentioned concept of joined inputs from 
both the venture capitalists and entrepreneurs. Venture capitalists provide marketing 
and networking while entrepreneurs have skills in technology and production and 
experience in innovation (Fairchild, 2011), hence they should complement each other. 
In this study, complementarity from the venture capitalists’ perspective is found to be 
high, as shown in Table 6.6, p. 198, while entrepreneurs do find it to be above average 
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in three out of four measures; however, not too high. It is important to note that there 
are many different measures for performance and hence not all studies use the same 
measures, i.e. Vergara et al. (2016) find VC-E complementarity to have a positive, 
significant effect on the market value of the firm (a performance measure). Therefore, 
complementarity maybe strong enough to have an effect on VC-backed firm 
performance, even when combined with other relational measures in the index; 
however, on certain measures of performance and not the others.  
Another measure of the VC-E relationship is the level of disagreements. From 
the VC perspective, disagreements on different aspects are average or slightly lower 
than average, as shown in Table 6.7, p.200, whereas, from the entrepreneurs’ 
perspective, they are below average but not too low, as shown in Table 6.2, p. 194. As 
for the ease of VC-E relationship, results show that the way venture capitalists 
perceived it was slightly above average; with the exception of ‘not requiring third party 
interference’, it was highly above average. As for the entrepreneurs’ perception, the 
ease of the relationship was average to high. Other measures related to VC perception 
only are team spirit and trust. Team spirit, as shown in the literature, improves firm 
performance as it leads to the adoption of cooperative behaviour, which in turn 
increases overall performance (Li et al., 2018). In this study, venture capitalists are 
found to generally view the team spirit of VC- backed firms as high. As for trust, the 
only type of trust that was shown to be high is C-trust, which is the trust based on 
strategic consideration, which is a trade-off between the benefit of maintaining the 
relationship and the cost of terminating the trust as well as its effect on reputation (Li 
et al., 2018).  
241 
 
Statistics show that the VC-E relationship overall is perceived to be above 
average from the perspective of both. Theory emphasised the importance of the VC-E 
relationship on the performance of VC-backed firms, especially in emerging economies 
(Li et al., 2018). Hence, the non-significance can be justified by the fact that in the 
literature it has shown significance only for certain measures of performance; therefore, 
it does not have to hold for all the measures.  
Reject hypothesis 3b29 
7.1.4 Hypotheses for Moderating Variable (Legal Environment) 
• H4a: The positive impact of innovation on VC-backed firms’ performance 
becomes negative when moderated by laws and regulations in a weak legal 
environment 
Generally, in previous studies, it has been found that the stronger the IPR protection in 
a nation, the more reassurance to entrepreneurs that their idea would not be given away 
to the venture capitalists, and thus they would not feel the need to avoid revealing 
critical information. Furthermore, they would be able to improve innovations and 
increase innovative ideas (Ueda, 2004). This, however, is not evident in the results of 
this study. Descriptive statistics (Table 6.13, p.209) show that this is not the case in 
Egypt. On the contrary, entrepreneurs’ responses show that, despite the legal factors, 
67.3% of the entrepreneurs agree that their firm has been able to provide innovative 
products and services to customers, and 59.7% agree that their firm has been able to 
use modern technology to improve production and efficiency. Additionally, 61.5% 
agree that their firm has been able to come up with innovative ideas to obtain distinctive 
competencies than competitors, and 40.4% believe that government patent laws and 
                                                 
29 After a robustness check, this hypothesis will be accepted and an explanation is provided in section 
6.3. 
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licensing have an impact on the innovative outcomes of their business; however, the 
questions asked do not state whether the impact is positive or negative.  
The explanation as to why the results are not compatible with the expected 
hypothesis can be clarified by the trust measures, which, as evident in Table 6.10, p. 
204, show that the degree of trust between entrepreneurs and venture capitalists is above 
average for each measure. Since trust is relatively high between them, then this would 
explain why the entrepreneurs would still be able to innovate, despite the lack of 
protection rights or their enforceability.  
Reject hypothesis 4a 
Bruton and Ahlstrom (2003) point out through their investigation of the Chinese VC 
market that institutional factors in a different setting can create a VC industry with its 
own characteristics; therefore, the outcomes that are certain in one economy are not 
necessarily applicable in a different one.  
• H4b: The positive impact of monitoring and networking activities on VC-
backed performance becomes more positive when moderated by a weak legal 
environment. However, the positive impact of advice dispensed and services 
provided becomes negative 
 
Venture capitalists and entrepreneurs working in environments with weak legal 
systems have been found in previous studies to rely more on networks (interconnections 
between them) to resolve conflicts and negotiate contractual agreements between them 
(Meyer, 2001). Venture capitalists in developed countries are more likely to dispense 
advice and provide value-added services, as their contracts are enforced and their rights 
are protected; however, as this is not applicable in emerging markets, dispensing advice 
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and providing services would be expected to have a lower rate. Moreover, networking 
services should be more important than they would be in developed countries.  
In this study, entrepreneurs view the level of advice dispensed by venture 
capitalists to their firms as low (six of the advice types are below average). 
Additionally, networking services provided by venture capitalists are found to be 
insignificant in this study. However, in the descriptive statistics, networks are found to 
be the most important services provided by venture capitalists in Egypt, as evident in 
Table 5.19, p.177. The introduction of portfolio firms to customers and their 
introduction to suppliers have the highest mean rankings amongst all services provided 
by venture capitalists. This is also confirmed by these two measures having the highest 
factor loadings in the VC services factor analysis variable (Table 5.25, p.186). 
Likewise, when checking the VC governmental relations, networking with government 
also has the highest factor loading in the variable and the highest mean ranking (Table 
5.20, p. 178). As for advice dispensed by venture capitalists, entrepreneurs assess that 
networking advice is the main aspect on which they receive advice from venture 
capitalists (Table 5.17, p. 173). Furthermore, when entrepreneurs and venture 
capitalists were asked about their perception of the legal environment in Egypt, both 
explained that it was necessary to rely more on networks and personal relationships, as 
shown in Table 6.13, p.209. The legal environment leads to relying more on networks 
and personal relationships has the highest ranking (E- perspective). In Table 6.15, 
p.213, relying on networks has the second-highest mean ranking whereas relying on 
personal networks has a mean that is highly above average (VC- perspective). These 
statistical findings confirm previous studies and are consistent with Institutional 
Theory, even though the regression results are not significant. 
 Do not reject hypothesis 4b 
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• H4c: The negative impact of contract dependency on VC-backed firm 
performance becomes more negative when moderated by a weak legal 
environment. However, the positive impact of the extent of the dependency in 
the VC and entrepreneur relationship becomes more positive 
Results of the study show that entrepreneurs did not perceive contracts as favourable in 
Egypt, and hence they had a negative, significant impact on the performance of the VC-
backed firms. Thus, including the legal environment from the entrepreneurs’ perception 
in the analysis, results become insignificant. This is in line with the Institutional Theory 
and previous literature, which explain that, in countries where financial markets are not 
fully developed yet and the legal environment is weak (Bruton and Ahlstrom, 2006), 
contract enforcement is therefore unreliable, and dependency on the strength of the VC-
E relationship would be more efficient in such environments. Previous studies on the 
VC markets of developed economies show that venture capitalists rely on the rule of 
law: that their contracts will be enforced and their ownership rights will be preserved. 
However, in developing economies results show that this rule of law is unlikely to hold 
and hence dependence on contractual agreements is forgone. Subsequently, alternative 
non-contractual mechanisms, such as strategic consideration, trust and teamwork 
between the entrepreneurs and the venture capitalists, become the incentives for venture 
capitalists to provide value-added services. More specifically, this would be that 
venture capitalists and entrepreneurs will work together to increase the chances of the 
firm’s success, because of the desire they both have to obtain high returns and to avoid 
financial loss as well as loss of reputation. This will therefore drive each of them to 
abide by the contractual obligations and expect the same of the other party (Li et al., 
2018).  
Do not reject hypothesis 4c 
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In this study, the importance of the VC-E relationship does increase when legal 
environment is included in the model, however, it is not shown in the results in section 
6.1 Rather it is explained next, in section 6.3, after the robustness check is presented. 
7.3 Robustness Check 
Initially, the dependent variable in this study was an ordinal value derived from a Likert 
scale. The dependent variable is the performance of VC-backed firms, which is 
captured by 10 different firm performance measures, all in the form of five-point Likert-
scale questions. Five out of these 10 measures which had complete responses from all 
firms were reduced into an index to be fit (as a continuous variable) for the OLS 
regression applied in the analysis.  
A robustness check was conducted using Ordered Probit Regression, which is a 
regression type that is suitable for a dependent variable that is ordinal or responses that 
are in the form of a scale or ranking. The dependent variable originally relied on ten 
ordinal scales measures for reassurance. However, when applying the ordered probit 
regression, the only measure for VC-backed firm performance considered out of the 10 
is Sales Growth, which is used as a proxy for the dependent variable. Sales Growth was 
selected as it is the best fit out of the 10 measures for several reasons. First, it is the 
most highly correlated measure with all the other measures of performance, as shown 
in Table 5.22 p. 181. Second, when assessing the variables after they were grouped into 
an index, Sales Growth had the highest factor loading, as shown in Appendix A, Table 
A36 in the appendix. Finally, it had a full set of respondents, meaning no respondents 
have omitted this measure. 
  Ordered Probit Regression was selected for this study as it is more fit than 
Ordered Logistic Regression which is also used when the dependent variable is an 
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ordinal one. The main reason for this choice is that ordered probit is used more when 
the data presented in the model is random while ordered logistic is more fit when the 
data is fixed. However, ordered logistic regression was used to highlight consistency of 
results as the analysis was also conducted and the results yielded have reassured 
robustness as shown in Appendix A, Table A65. Results showed no differences when 
using ordered probit or ordered Logit. 
Results of ordered probit regression below in Table 7.1 below show 
coefficients, standard error and significance for each variable. Coefficients (the top 
number in each cell) indicate the size of the effect that each independent variable is 
having on the dependent variable, while the sign in ordered probit regression is 
irrelevant. Standard errors (the lower number in parenthesis in each cell) provide an 
estimate of the standard deviation of the coefficient, the amount it varies across cases.  
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Table 7.1 Ordered Probit Regression Results 
Variables No moderators 
 
E-moderators VC-moderators E&VC moderators 
 Coefficient 
(Std. error) 
Coefficient 
(Std. error) 
Coefficient 
(Std. error) 
Coefficient 
(Std. error) 
VC education .1511 
(.2696) 
.1363 
(.2754) 
.2225 
(.3314) 
.2536 
(.3432) 
VC experience .0276 
(.4952) 
.0677 
(.5652) 
.1971 
(.6055) 
-.0371 
(.6969) 
VC involvement -.1766 
(.4673) 
-.5440 
(.5115) 
-.2844 
(4936) 
-.5338 
(.5273) 
VC services .0723 
 (.3728) 
.3745 
(.4227) 
.0529 
(.3893) 
.4443 
(.4608) 
VC gov’t network -.2597 
(.3611) 
-.3918 
(.3714) 
-.3493 
(.3853) 
-.3951 
(.3934) 
Avg. Connections -.3722 
(.3426) 
-.1977 
(.3584) 
-.3182 
(.4027) 
-.2714 
(.4164) 
VC-E relationship -.4803* 
(.2905) 
-.5374* 
(.3128) 
-.4890 
(.3534) 
-.4617 
(.3654) 
Executive 
Recruitment 
.1386 
(.2768) 
.0905 
(.2888) 
.1780 
(.2811) 
.0889 
(.2950) 
E- Business Network .5009** 
(.2420) 
.5093** 
(.2480) 
.5086** 
(.2433) 
.5067** 
(.2487) 
Network use .3381 
(.2381) 
.3613 
(.2446) 
.3708 
(.2416) 
.3823 
(.2493) 
Fit RBC strategy .8535** 
(.3422) 
.9452** 
(.3840) 
.9341*** 
(.3621) 
.9188** 
(.4063) 
Previous experience 
founders 
-.5177* 
(.2663) 
-.4954* 
(.2757) 
-.5363** 
(.2687) 
-.5084* 
 (.2782) 
Previous managerial 
experience 
-.4222 
(.2643) 
-.4937 
(.2815) 
-.4173* 
(.2710) 
-.4495* 
(.2934) 
Proportion education .1750 
(.4310) 
.2139 
(.4736) 
.1450 
(.4234) 
.2102 
(.4738) 
Advice .0723 
(.2691) 
.0868 
(.2790) 
.0310 
(.2798) 
.1044 
(.2936) 
E-Extent of relation .7361* 
(.3802) 
.7779** 
(.3887) 
.7668** 
(.3852) 
.7720** 
(.3930) 
E- contractual 
flexibility 
.8003 
(.2688) 
.2475 
(.2900) 
.0578 
(.2726) 
.2598 
(.2975) 
E- contractual 
favourableness 
-.4459* 
(.2528) 
-.3556 
(.2665) 
-.4703* 
(.2547) 
-.3789 
(.2716) 
Firm age .0838 
(.4809) 
.3362 
(.5029) 
.1662 
(.4925) 
.3914 
(.5126) 
Firm size 1.5472*** 
(.4615) 
1.8658*** 
(.4928) 
1.5521*** 
(.4672) 
1.8311*** 
(.4968) 
E- Legal Perception NA .5060** 
(.2464) 
NA .4837* 
(.2554) 
E-Legal Impact NA .4391* 
(.2542) 
NA .4721* 
(.2554) 
VC- Legal Perception NA NA .1743 
(.4690) 
-.1174 
(.5009) 
VC-Legal impact NA NA .2532 
(.3052) 
.1671 
(.3229) 
Pseudo R-squared 0.3325 0.3698 0.3376 0.3821 
No. of Observations 52 52 52 52 
Standard errors in provided in parenthesis 
***,**,* denote statistical significance at 1, 5, 10% levels, respectively. 
 
Ordered probit regression results are consistent with those of OLS regression, 
where the business network of entrepreneurs, the fit between their RBCs and strategies, 
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and their previous experience all have a significant impact on the performance of VC-
backed firms in all four models. Contractual favourableness, from the perception of 
entrepreneurs, is also consistent with OLS results and has a significant impact on VC-
backed firms, when no moderators are included in the model and when the legal 
environment from the perspective of venture capitalists only is included. Firm size 
(control variable) as well as the legal environment moderators are also significant in all 
four models. Both are consistent with the results of the OLS regression analysis. 
The only difference in both results is that ordered probit regression shows the 
relationship between the venture capitalists and entrepreneurs to be significant in 
addition to the other variables.  
VC-E relationship is captured twice in this study, once from the perspective of 
entrepreneurs and once from that of the venture capitalists. Ordered probit regression 
results show the former to have a significant effect of performance in all four models 
and the latter only when no moderators are included, or when moderators from the 
entrepreneurs’ perspective only are included. The reason there is a difference in results 
is because, Therefore, the variables VC-E relationship from the perspective of the 
venture capitalists and from that of the entrepreneurs have an impact on the 
performance measure, sales growth, but not on the rest of the measures, when combined 
together. Moreover, this can be tested in a future study. An analysis can be conducted 
on the effect of all the variables on each performance measure separately. Hence, some 
variables may be effective on certain firm performance measures and not the others.  
 The significance of the VC-E relationship is consistent with the Institutional 
Theory and with the literature, which shows that, in emerging countries, which lack 
formal institutions and have weak legal environments, the VC-E relationship becomes 
of ultimate importance. Rules, laws and court systems are not reliable and hence 
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reliability is dependent on the relationships built (Bruton and Ahlstrom, 2003, 2006) 
and on the trust between venture capitalists and entrepreneurs (Li et al., 2018). From 
the perspective of entrepreneurs, the extent of the relationship includes VC-E 
complementarity, which is consistent with previous literature that efforts and resources 
of both should complement each other, rather than act as substitutes (Casamatta, 2003; 
Veragara et al., 2012; Panda and Dash, 2016; Li et al., 2018). The extent of the 
relationship also includes level of disagreement (Lim and Cu, 2012), as well as ease of 
negotiations (Li et al., 2018). In addition to those, the VC-E relationship from the VC 
perspective also includes trust and perception of the team spirit of the VC- backed firm; 
hence, their significance is consistent with previous studies that highlighted their 
importance (Campbell, 1993; Huang, 2000; De Clerq and Sapienza, 2000; Botazzi et 
al., 2012; Vergara et al., 2016).  
 In ordered probit regression models, only the sign of the coefficient is 
meaningful in results; however, to detect the value of the coefficient and the actual 
change in variables, whether they are positive or negative, it is essential to calculate the 
marginal effects for each variable, as shown in Table A66 in appendix A. Marginal 
effects are more reliable when sample size is large, thus the variation in marginal effects 
in this study is not too high because of the small sample size. Therefore, the magnitude 
of the effects cannot be relied on. However, the sign and significance can still be 
considered in the same manner that they are with ordered probit coefficients. Table A66 
in appendix A can be used to illustrate the results of marginal effects but not to be 
included in the analysis. I can also be noted that marginal effects are significant at 
certain levels but not others, excluding the exact magnitude.  
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Results of marginal effects show that, for every 1% increase in the business networks 
of entrepreneurs, the probability of being in the sales growth category 2- below average 
decreases; however, the probability of being in category 4- above average, increases. 
Network use by entrepreneurs shows that, for every 1% increase in network use, the 
probability of having sales growth above average increases. This is consistent with 
previous work (Bruton et al., 2002, 2004; Lockett et al., 2002; Wright et al., 2002; 
Butler et al., 2003; Hoang and Antoncic, 2003; Peng, 2003; Manigart et al., 2006; 
Tykvova, 2017) and theories such as the Institutional Theory, as it highlights the 
importance of networks in the emerging economy of Egypt, especially with the legal 
environment existing in Egypt, which drives individuals in businesses to rely more on 
networks, connections and relations. Having portfolio firms that possess RBCs that fit 
with their strategies decreases the probability of having below average sales growth and 
increases the probability of having above average sales growth. Furthermore, this 
highlights the importance of having RBCs which provide firms with a competitive 
advantage; however, their performance increases when they are combined with a good 
strategy. Having this fit leads to above average sales growth (a measure of performance) 
and lacking it would decrease performance.  
Previous experience that entrepreneurs in Egypt are exposed to is very similar, 
as discussed below, and additionally lacks many of the requirements that would lead to 
effectiveness on performance. For example, entrepreneurs have previous experience in 
start-ups, but those start-ups have not shown success. Accordingly, every 1% of 
previous experience increases the chance of having below average performance and 
decreases the chance of having above average performance.  
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An emphasis is placed on the importance of relationships in EM or economies 
with weak legal environments. This is consistent with previous studies such as Li et al. 
(2018), and with Institutional Theory (Bruton and Ahlstrom. 2006). Hence, the VC-E 
relationship and trust between the VC and the entrepreneur are important in Egypt, 
where the effect of contracts is not significant and contract enforcement is perceived to 
be very low. The extent of the VC-E relationship shows that every 1% increase leads 
to a decrease in the probability of having below average sales growth; on the other hand, 
it leads to an increase in the probability of having above average sales growth.  
Although firm size is a variable that is controlled for in this study, the results 
show that it has a significant impact on firm performance. Every 1% increase in firm 
size shows a chance of a decrease in the likelihood of having below average sales 
growth. However, it increases the likelihood of having above average sales growth. 
This means that, the bigger the firm, the more likely it is to have above average sales. 
 The abovementioned variables are those that have a significant impact on the 
performance of VC-backed firms and hence the extent to which they increase or 
decrease performance is important.  
7.4 Chapter Summary  
This chapter demonstrated the results of the analysis. It also explained how the results 
reflected the hypotheses and which of these hypotheses were rejected. Each hypothesis 
was also compared to previous studies and to the descriptive statistics provided in 
Chapters five and six. These descriptive statistics reflect the environment in which 
entrepreneurs as well as VC managers exist. The robustness check conducted to check 
for consistency of the results was also explained thoroughly in this chapter. 
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OLS regression is used in this study to determine the impact of entrepreneur 
characteristics, VC firm characteristics and the VC-E relationship on the performance 
of VC-backed firms. OLS regression was conducted on the indices created, using CFA 
as well as a group of standardised variables, which could not be reduced into indices.  
Results show entrepreneurs’ business networks and fit RBC strategy to have a 
positive and significant impact on VC-backed firms’ performance. On the other hand, 
entrepreneurs’ previous managerial experience and contract favourableness have a 
negative and significant impact on VC-backed firms’ performance.  
Ordered probit regression is used for robustness check as it is fit for an ordinal 
dependent variable. Ordered probit and ordered logit results are similar to regression 
results, with the exception of the VC-E relationship, having a positive and significant 
impact on VC-backed firms (namely sales growth). This is most significant with the 
Institutional Theory (Bruton and Ahlstrom, 2003, 2006), which explains the importance 
of the VC-E relationship as well as networks in emerging economies, where legal 
systems are weak. Additionally, when calculating the marginal effects of ordered 
probit, network use is also found to have a positive significant impact on achieving 
above average sales, hence emphasising the effect of networks in Egypt.  
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Chapter Eight 
 Conclusion 
8.0 Introduction 
This chapter summarises the contribution of this thesis (section 8.1), the literature that 
is relevant to the VC market in emerging economies and particularly Egypt. It also 
highlights the main findings (section 8.2), industry recommendations (section 8.3), and 
limitations and implications of this study to future research (section 8.4).  
8.1 Findings of the Study 
The data in this study was analysed using, very thorough descriptive statistics, as well 
as parametric tests (t-tests), to compare means of components of each sub-variable, in 
order to recognise the importance of each, which would provide a better understanding 
of the data and enable its explanation, with the support of the literature. CFA was also 
applied to the data of this study for three purposes: construct validation, data reduction 
and to allow for consistent comparison of measures, specifically that many of the 
measures including the dependent variable (VC-backed firms’ performance) are ordinal 
(Likert scale). After which, a multiple regression model was implemented on the 19 
indices or variables created as well as the four moderators measuring the legal 
environment in Egypt, to further analyse the data. OLS multiple regression is used to 
test the hypotheses of the effect of each predictor on the dependent variable and to 
evaluate their relative importance. The dependent variable in this study is an ordinal 
one (Likert-Scale), hence it is best analysed using ordered probit regression. For a 
robustness check, the best measure of the dependent variable (Sales Growth) has been 
selected and ordered probit regression was applied to confirm results of the regression 
analysis.  
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The analysis carried out in this study produced five main findings. First, 
variables tested in this study can have an impact on certain performance measures and 
not others. The r robustness check in this study was conducted using the most fit 
measure of portfolio firm performance, rather than all 10 performance measures 
combined. Results did show a slight difference where VC-E relationship had a 
significant impact on sales growth but not on all performance measures combined. 
Second, entrepreneurs’ SC assists them in obtaining resources, such as capital 
(Hsu, 2007), information to facilitate transactions (Hsu, 2004), and talented personnel 
(Bygrave and Timmons, 1992). In Egypt, the networking area of weakness is evident 
(shown in Table 5.3, p.154) in the entrepreneurs’ ability to utilise their own social 
networks to recruit or obtain talented personnel, rather than those of the VC firm, and 
hence their impact on VC-backed firms’ performance is insignificant. Business 
networks of entrepreneurs, however, have a positive and significant impact on VC-
backed firms’ performance, and the use of all the entrepreneurs’ different networks has 
a positive and significant impact on achieving above average sales growth. Therefore, 
the hypothesis expecting SC of entrepreneurs to have a positive impact on VC-backed 
firms’ performance (H1a) was accepted.  
In contrast to the effectiveness of the entrepreneurs’ networks, regression results 
show that the value-added services provided by venture capitalists including 
networking services have no significant impact on the performance of VC-backed firms 
in Egypt, hence the hypothesis that claimed the positive impact of VC value-added 
services on VC-backed firms’ performance (H2b) was rejected. However, the results of 
the parametric t-tests used to produce mean rankings show that networking services 
have the highest means of all the VC services offered (see Table 5.19, p.177). 
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Additionally, network advice is the main form of advice provided to entrepreneurs out 
of all the advice aspects available, as evident in the highest mean (see Table 5.17, 
p.173). The findings related to networks of entrepreneurs and of venture capitalists are 
consistent with Social Networking Theory (Laudan, 1977), which is also in line with 
SC Theory. A firm’s social network is only possible through the SC it possesses 
(Bordieu, 1983; Coleman, 1988; Putman, 1993), which suggests that a firm’s external 
network is a major contributor to its performance. Results also reflect the Institutional 
Theory (Bruton and Ahlstorm, 2003, 2006) and previous studies (Li et al., 2018), which 
emphasise that networks play an important role in emerging economies. 
Third, RBCs of the firms and the compatibility of those RBCs with the strategies 
of their firm have the most significant positive impact on VC-backed firms’ 
performance. Therefore, the hypothesis stating that the RBCs of the firms and the 
strategies that support them have a positive impact on VC-backed firms’ performance 
(H1b) was accepted. This is consistent with RBVF (Barney, 1991), which associates 
superior performance with the possession of resources that are valuable, rare and not 
substitutable, and hence contribute to firm success and create a competitive advantage 
for the firm (Barney, 1991; Grant 1991; Mahoney and Pandian, 1992; Peteraf, 1993; 
Wang and Ang, 2004; Ferreira and Fernandes, 2017). Strategies make better use of 
resources through focused and productive efforts (Wang and Ang, 2004); therefore, if 
the right strategy is selected for each of its available resources (Kuratko et al., 2005), 
firms will achieve superior performance (Camison and Villar-Lopes, 2014; Karlsson 
and Tavassoli, 2018).  
 Fourth, regressions results show that previous experience (a HC factor) of 
entrepreneurs in Egypt has a significant but negative impact on VC-backed firms’ 
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performance. Education of both entrepreneurs and VC managers has an insignificant 
effect on VC-backed firms’ performance, and experience of VC managers also has an 
insignificant effect. Thus, the hypotheses that HC of entrepreneurs and that of VC 
managers lead to a positive impact on VC-backed firms (H1c, H2a respectively) were 
both rejected. The results shown to reject this hypotheses are contradictory to previous 
studies in the literature and to the HCT (Becker, 1975). This theory suggests that HC 
characteristics of both the entrepreneurs and the fund managers determine their 
performance. In the case of entrepreneurs, some HC characteristics, mainly industry or 
entrepreneurial experience, have been found to impact their venture performance 
(Davidsson and Honig, 2003; Rotefoss and Kolvereid, 2005). In the case of VC 
managers, HC is separated into task-specific HC (education and experience related to 
VC tasks) and industry-specific HC (education and experience related to industry of 
company funded) (Dimov and Shepherd, 2005). 
There is a lack of diversity in the previous experiences of most of the 
entrepreneurs in Egypt, as they mainly have similar backgrounds. Some requirements 
that enable previous experience to have a positive impact on portfolio firm success do 
not occur sufficiently among entrepreneurs in Egypt. Industry experience is shown 
throughout the literature to have a more positive impact on venture emergence than 
entrepreneurship experience (Delmar and Shane, 2003; Honig and Karlsson, 2004; 
Dimov, 2010). In this study, however, descriptive statistics show that entrepreneurial 
experience is more dominant than industry experience: 67% of entrepreneurs examined 
in this study have previous experience in entrepreneurship, in terms of having a 
previous start-up, while only 25% have had this experience in the same industry or field 
of the current start-up. Another requirement is a previous successful entrepreneur 
experience. Not only does having a previous start-up, especially in the same field as the 
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current start-up, have an impact on the performance of the VC-backed firm, but having 
a previous start-up that was a success gives a 30% chance that the current one will be 
successful (Gompers et al., 2006). The results of this study show that, even though 67% 
of the entrepreneurs have had previous start-up experience, only 7.7% had successful 
experience in terms of achieving an IRR of 100% or higher. Additionally, descriptive 
statistics from the entrepreneur results in this study show that managerial experience 
responses are very high, above average, which shows that most respondents have 
similar experiences; hence, no diversity is evident. Therefore, managerial experience 
does not position them with a competitive advantage or present qualities that place them 
in a unique position to deliver better results. The majority, 64%, did not have a previous 
business together, and 85% had never worked on the management team of a public 
company before, but 67% had previously managed a start-up. These statistics explain 
why managerial experience does not have a positive effect on VC-backed firms’ 
performance. 
As for the experience of VC managers, results of all VC firms examined in this 
study show that they have at least one of the management team with previous 
experience in the industry of the start-ups they are funding and at least one with finance 
experience. All the VC firms had at least one of the management team with experience 
in business. Almost 86% of the VC managers have consulting experience, while only a 
few have experience in the law field. Results show that there is a lack of variation in 
HC (experience and education) of VC managers, as results are to a great extent 
consistent across respondents. However, HC is more effective when it is variant: as 
explained in the literature, variation in HC of firm managers can create a competitive 
advantage for firms through the unique knowledge or skills they possess (Zarutskie, 
2008).  
258 
 
Not only is there a lack of diversity in experience, but in education of both 
entrepreneurs and VC managers in Egypt. Education is more effective in nations that 
have more variant education (Unger et al., 2009). Results show that more than 50% of 
VC firms have three or more of the managers that hold degrees in the fields of the start-
ups they fund, post-graduate degrees or finance degrees, while more than 50% have 
only one or none of the managers that hold degrees in law, medicine or engineering or 
degrees in any other field. Results for the entrepreneurs show that the vast majority do 
not hold a doctorate degree or a CFA. Almost 60% do not have any of the co-founders 
of the firm that hold a master’s degree, and only 30% have one founder that does. These 
results clarify why the HC aspect education has an insignificant impact on VC-backed 
firms’ performance.  
Finally, when controlling for legal environment, contracts are not viewed by 
entrepreneurs as favourable, and hence they have a negative impact on VC-backed 
firms’ performance. However, when the legal factors are incorporated in the model, 
contract favourableness is then found to be insignificant. This is in line with the 
Institutional Theory (Bruton and Ahlstrom, 2003, 2006) and with previous studies 
(Arthur and Busenitz, 2003; Lerner and Schoar 2005; Lerner and Tag, 2015; Vergara 
et al., 2016; Li et al., 2018). As explained in the theory and confirmed by the results of 
this study, when in a weak legal environment contracts are not significant. 
Alternatively, both parties who are bounded by the contract rely on the extent of their 
relationship. The extent of the VC-E relationship is found to have a positive and 
significant impact on VC-backed firms’ performance in this study. However, this 
significant impact is only evident when the performance of VC-backed firms is 
measured by sales growth only, rather than when it is measured through the index that 
combines all of the firm performance measures. The entrepreneurs find that legal 
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environment factors drive them to rely more on their networks, as well as personal 
relationships, which is the case in most emerging countries, which lack formal 
institutional systems and have weak legal systems.   
8.2 Contribution of the Study  
 This study can be used a reference in Egypt as there is no proper disclosure of any data 
related to the VC market, not even a database containing all the existing VC firms. The 
Egyptian market has mainly consisted of 80% of businesses owned and run by families. 
After the Egyptian 2011 Revolution, this has started to change. Statistics have shown a 
more positive societal perception of entrepreneurship, especially for youth. 
Entrepreneurship and venture capitalists are interdependent; both are crucial to 
economic development, which has been a main goal of the Egyptian government since 
the revolution. Despite its importance, there is a lack of research on this topic. 
Accordingly, given how crucial they are to economic development, it is important to 
have a full understanding of what impacts the success of VC-backed firms and to try 
and capture the most significant aspects that enhance their performance. This study can 
also be used as a guide for venture capitalists to select firms based on criteria that would 
enhance their portfolios and for VC-backed firms to have a better understanding of the 
market and the factors that currently have an impact on performance. This is achievable 
through the provision of recommendations to venture capitalists and entrepreneurs in 
the Egyptian market, to inform them about the necessary measures that would enhance 
the performance of the portfolio firms. Moreover, this study will provide a stepping-
stone to research on the VC market in Egypt. 
This study contributes to the VC market literature in general as well as the 
Egyptian VC market. To the best of our knowledge, this study is the first to combine 
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entrepreneur characteristics (Batjargal and Liu, 2004; Hallen, 2008; Unger et al., 2009; 
Dimov, 2010; Karabulut, 2015; Karlsson and Tavassoli, 2015; Ferriera and Fernandes, 
2017), VC characteristics (Hellmann and Puri, 2002; Rajan 2010; Croce et al., 2012; 
Rosenbusch et al., 2012) and VC-E relationship (Elitzur and Gavious, 2001; Arthurs 
and Busenitz, 2003; Casamatta, 2003; Lim and Cu, 2012; Vergara et al., 2016; Li et al., 
2018), and examine their impact on VC-backed firms’ performance. Each variable may 
have a significant impact when considered alone but the impact may vary when it is 
combined with other variables. Hence, the approach of this study to view the variables 
together should provide significant implications to the industry. All the variables exist 
together in the market, rather than solely; thus, their impacts should be studied together. 
Previous literature shows that some of the variables are included in studies to capture 
the impact on firm performance in general rather than VC-backed firms’ performance, 
while this study focuses entirely on VC-backed firms.  
8.3 Recommendations to Improve the VC market in Egypt  
The results of this study clarify the areas of strengths and weaknesses possessed by 
entrepreneurs and venture capitalists in Egypt. Through the witnessed weaknesses 
highlighted in the results, recommendations can be provided to entrepreneurs to 
enhance the performance of their firms, to venture capitalists to enhance the 
performance of their portfolio firms, and for the relationship between venture capitalists 
and entrepreneurs, which would in turn enhance the performance of VC-backed firms.  
Recommendations to Entrepreneurs 
Entrepreneurs should improve their ability to recruit talented personnel and 
executives through their own networks rather than those of venture capitalists. This is 
their area of weakness in networking (shown in Table 5.3, p. 154), which is evident in 
the findings of this study. The entrepreneurs’ ability to recruit increases the valuations 
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of their ventures (Shane and Stuart, 2002). The talented personnel and executives they 
recruit increases their chances of success (Baron et al., 2016; Collins and Clark, 2003). 
The entrepreneurs’ strongest networks in Egypt are personal business networks (shown 
in Table 5.4, p. 155), however they should consider increasing their community 
businesses networks, by joining any business associations such as chambers of 
commerce, rotary etc. 
Entrepreneurs should focus on creating a competitive advantage for their firm 
through their unique education and experience. Responses related to education and 
experience (evident in tables 5.12 and 5.13, pp. 166 and 167 respectively) show 
minimal diversity amongst entrepreneurs. Not only does this require improvement in 
education and opportunities available in Egypt, but it also leaves room for entrepreneurs 
to seek unique knowledge opportunities. Entrepreneurs should also seek education in 
entrepreneurship, which is commencing in Egypt. If attained, it should enhance the 
performance of the entrepreneur’s firm as it provides a more precise education to endure 
the nature of their risky jobs (business owners) (Dickson et al., 2008; Macko and 
Tyszka, 2009). 
Recommendations to Venture Capital Managers 
 VC managers, on the other hand, should also focus on attaining distinctive 
education, to allow them to offer superior value-added advice and other services which 
other VC firm managers cannot. The educational background of the VC management 
teams in Egypt also shows very low variation and hence can be improved to enable 
distinctive value-added services for their VC firms. Results also show that most VC 
teams do not have a law expert on their management teams; however, it is found to be 
important. Law background is essential for the performance of VC task requirements, 
such as critical analysis of business plans and negotiation of contract structures, which 
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can detect and minimise risks (Dimov and Shepherd, 2005). Hence, it is advisable for 
VC firms to have a person with a strong legal background on their management team. 
As for the selection of portfolio firms, venture capitalists should take into 
consideration characteristics of entrepreneurs. When VC managers select entrepreneurs 
with previous entrepreneurial experiences, they should know that it is not sufficient. To 
enhance the performance of VC-backed firms, previous entrepreneurial experience 
should be successful and preferably in the same field as the current venture. This is 
important as the literature on VC-backed firm performance shows that entrepreneurs 
who have succeeded in a prior venture have a 30% chance of succeeding in their next 
venture (Gompers et al., 2006). In addition, a start-up owned by an entrepreneur with a 
track record of success is more likely to succeed, regardless of whether it is funded by 
a top- or lower-tier VC firm. Entrepreneurs that have previous experience in the same 
industry as their current start-up are also shown throughout previous studies to have 
higher success chances than those that do not (Bruderl et al., 1992; Chatterji, 2009). 
Other than selection, VC services are essential. VC firms should work on 
increasing the advice they provide to their portfolio firms, as it is crucial to add value 
to portfolio firms; thus, it increases their survival chances and boosts their performance 
(Nofsinger and Wang, 2011; Wise and Valliere, 2014). Results show that entrepreneurs 
perceive the level of advice provided by venture capitalists to be below average on most 
advice aspects (PD, exit, HR, marketing and R&D), slightly above average for others 
(financial and strategic advice), and only highly above average for networking advice 
(Table 5.17, p.173).  
263 
 
Recommendations to both Venture Capitalists and Entrepreneurs 
 Venture capitalists and entrepreneurs should work more on negotiation to reach 
terms that are more favourable to both, and thus provide an incentive for both to exert 
more effort and have a positive impact on performance (Vergara et al., 2016). The VC-
E relationship is governed either by the contract binding both or by the extent of their 
relationship. Therefore, negotiation is crucial as results show that, in Egypt, 
entrepreneurs do not find the contractual terms to be favourable and hence this has a 
negative impact on performance. Additionally, the choice of securities has an impact 
on the control rights and voting rights, and on the incentives given to both venture 
capitalists and entrepreneurs, and hence the efforts of both (Kaplan and Stromberg, 
2001; Hart and Moore, 2004). The choice of securities can also differ based on the stage 
of financing of the firm (early or later stage) (Cumming and Johan, 2007). These 
choices can include convertible preferred securities and convertible bonds; however, in 
Egypt they mainly use equities in contracts between venture capitalists and 
entrepreneurs, and hence it is recommended for these firms to explore other options for 
securities.  
Venture capitalists and entrepreneurs should also focus on building and 
maintaining a strong relationship. When considering the legal environment factors in 
Egypt, results show that entrepreneurs and venture capitalists tend to rely more on 
networks and personal relationships, since contract enforcement is weak; in that case, 
the importance of trust arises. Both parties should be aware of the necessity of trust 
between them and that the strength of their relationship plays a role in enhancing the 
performance of the VC-backed firm. 
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Recommendations to Policy Makers 
Recommendations to policy makers can be extracted from the results of this 
study. Given the crucial roles that VCs play in boosting economic growth, the 
government should work towards enhancing the VC market in Egypt. Given that 
entrepreneurship and VC are interdependent, they are already on the right track as they 
have commenced the establishment of entrepreneur training centres. They should 
continue building towards increasing entrepreneurship education, in order to have more 
successful entrepreneurs. Moreover, a VC association should be created and hence it 
would maintain a database of all VC firms in the market and promote the VC market in 
Egypt to create awareness to potential investors and investees. A well-established 
system for the regulation of these institutions should be developed and disclosure 
requirements should be generated and enforced.  
Additionally, policy makers should also be aware that enhancing patenting laws and 
their enforcement would increase innovations and encourage the formation of your 
entrepreneurial firms. Whereas, enhancing investor protection laws and their 
enforcements would increase the number of investments as investors would be more 
willing to provide funds, knowing that their investments are secured. 
8.4 Limitations of the Study and Implications for Future Research 
This study is conducted on the Egyptian VC market, which is a very small market. 
Research conducted on a small number of respondents is assumed to have an effect on 
robustness. However, in this study almost the entire population was covered (87.5%) 
and hence increasing the sample size of the study is not feasible. Robustness checks 
were carried out, and their outcomes showed consistent results. Moreover, although it 
was not feasible for the reasons explained in section 4.4.1, the analysis would have been 
more in-depth if semi-structured interviews were executed after the questionnaires. 
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Reaching out to respondents for the first time was not facile; it was full of obstacles, 
and most respondents did not even agree to meet. Hence, after they had completed a 
questionnaire there was no way to reach out to them again for interviews. However, a 
different study may build on the results found through the surveys in this research, by 
the use of interviews that provide a more in-depth analysis. 
Another limitation in this study is that respondents feared in some cases, 
particularly in questions related to the legal environment in Egypt, to give answers that 
truly reflected their perceptions. Instead, they chose to select ‘neutral’ for a response. 
As the descriptive statistics show (Tables 6.12, p.207 and 6.14, p.210), in the legal 
environment sections many of the responses were neither agree nor disagree, but 
neutral. This research would have provided an even more realistic outcome if they had 
not chosen neutral. Despite this, results are reflective of previous literature as well as 
theories and confirm both.    
This study is a stepping-stone for literature on VC-backed firm performance in 
Egypt and other EMs. Most of the previous studies have investigated the variables that 
affect VC-backed firms separately, whereas this study aggregates most variables, which 
not only brings insights that are closer to reality by delivering a full perspective but also 
establishes a strong ground for future research. Most VC studies in the literature have 
been based on the USA or developed countries, and have mainly investigated the impact 
of each of the variables separately, with more focus on the effect of each variable alone. 
Therefore, a study can be conducted to aggregate the variables as this model did and 
see how different the results of the aggregated variables would be in a developed 
economy.  
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In Egypt there is much more to be studied. If this study provides a reference or 
an overview to the status quo, then the starting point could be studying each variable in 
more depth. First, for HC of entrepreneurs as well as VC managers, research can be 
conducted to examine the effect of HC outcomes rather than HC investments. This 
study focuses on HC investments only, while previous studies have concluded that the 
outcomes of education and experience are the variables that trigger the effectiveness of 
the firms’ performance (Davidsson, 2004; Unger et. al., 2009).  
Additionally, when looking at previous experience of entrepreneurs, regardless 
of the experience they possess, the extent to which they focus on early planning and 
opportunity confidence is necessary for performance enhancement (Dimov, 2010). 
Neither factor is incorporated in this study, and hence they can be investigated in a 
future study to find if their presence along with previous experience would have an 
impact on VC-backed firm performance. 
Results of this study show no variation in HC in Egypt, particularly for 
education. Variation in education and differences in degrees of education attained, as 
well as the field in which these degrees are attained, is important to create a competitive 
advantage for individuals or management teams and hence can play a role in enhancing 
firm performance (Unger et al., 2009). Future research could also focus on 
understanding further the education available in Egypt and the degree of variation that 
exists. If the degrees are similar, then it is necessary to explore the quality of each one, 
as the institution from which the degree is attained may have an impact on the quality 
of the degree and accordingly the knowledge extracted from it.  
Another important point to note when considering education is the lack of 
entrepreneurship education in Egypt. Most universities do not have an entrepreneurship 
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programme or offer extensive entrepreneurship courses. Only recently did the 
government start to shed light on the importance of such courses and start to provide 
them. Two centres have been established in Egypt for entrepreneurship training, one 
established in 2010 and the other in 2015. One university launched an entrepreneurship 
summer programme in 2015. With those programmes in place, future research can 
produce a comparative study for the pre- and post-effect of the newly commenced 
entrepreneur education on VC-backed firms’ performance, after this aspect is enhanced 
in Egypt.  
Second, there are also external factors in the entrepreneur environment 
impacting the performance of the firm itself, such as the laws and regulations for start-
ups and labour laws as well as tax laws. These macro factors were not explored in this 
study, as it focuses on the characteristics and roles of the parties involved in the firm. 
     Additionally, while many studies have tested whether it is VC selection of firms 
or the value-added services provided by venture capitalists that enhance VC-backed 
firms’ performance (Colombo and Grilli, 2010; Bertoni et al., 2011; Chemmanur et al., 
2011), none of these studies were conducted on emerging markets or on Egypt in 
particular. As the results of this study find that value-added services by venture 
capitalists are not significant, then future research can investigate the role of portfolio 
firm selection in Egypt.  
As for the third variable, VC-E relationship, all available studies failed to 
include the effect of bargaining and negotiation between the VC and the E, until the 
recent study by Fu et al. (2018) covered the bargaining power of the entrepreneur and 
the VC. However, to date, no work has included the effect of syndication in the VC-E 
contractual relationship. As for Egypt, contract favourableness was shown in this study 
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to be low. This can be explored further in Egypt and VC experience can also be taken 
into consideration, when studying the contractual relationship between the venture 
capitalist and the entrepreneur. The more experienced venture capitalists are, the less 
concerned they are with clauses in the contract that would hedge their risk (Bengtsson 
and Sensoy, 2011). Venture capitalists with better governance abilities avoid clauses 
involving costs of risk sharing and focus more on influencing venture development, 
such as negotiating more on board representation rights. Studies can be conducted in 
Egypt to examine the applicability of these results.  
The first VC fund in Egypt was established in 2004. This study covers all VC 
funds in Egypt since 2004 to date. Future research can reach more influential 
conclusions by utilising moving windows. Moving windows allow the segregation of 
periods instead of studying the period as a whole, to compare the effect of the variables 
on performance corresponding with any institutional changes. Additionally, studies can 
also investigate consistency of results when considering industry, and size and/or stage 
of portfolio firm, which are all controlled for in this study. 
 The robustness check in this study was conducted using the most fit measure of 
portfolio firm performance, sales growth, rather than all 10 performance measures 
combined. Results did show a slight difference and hence this verifies that some 
variables may have an impact on certain measures of performance and not necessarily 
on all measures. This provides ground for research to build on. A study can test the 
impact of each of the nine remaining performance measures separately, to understand 
which are enhanced by the variables.  
 Taking the research even further, macro-level factors such as tax, labour, 
and start-up laws and regulations, can be combined with the variables of this study to investigate 
further the determinants of the success of VC-backed firms. A future study could also focus on 
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finding common covariates to measure performance of VC-backed firms vs. non-VC-backed 
firms. Finally, this study covers VC firms based in Egypt only; a comparative study could 
compare the performance of portfolio firms backed by VC firms based in Egypt vs. VC firms 
based abroad. 
     All of the above suggestions for further research can enrich the literature 
relevant to the performance of VC-backed firms in emerging economies, namely that 
of Egypt, as well as allow for improvements in the VC market. 
8.5 Chapter Summary 
This chapter demonstrated the contribution of this study to the literature on the 
performance of VC-backed firms and to the VC market in Egypt and other emerging 
economies. It also summarised the main findings of this study as well as the methods 
used to reach those findings. Recommendations to benefit the entrepreneurs and VC 
managers in the Egyptian market were also established in this chapter, based on the 
findings of the study, after which the limitations of this study were presented as well as 
implications for future research in this area.   
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APPENDIX A 
 
 
  
Table A1 Summary of Literature in Relation to this Study 
Theories Previous Studies Relation to this Research 
Macroeconomic 
Theory and 
information 
asymmetries 
Amit el al. (1999) 
Lerner and Tag (2013) 
Pettinger (2017) 
To justify importance of VC firms 
Agency Theory 
and Financial 
Contracting  
Cumming and Johan 
(2009) 
To explain the relationship between VC & E  
Institutional 
Theory 
Kaplan and Stromberg 
(2000) 
Bruton and Ahlstrom, 
(2003/6/9) 
Li et al. (2018) 
To explain how this relationship may not be 
applicable in every context 
Resource 
Dependence 
Theory 
Sapienza et al. (1996) 
Jeng and Wells (2000) 
Gabrielsson and Huse 
(2002) 
Entrepreneur contributes innovative ideas and VC 
contribution is not limited to financial support 
Human Capital 
Theory 
Davidsson and Honig 
(2003) 
Zarutskie (2007) 
Dimov (2010)   
Importance of HC of both venture capitalists and 
entrepreneurs 
Social Capital 
Theory 
Hochberg et al. (2005) 
Hsu, (2007)  
Hallen (2008) 
Coleman (2009) 
Milosevic (2018) 
Importance of SC of VC and entrepreneur and the 
networks of venture capitalists 
Table A2 Skewness Kurtosis Tests for Normality 
Variable Observations Pr(skewness) Pr(Kurtosis) Adj chi2(2) Prob > Chi 2 
Residuals 5 0.6448 0.6618 0.41 0.8142 
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Table A3 Industry, Age and Size of VC Firms 
 
INDUSTRY 
Age in 
months 
Size by 
employees 
 
INDUSTRY 
Age in 
months 
Size by 
employees 
E1 
Health Tech 12 11 
E27 
Recycling 10 3 
E2 Trading & 
distribution 18 15 
E28 
Health Tech 36 20 
E3 
Event Mgt 54 9 
E29 
Fintech 12 5 
E4 
Health Tech 72 180 
E30 Mobile Application 
for Disabilities 12 5 
E5 
Tech 24 15 
E31 
Internet 6 70 
E6 
Waste management 24 5 
E32 
Fintech 8 4 
E7 
Home services 48 25 
E33 
Education 48 7 
E8 
Education  36 250 
E34 
Automotives 12 14 
E9 
Industrial Solutions 119 50 
E35 
Logistics 2 200 
E10 
Mobility 12 40 
E36 
EdTec 48 9 
E11 
Healthtech 48 25 
E37 
Consumer services 12 5 
E12 
SAAS 36 8 
E38 
Entrepreneurship 42 10 
E13 
Education 36 30 
E39 
Home services  6 30 
E14 
E-commerce 36 7 
E40 
F&B 60 20 
E15 
Food tech 42 30 
E41 
F&B 72 45 
E16 
FinTech 30 28 
E42 
Fintech 18 5 
E17 
HR Solutions 48 10 
E43 
F&B 12 6 
E18 
Saas Retail Tech 36 56 
E44 
F&B 66 8 
E19 
Online Gaming 72 25 
E45 
Home services 24 40 
E20 Furniture & Fashion 
Design 72 9 
E46 
Design 11 8 
E21 IOT 
MANUFACTURER 9 6 
E47 
Footwear 24 16 
E22 
Crowdfunding 60 10 
E48 
Service 36 50 
E23 
E-commerce 48 185 
E49 
Health Tech 18 8 
E24 
ICT (E- Commerce) 12 3 
E50 
FMCGS 5 70 
E25 E-
commerce/Automotive 10 14 
E51 
Life sciences 48 24 
E26 
Sports/Tech 12 0 
E52 
E-commerce 24 50 
 
Table A4 E-Ability to Recruit Response Frequencies 
 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 Total 
# non-exec 16 9 5 10 5 3 4 52 
thru founder 14 12 11 9 2 2 2  52 
thru friend 29 16 3 3 1 0 0 52 
thru co-worker 36 14 0 0 0 0 2 52 
Other 33 9 6 2 1 0 1 52 
The number responses from these measures vary from ‘0’ to ‘6’, where ‘0’ refers to none and ‘6’ refers to any 
number of non-founder executives higher than 5. 
 
 
 
305 
 
 
 
Table A5 E-Business Networks Response Frequencies 
  0 1 Total 
Parents 22 30 52 
Friends 10 42 52 
Encouragement 15 37 52 
Business networks 34 18 52 
Business Advisories 27 25 52 
Previous Start-ups 25 27 52 
These six measures are based on YES or NO if the measure exits a ‘1’ is given and if does not exist a ‘0’ is 
given. 
 
Table A6 E- Network Use Response Frequencies 
 0 1 2 3 4 5 Total 
Political leaders 1 32 5 9 5 0 52 
Regulatory officials 1 29 12 9 1 0 52 
Chief executives 1 30 6 9 5 1 52 
Politicians 1 28 12 7 4 0 52 
TM customer 0 10 8 15 12 7 52 
TM suppliers 0 12 6 16 11 7 52 
TM competitors 1 19 8 12 7 5 52 
Trade Associations 1 25 13 10 3 0 52 
Religious leaders 1 36 3 11 1 0 52 
CF political connect 1 26 6 10 7 2 52 
CF business connect 0 2 10 9 13 18 52 
These items are based on a scale from ‘1’ representing very low to ‘5’ representing very high. 
 
Table A7 E-Innovation RBCS Response Frequencies 
 1 2 3 4 5 Total 
Innov marketers 3 8 15 15 11 52 
Good marketing 3 11 15 17 6 52 
Marketing expert 5 7 20 11 9 52 
PD expert 3 5 17 17 10 52 
Innov employees 1 4 12 19 16 52 
These measures are based on a scale from ‘1’ to ‘5’ where ‘1’ represents strongly disagree and ‘5’ represents 
strongly agree. 
 
Table A8 E-Quality RBCs Response Frequencies 
 1 2 3 4 5 Total 
Superior CS 2 2 14 21 13 52 
Expert CS 2 6 17 16 11 52 
Quality CS 7 8 21 8 8 52 
Managerial expert 2 3 14 22 11 52 
Flexibility 1 3 8 15 25 52 
These measures are based on a scale from ‘1’ to ‘5’ where ‘1’ represents strongly disagree and ‘5’ represents 
strongly agree. 
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Table A9 E-Cost Reduction RBCs Response Frequencies 
 1 2 3 4 5 Total 
Material 2 14 18 12 6 52 
Distribution 5 8 19 10 10 52 
Labour 15 14 12 10 1 52 
FOP 9 12 18 7 6 52 
Availability of Cap 4 6 19 17 6 52 
Productive Employees 0 2 10 17 23 52 
Facilities 4 12 14 15 7 52 
These measures are based on a scale from ‘1’ to ‘5’ where ‘1’ represents strongly disagree and ‘5’ represents 
strongly agree. 
 
Table A10 E-Innovation Strategy Response Frequencies 
 1 2 3 4 5 Total 
New products 1 4 11 21 15 52 
New PD 0 5 8 24 15 52 
Novel Marketing 0 4 18 21 9 52 
Product opportunities 0 1 10 21 20 52 
Quality performance 0 1 4 18 29 52 
Change PD 0 2 4 20 26 52 
Innovation 0 1 4 17 30 52 
These measures are based on a scale from ‘1’ to ‘5’ where ‘1’ represents strongly disagree and ‘5’ represents 
strongly agree. 
 
Table A11 E-Quality Strategy Response Frequencies 
 1 2 3 4 5 Total 
Quality Control 0 6 15 19 12 52 
Quality Requirements 0 4 10 21 17 52 
Customer SL 0 3 5 22 22 52 
HL product Quality 0 2 5 23 22 52 
Customer Needs 1 0 6 17 28 52 
These measures are based on a scale from ‘1’ to ‘5’ where ‘1’ represents strongly disagree and ‘5’ represents 
strongly agree. 
 
 
Table A12 E-Cost reduction Strategy Response frequencies 
 1 2 3 4 5 Total 
Cost reduction 3 9 15 12 13 52 
Employee productivity 0 3 6 21 22 52 
Process innovation 3 3 15 18 13 52 
Invest machinery 17 8 10 11 6 52 
These measures are based on a scale from ‘1’ to ‘5’ where ‘1’ represents strongly disagree and ‘5’ represents 
strongly agree. 
 
Table A13 E- Experience Response Frequencies 
  0 1 Total 
Managed start-up 17 35 52 
Previous start-up 17 35 52 
IRR 100% 48 4 52 
Previous industry work 24 28 52 
Previous industry start-up 39 13 52 
Public company 44 8 52 
Business together 33 19 52 
Functional diversity 9 43 52 
These eight measures are based on dichotomous variables (YES or NO questions). The selection of ‘1’ 
represents that any of the founders of the firm have the specified experience, and ‘0’ means they do not. 
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Table A14 E-Education Response Frequencies 
 0 1 2 3 4 Total 
Doctorates 46 5 1 0 0 52 
Masters 30 16 6 0 0 52 
CFA 45 51 1 1 0 52 
Field of start up 24 17 9 2 0 52 
Responses range from ‘0’ to ‘4’. A ‘0’ is selected when none of the co-founders of the venture hold a degree in the 
enquired about category, the choice are chronological till ‘4’. Where ‘4’ is selected if more than 3 of the co-
founders hold a degree in the enquired about category. 
 
 
Table A15 Company Performance Response Frequencies 
 1 2 3 4 5 Total 
Sales Growth 6 7 21 13 5 52 
Sales Volume 8 10 21 11 2 52 
ROA 7 10 22 8 4 51 
ROS 6 6 26 11 1 50 
Product Growth 4 3 18 23 4 52 
Market Share 15 9 13 10 5 52 
Growth M. Share 6 11 17 13 4 51 
Profit 10 19 13 7 2 51 
Profit Growth 11 12 18 7 3 51 
Co. Performance 3 4 29 15 1 52 
The scale for these 10 performance indicators ranges from ‘1’ to ‘5’, where ‘1’ represents far below average and 
‘5’ represents far above average. 
 
 
 
 
Table A16 E- VC Advice Response Frequencies 
 1 2 3 4 5 Total 
Strategic advice 5 10 10 20 7 52 
Marketing advice 13 13 18 5 3 52 
Financial advice 7 7 14 15 9 52 
R&D advice 16 14 13 4 5 52 
PD advice 12 11 17 6 6 52 
HR advice 13 15 12 7 5 52 
Exit advice 15 10 13 8 6 52 
Interpersonal advice 11 8 15 14 4 52 
Networking advice 5 7 13 11 16 52 
These four complementarity measures are based on Likert scale were ‘1’ represents very low and ‘5’ represents 
very high. 
Table A17 E- Complementary Response Frequencies 
 1 2 3 4 5 Total 
Resources 3 10 13 18 8 52 
Strengths 4 8 20 16 4 52 
Abilities 2 9 19 12 10 52 
Expectations 7 10 17 13 5 52 
These four complementarity measures are based on Likert scale were ‘1’ represents very low and ‘5’ represents 
very high 
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Table A20 E-Contract Favourableness Response Frequencies 
 1 2 3 4 5 Total 
Company Valuation 2 3 27 12 8 52 
Type of security 3 8 26 10 5 52 
Amount of investments 3 13 19 13 4 52 
No. of directors 5 6 25 11 5 52 
Voting Rights 4 4 27 9 8 52 
Vesting Founder Stocks 3 5 25 10 9 52 
Management Control 3 3 31 8 7 52 
Conversion Rights 3 4 32 7 6 52 
These eight items contract favourableness measures were assessed on a scale were ‘1’ represents strongly disagree 
and ‘5’ represents strongly agree. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table A18 E-Disagreement Response Frequencies 
 1 2 3 4 5 Total 
Strategy disagreements 8 11 21 9 3 52 
Marketing disagreements 10 13 22 7 0 52 
Financial disagreements 9 12 15 10 6 52 
R&D disagreements 16 7 19 9 1 52 
PD disagreements 10 13 21 4 4 52 
HR disagreements 13 11 22 2 3 52 
CEO disagreements 28 7 12 3 2 52 
Other disagreements 19 9 21 2 1 52 
Likert-scale questions were also used to show, the extent of disagreements from very low ‘1’ to very high ‘5 
Table A19 E-Contract Flexibility Response Frequencies 
 1 2 3 4 5 Total 
Strategy flexibility 3 7 23 12 7 52 
Marketing flexibility 2 6 25 13 6 52 
Financial flexibility 5 6 22 13 6 52 
R&D flexibility 6 9 21 11 5 52 
PD flexibility 4 6 24 12 6 52 
HR flexibility 4 6 23 11 5 52 
The six measures of flexibility are based on a scale from ‘1’ very low to ‘5’ very high. 
Table A21 E-VC-E Relationship Response Frequencies 
 1 2 3 4 5 Total 
Negotiate 4 3 22 16 7 52 
Agreement speed  3 7 21 15 6 52 
Ease of agreement 3 6 20 17 6 52 
Agree speed on new venture 4 6 21 17 4 52 
Third party 2 4 18 9 19 52 
The answers ranged from ‘1’ to ‘5’ where ‘1’ represents strongly disagree and ‘5’ represents strongly 
agree. 
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Table A22 E- Legal Perception Response Frequencies 
 1 2 3 4 5 Total 
Trust  12 12 19 7 2 52 
Confidence 12 7 21 8 4 52 
Corruption 11 12 21 7 1 52 
Crime 5 12 21 13 1 52 
Contract enforcement 9 10 27 4 2 52 
Investor Protection 10 8 26 6 2 52 
The six legal perception measures ae based on a scale were ‘1’ represents strongly disagree and ‘5’ 
represents strongly disagree. 
Table A23 E- Legal Impact Response Frequencies 
 1 2 3 4 5 Total 
Stability  3 5 15 13 16 52 
Govt Legislation 2 3 12 14 21 52 
Innov. Product 1 1 15 20 15 52 
Modern Technology 1 1 19 16 15 52 
Innov. Idea 0 3 17 13 19 52 
Patents 6 5 20 13 8 52 
Rely networks 0 1 18  6 27 52 
Rely relations 0 2 17 9 24 52 
The eight legal impact measures are based on a scale where ‘1’ represents strongly disagree and ‘5’ represents 
strongly agree. 
Table A24 VC Management Education Response Frequencies 
 0 1 2 3 4 Total 
Degree Field 2 1 3 1 7 14 
Post grad. Degree 1 3 2 4 4 14 
Finance degree 1 2 3 7 1 14 
Law degree 6 4 1 3 0 14 
Med./Eng. Degree 6 5 1 1 1 14 
Other degree 5 1 4 2 2 14 
This table shows VC management teams’ education. Responses vary from ‘0’ to ‘4’, where a ‘0’shows that none 
of the fund managers in the VC firm hold such degree. ‘4’ shows that a VC firm has four or more fund managers 
that hold a certain degree. 
Table A25 VC Experience Response Frequencies 
 0 1 Total 
Industry experience 1 13 14 
Business experience 0 14 14 
Law experience 9 5 14 
Finance experience 1 13 14 
Consulting experience 2 12 14 
A ‘0’ represents none of the VC managers in the firm have previous experience in the stated field, and a ‘1’ if any 
of the VC managers do. 
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Table A26 VC Involvement Response Frequencies 
 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 Total 
Meetings per month 0 3 3 0 5 1 0 0 2 14 
 Average boards 1 0 3 0 3 2 0 1 4 14 
 Average reports 0 0 0 0 9 0 0 0 5 14 
Average rounds 0 4 4 4 2 0 0 0 0 14 
VC involvement measures are based on a scale from ‘0’ to ‘8’ where ‘0’ refers to none and ‘8’ refers to any number 
more than seven. 
Table A27 VC Services Response Frequencies 
 1 2 3 4 5 Total 
Recruit Intro. 2 1 4 4 3 14 
Intro. To Customers 1 0 1 4 8 14 
Intro. To Suppliers 1 1 1 5 6 14 
HR mgt. 1 3 4 3 3 14 
HR policy 1 3 7 1 2 14 
Mgt. Recruit 3 4 3 2 2 14 
Recruit admin. 5 3 3 2 1 14 
Recruit Sales 2 6 4 2 0 14 
Financial Policy 2 0 5 4 3 14 
VC services measures are based on a Likert scale from ‘1’ to ‘5’, where ‘1’ represents strongly disagree and ‘5’ 
represents strongly agree. 
Table A28 VC Government Services Response Frequencies 
 1 2 3 4 5 Total 
Gov’t network 2 0 3 3 6 14 
Gov’t officials 1 2 2 3 6 14 
Contact government 3 0 5 2 4 14 
Introduction government 1 4 3 2 4 14 
Gov’t needs 1 3 3 2 5 14 
VC government networking measures also are based on a scale from ‘1’ to ‘5’, with ‘1’ being strongly disagree and 
‘5’ strongly agree. 
Table A29 VC Syndicate Response Frequencies 
 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Total 
Connections 0 0 0 0 1 2 1 10 14 
Well Connected 1 0 1 2 2 3 1 4 14 
Invite 1 0 3 1 2 2 0 5 14 
Initiate 0 0 3 3 2 0 0 6 14 
Connect through 10 1 0 2 0 0 0 1 14 
These five measures of syndication are continuous variables. Where ‘0’ is selected if no such connection exists and 
‘7’ is selected for any number larger than 6, which means the VC firm has more than six of that specific connection 
measure. 
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Table A30 VC-E Complementarity Response Frequencies 
 1 2 3 4 5 Total 
Resources 0 1 3 4 6 14 
Strengths 0 0 4 5 5 14 
Abilities 0 0 5 7 2 14 
Expectations 0 0 8 5 1 14 
These complementarity measures are enquired about in the form of a scale, were ‘1’ represents very low and ‘5’ 
represents very high. 
Table A31 VC-E Disagreement Response Frequencies 
 1 2 3 4 5 Total 
Strategy disagreements 4 3 6 1 0 14 
Marketing disagreements 2 2 10 0 0 14 
Financial disagreements 2 2 5 4 1 14 
R&D disagreements 3 4 6 0 1 14 
PD disagreements 0 5 7 0 2 14 
HR disagreements 4 3 5 1 1 14 
CEO disagreements 2 3 5 3 1 14 
Other disagreements 7 1 4 2 0 14 
VC-E disagreement from perspective of VC managers are based on a scale to show the extent from very low ‘1’ 
to very high ‘5’ of disagreement on these eight issues. 
Table A32 VC-E Extent of Relation Response Frequencies 
 1 2 3 4 5 Total 
Negotiate 0 3 4 6 1 14 
Agreement speed  0 4 1 7 2 14 
Agreement Ease 0 2 4 8 0 14 
New venture agree speed  0 1 5 8 0 14 
 Third party 0 0 1 3 10 14 
These five ease of relationship measures from the perspective of VC managers are based on a 5 point scale, 
where ‘1’ stands for strongly disagree and ‘5’ stands for strongly agree. 
Table A33 Team Spirit Response Frequencies 
 1 2 3 4 5 Total 
Clear Goal 0 0 2 9 3 14 
Work Hard 0 1 3 6 4 14 
Team Interest 0 0 7 5 2 14 
Try Best 0 0 2 11 1 14 
Responsibility 0 2 3 6 3 14 
These five measures of portfolio firms’ team spirit are based on a scale from ‘1’ to ‘5’ where ‘1’ represents 
strongly disagree and ‘5’ represents strongly agree. 
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Table A34 PF Trust Response Frequencies 
 1 2 3 4 5 Total 
Benefits 0 1 1 8 4 14 
Economic Consequences 0 1 3 7 3 14 
Dependable 0 4 4 5 1 14 
Act Fairly 0 2 7 5 0 14 
VC-Openness 1 4 3 4 2 14 
No Doubt 0 3 4 4 3 14 
Responds constructively 1 1 5 7 0 14 
Common Bus. Values 0 1 3 7 3 14 
These eight measures of trust are based on a scale that ranges from ‘1’ very low to ‘5’ very high. 
 
  
Table A35 VC-Legal Perception Response Frequencies 
 1 2 3 4 5 TOTAL 
Trust 5 4 3 2 0 14 
Confidence 2 3 5 3 1 14 
Corruption 5 2 4 2 1 14 
Crime  2 5 3 2 2 14 
Laws 1 8 2 3 0 14 
Contractual rights 2 7 2 2 1 14 
Investor protection rights 4 4 2 3 1 14 
These seven measures of legal perception are based on a scale from ‘1’ representing strongly disagree to ‘5’ 
representing strongly agree. 
Table A36 VC-backed Firm Performance Factor Loadings 
Performance Measure Factor loading 
Sales Growth 0.8767 
Sales Volume 0.8327 
ROA 0.8118 
ROS 0.8313 
Production Growth 0.7600 
Market Share 0.6472 
Growth of Market Share 0.7907 
Profit 0.6327 
Profit Growth 0.7796 
Company performance 0.8288 
Factor loadings for all performance measures. 
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Table A39 E-RBCs-Strategy Fit Correlations 
 Mod. Innovation Mod. Quality Mod. Cost leadership 
Mod. innovation 1.000   
Mod. Quality 
0.5552* 1.000  
Mod. Cost leadership 
0.888* 0.0578 1.000 
* Denotes statistical significance at 10% level 
 
Table A40 E- Previous Experience Correlations 
 Previous 
manage 
Previous St. 
up 
IRR 
Previous Ind. 
work 
Previous Ind. St. 
up 
Previous manage 1.000     
Previous St. up 0..8252* 1.000    
IRR 0.0473 -0.1065 1.000   
Previous ind. work 0.1771 0.1771 0.0233 1.000  
Previous ind. St. up 0.3077* 0.2130 0.333* 0.4454* 1.000 
* Denotes statistical significance at 10% level 
 
Table A41 E- Education Correlations 
 
Doctorates Masters 
Professional 
Qualifications 
Degree in field of 
st. up 
Doctorates 1.000    
Masters 0.2880 1.000   
Professional Qualifications 0.6303* 0.1715 1.000  
Degree in field of st. up 0.3671* 0.1264 0.3487* 1.000 
* Denotes statistical significance at 10% level 
 
  
Table A37 E- Business Network Correlations 
 
Parents 
Close 
friends 
Encouragement 
Business 
Networks 
Business 
advisories 
Previous 
start-ups 
Parents 1.000      
Close friends 0.372* 1.000     
Encouragement 0.228 0.355* 1.000    
Business Networks 0.050 0.149 0.195 1.000   
Business advisories 0.278* 0.176 0.442* 0.351* 1.000  
Previous start-ups 0.188 0.214 0.151 0.133 0.078 1.000 
* Denotes statistical significance at 10% level 
  
 
     
Table A38 E- Network Use Correlations 
 Govt official networks Business contact networks Community networks 
Govt official networks 1.000   
Business contact networks 
0.472* 1.000  
Community networks 
0.737* 0.354* 1.000 
* Denotes statistical significance at 10% level 
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Table A42 E-Advice Correlations 
 Strategic Marketing Finance R&D PD HR Exit Inter-
personal 
Network 
Strategic 1.000         
Marketing 0.5184* 1.000        
Finance 0.7095* 0.4216* 1.000       
R&D 0.6348* 0.5358* 0.5000* 1.000      
PD 0.5664* 0.5734* 0.3831* 0.7908* 1.000     
HR 0.5285* 0.4977* 0.3315* 0.4870* 0.5549* 1.000    
Exit 0.5663* 0.4938* 0.4246* 0.4732* 0.4674* 0.6985* 1.000   
Interpersonal 0.4927* 0.2542* 0.3762* 0.3321* 0.3336* 0.4313* 0.5949* 1.000  
Network 0.5905* 0.3110* 0.4067* 0.4089* 0.5048* 0.4307* 0.392* 0.4718* 1.000 
* Denotes statistical significance at 10% level 
 
Table A43 E- Complementarity Correlations 
 Resources Strengths Abilities Expectations 
Resources 1.000    
Strengths 0.7703* 1.000   
Abilities  0.6953* 0.7389* 1.000  
Expectations 0.7369* 0.7402* 0.7739* 1.000 
* Denotes statistical significance at 10% level 
 
Table A44 E-Disagreement Correlations 
 Strategy Marketing Finance R&D PD HR CEO Other 
Strategy 1.000        
Marketing 0.5965* 1.000       
Finance 0.6990* 0.3733* 1.000      
R&D 0.5932* 0.5974* 0.5782* 1.000     
PD 0.5593* 0.6628* 0.4401* 0.7152* 1.000    
HR 0.5124* 0.4848* 0.3787* 0.6485* 0.7874* 1.000   
CEO 0.2767* 0.4193* 0.2051 0.4306* 0.6619* 0.6554* 1.000  
Other  0.5505* 0.4800* 0.5288* 0.4828* 0.5289* 0.5134* 0.4938* 1.000 
* Denotes statistical significance at 10% level 
 
Table A45 E-Contract Flexibility Correlations 
 Strategy Marketing Finance RD PD HR 
Strategy 1.000      
Marketing 0.7695* 1.000     
Finance 0.7304* 0.5678* 1.000    
RD 0.6864* 0.7136* 0.4465* 1.000   
PD 0.5813* 0.6473* 0.3623* 0.8179* 1.000  
HR 0.6461* 0.5658* 0.5018* 0.7872* 0.7915* 1.000 
* Denotes statistical significance at 10% level 
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Table A46 E-Contract Favourableness Correlations 
 Co. 
Valuation 
Type of 
Security 
Amount 
of Invest 
No. 
Directors 
Voting 
Rights 
Vest. 
Founder 
stocks 
Mgt. 
Control 
Conversion 
Rights 
Co. Valuation 1.000        
Type of Sec. 0.6176* 1.000       
Amount of 
Invest 
0.5030* 0.4998* 1.000      
No. Directors 0.4872* 0.6331* 0.4675* 1.000     
Voting Rights 0.5933* 0.7215* 0.2240 0.7308* 1.000    
Vest. Founder 
Stocks 
0.4475* 0.4893* 0.2578* 0.6382* 0.7075* 1.000   
Mgt. Control 0.4615* 0.4431* 0.2858* 0.5919* 0.6046* 0.7590* 1.000  
Conversion 
Rights 
0.4864* 0.5696* 0.3566* 0.5749* 0.6198* 0.6666* 0.6816* 1.000 
* Denotes statistical significance at 10% level 
 
Table A47 E- VC-E Ease of Relation Correlations 
 Negotiation 
ease 
Non-contract 
agreement speed 
New venture ease 
of agreement 
New venture 
agreement speed 
Third party 
Negotiation ease 1.000     
Non- contract 
agreement speed  
0.6690* 1.000    
New venture ease 
of agreement 
0.6539* 0.6394* 1.000   
New venture 
agreement speed 
0.6438* 0.6556* 0.7615* 1.000  
Third party 0.4665* 0.6517* 0.5526* 0.4143* 1.000 
* Denotes statistical significance at 10% level 
 
Table A48 E- Extent of Relationship Correlations 
 E-complementarity E-disagreements E-ease of relation 
E-Complementarity 1.000   
E-disagreements 
-0.2692* 1.000  
E- ease of relation 
0.5673* -0.3610* 1.000 
* Denotes statistical significance at 10% level 
 
Table A49 E-Legal Perception Correlations 
 
Trust Confidence Corruption Crime 
Contract 
Enforcement 
Investor 
protection 
Trust  1.000      
Confidence 0.6239* 1.000     
Corruption 0.5095* 0.8082* 1.000    
Crime 0.1751 0.1833 0.2263* 1.000   
Contract enforcement 0.6997* 0.5095* 0.5017* 0.5147* 1.000  
Investor Protection 0.6808* 0.5704* 0.5480* 0.5134* 0.9077* 1.000 
* Denotes statistical significance at 10% level 
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Table A50 E-Legal Impact Correlations 
 Stability Govt 
Legisl. 
Innovate 
prdt 
Modern 
Tech 
Innovate 
idea 
Patents Rely 
Network 
Rely Relation 
Stability 1.000        
Govt Legisl. 0.6994* 1.000       
Innovate prdt 0.2402* 0.2459* 1.000      
Modern Tech 0.1030 0.1213 0.7538* 1.000     
Innovate idea 0.2669* 0.1785 0.7465* 0.7799* 1.000    
Patents 0.2819* 0.2346* 0.0755 0.0717 0.0502 1.000   
Rely Network 0.1945 0.3167* 0.2361* 0.1971 0.3663* 0.1946 1.000  
Rely Relation 0.1189 0.3101* 0.1600 0.1384 0.2742* 0.1409 0.8793* 1.000 
* Denotes statistical significance at 10% level 
 
Table A51 VC Education Correlations 
 Degree 
in field 
Post grad 
degree 
Finance 
degree 
Law 
degree 
Med./Eng. degree Other degree 
Degree in field 1.000      
Post grad degree 0.3280* 1.000     
Finance degree 0.2435* 1.985 1.000    
Law degree -0.5300* -0.3633* -0.3282* 1.000   
Medical/ Eng. Degree 0.3266* 0.6875* 0.3434* -0.2782* 1.000  
Other degree -0.3549* -0.3003* 0.0997 0.1386 0.1341 1.000 
* Denotes statistical significance at 10% level 
 
Table A52 VC Experience Correlations 
 Industry 
experience 
Law experience Finance experience 
Consulting 
experience 
Industry experience 1.000    
Law experience 0.1394 1.000   
Finance experience -0.0577 -0.4142* 1.000  
Consulting experience 0.8083* 0.1724 -0.0714 1.000 
* Denotes statistical significance at 10% level 
 
Table A53 VC Involvement Correlations 
 Meetings per 
month 
Avg. boards Avg. reports Rounds till exit  
Meetings per month 1.000    
Avg. boards -0.3575* 1.000   
Avg. reports  -0.1356 0.1769 1.000  
Rounds till exit 0.0618 0.0117 0.6690* 1.000 
* Denotes statistical significance at 10% level 
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Table A54 VC Services Correlations 
 Meet/ 
month 
Intro. 
To 
recruit 
Intro. 
To cust. 
Intro. 
To sup. 
Shape 
HR mgt 
Shape 
HR 
policies 
Recr. 
Senior
manag
. 
Recr. 
admin 
Recr. 
Sales 
Shaping 
fin. 
policies 
Meet/month 1.00          
Intro. To 
recruitment 
firms 
0.0879 1.00         
Intro. To 
customers 
0.3157* 0.5487* 1.00        
Intro. To 
suppliers 
0.1424 0.6132* 0.5763* 1.00       
Shaping HR 
management 
0.0592 -0.301* 0.1308 0.01921 1.00      
Shaping HR 
policies 
0.2723* -0.1196 0.05106 0.2189 0.3894* 1.00     
Recruit 
senior 
managers 
0.2140 0.1088 0.1026 -0.0596 0.3035* 0.0716 1.00    
Recruit 
admin 
-0.3157* 0.0880 -0.1537 -0.1833 0.3448* 0.3560* 0.3643* 1.00   
Recruit sales -0.4659* -0..000 -0.7853* -0.3335* -0.1045 0.784 -0.0580 0.5236* 1.00  
Shaping 
financial 
policies 
0.4795* 0.5861* 0.5413* 0.7496* 0.2804* 0.5213* 0.1358 0.1105 -0.273* 1.00 
* Denotes statistical significance at 10% level 
 
Table A55 VC Government Network Correlations 
 
Gov. needs Gov. officials 
Contact gov 
for PF issues 
Intro. PF to gov. 
officials 
Network with gov. 
Gov. Needs 1.000     
Gov. officials  0.9268* 1.000    
Contact gov for PF issues 0.8343* 0.8951* 1.000   
Intro. PF to gov off 0.6728* 0.7461* 0.8785* 1.000  
Network with gov.  0.7758* 0.8550* 0.9039* 0.9107* 1.000 
* Denotes statistical significance at 10% level 
 
Table A56 VC Syndicates Networks Correlations 
 
Connections 
Well-
connected 
Invite Initiate Connect Through 
Connections 1.000     
Well-connected  -0.3278* 1.000    
Invite 0.2427* 0.3726* 1.000   
Initiate 0.1321 -0.0546 0.0227 1.000  
Connect through -0.3662* 0.3252* 0.3706* 0.2699* 1.000 
* Denotes statistical significance at 10% level 
 
Table A57 VC- Complementarity Correlations 
 Resources Strengths Abilities Expectations 
Resources 1.000    
Strengths 0.9034* 1.000   
Abilities  0.5690* 0.4603* 1.000  
Expectations -0.1043 0.1028 0.2720* 1.000 
* Denotes statistical significance at 10% level 
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Table A58 VC-Disagreement Correlations 
 Strategy Marketing Finance R&D PD HR CEO Other 
Strategy 1.000        
Marketing 0.1105 1.000       
Finance 0.4133* -0.1613 1.000      
R&D 0.2437* -0.2485* -0.0851 1.000     
PD 0.3631* -0.3218- 0.2954* 0.7228* 1.000    
HR 0.7096* -0.1740 0.2454* 0.3926* 0.2711* 1.000   
CEO 0.3080* 0.1825 -0.3661* 0.4536* 0.3229* 0.3731* 1.000  
Other  0.4905* 0.3611* -0.0289 0.2078 -0.0270 0.5759* 0.5456* 1.000 
* Denotes statistical significance at 10% level 
 
Table A59 VC- VC-E Ease of Relation Correlations 
 Negotiation 
ease 
Non-contract 
agreement speed 
New venture ease 
of agreement 
New venture 
agreement speed 
Third party 
Negotiation ease 1.000     
Non- contract 
agreement speed  
0.5646* 1.000    
New venture ease 
of agreement 
0.6897* 0.5415* 1.000   
New venture 
agreement speed 
0.3263* 0.1316 0.4225* 1.000  
Third party -0.2358* -0.0036 0.1589 0.0180 1.000 
* Denotes statistical significance at 10% level 
 
Table A60 Team Spirit Correlations 
 
Clear Goal Work Hard Team Interest Try Best  Responsibility 
Clear Goal 1.000     
Work Hard 0.7614* 1.000    
Team Interest 0.0745 0.2426* 1.000   
Try Best 0.6814* 0.7901* 0.6521* 1.000  
Responsibility 0.6496* 05432* 0.3820* 0.6260* 1.000 
* Denotes statistical significance at 10% level 
 
Table A61 Trust in PF Correlations 
 Benefits Economic 
Consequenc
es 
Dependable Act 
Fairly 
VC 
Openness 
No 
Doubt 
Responds 
Constructivel
y 
Common 
Bus. 
Values 
Benefits 1.000        
Economic 
Consequences 
0.7510* 1.000       
Dependable 0.4701* 0.4776* 1.000      
Act Fairly 0.5432* 0.3074* 0.5381* 1.000     
VC-Openness 0.4297* 0.1791 -0.2349* 0.2934 1.000    
No Doubt 0.4770* 0.6594* 0.6924* 0.5780* -0.0056 1.000   
Responds 
constructively 
0.7640* 0.5386* 0.7339* 0.5287* 0.1716 0.5108* 1.000  
Common Bus. 
Values 
0.4289* 0.0799 0.2654* 0.0751 0.2849* 0.1426 0.6763* 1.000 
* Denotes statistical significance at 10% level 
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Table A62 VC-E Relation Correlations 
 
VC complementarity VC disagreements Ease of relation Team Spirit  PC Trust 
VC complementarity 1.000     
VC disagreements 0.2448* 1.000    
Ease of relation -0.0830 0.3455* 1.000   
Team Spirit 0.5945* 0.8910* 0.1646 1.000  
PC trust 0.6425* 0.4958* -0.3882* 0.7540* 1.000 
* Denotes statistical significance at 10% level 
 
Table A63 VC Legal Perception Correlations 
 Trust Confidence Corruption Crime Laws Contractu
al rights 
Investor 
protection  
Trust 1.000       
Confidence 0.7203* 1.000      
Corruption 0.4368* 0.7829* 1.000     
Crime  0.4917* 0.6376* 0.4819* 1.000    
Laws 0.4046* 0.6130* 0.6728* 0.3988* 1.000   
Contractual rights 0.8148* 0.8234* 0.5240* 0.5032* 0.6090* 1.000  
Investor protection 
rights 
0.6221* 0.8713* 0.7427* 0.7203* 0.6532* 0.8348* 1.000 
* Denotes statistical significance at 10% level 
 
Table A64 VC-Legal Impact Correlations 
 Stability Govt 
Legisl. 
Value-
added 
Sufficient Contract 
Enf. 
Protection Rely 
Network 
Rely Relation 
Stability 1.000        
Govt Legisl. 0.6108* 1.000       
Value-added -0.3526* 0.0369 1.000      
Sufficient 0.0711 0.2136 0.7051 1.000     
Contract Enf. -0.2048 -0.0643 -0.5484* -0.6569* 1.000    
Protection  -0.2521* -0.1068 -0.5039* *0.5140* 0.8522* 1.000   
Rely Network 0.3328* 0.0875 0.3753* -0.1064 0.2861* 0.2821* 1.000  
Rely Relation -0.4485* -0.1577 0.0495 -0.5148* 0.6703* 0.5039* 0.7410* 1.000 
* Denotes statistical significance at 10% level 
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Table A65 Ordered Logistic Regression Results 
Variables No moderators 
 
E-moderators VC-moderators E&VC moderators 
 Coefficient 
(Std. error) 
Coefficient 
(Std. error) 
Coefficient 
(Std. error) 
Coefficient 
(Std. error) 
VC education .4432 
(.5218) 
.4128 
(.3671) 
.5021 
(.4982) 
.4976 
(.5021) 
VC experience .1034 
(.8225) 
.1640 
(.9397) 
.5454 
(1.097) 
.1429 
(1.1483) 
VC involvement -.4173 
(.7821) 
-1.114 
(.8728) 
-.6504 
(.8621) 
-1.1468 
(.8980) 
VC services .3193 
 (.5906) 
.9130 
(.7088) 
.1924 
(.6924) 
.9699 
(.8087) 
VC gov’t network -.5709 
(.6282) 
-.7838 
(.6577) 
-.6971 
(.6590) 
-.7970 
(.6838) 
Avg. Connections -.4902 
(.5074) 
-.0953 
(.5499) 
-.2437 
(.6191) 
-.0716 
(.6251) 
VC-E relationship -.4902* 
(.5064) 
-1.046* 
(.5534) 
-.9991* 
(.5714) 
-1.0176* 
(.6130) 
Executive 
Recruitment 
.2424 
(.5033) 
.0598 
(.5484) 
.29804 
(.5116) 
.1389 
(.4950) 
E- Business Network .8971** 
(.4237) 
.9327** 
(.4356) 
.8986** 
(.4222) 
.9370** 
(.4363) 
Network use .5463 
(.4331) 
.6769 
(.4490) 
.6098 
(.4518) 
.6862 
(.4609) 
Fit RBC strategy 1.4751** 
(.5872) 
1.6902** 
(.6695) 
1.6241*** 
(.6254) 
1.6868** 
(.6977) 
Previous experience 
founders 
-.9197* 
(.4606) 
-.8864* 
(.4822) 
-.9037* 
(.4760) 
-.8863* 
 (.4824) 
Previous managerial 
experience 
-.81405* 
(.4475) 
-.9129* 
(.4745) 
-.8324* 
(.4510) 
-.8963 
(.4806) 
Proportion education .2297 
(.6923) 
.2614 
(7601) 
.1681 
(.6896) 
.2313 
(.7657) 
Advice .0948 
(.4948) 
.1534 
(5143) 
-.0022 
(.5152) 
.1362 
(.5343) 
E-Extent of relation 1.3380* 
(.7334) 
1.373* 
(.7475) 
1.3985* 
(.7477) 
1.3962** 
(.7589) 
E- contractual 
flexibility 
.2414 
(.4794) 
.4933 
(.5181) 
.1846 
(.4938) 
.4988 
(.5365) 
E- contractual 
favourableness 
-.8426* 
(.4514) 
-.7521 
(.4968) 
-.9015** 
(.4585) 
-.7731 
(.5057) 
Firm age .0125 
(.4304) 
.3072 
(.4646) 
.0927 
(.4504) 
.3318 
(.4745) 
Firm size 1.4292*** 
(.4447) 
1.8212*** 
(.5095) 
1.4841*** 
(.4657) 
1.8164*** 
(.5108) 
E- Legal Perception NA .5060** 
(.4295) 
NA .9004** 
(.4411) 
E-Legal Impact NA .4391* 
(.4513) 
NA .8485* 
(.4602) 
VC- Legal Perception NA NA .4955 
(.8440) 
-.01509 
(.8247) 
VC-Legal impact NA NA .2935 
(.4731) 
.1290 
(.4971) 
Pseudo R-squared 0.3316 0.3599 0.3323 0.3789 
No. of Observations 52 52 52 52 
Standard errors in provided in parenthesis 
***,**,* denote statistical significance at 1, 5, 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table A66 OP Marginal Effects 
Prob. Outcome 
 
 
Variables 
1 2 3 4 5 
Coefficient 
(Std. error) 
Coefficient 
(Std. error) 
Coefficient 
(Std. error) 
Coefficient 
(Std. error) 
Coefficient 
(Std. error) 
VC education -.0097 
(.0129) 
-.0410 
(.04764) 
-.0497 
(.05265) 
.0885 
(.0977) 
 .0042 
(.00668) 
VC experience .0111 
(.02933) 
.0471 
(.12064) 
.0481 
(.12662) 
-.1016 
(.25861) 
-.0048 
(.01346) 
VC involvement .0039 
(.02119) 
.0167 
(.08795) 
.0171 
(.09002) 
-.0362 
(.18915) 
-.0017 
(.00922) 
VC services -.0115 
(.01815) 
-.0486 
(.07025) 
-.0497 
(.07664) 
.1048 
(.14777) 
.0050 
(.00897) 
VC gov’t network .0049 
(.01509) 
.0209 
(.06145) 
.0214 
(.06385) 
-.0452 
(.13201) 
-.0021 
(.00662) 
Avg. Connections .0158 
(.01858) 
.0667 
(.06752) 
.0683 
(.08055) 
-.1440 
(.13873) 
-.0068 
(.01016) 
VC-E relationship .0072 
(.0156) 
.0306 
(.0609) 
.0313 
(.0700) 
-.0660 
(.1360) 
-.0031 
(.0072) 
Executive 
Recruitment 
-.0031 
(.0105) 
-.0130 
(.0427) 
-.0133 
(.0441) 
.0281 
(.0919) 
.0013 
(.0045) 
E- Business 
Network 
.0194 
(.0172) 
-.0818* 
(.0425) 
-.0837 
(.0698) 
.1766** 
(.0876) 
.0084 
(.0100) 
Network use -.0163 
(.0157) 
-.0689 
(.0467) 
-.0705 
(.0574) 
.1487* 
(.0857) 
.0071 
(.0085) 
Fit RBC strategy -.0296 
(.0265) 
-.1248* 
(.0673) 
-.1276 
(.1060) 
.2691** 
(.1362) 
.0128 
(.0151) 
Previous 
experience 
founders 
.0201 
(.0185) 
.0847* 
(.0468) 
.0866 
(.0742) 
-.1827* 
(.0981) 
-.0087 
(.0103) 
Previous 
managerial 
experience 
.0154 
(.0154) 
.0649 
(.0466) 
.0664 
(.0613) 
-.1401 
(.0936) 
-.0067 
 (.0085) 
Proportion 
education 
-.0188 
(.0172) 
-.0458 
(.0690) 
-.0469 
(.0863) 
.0989 
(.1568) 
.0047 
(.0094) 
Advice -.0012 
(.0101) 
-.0053 
(.0430) 
-.0054 
(.0434) 
.0114 
(.0919) 
.0005 
(.0045) 
E-Extent of 
relation 
-.0324 
(.0293) 
-.1368* 
(.0735) 
-.1399 
(.1124) 
.2924** 
(.1428) 
.0141 
(.0167) 
E- contractual 
flexibility 
-.0109 
(.0131) 
-.0459 
(.0481) 
-0.4703 
(.0556) 
.0991 
(.0988) 
.0047 
(.0071) 
E- contractual 
favourableness 
.0172 
(.0170) 
.0727 
(.0506) 
.0744 
(.0637) 
-.1569 
(.0958) 
-.0075 
(.0095) 
Firm age -.0159 
(.0227) 
-.0651 
(.0792) 
-.0667 
(.0814) 
.1407 
(.1582) 
.0071 
(.0116) 
Firm size -.0834 
(.0589) 
-.2372*** 
(.0922) 
-.2307 
(.1355) 
.4993** 
(.1389) 
.05216 
(.0487) 
E- Legal 
Perception 
-.0177 
(.0160) 
-.0746* 
(.0450) 
-.0762* 
(.0608) 
.1609* 
(.0827) 
.0076 
(.0092) 
E-Legal Impact -.0164 
(.0154) 
-.0693 
(.04567) 
-.0709 
(.0623) 
.1495* 
(.0900) 
.0071 
(.0089) 
VC- Legal 
Perception 
.0053758 
(.01371) 
.0226 
(.0568) 
.0231 
(.0582) 
-.0488 
(.1201) 
-.0023 
(.0064) 
VC-Legal impact -.0152  
(.0163) 
-.0642 
(.0531) 
-.0656 
(.0644) 
.1385 
(.1063) 
.0066 
(.0087) 
Standard errors in provided in parenthesis 
***,**,* denote statistical significance at 1, 5, 10% levels, respectively. 
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APPENDIX B 
Appendix B1: VC Managers’ Questionnaire 
 
Questionnaire Cover Letter 
Survey on the Performance of venture capital backed firms in Egypt 
 
This survey is conducted to capture the impact of certain factors (entrepreneurs’ (E) 
characteristics, venture capital (VC) fund managers’ characteristics and the VC-E 
relationship), on the performance of the VC-backed portfolio firms. I am a lecturer at 
Arab Academy for Science, Technology and Maritime Transport (AASTMT), studying 
for my PhD at De Montfort University (UK). Findings of this study will be used entirely 
for academic purposes. Your full participation in this study will assist to include the 
Egyptian VC market perspective in the analysis. As such, your cooperation in 
completing this questionnaire is central to the success of this research.  
Each question should be viewed as a separate independent judgement. Kindly answer 
the questions as fully and accurately as possible and remember there are no right 
answers to the questions asked, as each firm and each manager has their unique ways 
and capabilities. Your name is not asked for on the survey, as you are guaranteed 
complete confidentiality and anonymity. Only general findings from the study will 
be reported.  
  As a way of expressing appreciation for your assistance in this survey, you are 
guaranteed a complimentary report containing a summary of this study. Please include 
a business card, email or mobile number to ensure that the summary report is sent to 
your preferred contact address. Again, there is no way this will be linked to the answers 
provided.  
323 
 
 
 
SECTION I: REGARDING VC MANAGER’S HC 
Question 1: Experience and Education of VC managers 
Please indicate the number of VC management team members?     
Please circle the figures that are most relevant to previous education of the VC 
management team 
1. How many of VC management team hold a degree in the 
same field as the funded start-ups? 
0 1 2 3 ≥4 
2. How many of VC management team hold a post graduate 
degree or a CFA? 
0 1 2 3 ≥4 
3. How many of VC management team hold a finance degree? 0 1 2 3 ≥4 
4. How many of VC management team hold a law degree? 0 1 2 3 ≥4 
5. How many of VC management team hold a medical or 
engineering degree? 
0 1 2 3 ≥4 
6. How many of VC management team hold a degree in any 
other field? 
Specify the field:__________________________ 
0 1 2 3 ≥4 
Please circle yes or no to indicate the answers to best describe the previous experience of 
founders of the VC management team 
7. At least one of the VC management team has previous work experience 
in the industry of the portfolio firms 
YES NO 
8. At least one of the VC management team has previous work 
experience in business management 
YES NO 
9. At least one of the VC management team has previous work 
experience in law 
YES NO 
10. At least one of the VC management team has previous work 
experience in finance 
YES NO 
11. At least one of the VC management team has previous work 
experience in consultancy 
YES NO 
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SECTION II: REGARDING VC VALUE-ADDED ACTIVITIES 
Question 1: Strategic and Operational Value-Added Activities 
 Please circle the figures that are most relevant to the following statements indicating your 
firm’s involvement in the portfolio company. 
1. Total number of meetings each month on 
average 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 >7 
2. The average number of boards most VC 
partners are members of. 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 >7 
3. Average number of monitoring reports 
requested from ventures/ year 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 >7 
4. Average number of investment rounds in 
portfolio firms till exit 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 >7 
Question 2: VC Networking activities  
To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following 
statements describing your networking activities related to 
service providers. Please circle the number that best 
represents your opinion. S
tr
o
n
g
ly
 
D
is
a
g
re
e
 
D
is
a
g
re
e
 
N
eu
tr
a
l 
A
g
re
e
 
S
tr
o
n
g
ly
 
A
g
re
e
 
1. The VC firm has introduced recruitment firms to the 
portfolio. 
1 2 3 4 5 
2. The VC firm has introduced new customers to the portfolio 
firm. 
1 2 3 4 5 
3. The VC firm has introduced new suppliers to the portfolio 
firm. 
1 2 3 4 5 
4. The VC has influence in shaping HR management team of 
portfolio firm. 
1 2 3 4 5 
5. The VC has influence in shaping HR policies of the 
portfolio firm. 
1 2 3 4 5 
6. The VC firm management is involved in recruiting senior 
managers of the portfolio firm. 
1 2 3 4 5 
7. The VC firm management is involved in recruiting 
administrative and management personnel of the portfolio 
firm 
1 2 3 4 5 
8. The VC firm management is involved in recruiting sales 
and marketing personnel of the portfolio firm. 
1 2 3 4 5 
9. The VC firm management is involved in shaping financial 
policies and procedures of the portfolio firm. 
1 2 3 4 5 
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To what extent do you agree or disagree with the 
following statements describing your networking 
activities related to government officials. Please circle 
the number that best represents your opinion. S
tr
o
n
g
ly
 
D
is
a
g
re
e
 
D
is
a
g
re
e
 
N
eu
tr
a
l 
A
g
re
e
 
S
tr
o
n
g
ly
 
A
g
re
e
 
1. Our VC firm/managers are capable of networking 
with government and regulatory department. 
1 2 3 4 5 
2. Our VC firm/ mangers maintain relationships with 
many Egyptian government officials and regulatory 
departments 
1 2 3 4 5 
3. Our VC firm frequently contacts Egyptian 
government officials and regulatory departments for 
important issues concerning the portfolio firms 
1 2 3 4 5 
4. Our VC firm has introduced the portfolio firms to 
government officials. 
1 2 3 4 5 
5. Our VC firm has used its government network to 
meet growing needs of the portfolio firms. 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
 
  
Please answer the following inquiries describing your firm’s networking activities 
related to syndicates, circling the number that best represents your firm. 
1. How many other VC firms does your firm have 
relationships or connections with? 
0 
 
1 
 
2 3 4 5 6 >6 
2. How many of the firms stated in the previous 
question, are known to be very well-connected VCs? 
0 
 
1 
 
2 3 4 5 6 >6 
3. How many times has your firm been invited by other 
VC firms to invest in a venture? 
0 
 
1 
 
2 3 4 5 6 >6 
4. How many times has your firm initiated an 
investment or invited other VC firms to co-invest? 
0 
 
1 
 
2 3 4 5 6 >6 
5. How many VC firms are only connected to each-
other through your firm and have no direct 
relationship otherwise? 
0 
 
1 
 
2 3 4 5 6 >6 
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SECTION III: REGARDING VC-E RELATIONSHIP 
 
   
How would you perceive the complementary roles of 
your firm as well as the portfolio firm? Please circle the 
option that is most relevant. V
er
y
 
L
o
w
 
L
o
w
 
A
v
er
a
g
e H
ig
h
 
V
er
y
 
H
ig
h
 
1. We both contribute different resources to achieve the 
common goal. 
1 2 3 4 5 
2. We have complementary strengths that are useful to 
our new venture. 
1 2 3 4 5 
3. We each have separate abilities that, when combined, 
enable us to achieve goals beyond our individual 
reach. 
1 2 3 4 5 
4. Your expectations of the effort exerted by the start-
up’ founders are met. 
1 2 3 4 5 
How would you perceive your level of disagreement 
with the portfolio firm managers on the following 
issues? Please circle the option that is most relevant. 
V
er
y
 L
o
w
 
L
o
w
 
A
v
er
a
g
e
 
H
ig
h
 
V
er
y
 
H
ig
h
 
1. Strategy related issues 1 2 3 4 5 
2. Marketing related issues 1 2 3 4 5 
3. Financial related issues 1 2 3 4 5 
4. R&D related issues 1 2 3 4 5 
5. Product development related issues 1 2 3 4 5 
6. HR related issues 1 2 3 4 5 
7. CEO replacement issues 1 2 3 4 5 
8. Other issues 
Please specify: ______________ 
1 2 3 4 5 
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Please rate how you perceive the following statements 
regarding your relationship with portfolio firms’ 
management team. Please circle the option that is most 
relevant. S
tr
o
n
g
ly
 
D
is
a
g
re
e
 
D
is
a
g
re
e
 
N
eu
tr
a
l 
A
g
re
e
 
S
tr
o
n
g
ly
 
A
g
re
e
 
1. We can easily negotiate over the issues which were 
not written in detail in the contracts before the 
investment started. 
1 2 3 4 5 
2. We can reach an agreement quickly over issues not 
written in detail in the contracts before the 
investment started. 
1 2 3 4 5 
3. It is easy for us to agree on major new venture 
decisions. 
1 2 3 4 5 
4. We do not need a long time to reach an agreement on 
major new venture decisions. 
1 2 3 4 5 
5. We did not need an external third party to resolve 
any conflicts between us. 
1 2 3 4 5 
Please rate how you perceive the portfolio firms’ team 
spirit through the following statements. Please circle 
the option that is most relevant. 
S
tr
o
n
g
ly
 
D
is
a
g
re
e
 
D
is
a
g
re
e
 
N
eu
tr
a
l 
A
g
re
e
 
S
tr
o
n
g
ly
 
A
g
re
e
 
1. The portfolio firm team has a clear overall goal and I 
believe we can achieve it. 
1 2 3 4 5 
2. The portfolio firm team members all work hard to 
make the team successful. 
1 2 3 4 5 
3.  The portfolio firm team members put the interest of 
the team before their personal interests. 
1 2 3 4 5 
4. The portfolio firm team members try their best to 
improve their ability and master more resources to 
improve the overall team performance constantly. 
1 2 3 4 5 
5. As a team everyone accepts personal responsibility 
for the success of the team. 
1 2 3 4 5 
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SECTION IV: REGARDING LEGAL ENVIRONMENT 
 
Please circle the level that reflects your trust to portfolio 
firm on the following relational aspects: 
V
er
y
 L
o
w
 
L
o
w
 
A
v
er
a
g
e
 
H
ig
h
 
V
er
y
 
H
ig
h
 
1. The portfolio company will respect our contract because 
it knows clearly the beneﬁts of doing so. 
1 2 3 4 5 
2. The portfolio company will respect our contract because 
it knows clearly the economic consequences of the loss 
of reputation. 
1 2 3 4 5 
3. From past dealing we know that the portfolio company 
is dependable.  
1 2 3 4 5 
4. From past dealings, we know the portfolio company will 
act fairly and promptly. 
1 2 3 4 5 
5. We know the portfolio company has been open in 
describing its strengths and weaknesses in past 
negotiations. 
1 2 3 4 5 
6. Given the portfolio company's track records, we 
generally see little reason to signiﬁcantly doubt 
their competence. 
1 2 3 4 5 
7. We can freely share concerns and problems 
about our company and know that the portfolio 
company will respond constructively. 
1 2 3 4 5 
8. We share common business values with the portfolio 
company. 
1 2 3 4 5 
Please circle the figure that best describes how you 
perceive the legal environment in Egypt. 
S
tr
o
n
g
l
y
 
D
is
a
g
re
e D
is
a
g
re
e N
eu
tr
a
l 
A
g
re
e
 
S
tr
o
n
g
l
y
 A
g
re
e
 
1. The court system in Egypt can be trusted. 1 2 3 4 5 
2.. I have confidence in the political stability in Egypt. 1 2 3 4 5 
3. Corruption in Egypt is being mitigated  1 2 3 4 5 
4. Crime and theft is not common in Egypt. 1 2 3 4 5 
5. Laws or regulations that materially affect the operation 
and growth of your business are predictable. 
1 2 3 4 5 
6. I am confident that the judicial system will enforce my 
contractual rights in business disputes. 
1 2 3 4 5 
7. I am confident that the judicial system will enforce my 
investor protection rights in business disputes. 
1 2 3 4 5 
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ADDITIONAL INFORMATION: 
1. Please specify the number of funds raised since 
operation___________________ 
2. Please specify the number of firms that exist under your current 
portfolio__________ 
3. In your view what’s your optimum duration of investment in portfolio 
companies_______ 
4. What is the security type you most commonly agree to use in the agreement 
with the portfolio company? ___________________ 
5. Please provide the names of the highest performing companies in your 
portfolio in Egypt ________________________ 
6. Please provide the names of other (least performing) companies in your 
portfolio in Egypt _________________________ 
THANK YOU VERY MUCH FOR YOUR TIME AND COOPERATION  
Please indicate the extent to which you perceive the legal 
environment in Egypt, to impact your business and 
innovation. S
tr
o
n
g
l
y
 
D
is
a
g
re
e D
is
a
g
re
e N
eu
tr
a
l 
A
g
re
e
 
S
tr
o
n
g
l
y
 A
g
re
e
 
1. Stability of political systems in Egypt have an impact 
on your business 
1 2 3 4 5 
2. Government legislations have an impact on your 
business 
1 2 3 4 5 
3.  Despite the external legal environment factors on your 
business, your firm has been able to provide various 
value-added services to portfolio companies. 
1 2 3 4 5 
4. Despite the external legal environment factors on your 
business, your firm has been able to provide sufficient 
service to portfolio firms. 
1 2 3 4 5 
5. Contract Enforcement in your country has an impact on 
the service level your company provides. 
1 2 3 4 5 
6. Investor protection laws have an impact on the service 
level your company provides. 
1 2 3 4 5 
7. In my opinion, due to the legal conditions in the 
country, it is more important to rely on networks and 
connections. 
1 2 3 4 5 
8. In my opinion, due to the legal conditions in the 
country, it is important to rely on personal relationships. 
1 2 3 4 5 
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Appendix B2: Entrepreneurs’ Questionnaire 
 
SECTION I: REGARDING ENTREPRENEUR’S SOCIAL CAPITAL 
Question 1: Executive Recruitment 
Please circle the figures that are most relevant to describe executive recruitment 
in your firm 
1. How many non-executive founders exist in this firm? 1 2 3 4 5 >5 
2. How many of them were recruited through the founder? 1 2 3 4 5 >5 
3. How many of them were recruited through a friend or 
classmate of the founder? 
1 2 3 4 5 >5 
4. How many of them were recruited through a co-worker 
or advisor of the founder? 
1 2 3 4 5 >5 
5. How many were recruited through other means? 
Please specify the source of 
recruitment:_______________ _________________ 
1 2 3 4 5 >5 
Question 2: Personal Business Networks 
Please circle yes or no to indicate the answers to best describe your personal business 
network 
1. Have you or any of your co-founders’ parents ever owned a business? YES NO 
2. Have you or any of your co-founders’ close friends or neighbours ever 
owned a business? 
YES NO 
3. Have your or any of your co-founders’ family, spouse or close friends 
encouraged you/them to start a business? 
YES NO 
 
 Question 3: Relationships with individuals in the business community   
Please circle yes or no to indicate the answers to best describe your relationships 
with individuals in the business community 
1. Have you or any of your co-founders’ been involved in any 
business networks such as trade associations, chambers of 
commerce or service clubs e.g. Rotary? 
YES NO 
2. Have you or any of your co-founders’ had specific contacts with 
organisations that dispense business advice assistance? 
YES NO 
3. Have you or any of your co-founders’ been previously involved 
in a start-up team rather than an individual start-up? 
YES NO 
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Please circle the number that best represents extent to which 
you have utilised personal ties, networks, and connections 
during the past three years with:   
 V
e
r
y
 
L
o
w
 
L
o
w
 
A
v
er
a
g
e
 
H
ig
h
 
V
er
y
 
h
ig
h
 
Any government officials: 
1.  Political leaders in various levels of the government (e.g. 
Ministers of State)  
1  2  3  4  5  
2.  Officials in regulatory and supporting institutions (e.g., Tax 
authorities)  
1  2  3  4  5  
3.  Metropolitan/municipal/district chief executives  1  2  3  4  5  
4.  Regional and national government politicians (e.g. regional or 
national party chairman/chairperson)  
1  2  3  4  5  
Business contacts:  
5.  Top managers at buyer/customer firms  1  2  3  4  5  
6.  Top managers at supplier firms  1  2  3  4  5  
7.  Top managers at competitor firms  1  2  3  4  5  
8. Members of trade associations or chambers of commerce 1  2  3  4  5  
Community contacts: 
8.  Religious leaders (e.g., sheikh, priest)  1  2  3  4  5  
9. Close friends that have political connections 1  2  3  4  5  
10. Close friends that have business connections 1  2  3  4  5  
 
SECTION II: REGARDING ENTREPRENEURIAL FIRM RESOURCE BASED 
CAPABILITIES (RBCs) 
 
Question 1: Resource Based Capabilities 
To what extent do you agree or disagree with the 
following statements describing your firm’s 
RBCs. Please circle the number that best 
represents your opinion. S
tr
o
n
g
ly
 
D
is
a
g
re
e
 
D
is
a
g
re
e
 
N
eu
tr
a
l 
A
g
re
e
 
S
tr
o
n
g
ly
 
A
g
re
e
 
INNOVATION RELATED RBCS 
1. This venture has innovative marketers. 1 2 3 4 5 
2. This venture has employees that are good at 
marketing. 
1 2 3 4 5 
3. This venture possesses marketing expertise. 1 2 3 4 5 
4. This venture possesses product development 
expertise. 
1 2 3 4 5 
5. This venture has innovative employees 1 2 3 4 5 
QUALITY RELATED RBCS 
1. The employees in this venture provide superior 
customer service. 
1 2 3 4 5 
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Question 2: Strategies related to resources 
2. The venture possesses expertise in customer 
service. 
1 2 3 4 5 
3. This venture provides quality customer service 
training. 
1 2 3 4 5 
4. This venture possesses managerial expertise. 1 2 3 4 5 
5. This venture has flexibility to adapt. 1 2 3 4 5 
COST LEADERSHIP RELATED RBCS 
1. This venture depends on low cost materials. 1 2 3 4 5 
2. This venture depends on low cost distribution 
channels. 
1 2 3 4 5 
3. This venture depends on low cost labour. 1 2 3 4 5 
4. This venture depends on low cost factors of 
production. 
1 2 3 4 5 
5. This venture depends on availability capital. 1 2 3 4 5 
6. This venture depends on highly productive 
employees. 
1 2 3 4 5 
7. This venture depends on leading-edge facilities. 1 2 3 4 5 
To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following 
statements describing your firm’s strategies. Please circle 
the number that best represents your opinion. 
S
tr
o
n
g
ly
 
D
is
a
g
re
e
 
D
is
a
g
re
e
 
N
eu
tr
a
l 
A
g
re
e
 
S
tr
o
n
g
ly
 
A
g
re
e
 
INNOVATION RELATED STRATEGIES 
1. The strategies of this venture drive it to be the first to 
introduce new products. 
1 2 3 4 5 
2. The strategies of this venture stress on new product 
development 
1 2 3 4 5 
3. The strategies of this venture focus on engaging it in 
novel marketing 
1 2 3 4 5 
4. Our firm researches new product opportunities continually 1 2 3 4 5 
5. Developing quality and performance of current products 
continually is important for our firm 
1 2 3 4 5 
6. Making changes in product development method 
sometimes is important for our firm 
1 2 3 4 5 
7. Innovation activities are encouraged in this firm 1 2 3 4 5 
QUALITY RELATED STRATEGIES 
1. The strategies of this venture focus on implementing strict 
quality control. 
1 2 3 4 5 
2. The strategies of this venture focus on meeting quality 
requirements. 
1 2 3 4 5 
3. The strategies of this venture focus on meeting a strong 
customer service level.  
1 2 3 4 5 
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SECTION III: REGARDING ENTREPRENEURIAL HUMAN CAPITAL 
Question 1: Experience and Education of Entrepreneur 
Please indicate the number of founders of this this start-up?     
Please circle yes or no to indicate the answers to best describe the previous experience of 
founders of the venture 
1. Have you or any of your co-founders been on the management team of a 
previous start-up? 
YES NO 
2. Have you or any of your co-founders previously started up a business? 
IF YES, please specify the total number of starts-ups that founders were 
involved in  
 
 
YES NO 
3. Has your or any of your co-founders’ previous start-ups liquidated an IRR 
of 100% or higher on a series A investment? 
YES NO 
4. Have you or any of your co-founders previously worked in the industry of 
the current start-up? 
YES NO 
5. Have you or any of your co-founders previously had a start-up in the 
industry of the current start-up? 
YES NO 
Please circle yes or no to indicate the answers to best describe the previous managerial 
experience of the founders 
1. Have you or any of your co-founders previously managed a public 
company? 
YES NO 
2. Have you or any of your co-founders previously started a business 
together? 
YES NO 
3. The management team of the start-up can be considered functionally 
diverse. 
YES NO 
4. The strategies of this venture focus on meeting a high 
level of product quality. 
1 2 3 4 5 
5. The strategies of this venture focus on meeting customer 
needs. 
1 2 3 4 5 
COST LEADERSHIP RELATED STRATEGIES 
1. The strategies of this venture focus on cost reduction in all 
facets of business operations. 
1 2 3 4 5 
2. The strategies of this venture focus on improvement of 
employee productivity and efficiency 
1 2 3 4 5 
3. The strategies of this venture focus on the development of 
lower production cost via process innovation. 
1 2 3 4 5 
4. The strategies of this venture focus on the development of 
lower production cost via investing in machinery. 
1 2 3 4 5 
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Please circle the figures that are most relevant to previous education of the founders of 
the firm 
6. How many of the founders hold a doctorates degree? 0 1 2 3 ≥4 
7. How many of the founders hold a master’s degree? 0 1 2 3 ≥4 
8. How many of the founders are CFA holders? 0 1 2 3 ≥4 
9. How many of the founders hold a degree specialised in the 
field of this start-up? 
0 1 2 3 ≥4 
 
SECTION VI: REGARDING YOUR COMPANY’S PERFORMANCE   
 
SECTION VII: REGARDING VALUE-ADDED OF VENTURE CAPITALISTS  
Compared to your industry average, how would you 
grade your company’s performance on the following 
indicators? Please circle the number that best 
represents your opinion. 
F
a
r 
B
el
o
w
 
A
v
er
a
g
e
 
B
el
o
w
 
A
v
er
a
g
e
 
A
v
er
a
g
e
 
A
b
o
v
e 
A
v
er
a
g
e
 
F
a
r 
A
b
o
v
e 
A
v
er
a
g
e
 
1. Growth of sales   1 2 3 4 5 
2. Sales volume  1 2 3 4 5 
3. Return on assets   1 2 3 4 5 
4. Return on sales   1 2 3 4 5 
5. Growth in productivity  1 2 3 4 5 
6. Market share  1 2 3 4 5 
7. Growth in market share  1 2 3 4 5 
8. Profitability   1 2 3 4 5 
9. Growth in profitability   1 2 3 4 5 
10. Overall company performance  1 2 3 4 5 
How would you rate the level of advice given to your 
firm from your VC investor? Please circle the number 
that best represents your opinion. 
V
er
y
 L
o
w
 
L
o
w
 
A
v
er
a
g
e
 
H
ig
h
 
V
er
y
 
H
ig
h
 
1.  Strategic advice 1 2 3 4 5 
2. Marketing advice 1 2 3 4 5 
3. Financial advice 1 2 3 4 5 
4. R&D advice 1 2 3 4 5 
5. Product development advice 1 2 3 4 5 
6. HR advice  1 2 3 4 5 
7. Exit Strategy advice  1 2 3 4 5 
8. Interpersonal advice 1 2 3 4 5 
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SECTION VIII: REGARDING VC-E RELATIONSHIP 
 
 
9. Networking advice 1 2 3 4 5 
How would you perceive the complementary roles of 
your firm as well as the VC firm? Please circle the 
option that is most relevant. 
V
er
y
 L
o
w
 
L
o
w
 
A
v
er
a
g
e
 
H
ig
h
 
V
er
y
 H
ig
h
 
1. We both contribute different resources to achieve 
the common goal. 
1 2 3 4 5 
2. We have complementary strengths that are useful to 
our new venture. 
1 2 3 4 5 
3. We each have separate abilities that, when 
combined, enable us to achieve goals beyond our 
individual reach. 
1 2 3 4 5 
4. Your expectations of effort exerted by VC manager 
are met.  
1 2 3 4 5 
How would you perceive your level of disagreement 
with the VC managers on the following issues? Please 
circle the option that is most relevant. 
V
er
y
 L
o
w
 
L
o
w
 
A
v
er
a
g
e
 
H
ig
h
 
V
er
y
 H
ig
h
 
1. Strategy related issues 1 2 3 4 5 
2. Marketing related issues 1 2 3 4 5 
3. Financial related issues 1 2 3 4 5 
4. R&D related issues 1 2 3 4 5 
5. Product development related issues 1 2 3 4 5 
6. HR related issues 1 2 3 4 5 
7. CEO replacement issues 1 2 3 4 5 
8. Other issues 1 2 3 4 5 
How would you perceive the Venture Capitalists’ level 
of contractual flexibility on the following issues? Please 
circle the option that is most relevant for each of the 
following issues V
er
y
 L
o
w
 
L
o
w
 
A
v
er
a
g
e 
H
ig
h
 
V
er
y
 H
ig
h
 
1. Strategy related issues 1 2 3 4 5 
2. Marketing related issues 1 2 3 4 5 
3. Financial related issues 1 2 3 4 5 
4. R&D related issues 1 2 3 4 5 
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5. Product development related issues 1 2 3 4 5 
6. HR related issues 1 2 3 4 5 
How would you perceive your level of favourableness 
of contractual terms agreed upon with the VC 
managers? Please circle the option that is most 
relevant according to each of the following contractual 
terms V
er
y
 L
o
w
 
L
o
w
 
A
v
er
a
g
e
 
H
ig
h
 
V
er
y
 H
ig
h
 
1. Company Valuation 1 2 3 4 5 
2. Type of security 1 2 3 4 5 
3. Amount and timing of investments 1 2 3 4 5 
4. Number of elected directors 1 2 3 4 5 
5. Voting Rights 1 2 3 4 5 
6. Vesting of founders Stock 1 2 3 4 5 
7. Management Control 1 2 3 4 5 
8. Conversion Rights 1 2 3 4 5 
 
How you perceive the following statements regarding 
your relationship with VC firm management team 
Please circle the option that is most relevant. 
S
tr
o
n
g
ly
 
D
is
a
g
re
e
 
D
is
a
g
re
e
 
N
eu
tr
a
l 
A
g
re
e
 
S
tr
o
n
g
ly
 
A
g
re
e
 
1 We can easily negotiate over the issues which were 
not written in detail in the contracts before the 
investment started. 
1 2 3 4 5 
2  We can reach an agreement quickly over issues not 
written in detail in the contracts before the 
investment started. 
1 2 3 4 5 
3. It is easy for us to agree on major new venture 
decisions. 
1 2 3 4 5 
4. We do not need a long time to reach an agreement 
on major new venture decisions. 
1 2 3 4 5 
5. We did not need an external third party to resolve 
any conflicts between us. 
1 2 3 4 5 
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SECTION IX: REGARDING LEGAL ENVIRONMENT 
 
 
 
 
 
Please indicate the extent to which you perceive the legal 
environment in Egypt. 
S
tr
o
n
g
l
y
 
D
is
a
g
re
e D
is
a
g
re
e N
eu
tr
a
l 
A
g
re
e
 
S
tr
o
n
g
l
y
 A
g
re
e
 
1. The court system in Egypt can be trusted. 1 2 3 4 5 
2. I have confidence in the political stability in Egypt. 1 2 3 4 5 
3. Corruption in Egypt is being mitigated.  1 2 3 4 5 
4. Crime and theft is not common in Egypt. 1 2 3 4 5 
5. I am confident that the judicial system will enforce my 
contractual rights in business disputes. 
1 2 3 4 5 
6. I am confident that the judicial system will enforce my 
property rights in business disputes. 
1 2 3 4 5 
Please indicate the extent to which you perceive the legal 
environment in Egypt, to impact your business and 
innovation. 
S
tr
o
n
g
ly
 
D
is
a
g
re
e
 
D
is
a
g
re
e
 
N
eu
tr
a
l 
A
g
re
e
 
S
tr
o
n
g
ly
 
A
g
re
e
 
1. Stability of political systems in Egypt have an impact 
on your business 
1 2 3 4 5 
2. Government legislations have an impact on your 
business 
1 2 3 4 5 
3.  Despite the external legal environment factors on your 
business, your firm has been able to provide innovative 
products or services to customers. 
1 2 3 4 5 
4. Despite the external legal environment factors on your 
business, your firm has been able to come out with 
modern technology to improve productivity and 
efficiency. 
1 2 3 4 5 
5. Despite the external legal environment factors on your 
business, your firm has been able to come out with 
innovative ideas to obtain distinctive competencies 
than competitors. 
1 2 3 4 5 
6. Government patent laws and licensing have an impact 
on the innovative outcomes of your business. 
1 2 3 4 5 
7. In my opinion, due to the legal conditions in the 
country, it is more important to rely on networks and 
connections. 
1 2 3 4 5 
8. In my opinion, due to the legal conditions in the 
country, it is important to rely on personal 
relationships. 
1 2 3 4 5 
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ADDITIONAL INFORMATION 
1. What is your current position in the company? ___________________ 
2. Which industry does your company operate in? ___________________ 
3. How long has your company been in business? ____________________ 
4. What is the total number of employees in your company? ____________ 
 
THANK YOU VERY MUCH FOR YOUR TIME AND COOPERATION  
 
 
 
 
